fix(opcua): don't register with a discovery server unless configured (#876)
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OpcUaApplicationHost left ServerConfiguration.MaxRegistrationInterval at the SDK default (30000) with a null RegistrationEndpoint, so SDK 2.0.1's StandardServer armed its registration timer against opc.tcp://localhost:4840, which on an OtOpcUa node is the server itself (no LDS). It answered BadServiceUnsupported and the SDK retried forever, visible since #874. Registration is now opt-in: ApplyDiscoveryRegistration sets MaxRegistrationInterval = 0 (the value that keeps StandardServer from arming the timer) unless OpcUa:DiscoveryServerUrl is set, in which case the server registers against that URL every OpcUa:DiscoveryRegistrationIntervalMs (default 30000) over SignAndEncrypt/Basic256Sha256, like the SDK's own default endpoint. The validator requires an absolute opc.tcp:// URL and a positive interval when the URL is set. Documented in Configuration.md and OpcUaServer.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ Until #678.6 the overlay never loaded on a node carrying a `cluster-*` role (the
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| `EnabledSecurityProfiles` | list of `OpcUaSecurityProfile` | `[None, Basic256Sha256Sign, Basic256Sha256SignAndEncrypt]` | Transport-security profiles, one endpoint per entry. Must contain ≥1. Profile detail in [`security.md`](security.md). |
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| `AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates` | bool | `false` | Auto-trust unknown client certs on first connect (dev convenience). Not validated. See [`security.md`](security.md). |
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| `PeerApplicationUris` | list of string | `[]` (empty) | Partner node `ApplicationUri`s published in `Server.ServerArray` for redundancy discovery. See [`Redundancy.md`](Redundancy.md). |
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| `DiscoveryServerUrl` | string? | `null` | OPC UA discovery server (LDS/GDS) to register with via `RegisterServer2`, e.g. `opc.tcp://lds-host:4840`. **Unset = no registration** (#876 — the SDK default registered with `opc.tcp://localhost:4840`, i.e. the server itself, and logged `BadServiceUnsupported` forever). Must be an absolute `opc.tcp://` URL when set (validated). Ignored when `ApplicationConfigPath` is set (the XML's own `RegistrationEndpoint`/`MaxRegistrationInterval` apply). |
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| `DiscoveryRegistrationIntervalMs` | int | `30000` | Maximum interval between `RegisterServer2` calls while `DiscoveryServerUrl` is set (SDK default). Must be `> 0` while `DiscoveryServerUrl` is set (validated); ignored otherwise. |
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| `CredentialLockout:MaxFailedAttempts` | int | `5` | Failed UserName (API-key) activations for ONE credential identity (key id, else username) from one client before that client is refused that identity `BadUserAccessDenied` (#833, per-identity since #844 — a success clears only its own identity's count). Only definite bad credentials count; store timeouts / miss-budget refusals / authenticator faults do not (#845). `≤ 0` disables the whole lockout. **Never refuses Anonymous.** See [`security.md`](security.md#failed-credential-lockout-opcuacredentiallockout). |
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| `CredentialLockout:MaxFailedAttemptsPerClient` | int | `0` (⇒ `2 × MaxFailedAttempts`) | Failed UserName activations from one client across EVERY identity before all its UserName activations are refused (#844). **A success never resets it**; it ages out through `FailureWindowSeconds`. Must be `0` or `>= MaxFailedAttempts` (validated). |
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| `CredentialLockout:FailureWindowSeconds` | int | `60` | A failure more than this long after the client's previous one starts a fresh count. Must be `> 0` while the lockout is enabled (validated). |
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