Phase 6.2 Stream C — Browse gating on DriverNodeManager

Closes task #120 (partial — strict point-check; ancestor-visibility
implication is a follow-up).

Before this commit DriverNodeManager exposed every materialized node to
every browsing session regardless of the user's ACL. Read + Write +
HistoryRead were already gated through AuthorizationGate in Phase 6.2
Stream C core; Browse was the one surface where the session could still
enumerate nodes it had no permission to touch, discovering structure
even when reads failed with BadUserAccessDenied.

Implementation
- New `Browse` override on DriverNodeManager that calls base.Browse
  first (lets the stack populate the reference list normally), then
  post-filters the IList<ReferenceDescription> so denied nodes are
  removed silently. OPC UA convention: Browse filtering is invisible to
  the client; no BadUserAccessDenied surfaces.
- Extracted the filter loop into the static internal
  `FilterBrowseReferences(references, userIdentity, gate, scopeResolver)`
  so the policy is unit-testable without standing up the full OPC UA
  server stack.
- Non-string NodeId identifiers (stack-synthesized standard-type
  references with numeric identifiers) bypass the gate — only driver-
  materialized nodes key into the authz trie.
- When AuthorizationGate or NodeScopeResolver is null, the filter is a
  no-op — preserves the pre-Phase-6.2 dispatch path for integration
  tests that construct DriverNodeManager without authz.

Tests — 6 new in BrowseGatingTests.cs (gate-null no-op, empty-list
no-op, denied-removed, allowed-passes-through, numeric-id bypass,
lax-mode null-identity keeps references). Server.Tests 257 → 263.

Known follow-up (tracked implicitly under #120 re-scope):
- Ancestor-visibility implication (acl-design.md §Browse line 111): a
  user with Read at `Line/Tag` should be able to Browse `Line` even
  without an explicit Browse grant. Current filter does a strict
  point-check. Proper fix needs TriePermissionEvaluator to expose a
  "subtree-has-any-grant" query.
- TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds not yet filtered (same extension
  pattern; small follow-up).

Docs: v2-release-readiness.md Phase 6.2 Stream C hardening list marks
the Browse bullet struck-through with "Partial" close-out note.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-04-24 15:11:19 -04:00
parent a23de2a7e4
commit e8b8541554
3 changed files with 227 additions and 1 deletions

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@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ All code-path release blockers are closed. The remaining items are live-hardware
Remaining Stream C surfaces (hardening, not release-blocking):
- Browse + TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds gating with ancestor-visibility logic per `acl-design.md` §Browse.
- ~~Browse + TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds gating with ancestor-visibility logic per `acl-design.md` §Browse.~~ **Partial, 2026-04-24.** `DriverNodeManager.Browse` override post-filters the `ReferenceDescription` list via a new `FilterBrowseReferences` helper — denied nodes disappear silently per OPC UA convention. Ancestor-visibility implication (Read-grant at `Line/Tag` implying Browse on `Line`) still to ship; needs a subtree-has-any-grant query on the trie evaluator. `TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds` surface not yet wired.
- CreateMonitoredItems + TransferSubscriptions gating with per-item `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)` stamp so revoked grants surface `BadUserAccessDenied` within one publish cycle (decision #153).
- Alarm Acknowledge / Confirm / Shelve gating.
- Call (method invocation) gating.

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@@ -276,6 +276,73 @@ public sealed class DriverNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2, IAddressSpaceBuilder
return ServiceResult.Good;
}
/// <summary>
/// Phase 6.2 Stream C — Browse gating. Post-filters the reference list the base
/// <see cref="CustomNodeManager2"/> produced so nodes the session isn't allowed to
/// see disappear from the browse result silently (OPC UA convention: deny = omit,
/// not an error).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// Each surviving reference is a <see cref="ReferenceDescription"/>; we map its
/// <see cref="ReferenceDescription.NodeId"/> back to the driver-side fullRef the
/// node manager uses as its identifier, resolve a <see cref="NodeScope"/> via
/// <see cref="NodeScopeResolver"/>, and ask <see cref="AuthorizationGate"/>
/// whether <see cref="OpcUaOperation.Browse"/> is allowed for that scope.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// References with non-string NodeId identifiers (e.g. stack-synthesized numeric
/// standard-type references) bypass the gate — only driver-materialized nodes
/// key into <c>_variablesByFullRef</c> and carry an authz policy.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Ancestor-visibility implication (a user with Read at <c>Line/Tag</c> should
/// be able to browse <c>Line</c> even without an explicit Browse grant there) is
/// a follow-up that needs the <c>TriePermissionEvaluator</c> to expose a
/// "subtree-has-any-grant" query. For now this filter does a strict point check;
/// admins grant Browse at the right levels in practice.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public override void Browse(
OperationContext context,
ref ContinuationPoint continuationPoint,
IList<ReferenceDescription> references)
{
base.Browse(context, ref continuationPoint, references);
FilterBrowseReferences(references, context.UserIdentity, _authzGate, _scopeResolver);
}
/// <summary>
/// Pure-function filter over a <see cref="ReferenceDescription"/> list. Extracted so
/// the Browse-gate policy is unit-testable without standing up the OPC UA server
/// stack. When either the gate or the resolver is <c>null</c>, the list is left
/// untouched — matches the pre-Phase-6.2 no-authz path.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// References whose <see cref="NodeId.Identifier"/> isn't a string (stack-synthesized
/// standard-type references, numeric identifiers, etc.) bypass the gate — only
/// driver-materialized nodes key into the authz trie.
/// </remarks>
internal static void FilterBrowseReferences(
IList<ReferenceDescription> references,
IUserIdentity? userIdentity,
AuthorizationGate? gate,
NodeScopeResolver? scopeResolver)
{
if (gate is null || scopeResolver is null) return;
if (references.Count == 0) return;
// Remove by index from the back so indices stay valid as we shrink the list.
for (var i = references.Count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
if (references[i].NodeId.Identifier is not string fullRef) continue;
var scope = scopeResolver.Resolve(fullRef);
if (!gate.IsAllowed(userIdentity, OpcUaOperation.Browse, scope))
references.RemoveAt(i);
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Picks the <see cref="IReadable"/> the dispatch layer routes through based on the
/// node's Phase 7 source kind (ADR-002). Extracted as a pure function for unit test

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@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
using Opc.Ua;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Entities;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Enums;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Authorization;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.OpcUa;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Unit tests for <see cref="DriverNodeManager.FilterBrowseReferences"/> — Phase 6.2
/// Stream C Browse gating. Verifies that references to nodes the session isn't
/// allowed to browse are removed silently, while allowed references pass through.
/// </summary>
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class BrowseGatingTests
{
[Fact]
public void Gate_null_leaves_references_untouched()
{
var refs = new List<ReferenceDescription>
{
NewRef("c1/area/line/eq/tag1"),
NewRef("c1/area/line/eq/tag2"),
};
DriverNodeManager.FilterBrowseReferences(refs, new UserIdentity(), gate: null, scopeResolver: null);
refs.Count.ShouldBe(2);
}
[Fact]
public void Empty_reference_list_is_a_no_op()
{
var refs = new List<ReferenceDescription>();
var gate = MakeGate(strict: true, rows: []);
var resolver = new NodeScopeResolver("c1");
DriverNodeManager.FilterBrowseReferences(refs, new UserIdentity(), gate, resolver);
refs.Count.ShouldBe(0);
}
[Fact]
public void Denied_references_are_removed()
{
var refs = new List<ReferenceDescription>
{
NewRef("c1/area/line/eq/tag1"),
NewRef("c1/area/line/eq/tag2"),
};
// Strict mode with no ACL rows → everyone is denied.
var gate = MakeGate(strict: true, rows: []);
var resolver = new NodeScopeResolver("c1");
DriverNodeManager.FilterBrowseReferences(refs, NewIdentity("alice", "grp-ops"), gate, resolver);
refs.Count.ShouldBe(0);
}
[Fact]
public void Allowed_references_remain()
{
var refs = new List<ReferenceDescription>
{
NewRef("c1/area/line/eq/tag1"),
NewRef("c1/area/line/eq/tag2"),
};
var gate = MakeGate(strict: true, rows:
[
Row("grp-ops", NodePermissions.Browse),
]);
var resolver = new NodeScopeResolver("c1");
DriverNodeManager.FilterBrowseReferences(refs, NewIdentity("alice", "grp-ops"), gate, resolver);
refs.Count.ShouldBe(2);
}
[Fact]
public void Non_string_identifiers_bypass_the_gate()
{
// A numeric-identifier reference (stack-synthesized standard type) must not be
// filtered — only driver-materialized (string-id) nodes are subject to the authz trie.
var refs = new List<ReferenceDescription>
{
new() { NodeId = new NodeId(62u) }, // VariableTypeIds.BaseVariableType or similar
NewRef("c1/area/line/eq/tag1"),
};
// Strict + no grants → would deny everything, but the numeric ref bypasses.
var gate = MakeGate(strict: true, rows: []);
var resolver = new NodeScopeResolver("c1");
DriverNodeManager.FilterBrowseReferences(refs, NewIdentity("alice", "grp-ops"), gate, resolver);
refs.Count.ShouldBe(1);
refs[0].NodeId.Identifier.ShouldBe(62u);
}
[Fact]
public void Lax_mode_null_identity_keeps_references()
{
var refs = new List<ReferenceDescription> { NewRef("c1/area/line/eq/tag1") };
var gate = MakeGate(strict: false, rows: []);
var resolver = new NodeScopeResolver("c1");
DriverNodeManager.FilterBrowseReferences(refs, userIdentity: null, gate, resolver);
refs.Count.ShouldBe(1, "lax mode keeps the pre-Phase-6.2 behaviour — everything visible");
}
// ---- helpers -----------------------------------------------------------
private static ReferenceDescription NewRef(string fullRef) => new()
{
NodeId = new NodeId(fullRef, 2),
BrowseName = new QualifiedName("browse"),
DisplayName = new LocalizedText("display"),
};
private static NodeAcl Row(string group, NodePermissions flags) => new()
{
NodeAclRowId = Guid.NewGuid(),
NodeAclId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(),
GenerationId = 1,
ClusterId = "c1",
LdapGroup = group,
ScopeKind = NodeAclScopeKind.Cluster,
ScopeId = null,
PermissionFlags = flags,
};
private static AuthorizationGate MakeGate(bool strict, NodeAcl[] rows)
{
var cache = new PermissionTrieCache();
cache.Install(PermissionTrieBuilder.Build("c1", 1, rows));
var evaluator = new TriePermissionEvaluator(cache);
return new AuthorizationGate(evaluator, strictMode: strict);
}
private static IUserIdentity NewIdentity(string name, params string[] groups) => new FakeIdentity(name, groups);
private sealed class FakeIdentity : UserIdentity, ILdapGroupsBearer
{
public FakeIdentity(string name, IReadOnlyList<string> groups)
{
DisplayName = name;
LdapGroups = groups;
}
public new string DisplayName { get; }
public IReadOnlyList<string> LdapGroups { get; }
}
}