fix(opcua): failed sign-ins no longer lock a client out of anonymous sessions (#833)
OPC Foundation SDK 2.0.1's SessionManager lockout refused EVERY activation (Anonymous included, before the token is read) from a client with 5 failed identity validations in 60 s, for 5 minutes, keyed on cert thumbprint else peer IP. Disable it (MaxFailedAuthenticationAttempts=0 on built and loaded configs) and enforce FailedCredentialLockout in the identity-registry adapter instead: UserName activations only, keyed on thumbprint+peer together, same 5/60s/300s defaults, configurable via OpcUa:CredentialLockout.
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@@ -206,6 +206,12 @@ Two things to know before relying on any of this:
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the same `RoleCarryingUserIdentity` a key produces. Set it `false` to make keys mandatory. A key may
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**not** use the `anonymous` principal, and a failure to read anonymous's grants **denies** rather
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than admitting with no roles.
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- ⚠️ **The SDK's failed-auth lockout is OFF; ours is UserName-only (#833).** SDK 2.0.1 `SessionManager` refuses
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EVERY activation (Anonymous included, before the token is read) from a client with 5 failures in 60 s, for 5 min,
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keyed cert-thumbprint-else-peer-IP. `OpcUaApplicationHost.DisableSdkAuthenticationLockout` zeroes
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`MaxFailedAuthenticationAttempts` on built AND loaded configs; `FailedCredentialLockout` (`OpcUa:CredentialLockout`,
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5 / 60 s / 300 s) counts and refuses UserName activations only, keyed thumbprint+peer together. Do not re-enable the
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SDK setting. `docs/security.md` §"Failed-credential lockout".
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- **Keys reach a driver-only node inside the deployment artifact** (stage 4). `ConfigComposer` snapshots
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the `ApiKey` rows — the peppered HMAC only, never a secret, and the pepper is node config that is
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deliberately *not* in the artifact — and `DeploymentArtifact.ParseDataPlaneAuthority` decodes them
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