b104760b3a
Standardize role string VALUES on the canonical vocabulary
(Administrator/Designer/Deployer/Viewer; Operator/Engineer unused here):
Admin -> Administrator
Design -> Designer
Deployment -> Deployer
Audit -> Administrator (COLLAPSE; accepted privilege escalation)
AuditReadOnly-> Viewer (COLLAPSE; keeps audit-read, no export)
SoD: OperationalAuditRoles = { Administrator, Viewer },
AuditExportRoles = { Administrator }
so Viewer reads the audit log + nav but cannot bulk-export, while
Administrator does both + holds the full admin surface (the documented,
accepted auditor/admin SoD collapse).
Atomic move across every enforcement site:
- Roles constants; AuthorizationPolicies (RequireClaim values + SoD arrays +
honest XML-doc); RoleMapper Deployer check.
- ManagementActor.GetRequiredRole switch + the hard-coded site-scope
admin-bypass (now Roles.Administrator at all 6 sites). Site-scoping logic
is otherwise unchanged.
- DebugStreamHub Administrator/Deployer gates (Deployer kept case-sensitive).
- CentralUI BrowseService/BindingTester Designer guards; LdapMappingForm
dropdown now offers canonical values (incl. Viewer).
- Config-DB seed (LdapGroupMappings Id 1-4) + EF migration CanonicalizeRoles:
Id-keyed UpdateData for seed rows + idempotent raw catch-all UPDATEs for
operator-added rows. Down is lossy on the collapse (documented in-file).
No pending model changes.
Tests reworked to the collapsed model across Security/CentralUI/
ManagementService/ConfigurationDatabase/Integration suites, incl. explicit
Viewer-reads-not-exports and former-Audit-now-Administrator-escalation cases.
CHANGELOG: BREAKING security note documenting the canonicalization + SoD
collapse.
195 lines
6.7 KiB
C#
195 lines
6.7 KiB
C#
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions.Ldap;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security;
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namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.IntegrationTests;
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/// <summary>
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/// WP-5 (Phase 8): Security hardening tests.
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/// Verifies LDAPS enforcement, JWT key length, secret scrubbing, and API key protection.
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/// </summary>
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public class SecurityHardeningTests
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{
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private static JwtTokenService CreateJwtService(string signingKey = "integration-test-signing-key-must-be-at-least-32-chars-long")
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{
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var options = Options.Create(new SecurityOptions
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{
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JwtSigningKey = signingKey,
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JwtExpiryMinutes = 15,
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IdleTimeoutMinutes = 30,
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JwtRefreshThresholdMinutes = 5
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});
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return new JwtTokenService(options, NullLogger<JwtTokenService>.Instance);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void LdapOptions_Transport_DefaultsToLdaps()
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{
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// Production requires encrypted transport. The shared LdapOptions defaults to
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// LDAPS (secure-by-default), preserving the donor's LdapUseTls=true default.
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var options = new LdapOptions();
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Assert.Equal(LdapTransport.Ldaps, options.Transport);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void LdapOptions_AllowInsecure_DefaultsToFalse()
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{
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var options = new LdapOptions();
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Assert.False(options.AllowInsecure);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void JwtSigningKey_MinimumLength_Enforced()
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{
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// HMAC-SHA256 requires a key of at least 32 bytes (256 bits).
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var jwtService = CreateJwtService();
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var token = jwtService.GenerateToken(
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displayName: "Test",
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username: "test",
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roles: new[] { "Administrator" },
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permittedSiteIds: null);
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Assert.NotNull(token);
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Assert.True(token.Length > 0);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void JwtSigningKey_ShortKey_FailsValidation()
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{
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var shortKey = "tooshort";
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Assert.True(shortKey.Length < 32,
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"Test key must be shorter than 32 chars to verify minimum length enforcement");
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}
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[Fact]
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public void LogOutputTemplate_DoesNotContainSecrets()
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{
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// Verify the Serilog output template does not include secret-bearing properties.
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var template = "[{Timestamp:HH:mm:ss} {Level:u3}] [{NodeRole}/{NodeHostname}] {Message:lj}{NewLine}{Exception}";
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Assert.DoesNotContain("Password", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
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Assert.DoesNotContain("ApiKey", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
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Assert.DoesNotContain("Secret", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
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Assert.DoesNotContain("SigningKey", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
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Assert.DoesNotContain("ConnectionString", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void LogEnrichment_ContainsExpectedProperties()
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{
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var enrichmentProperties = new[] { "SiteId", "NodeHostname", "NodeRole" };
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foreach (var prop in enrichmentProperties)
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{
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Assert.DoesNotContain("Password", prop, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
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Assert.DoesNotContain("Key", prop, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
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}
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}
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[Fact]
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public void JwtToken_DoesNotContainSigningKey()
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{
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var jwtService = CreateJwtService();
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var token = jwtService.GenerateToken(
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displayName: "Test",
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username: "test",
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roles: new[] { "Administrator" },
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permittedSiteIds: null);
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// JWT tokens are base64-encoded; the signing key should not appear in the payload
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Assert.DoesNotContain("signing-key", token, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void SecurityOptions_JwtExpiryDefaults_AreSecure()
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{
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var options = new SecurityOptions();
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Assert.Equal(15, options.JwtExpiryMinutes);
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Assert.Equal(30, options.IdleTimeoutMinutes);
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Assert.Equal(5, options.JwtRefreshThresholdMinutes);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void JwtToken_TamperedPayload_FailsValidation()
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{
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var jwtService = CreateJwtService();
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var token = jwtService.GenerateToken(
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displayName: "User",
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username: "user",
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roles: new[] { "Administrator" },
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permittedSiteIds: null);
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// Tamper with the token payload (second segment)
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var parts = token.Split('.');
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Assert.Equal(3, parts.Length);
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// Flip a character in the payload
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var tamperedPayload = parts[1];
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if (tamperedPayload.Length > 5)
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{
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var chars = tamperedPayload.ToCharArray();
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chars[5] = chars[5] == 'A' ? 'B' : 'A';
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tamperedPayload = new string(chars);
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}
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var tamperedToken = $"{parts[0]}.{tamperedPayload}.{parts[2]}";
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var principal = jwtService.ValidateToken(tamperedToken);
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Assert.Null(principal);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void JwtRefreshToken_PreservesIdentity()
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{
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var jwtService = CreateJwtService();
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var originalToken = jwtService.GenerateToken(
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displayName: "Original User",
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username: "orig_user",
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roles: new[] { "Administrator", "Designer" },
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permittedSiteIds: new[] { "site-1" });
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var principal = jwtService.ValidateToken(originalToken);
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Assert.NotNull(principal);
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// Refresh the token
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var refreshedToken = jwtService.RefreshToken(
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principal!,
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new[] { "Administrator", "Designer" },
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new[] { "site-1" });
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Assert.NotNull(refreshedToken);
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var refreshedPrincipal = jwtService.ValidateToken(refreshedToken!);
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Assert.NotNull(refreshedPrincipal);
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Assert.Equal("Original User", refreshedPrincipal!.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.DisplayNameClaimType)?.Value);
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Assert.Equal("orig_user", refreshedPrincipal.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.UsernameClaimType)?.Value);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void StartupValidator_RejectsInsecureLdapInProduction()
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{
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// The shared LdapOptionsValidator (registered with ValidateOnStart by AddZbLdapAuth)
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// rejects plaintext transport (Transport=None) unless AllowInsecure is explicitly set,
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// preserving the donor's production LDAPS-enforcement guarantee.
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var insecure = new LdapOptions
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{
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Server = "ldap.example.com",
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SearchBase = "dc=example,dc=com",
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ServiceAccountDn = "cn=admin,dc=example,dc=com",
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Transport = LdapTransport.None,
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AllowInsecure = false,
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};
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var result = new ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Ldap.LdapOptionsValidator().Validate(name: null, insecure);
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Assert.True(result.Failed);
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Assert.Contains(nameof(LdapOptions.AllowInsecure), result.FailureMessage);
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}
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}
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