Files
ScadaBridge/tests/ScadaLink.Transport.Tests/Import/BundleImporterLoadTests.cs
T
Joseph Doherty 819f1b4665 fix(validation): close Theme 3 — 11 input-validation / unbounded-input findings
Each finding is a focused validation guard or upper bound at a trust boundary.
Highlights:
- Commons-015: EncryptionMetadata ctor now validates Algorithm (AES-256-GCM
  only), Kdf (PBKDF2-SHA256 only), Iterations ([100k, 10M]), non-null Salt/IV.
- Transport-004: new BundleUnlockRateLimiter (sliding-window, per-key,
  singleton) wired into BundleImporter.LoadAsync; over-budget callers see
  BundleUnlockRateLimitedException. Per-bundle 3-strike + per-window cap.
- ESG-022: ExternalSystemClient.InvokeHttpAsync allow-lists the documented
  GET/POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE set (case-insensitive); unknown verbs throw.
- SEL-015: SiteEventLogger queue now bounded (10k cap, DropOldest); dropped
  events fault their Task and increment FailedWriteCount so the drop is
  observable instead of an unbounded memory growth.
- SEL-017: EventLogQueryService clamps caller-supplied PageSize to a new
  MaxQueryPageSize cap (default 500) so int.MaxValue can't OOM the host.
- SEL-020: LogEventAsync rejects severities outside {Info, Warning, Error}
  (matches SQLite BINARY-collation query filter).
- InboundAPI-020: ContentType "json" check now case-insensitive
  (application/JSON no longer slips through as not-json).
- InboundAPI-024: _knownBadMethods capped at 1000 entries (drops new entries
  once full); per-request DB lookup remains the correctness path.
- SR-025: HandleSetStaticAttribute validates the attribute name against the
  deployed config; unknown names now return Success=false instead of
  leaking orphan override rows into the SQLite store.
- TE-021: MoveTemplateAsync runs the sibling-name-collision check at the
  destination, mirroring TemplateFolderService.MoveFolderAsync.
- TE-022: LockEnforcer's once-locked-stays-locked rule now also covers
  LockedInDerived (was previously only IsLocked).

New regression tests across 8 test projects (EncryptionMetadata, rate
limiter, ESG client allow-list, SEL bounded channel / PageSize clamp /
severity validation, InboundAPI ContentType + bad-methods cap, SiteRT
unknown-attribute, TemplateEngine MoveTemplate + LockedInDerived).
Build clean; affected suites all green. README regenerated: 93 open (was 104).

Note: a separate manual re-run was needed for the SiteEventLogging hunk
because its initial subagent's source edits never landed on disk despite
reporting success (file-collision-style failure mode).
2026-05-28 06:58:25 -04:00

533 lines
24 KiB
C#

using System.IO.Compression;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using NSubstitute;
using ScadaLink.Commons.Interfaces.Repositories;
using ScadaLink.Commons.Interfaces.Services;
using ScadaLink.Commons.Interfaces.Transport;
using ScadaLink.Commons.Types.Transport;
using ScadaLink.ConfigurationDatabase;
using ScadaLink.TemplateEngine.Validation;
using ScadaLink.Transport.Encryption;
using ScadaLink.Transport.Import;
using ScadaLink.Transport.Serialization;
namespace ScadaLink.Transport.Tests.Import;
/// <summary>
/// Unit tests for <see cref="BundleImporter.LoadAsync"/>. Uses the real
/// <see cref="BundleSerializer"/>, <see cref="ManifestValidator"/>,
/// <see cref="BundleSecretEncryptor"/>, <see cref="EntitySerializer"/> and
/// <see cref="BundleSessionStore"/> — they're stateless / in-memory and easier
/// to drive than mocks. Repositories + audit + DbContext are mocked because
/// LoadAsync does not exercise them (they're injected so the constructor stays
/// stable across T15/T16/T17).
/// </summary>
public sealed class BundleImporterLoadTests
{
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions BundleJsonOptions = new()
{
WriteIndented = false,
DefaultIgnoreCondition = JsonIgnoreCondition.WhenWritingNull,
Converters = { new JsonStringEnumConverter() },
};
private static BundleContentDto EmptyContent() => new(
TemplateFolders: Array.Empty<TemplateFolderDto>(),
Templates: Array.Empty<TemplateDto>(),
SharedScripts: Array.Empty<SharedScriptDto>(),
ExternalSystems: Array.Empty<ExternalSystemDto>(),
DatabaseConnections: Array.Empty<DatabaseConnectionDto>(),
NotificationLists: Array.Empty<NotificationListDto>(),
SmtpConfigs: Array.Empty<SmtpConfigDto>(),
ApiKeys: Array.Empty<ApiKeyDto>(),
ApiMethods: Array.Empty<ApiMethodDto>());
private static BundleContentDto SmallContent() => new(
TemplateFolders: Array.Empty<TemplateFolderDto>(),
Templates: new[]
{
new TemplateDto(
Name: "Pump",
FolderName: null,
BaseTemplateName: null,
Description: "the one and only",
Attributes: Array.Empty<TemplateAttributeDto>(),
Alarms: Array.Empty<TemplateAlarmDto>(),
Scripts: Array.Empty<TemplateScriptDto>(),
Compositions: Array.Empty<TemplateCompositionDto>()),
},
SharedScripts: Array.Empty<SharedScriptDto>(),
ExternalSystems: Array.Empty<ExternalSystemDto>(),
DatabaseConnections: Array.Empty<DatabaseConnectionDto>(),
NotificationLists: Array.Empty<NotificationListDto>(),
SmtpConfigs: Array.Empty<SmtpConfigDto>(),
ApiKeys: Array.Empty<ApiKeyDto>(),
ApiMethods: Array.Empty<ApiMethodDto>());
private sealed class TestTimeProvider : TimeProvider
{
private DateTimeOffset _now;
public TestTimeProvider(DateTimeOffset start) { _now = start; }
public override DateTimeOffset GetUtcNow() => _now;
}
private sealed record TestRig(
BundleImporter Importer,
BundleSerializer Serializer,
ManifestBuilder ManifestBuilder,
BundleSecretEncryptor Encryptor,
BundleSessionStore SessionStore,
TransportOptions Options);
private static TestRig BuildRig(Action<TransportOptions>? configure = null)
{
var opts = new TransportOptions();
configure?.Invoke(opts);
var iOpts = Options.Create(opts);
var clock = new TestTimeProvider(DateTimeOffset.UtcNow);
var serializer = new BundleSerializer();
var validator = new ManifestValidator();
var encryptor = new BundleSecretEncryptor();
var entitySerializer = new EntitySerializer();
var manifestBuilder = new ManifestBuilder();
var store = new BundleSessionStore(iOpts, clock);
var importer = new BundleImporter(
bundleSerializer: serializer,
manifestValidator: validator,
encryptor: encryptor,
entitySerializer: entitySerializer,
sessionStore: store,
// T-004: the unlock rate limiter shares the test clock so its trailing-hour
// window pruning is deterministic. The window itself is the production
// default (1 hour).
unlockRateLimiter: new BundleUnlockRateLimiter(clock, BundleUnlockRateLimiter.DefaultWindow),
options: iOpts,
timeProvider: clock,
templateRepo: Substitute.For<ITemplateEngineRepository>(),
externalRepo: Substitute.For<IExternalSystemRepository>(),
notificationRepo: Substitute.For<INotificationRepository>(),
inboundApiRepo: Substitute.For<IInboundApiRepository>(),
auditService: Substitute.For<IAuditService>(),
correlationContext: Substitute.For<IAuditCorrelationContext>(),
// LoadAsync never touches the DbContext — Preview/Apply do. Build
// a no-provider DbContext so the importer's null check passes;
// the in-memory provider isn't worth pulling in for unit tests.
dbContext: new ScadaLinkDbContext(
new DbContextOptionsBuilder<ScadaLinkDbContext>().Options),
semanticValidator: new SemanticValidator());
return new TestRig(importer, serializer, manifestBuilder, encryptor, store, opts);
}
private static Stream PackPlainBundle(BundleSerializer serializer, ManifestBuilder builder, BundleContentDto content)
{
var contentBytes = serializer.SerializeContentBytes(content);
var manifest = builder.Build(
sourceEnvironment: "dev",
exportedBy: "alice",
scadaLinkVersion: "1.0.0",
encryption: null,
summary: new BundleSummary(content.Templates.Count, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
contents: Array.Empty<ManifestContentEntry>(),
contentBytes: contentBytes);
return serializer.Pack(content, manifest, passphrase: null, encryptor: null);
}
private static Stream PackEncryptedBundle(
BundleSerializer serializer,
ManifestBuilder builder,
BundleSecretEncryptor encryptor,
BundleContentDto content,
string passphrase)
{
var contentBytes = serializer.SerializeContentBytes(content);
// Pack re-stamps salt/iv/hash from the ciphertext it actually writes,
// so the seed values here are placeholders.
var seed = new EncryptionMetadata("AES-256-GCM", "PBKDF2-SHA256", 600_000, string.Empty, string.Empty);
var manifest = builder.Build(
sourceEnvironment: "dev",
exportedBy: "alice",
scadaLinkVersion: "1.0.0",
encryption: seed,
summary: new BundleSummary(content.Templates.Count, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
contents: Array.Empty<ManifestContentEntry>(),
contentBytes: contentBytes);
return serializer.Pack(content, manifest, passphrase, encryptor);
}
[Fact]
public async Task LoadAsync_returns_session_for_unencrypted_bundle()
{
var rig = BuildRig();
var content = SmallContent();
var stream = PackPlainBundle(rig.Serializer, rig.ManifestBuilder, content);
var session = await rig.Importer.LoadAsync(stream, passphrase: null);
Assert.NotNull(session);
Assert.NotEqual(Guid.Empty, session.SessionId);
Assert.Equal("dev", session.Manifest.SourceEnvironment);
Assert.Equal("alice", session.Manifest.ExportedBy);
Assert.Null(session.Manifest.Encryption);
Assert.NotNull(rig.SessionStore.Get(session.SessionId));
}
[Fact]
public async Task LoadAsync_returns_session_for_encrypted_bundle_with_correct_passphrase()
{
var rig = BuildRig();
var content = SmallContent();
var stream = PackEncryptedBundle(rig.Serializer, rig.ManifestBuilder, rig.Encryptor, content, "secret123");
var session = await rig.Importer.LoadAsync(stream, passphrase: "secret123");
Assert.NotNull(session);
Assert.NotNull(session.Manifest.Encryption);
Assert.NotEmpty(session.DecryptedContent);
// The decrypted payload must round-trip back to the original DTO so the
// PreviewAsync phase can deserialize it directly from the session.
var roundTripped = JsonSerializer.Deserialize<BundleContentDto>(
session.DecryptedContent, BundleJsonOptions);
Assert.NotNull(roundTripped);
Assert.Single(roundTripped!.Templates);
Assert.Equal("Pump", roundTripped.Templates[0].Name);
}
[Fact]
public async Task LoadAsync_throws_when_passphrase_wrong()
{
var rig = BuildRig();
var stream = PackEncryptedBundle(
rig.Serializer, rig.ManifestBuilder, rig.Encryptor, EmptyContent(), "correct");
// AES-GCM raises AuthenticationTagMismatchException, a CryptographicException
// subclass on .NET 10 — ThrowsAny is the right match.
await Assert.ThrowsAnyAsync<CryptographicException>(
() => rig.Importer.LoadAsync(stream, passphrase: "wrong"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task LoadAsync_locks_bundle_after_three_wrong_passphrases_even_across_callers()
{
// T-003: the lockout is server-side and keyed by ContentHash, so replaying
// the SAME bundle bytes from a second caller (different stream, different
// session) must hit the same counter. After MaxUnlockAttemptsPerSession (3)
// failures the importer throws BundleLockedException, not another
// CryptographicException — and the lock survives a fresh LoadAsync from a
// pristine caller that has no idea about the prior attempts.
var rig = BuildRig();
using var packed = PackEncryptedBundle(
rig.Serializer, rig.ManifestBuilder, rig.Encryptor, EmptyContent(), "correct");
var bundleBytes = ((MemoryStream)packed).ToArray();
// First two wrong-passphrase attempts surface as CryptographicException.
for (var attempt = 1; attempt <= 2; attempt++)
{
await Assert.ThrowsAnyAsync<CryptographicException>(
() => rig.Importer.LoadAsync(new MemoryStream(bundleBytes), passphrase: "wrong"));
}
// Third wrong-passphrase attempt crosses the threshold and surfaces as
// BundleLockedException — even though this is a fresh stream / a caller
// that never saw the earlier failures.
var locked = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<BundleLockedException>(
() => rig.Importer.LoadAsync(new MemoryStream(bundleBytes), passphrase: "wrong"));
Assert.Equal(3, locked.FailedAttempts);
// Fourth attempt — even with the CORRECT passphrase — is still locked,
// because the lockout sticks until the TTL expires or the bundle is
// re-exported with a new content hash.
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<BundleLockedException>(
() => rig.Importer.LoadAsync(new MemoryStream(bundleBytes), passphrase: "correct"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task LoadAsync_rejects_bundle_with_too_many_entries()
{
// T-006: a malicious bundle could pad the archive with arbitrary entries to
// exhaust per-entry handles or to slip an unexpected payload past the
// serializer. The envelope check rejects any archive whose entry count
// exceeds MaxBundleEntryCount BEFORE any decompression.
var rig = BuildRig(opts => opts.MaxBundleEntryCount = 2);
using var packed = PackPlainBundle(rig.Serializer, rig.ManifestBuilder, EmptyContent());
var bytes = ((MemoryStream)packed).ToArray();
var paddedBytes = AppendExtraZipEntry(bytes, "extra.bin", new byte[8]);
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidDataException>(
() => rig.Importer.LoadAsync(new MemoryStream(paddedBytes), passphrase: null));
}
[Fact]
public async Task LoadAsync_rejects_bundle_with_oversized_entry()
{
// T-006: caller-declared decompressed Length above the configured cap is
// a hostile bundle; reject without decompressing.
var rig = BuildRig(opts => opts.MaxBundleEntryDecompressedMb = 1);
using var packed = PackPlainBundle(rig.Serializer, rig.ManifestBuilder, EmptyContent());
var bytes = ((MemoryStream)packed).ToArray();
// Replace content.json with a 2 MB entry of compressible zeros — uncompressed Length > cap.
var bigPayload = new byte[2 * 1024 * 1024];
var oversizedBytes = ReplaceZipEntry(bytes, "content.json", bigPayload);
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidDataException>(
() => rig.Importer.LoadAsync(new MemoryStream(oversizedBytes), passphrase: null));
}
[Fact]
public async Task LoadAsync_rejects_bundle_whose_entry_exceeds_compression_ratio()
{
// T-006: defence-in-depth — even if Length is within the per-entry cap, an
// extreme compression ratio is a hallmark of a decompression bomb and is
// rejected outright.
var rig = BuildRig(opts =>
{
opts.MaxBundleEntryDecompressedMb = 100;
opts.MaxBundleEntryCompressionRatio = 10;
});
using var packed = PackPlainBundle(rig.Serializer, rig.ManifestBuilder, EmptyContent());
var bytes = ((MemoryStream)packed).ToArray();
// 1 MB of zeros compresses extremely well (>100x ratio) — well over the
// configured 10x cap.
var compressible = new byte[1024 * 1024];
var bombBytes = ReplaceZipEntry(bytes, "content.json", compressible);
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidDataException>(
() => rig.Importer.LoadAsync(new MemoryStream(bombBytes), passphrase: null));
}
/// <summary>
/// T-006 helper: rewrites an existing zip to add a fresh entry alongside the
/// originals. Used by the "too many entries" test.
/// </summary>
private static byte[] AppendExtraZipEntry(byte[] zipBytes, string newEntryName, byte[] payload)
{
var output = new MemoryStream();
using (var src = new MemoryStream(zipBytes))
using (var srcZip = new ZipArchive(src, ZipArchiveMode.Read))
using (var dstZip = new ZipArchive(output, ZipArchiveMode.Create, leaveOpen: true))
{
foreach (var entry in srcZip.Entries)
{
var dst = dstZip.CreateEntry(entry.FullName);
using var inStream = entry.Open();
using var outStream = dst.Open();
inStream.CopyTo(outStream);
}
var extra = dstZip.CreateEntry(newEntryName);
using (var s = extra.Open()) { s.Write(payload); }
}
return output.ToArray();
}
/// <summary>
/// T-006 helper: rewrites an existing zip, replacing one entry's bytes with
/// the supplied payload while preserving every other entry verbatim.
/// </summary>
private static byte[] ReplaceZipEntry(byte[] zipBytes, string entryToReplace, byte[] newPayload)
{
var output = new MemoryStream();
using (var src = new MemoryStream(zipBytes))
using (var srcZip = new ZipArchive(src, ZipArchiveMode.Read))
using (var dstZip = new ZipArchive(output, ZipArchiveMode.Create, leaveOpen: true))
{
foreach (var entry in srcZip.Entries)
{
var dst = dstZip.CreateEntry(entry.FullName);
using var outStream = dst.Open();
if (entry.FullName == entryToReplace)
{
outStream.Write(newPayload);
}
else
{
using var inStream = entry.Open();
inStream.CopyTo(outStream);
}
}
}
return output.ToArray();
}
[Fact]
public async Task LoadAsync_rejects_bundle_with_tampered_manifest_field_even_with_correct_passphrase()
{
// T-005: a stolen bundle whose plaintext manifest fields (SourceEnvironment,
// ExportedBy, …) have been edited must fail decryption with a tag mismatch.
// Without AAD an attacker could rewrite the SourceEnvironment label and slip
// past the Step-4 typo-resistant confirmation gate. We tamper the field by
// re-packing the manifest (with everything else, including the original
// ciphertext, unchanged) into a fresh ZIP and verify decrypt fails.
var rig = BuildRig();
using var packed = PackEncryptedBundle(
rig.Serializer, rig.ManifestBuilder, rig.Encryptor, EmptyContent(), "correct");
var bytes = ((MemoryStream)packed).ToArray();
// Read manifest + ciphertext from the legit bundle, mutate SourceEnvironment,
// and re-pack with the SAME ciphertext bytes — the cipher is fine, only the
// plaintext manifest is changed.
BundleManifest originalManifest;
byte[] cipherBytes;
using (var src = new MemoryStream(bytes))
using (var srcZip = new ZipArchive(src, ZipArchiveMode.Read))
{
using var ms = new MemoryStream();
srcZip.GetEntry("manifest.json")!.Open().CopyTo(ms);
originalManifest = JsonSerializer.Deserialize<BundleManifest>(ms.ToArray(), BundleJsonOptions)!;
using var ctMs = new MemoryStream();
srcZip.GetEntry("content.enc")!.Open().CopyTo(ctMs);
cipherBytes = ctMs.ToArray();
}
var tampered = originalManifest with { SourceEnvironment = "prod-spoofed" };
var tamperedManifestBytes = JsonSerializer.SerializeToUtf8Bytes(tampered, BundleJsonOptions);
var tamperedZipBytes = new MemoryStream();
using (var outZip = new ZipArchive(tamperedZipBytes, ZipArchiveMode.Create, leaveOpen: true))
{
var mEntry = outZip.CreateEntry("manifest.json");
using (var s = mEntry.Open()) { s.Write(tamperedManifestBytes); }
var cEntry = outZip.CreateEntry("content.enc");
using (var s = cEntry.Open()) { s.Write(cipherBytes); }
}
tamperedZipBytes.Position = 0;
// ContentHash check is the FIRST thing that catches the tamper here because
// ContentHash is sealed against the cipher bytes and the cipher is unchanged
// BUT the manifest's plaintext fields are mutated — wait, ContentHash is
// against the cipher which we kept, so it still matches. The defence is
// the AES-GCM AAD: the tag check fails because AAD differs.
await Assert.ThrowsAnyAsync<CryptographicException>(
() => rig.Importer.LoadAsync(tamperedZipBytes, passphrase: "correct"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task LoadAsync_resets_unlock_counter_on_correct_passphrase()
{
// T-003: a legitimate operator who typos once or twice before getting it
// right must not be penalised on the next bundle. A successful LoadAsync
// clears the per-bundle counter.
var rig = BuildRig();
using var packed = PackEncryptedBundle(
rig.Serializer, rig.ManifestBuilder, rig.Encryptor, EmptyContent(), "correct");
var bundleBytes = ((MemoryStream)packed).ToArray();
await Assert.ThrowsAnyAsync<CryptographicException>(
() => rig.Importer.LoadAsync(new MemoryStream(bundleBytes), passphrase: "wrong"));
var session = await rig.Importer.LoadAsync(new MemoryStream(bundleBytes), passphrase: "correct");
Assert.NotNull(session);
// Counter cleared — a subsequent wrong-passphrase attempt starts from 0
// and surfaces as CryptographicException, not BundleLockedException.
await Assert.ThrowsAnyAsync<CryptographicException>(
() => rig.Importer.LoadAsync(new MemoryStream(bundleBytes), passphrase: "wrong"));
Assert.Equal(1, rig.SessionStore.GetUnlockFailureCount(session.Manifest.ContentHash));
}
[Fact]
public async Task LoadAsync_throws_NotSupportedException_when_bundleFormatVersion_unsupported()
{
var rig = BuildRig();
// Synthesize a zip by hand whose manifest carries an unsupported format
// version. The validator looks at BundleFormatVersion first thing after
// null-checks, so the content hash doesn't need to be correct for this
// path — we just need a structurally valid manifest record.
var content = EmptyContent();
var contentBytes = rig.Serializer.SerializeContentBytes(content);
var forwardManifest = new BundleManifest(
BundleFormatVersion: 999,
SchemaVersion: "1.0",
CreatedAtUtc: DateTimeOffset.UtcNow,
SourceEnvironment: "dev",
ExportedBy: "alice",
ScadaLinkVersion: "1.0.0",
ContentHash: "sha256:" + Convert.ToHexString(SHA256.HashData(contentBytes)).ToLowerInvariant(),
Encryption: null,
Summary: new BundleSummary(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
Contents: Array.Empty<ManifestContentEntry>());
var bundleStream = HandCraftZip(forwardManifest, contentBytes, encrypted: false);
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<NotSupportedException>(
() => rig.Importer.LoadAsync(bundleStream, passphrase: null));
}
[Fact]
public async Task LoadAsync_throws_InvalidDataException_when_content_hash_mismatch()
{
var rig = BuildRig();
// Build a normal bundle, then corrupt content.json's bytes after the
// manifest is stamped — the manifest still references the original hash.
var content = SmallContent();
var originalContentBytes = rig.Serializer.SerializeContentBytes(content);
var manifest = rig.ManifestBuilder.Build(
sourceEnvironment: "dev",
exportedBy: "alice",
scadaLinkVersion: "1.0.0",
encryption: null,
summary: new BundleSummary(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
contents: Array.Empty<ManifestContentEntry>(),
contentBytes: originalContentBytes);
// Corrupt the bytes so the validator's recomputed hash diverges from
// the manifest's frozen hash.
var corrupted = (byte[])originalContentBytes.Clone();
corrupted[0] ^= 0xFF;
var bundleStream = HandCraftZip(manifest, corrupted, encrypted: false);
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidDataException>(
() => rig.Importer.LoadAsync(bundleStream, passphrase: null));
Assert.Contains("hash", ex.Message, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
[Fact]
public async Task LoadAsync_throws_InvalidOperationException_when_bundle_exceeds_size_cap()
{
// MaxBundleSizeMb is an int; the smallest positive value is 1 MB. Pack
// a normal bundle and bump it past 1 MB by padding with a long
// description, then cap the limit to 0 — the comparison is `> maxBytes`
// so any positive byte count exceeds a 0 MB cap.
var rig = BuildRig(opts => opts.MaxBundleSizeMb = 0);
var stream = PackPlainBundle(rig.Serializer, rig.ManifestBuilder, SmallContent());
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidOperationException>(
() => rig.Importer.LoadAsync(stream, passphrase: null));
}
/// <summary>
/// Builds a zip directly so the test can write a manifest whose
/// <c>ContentHash</c> or <c>BundleFormatVersion</c> intentionally
/// disagrees with the content bytes — paths the high-level
/// <see cref="BundleSerializer.Pack"/> won't produce because it always
/// re-stamps the hash itself.
/// </summary>
private static Stream HandCraftZip(BundleManifest manifest, byte[] contentBytes, bool encrypted)
{
var manifestBytes = JsonSerializer.SerializeToUtf8Bytes(manifest, BundleJsonOptions);
var ms = new MemoryStream();
using (var archive = new ZipArchive(ms, ZipArchiveMode.Create, leaveOpen: true))
{
WriteEntry(archive, "manifest.json", manifestBytes);
WriteEntry(archive, encrypted ? "content.enc" : "content.json", contentBytes);
}
ms.Position = 0;
return ms;
}
private static void WriteEntry(ZipArchive archive, string name, byte[] payload)
{
var entry = archive.CreateEntry(name, CompressionLevel.Optimal);
using var es = entry.Open();
es.Write(payload, 0, payload.Length);
}
}