f47ceb55b1
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013L3XdmVii9i5sY4FChU8pB
205 lines
9.4 KiB
Markdown
205 lines
9.4 KiB
Markdown
# Inbound API Key Re-issue Runbook
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**Status:** BREAKING change — action required on every environment that uses the
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inbound API (`POST /api/{methodName}`).
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**Date:** 2026-06-02
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**Migration:** `RetireInboundApiKeyStore`
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This runbook covers the migration of inbound API authentication from the legacy SQL
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Server `X-API-Key` scheme to the shared `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.ApiKeys` store. After this
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change **all existing inbound API keys are invalidated** and every API client must be
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re-issued a new credential.
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---
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## 1. What changed and why
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| | Before | After |
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|---|---|---|
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| Header | `X-API-Key: <key>` | `Authorization: Bearer sbk_<keyId>_<secret>` |
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| Verification | Deterministic HMAC hash, looked up in SQL Server | Peppered, constant-time HMAC compare in the shared `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.ApiKeys` verifier |
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| Storage | SQL Server `ApiKeys` table (config DB) | `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.ApiKeys` SQLite store |
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| Authorization | `ApiMethod.ApprovedApiKeyIds` CSV linking methods to key IDs | Per-key **scopes**, where each scope string is an allowed method name (ordinal, case-sensitive) |
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**Why:** the inbound credential path now reuses the shared auth library that the rest
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of the `ZB.MOM.WW.*` family uses, with a single, tested, peppered verifier and a
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proper one-time-token issuance model. The deterministic SQL Server hash table and its
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method-link CSV are retired. The legacy `ApiKeyHasher` / `IApiKeyHasher` and the
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in-repo `ApiKeyValidator` are gone — inbound auth runs through `IApiKeyVerifier`.
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> The old `X-API-Key` credentials are **not migrated**. There is no automated
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> conversion: the stored hashes are not reversible, and the new tokens have a
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> different shape (`sbk_<keyId>_<secret>`). Every key must be re-issued.
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---
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## 2. Required configuration (per environment)
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Set these under the ScadaBridge configuration for each environment (appsettings,
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environment variables, or your secret store):
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| Key | Value | Notes |
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|---|---|---|
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| `ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyStore:SqlitePath` | Filesystem path to the SQLite key store | Defaults to `<content-root>/data/inbound-api-keys.sqlite` if unset. Choose a durable, backed-up path on a writable volume. Used when `Provider` is `Sqlite` (the default) and, when `Provider=SqlServer`, as the source file `ImportFromSqlitePath` imports once at boot. |
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| `ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyStore:Provider` | `Sqlite` (default) or `SqlServer` | `SqlServer` shares one row set across a central pair (design 2026-09-02, register row 108). Case-insensitive; an unrecognized value fails startup. |
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| `ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyStore:SqlServer:ConnectionString` | Defaults to `ScadaBridge:Database:ConfigurationDb` | Only used when `Provider=SqlServer`. Must be a literal or env override, **never** a `${secret:}` reference — the secrets store is itself SQL-backed. |
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| `ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyStore:ImportFromSqlitePath` | Defaults to `SqlitePath`'s default | Only used when `Provider=SqlServer`. The one-shot import source; renamed `*.imported` after a successful import. |
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| `ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyPepper` | A strong, random string, **≥ 16 characters** | **DIFFERENT per environment.** Keep it secret (secret store, not source control). This is the HMAC pepper that binds every stored key to this deployment; it is also the verifier's pepper secret. |
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Notes:
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- The pepper must be present and at least 16 characters or the host fails fast at
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startup (`AddZbApiKeyAuth`).
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- Changing the pepper after keys are issued invalidates all keys in that environment
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(they would no longer verify). Set it once, per environment, and keep it stable.
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- The token prefix is `sbk` and migrations run on startup by default
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(`ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyStore:RunMigrationsOnStartup = true`); these are
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wired by the Host and normally need no operator change.
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### Central pairs
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A central pair (QA `vq03`/`vq04`, both docker rigs) should run `Provider=SqlServer` — under
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the `Sqlite` default a key exists on whichever node served the management call, and a failover
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401s every inbound client until keys are re-issued on the survivor (`StartupValidator` warns
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about this at boot). To move an existing pair over:
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1. Stop **both** central nodes together.
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2. Set `ScadaBridge:InboundApi:ApiKeyStore:Provider = SqlServer` on both nodes.
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3. If the app's SQL login lacks CREATE SCHEMA/TABLE rights, have a DBA run
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`docs/operations/sql/zbauth-schema.sql` against the configuration database first — the
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migrator then finds the version row already present and skips DDL.
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4. Start both nodes together.
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5. Check the import log line on each node (`grep -i "api-key store import\|zbauth"` in the
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node's log) — one node reports the keys it inserted, the other reports the ones it found
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already present (skipped); together they cover the union of both nodes' prior SQLite files.
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6. Run `security api-key list` against each node's management endpoint and confirm both show
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the same keys.
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7. After a quarantine period (once you're confident the import is correct and no rollback is
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needed), delete the `*.imported` SQLite files (and their `-wal`/`-shm` siblings) from both
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nodes' volumes.
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**Rollback:** revert `Provider` to `Sqlite` (or remove it) and rename the `*.imported` files
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back to their original names on both nodes; no SQL Server rows need to be removed — the SQLite
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code path never reads them.
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---
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## 3. Database migration step
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Apply the EF Core migration `RetireInboundApiKeyStore` to the SQL Server
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configuration database. It:
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- drops the `ApiKeys` table, and
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- drops the `ApprovedApiKeyIds` column from `ApiMethods`.
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If migrations are applied automatically on deploy (the default for the central node),
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this happens as part of the rollout. To apply manually:
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```bash
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dotnet ef database update RetireInboundApiKeyStore \
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--project src/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.ConfigurationDatabase \
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--startup-project src/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Host
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```
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> Applying this migration **permanently drops** the old key data. Take a database
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> backup first if you need a record of the prior `ApiKeys` rows for audit purposes
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> (the hashes are not usable credentials, but the names/enabled flags may be of
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> record-keeping value).
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The new inbound keys live in the **SQLite** store (section 2), not in SQL Server.
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---
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## 4. Operator re-issue procedure
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Re-issue one key per client. Each key is created with the exact method names it is
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allowed to call (its scopes).
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### Option A — Admin UI
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1. Navigate to **`/admin/api-keys`** in the central UI.
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2. **Create** a new key: enter a display name and select the allowed method(s).
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3. The one-time token `sbk_<keyId>_<secret>` is shown **exactly once** — copy it now.
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It cannot be retrieved later.
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4. Distribute the token securely to the owning client.
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### Option B — CLI
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```bash
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scadabridge --url <central-url> security api-key create \
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--name <client-name> \
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--methods <method1,method2>
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```
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- `--methods` is a comma-separated list of allowed method names — these become the
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key's scopes. A method name must match the registered `ApiMethod.Name` **exactly**
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(case-sensitive).
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- The command prints `API key created. KeyId: <id>` and then the one-time token on
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stdout (the "save this now — it will not be shown again" advisory goes to stderr, so
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piping stdout captures only the token).
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Capture the `sbk_…` token at issue time; it is the only moment the secret is available.
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To later change which methods a key may call:
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```bash
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scadabridge --url <central-url> security api-key set-methods --key-id <id> --methods <m1,m2>
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```
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---
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## 5. Client change
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Each API client must replace its header:
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- **Remove:** `X-API-Key: <old-key>`
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- **Add:** `Authorization: Bearer sbk_<keyId>_<secret>`
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Example:
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```http
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POST /api/CreateOrder HTTP/1.1
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Host: scadabridge.example.com
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Authorization: Bearer sbk_7f3a...._9c1e....
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Content-Type: application/json
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```
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The token is the full `sbk_<keyId>_<secret>` string exactly as issued — do not split
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or transform it.
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---
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## 6. Verification
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1. **Authn (valid key):** call an allowed method with the new Bearer token → `200`
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(or the method's normal result).
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2. **Authn (no/old credential):** call with no `Authorization` header, or with the old
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`X-API-Key` header only → `401` with `{"error":"Invalid or missing API key"}`.
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3. **Authz (out of scope):** call a method the key is **not** scoped for → `403` with
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`{"error":"API key not approved for this method"}`. A non-existent method name
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returns the identical `403` body (enumeration-safe — by design).
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4. **Audit:** a successful call records the verified key's display name as the audit
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actor; an auth failure records `Actor=null`. Confirm via the audit log.
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5. Confirm no client is still sending `X-API-Key` (those requests now fail `401`).
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---
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## 7. Rollback
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The migration `Down` recreates the `ApiKeys` table and the `ApprovedApiKeyIds` column,
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**but the dropped key rows are not restored** — `Down` only rebuilds empty structures.
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Rolling the migration back does **not** recover any credential.
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Therefore "rollback" means **reverting the deployment** to the prior build (which still
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speaks `X-API-Key`), not reverting the keys:
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1. Redeploy the previous ScadaBridge build.
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2. If you took a SQL Server backup before section 3, restore the `ApiKeys` table from
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it so the old keys verify again.
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3. Without that backup, the old keys are gone and must be re-created under the legacy
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scheme as well.
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Because rollback is costly and lossy, prefer rolling **forward**: complete the re-issue
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in section 4 and fix any straggler clients rather than reverting.
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