Audit hash chain + two-login hardening REMOVED (IT security, 2026-11-15) — deploy the drop migration to DEV + QA #143
Reference in New Issue
Block a user
Delete Branch "%!s()"
Deleting a branch is permanent. Although the deleted branch may continue to exist for a short time before it actually gets removed, it CANNOT be undone in most cases. Continue?
IT security asked (2026-11-15) for the AuditLog hash chain to be removed until a general, family-wide solution for tamper evidence exists. The two-login maintenance hardening goes with it.
Removed in code: main
3dea146c(commitsed2ed0a3+b418408c).verify-chain, chain entities,ChainSeq/RowHash, and theAuditLog:HashChainoptions.audit-chain-head-exporthealth check, andverify-heads.AuditLog:MaintenanceConnectionString,AuditMaintenanceContext, and the keyedaudit-maintenanceregistrations. Purge, archive, partition roll-forward andbackfill-source-noderun on the runtime login again.AuditLog:HashChain*/MaintenanceConnectionStringkey is ignored and logs one warning at central startup.Schema: a new migration,
RemoveAuditLogHashChain, drops the two chain indexes, theChainSeq/RowHashcolumns, theAuditLogChainHeadandAuditLogChainTombstonetables, and thescadabridge_audit_chainerrole. It also revokes the two grantsAuditMaintenanceGrantsgavescadabridge_audit_purger; the role itself predates the chain and is kept. Down recreates all of it. The idempotent delta script isdocs/plans/sql/RemoveAuditLogHashChain.sql.Deploy gate (not done yet): DEV vd03 and QA vq03/vq04 still run
8e32f353withAuditLog__HashChain__Enabled=true, so the chain is live on both tiers until this ships. The owner chose to leave it until the next deploy.061432c8, record2026-11-15-wonder-app-vd03-061432c8.md,50a5291b): deploy main with the migration, then removeAuditLog__HashChain__Enabledfrom the Central service env.061432c8, record2026-11-15-wonder-app-vq03-vq04-061432c8.md,50a5291b): the same. Stop both centrals and start them together: the old binaries map the chain columns, so they can't run on the migrated schema.Open (needs a decision): a family-wide approach to tamper evidence for audit data, owned by IT security and the owner, before anything like this comes back.
Tests on the merged branch: AuditLog 455, ConfigurationDatabase 500 (MSSQL), ManagementService 778, CLI 588, Host 733, Commons 986. All green. Two NotifyDispatcher timing flakes passed on re-run and also pass on main.
Deployed and verified on DEV and QA (2026-11-15), build
061432c8. Records are in50a5291b.E:\ApiInstall\ScadaBridge-backups\ScadaBridge_pre-061432c8_20261115T191258.bakF:\MSSQL\BACKUP\ScadaBridge_pre-061432c8_20261115T191851.bak(wonder-sql-vq03)RemoveAuditLogHashChain, < 1 s)AuditLog__HashChain__Enabledremoved (13 → 12 entries; the rest byte-identical)Gates, all passing on both tiers:
ChainSeq/RowHash, both tables, both indexes andscadabridge_audit_chainer;_purgerand_writerare kept, and the AuditLog rows are kept;verify-chain/verify-heads;service.versionis061432c8; Overview is Up.The purge/partition switch was not exercised: there is no read-only way to run it and nothing is due.
Rollback is binaries plus the DB restore above, plus
reg importof the pre-window Central key, with the QA pair stopped together. Details are in the records. The hash chain is now gone from every tier. The family-wide tamper-evidence question stays with the owner and IT security.