feat(auth)!: ScadaBridge canonical roles + SoD collapse (Audit→Administrator, AuditReadOnly→Viewer) + config-DB migration (Task 1.7)

Standardize role string VALUES on the canonical vocabulary
(Administrator/Designer/Deployer/Viewer; Operator/Engineer unused here):
  Admin        -> Administrator
  Design       -> Designer
  Deployment   -> Deployer
  Audit        -> Administrator   (COLLAPSE; accepted privilege escalation)
  AuditReadOnly-> Viewer          (COLLAPSE; keeps audit-read, no export)

SoD: OperationalAuditRoles = { Administrator, Viewer },
     AuditExportRoles      = { Administrator }
so Viewer reads the audit log + nav but cannot bulk-export, while
Administrator does both + holds the full admin surface (the documented,
accepted auditor/admin SoD collapse).

Atomic move across every enforcement site:
- Roles constants; AuthorizationPolicies (RequireClaim values + SoD arrays +
  honest XML-doc); RoleMapper Deployer check.
- ManagementActor.GetRequiredRole switch + the hard-coded site-scope
  admin-bypass (now Roles.Administrator at all 6 sites). Site-scoping logic
  is otherwise unchanged.
- DebugStreamHub Administrator/Deployer gates (Deployer kept case-sensitive).
- CentralUI BrowseService/BindingTester Designer guards; LdapMappingForm
  dropdown now offers canonical values (incl. Viewer).
- Config-DB seed (LdapGroupMappings Id 1-4) + EF migration CanonicalizeRoles:
  Id-keyed UpdateData for seed rows + idempotent raw catch-all UPDATEs for
  operator-added rows. Down is lossy on the collapse (documented in-file).
  No pending model changes.

Tests reworked to the collapsed model across Security/CentralUI/
ManagementService/ConfigurationDatabase/Integration suites, incl. explicit
Viewer-reads-not-exports and former-Audit-now-Administrator-escalation cases.

CHANGELOG: BREAKING security note documenting the canonicalization + SoD
collapse.

tests/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.IntegrationTests/SecurityHardeningTests.cs

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ public class SecurityHardeningTests
         var token = jwtService.GenerateToken(
             displayName: "Test",
             username: "test",
-            roles: new[] { "Admin" },
+            roles: new[] { "Administrator" },
             permittedSiteIds: null);
 
         Assert.NotNull(token);
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ public class SecurityHardeningTests
         var token = jwtService.GenerateToken(
             displayName: "Test",
             username: "test",
-            roles: new[] { "Admin" },
+            roles: new[] { "Administrator" },
             permittedSiteIds: null);
 
         // JWT tokens are base64-encoded; the signing key should not appear in the payload
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ public class SecurityHardeningTests
         var token = jwtService.GenerateToken(
             displayName: "User",
             username: "user",
-            roles: new[] { "Admin" },
+            roles: new[] { "Administrator" },
             permittedSiteIds: null);
 
         // Tamper with the token payload (second segment)
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ public class SecurityHardeningTests
         var originalToken = jwtService.GenerateToken(
             displayName: "Original User",
             username: "orig_user",
-            roles: new[] { "Admin", "Design" },
+            roles: new[] { "Administrator", "Designer" },
             permittedSiteIds: new[] { "site-1" });
 
         var principal = jwtService.ValidateToken(originalToken);
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ public class SecurityHardeningTests
         // Refresh the token
         var refreshedToken = jwtService.RefreshToken(
             principal!,
-            new[] { "Admin", "Design" },
+            new[] { "Administrator", "Designer" },
             new[] { "site-1" });
 
         Assert.NotNull(refreshedToken);