Files
ScadaBridge/tests/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.IntegrationTests/SecurityHardeningTests.cs
T
Joseph Doherty b104760b3a feat(auth)!: ScadaBridge canonical roles + SoD collapse (Audit→Administrator, AuditReadOnly→Viewer) + config-DB migration (Task 1.7)
Standardize role string VALUES on the canonical vocabulary
(Administrator/Designer/Deployer/Viewer; Operator/Engineer unused here):
  Admin        -> Administrator
  Design       -> Designer
  Deployment   -> Deployer
  Audit        -> Administrator   (COLLAPSE; accepted privilege escalation)
  AuditReadOnly-> Viewer          (COLLAPSE; keeps audit-read, no export)

SoD: OperationalAuditRoles = { Administrator, Viewer },
     AuditExportRoles      = { Administrator }
so Viewer reads the audit log + nav but cannot bulk-export, while
Administrator does both + holds the full admin surface (the documented,
accepted auditor/admin SoD collapse).

Atomic move across every enforcement site:
- Roles constants; AuthorizationPolicies (RequireClaim values + SoD arrays +
  honest XML-doc); RoleMapper Deployer check.
- ManagementActor.GetRequiredRole switch + the hard-coded site-scope
  admin-bypass (now Roles.Administrator at all 6 sites). Site-scoping logic
  is otherwise unchanged.
- DebugStreamHub Administrator/Deployer gates (Deployer kept case-sensitive).
- CentralUI BrowseService/BindingTester Designer guards; LdapMappingForm
  dropdown now offers canonical values (incl. Viewer).
- Config-DB seed (LdapGroupMappings Id 1-4) + EF migration CanonicalizeRoles:
  Id-keyed UpdateData for seed rows + idempotent raw catch-all UPDATEs for
  operator-added rows. Down is lossy on the collapse (documented in-file).
  No pending model changes.

Tests reworked to the collapsed model across Security/CentralUI/
ManagementService/ConfigurationDatabase/Integration suites, incl. explicit
Viewer-reads-not-exports and former-Audit-now-Administrator-escalation cases.

CHANGELOG: BREAKING security note documenting the canonicalization + SoD
collapse.
2026-06-02 08:00:47 -04:00

195 lines
6.7 KiB
C#

using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions.Ldap;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Security;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.IntegrationTests;
/// <summary>
/// WP-5 (Phase 8): Security hardening tests.
/// Verifies LDAPS enforcement, JWT key length, secret scrubbing, and API key protection.
/// </summary>
public class SecurityHardeningTests
{
private static JwtTokenService CreateJwtService(string signingKey = "integration-test-signing-key-must-be-at-least-32-chars-long")
{
var options = Options.Create(new SecurityOptions
{
JwtSigningKey = signingKey,
JwtExpiryMinutes = 15,
IdleTimeoutMinutes = 30,
JwtRefreshThresholdMinutes = 5
});
return new JwtTokenService(options, NullLogger<JwtTokenService>.Instance);
}
[Fact]
public void LdapOptions_Transport_DefaultsToLdaps()
{
// Production requires encrypted transport. The shared LdapOptions defaults to
// LDAPS (secure-by-default), preserving the donor's LdapUseTls=true default.
var options = new LdapOptions();
Assert.Equal(LdapTransport.Ldaps, options.Transport);
}
[Fact]
public void LdapOptions_AllowInsecure_DefaultsToFalse()
{
var options = new LdapOptions();
Assert.False(options.AllowInsecure);
}
[Fact]
public void JwtSigningKey_MinimumLength_Enforced()
{
// HMAC-SHA256 requires a key of at least 32 bytes (256 bits).
var jwtService = CreateJwtService();
var token = jwtService.GenerateToken(
displayName: "Test",
username: "test",
roles: new[] { "Administrator" },
permittedSiteIds: null);
Assert.NotNull(token);
Assert.True(token.Length > 0);
}
[Fact]
public void JwtSigningKey_ShortKey_FailsValidation()
{
var shortKey = "tooshort";
Assert.True(shortKey.Length < 32,
"Test key must be shorter than 32 chars to verify minimum length enforcement");
}
[Fact]
public void LogOutputTemplate_DoesNotContainSecrets()
{
// Verify the Serilog output template does not include secret-bearing properties.
var template = "[{Timestamp:HH:mm:ss} {Level:u3}] [{NodeRole}/{NodeHostname}] {Message:lj}{NewLine}{Exception}";
Assert.DoesNotContain("Password", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
Assert.DoesNotContain("ApiKey", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
Assert.DoesNotContain("Secret", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
Assert.DoesNotContain("SigningKey", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
Assert.DoesNotContain("ConnectionString", template, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
[Fact]
public void LogEnrichment_ContainsExpectedProperties()
{
var enrichmentProperties = new[] { "SiteId", "NodeHostname", "NodeRole" };
foreach (var prop in enrichmentProperties)
{
Assert.DoesNotContain("Password", prop, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
Assert.DoesNotContain("Key", prop, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
}
[Fact]
public void JwtToken_DoesNotContainSigningKey()
{
var jwtService = CreateJwtService();
var token = jwtService.GenerateToken(
displayName: "Test",
username: "test",
roles: new[] { "Administrator" },
permittedSiteIds: null);
// JWT tokens are base64-encoded; the signing key should not appear in the payload
Assert.DoesNotContain("signing-key", token, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
[Fact]
public void SecurityOptions_JwtExpiryDefaults_AreSecure()
{
var options = new SecurityOptions();
Assert.Equal(15, options.JwtExpiryMinutes);
Assert.Equal(30, options.IdleTimeoutMinutes);
Assert.Equal(5, options.JwtRefreshThresholdMinutes);
}
[Fact]
public void JwtToken_TamperedPayload_FailsValidation()
{
var jwtService = CreateJwtService();
var token = jwtService.GenerateToken(
displayName: "User",
username: "user",
roles: new[] { "Administrator" },
permittedSiteIds: null);
// Tamper with the token payload (second segment)
var parts = token.Split('.');
Assert.Equal(3, parts.Length);
// Flip a character in the payload
var tamperedPayload = parts[1];
if (tamperedPayload.Length > 5)
{
var chars = tamperedPayload.ToCharArray();
chars[5] = chars[5] == 'A' ? 'B' : 'A';
tamperedPayload = new string(chars);
}
var tamperedToken = $"{parts[0]}.{tamperedPayload}.{parts[2]}";
var principal = jwtService.ValidateToken(tamperedToken);
Assert.Null(principal);
}
[Fact]
public void JwtRefreshToken_PreservesIdentity()
{
var jwtService = CreateJwtService();
var originalToken = jwtService.GenerateToken(
displayName: "Original User",
username: "orig_user",
roles: new[] { "Administrator", "Designer" },
permittedSiteIds: new[] { "site-1" });
var principal = jwtService.ValidateToken(originalToken);
Assert.NotNull(principal);
// Refresh the token
var refreshedToken = jwtService.RefreshToken(
principal!,
new[] { "Administrator", "Designer" },
new[] { "site-1" });
Assert.NotNull(refreshedToken);
var refreshedPrincipal = jwtService.ValidateToken(refreshedToken!);
Assert.NotNull(refreshedPrincipal);
Assert.Equal("Original User", refreshedPrincipal!.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.DisplayNameClaimType)?.Value);
Assert.Equal("orig_user", refreshedPrincipal.FindFirst(JwtTokenService.UsernameClaimType)?.Value);
}
[Fact]
public void StartupValidator_RejectsInsecureLdapInProduction()
{
// The shared LdapOptionsValidator (registered with ValidateOnStart by AddZbLdapAuth)
// rejects plaintext transport (Transport=None) unless AllowInsecure is explicitly set,
// preserving the donor's production LDAPS-enforcement guarantee.
var insecure = new LdapOptions
{
Server = "ldap.example.com",
SearchBase = "dc=example,dc=com",
ServiceAccountDn = "cn=admin,dc=example,dc=com",
Transport = LdapTransport.None,
AllowInsecure = false,
};
var result = new ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Ldap.LdapOptionsValidator().Validate(name: null, insecure);
Assert.True(result.Failed);
Assert.Contains(nameof(LdapOptions.AllowInsecure), result.FailureMessage);
}
}