refactor: rename ScadaLink → ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge (code + projects + namespaces)

Solution + 23 src projects + 26 test projects renamed; folders, csproj, namespaces, and ScadaLinkDbContext/ScadaBridgeDbContext class updated. ActorSystem "scadalink" → "scadabridge", Akka seed-node URLs migrated. SQL roles/logins, LDAP domains, CLI command name, and CLI config dir (~/.scadalink → ~/.scadabridge) also renamed. Build green; 5 Host.Tests fail awaiting SQL login rename in next commit. Pre-existing StaleTagMonitor timing flakes unchanged. Rename script committed at tools/rename-to-scadabridge.sh.
2026-05-28 09:37:45 -04:00
parent 6d87ee3c3b
commit 7b0b9c7365
1531 changed files with 11180 additions and 11054 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+using System.Security.Cryptography;
+using System.Text.Json;
+using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Types.Transport;
+
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Transport.Encryption;
+
+/// <summary>
+/// T-005: computes the AES-GCM Associated Authenticated Data (AAD) for a bundle's
+/// encrypted payload. AAD is the SHA-256 of the manifest after normalising the two
+/// derivative fields (<c>ContentHash</c>, <c>Encryption</c>) to known sentinel
+/// values — those depend on the ciphertext and the IV, so they cannot themselves
+/// be authenticated, but every OTHER manifest field (<c>SourceEnvironment</c>,
+/// <c>ExportedBy</c>, <c>ScadaBridgeVersion</c>, <c>Summary</c>, <c>Contents</c>,
+/// <c>CreatedAtUtc</c>, …) participates in the GCM tag.
+/// <para>
+/// Threading this byte array through <c>AesGcm.Encrypt</c> / <c>AesGcm.Decrypt</c>
+/// makes the Step-4 "type the source environment name to confirm" gate
+/// tamper-evident: a flipped <c>SourceEnvironment</c> on a stolen bundle yields
+/// an <c>AuthenticationTagMismatchException</c> on decrypt instead of producing
+/// a valid plaintext with a forged origin label.
+/// </para>
+/// </summary>
+public static class BundleManifestAad
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// JSON options matching <c>BundleSerializer.JsonOptions</c> so the AAD bytes
+    /// are stable across the encrypt + decrypt side.
+    /// </summary>
+    private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions JsonOptions = new()
+    {
+        WriteIndented = false,
+        DefaultIgnoreCondition = JsonIgnoreCondition.WhenWritingNull,
+        Converters = { new JsonStringEnumConverter() },
+    };
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Computes the AAD bytes for the supplied manifest. The two derivative
+    /// fields are normalised to fixed sentinels so the AAD is independent of the
+    /// ciphertext / IV that will eventually populate them in the on-disk
+    /// manifest.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <param name="manifest">The manifest whose non-derivative fields should be authenticated.</param>
+    /// <returns>SHA-256 digest of the canonicalised manifest bytes.</returns>
+    public static byte[] Compute(BundleManifest manifest)
+    {
+        ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(manifest);
+        var canonical = manifest with
+        {
+            ContentHash = string.Empty,
+            Encryption = null,
+        };
+        var canonicalBytes = JsonSerializer.SerializeToUtf8Bytes(canonical, JsonOptions);
+        return SHA256.HashData(canonicalBytes);
+    }
+}