Files
ScadaBridge/src/ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Transport/Encryption/BundleManifestAad.cs
T
Joseph Doherty 7b0b9c7365 refactor: rename ScadaLink → ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge (code + projects + namespaces)
Solution + 23 src projects + 26 test projects renamed; folders, csproj,
namespaces, and ScadaLinkDbContext/ScadaBridgeDbContext class updated.
ActorSystem "scadalink" → "scadabridge", Akka seed-node URLs migrated.
SQL roles/logins, LDAP domains, CLI command name, and CLI config dir
(~/.scadalink → ~/.scadabridge) also renamed.

Build green; 5 Host.Tests fail awaiting SQL login rename in next commit.
Pre-existing StaleTagMonitor timing flakes unchanged.

Rename script committed at tools/rename-to-scadabridge.sh.
2026-05-28 09:37:45 -04:00

57 lines
2.4 KiB
C#

using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Types.Transport;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Transport.Encryption;
/// <summary>
/// T-005: computes the AES-GCM Associated Authenticated Data (AAD) for a bundle's
/// encrypted payload. AAD is the SHA-256 of the manifest after normalising the two
/// derivative fields (<c>ContentHash</c>, <c>Encryption</c>) to known sentinel
/// values — those depend on the ciphertext and the IV, so they cannot themselves
/// be authenticated, but every OTHER manifest field (<c>SourceEnvironment</c>,
/// <c>ExportedBy</c>, <c>ScadaBridgeVersion</c>, <c>Summary</c>, <c>Contents</c>,
/// <c>CreatedAtUtc</c>, …) participates in the GCM tag.
/// <para>
/// Threading this byte array through <c>AesGcm.Encrypt</c> / <c>AesGcm.Decrypt</c>
/// makes the Step-4 "type the source environment name to confirm" gate
/// tamper-evident: a flipped <c>SourceEnvironment</c> on a stolen bundle yields
/// an <c>AuthenticationTagMismatchException</c> on decrypt instead of producing
/// a valid plaintext with a forged origin label.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public static class BundleManifestAad
{
/// <summary>
/// JSON options matching <c>BundleSerializer.JsonOptions</c> so the AAD bytes
/// are stable across the encrypt + decrypt side.
/// </summary>
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions JsonOptions = new()
{
WriteIndented = false,
DefaultIgnoreCondition = JsonIgnoreCondition.WhenWritingNull,
Converters = { new JsonStringEnumConverter() },
};
/// <summary>
/// Computes the AAD bytes for the supplied manifest. The two derivative
/// fields are normalised to fixed sentinels so the AAD is independent of the
/// ciphertext / IV that will eventually populate them in the on-disk
/// manifest.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="manifest">The manifest whose non-derivative fields should be authenticated.</param>
/// <returns>SHA-256 digest of the canonicalised manifest bytes.</returns>
public static byte[] Compute(BundleManifest manifest)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(manifest);
var canonical = manifest with
{
ContentHash = string.Empty,
Encryption = null,
};
var canonicalBytes = JsonSerializer.SerializeToUtf8Bytes(canonical, JsonOptions);
return SHA256.HashData(canonicalBytes);
}
}