refactor: rename ScadaLink → ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge (code + projects + namespaces)

Solution + 23 src projects + 26 test projects renamed; folders, csproj,
namespaces, and ScadaLinkDbContext/ScadaBridgeDbContext class updated.
ActorSystem "scadalink" → "scadabridge", Akka seed-node URLs migrated.
SQL roles/logins, LDAP domains, CLI command name, and CLI config dir
(~/.scadalink → ~/.scadabridge) also renamed.

Build green; 5 Host.Tests fail awaiting SQL login rename in next commit.
Pre-existing StaleTagMonitor timing flakes unchanged.

Rename script committed at tools/rename-to-scadabridge.sh.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-05-28 09:37:45 -04:00
parent 6d87ee3c3b
commit 7b0b9c7365
1531 changed files with 11180 additions and 11054 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Types.Transport;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Transport.Encryption;
/// <summary>
/// T-005: computes the AES-GCM Associated Authenticated Data (AAD) for a bundle's
/// encrypted payload. AAD is the SHA-256 of the manifest after normalising the two
/// derivative fields (<c>ContentHash</c>, <c>Encryption</c>) to known sentinel
/// values — those depend on the ciphertext and the IV, so they cannot themselves
/// be authenticated, but every OTHER manifest field (<c>SourceEnvironment</c>,
/// <c>ExportedBy</c>, <c>ScadaBridgeVersion</c>, <c>Summary</c>, <c>Contents</c>,
/// <c>CreatedAtUtc</c>, …) participates in the GCM tag.
/// <para>
/// Threading this byte array through <c>AesGcm.Encrypt</c> / <c>AesGcm.Decrypt</c>
/// makes the Step-4 "type the source environment name to confirm" gate
/// tamper-evident: a flipped <c>SourceEnvironment</c> on a stolen bundle yields
/// an <c>AuthenticationTagMismatchException</c> on decrypt instead of producing
/// a valid plaintext with a forged origin label.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public static class BundleManifestAad
{
/// <summary>
/// JSON options matching <c>BundleSerializer.JsonOptions</c> so the AAD bytes
/// are stable across the encrypt + decrypt side.
/// </summary>
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions JsonOptions = new()
{
WriteIndented = false,
DefaultIgnoreCondition = JsonIgnoreCondition.WhenWritingNull,
Converters = { new JsonStringEnumConverter() },
};
/// <summary>
/// Computes the AAD bytes for the supplied manifest. The two derivative
/// fields are normalised to fixed sentinels so the AAD is independent of the
/// ciphertext / IV that will eventually populate them in the on-disk
/// manifest.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="manifest">The manifest whose non-derivative fields should be authenticated.</param>
/// <returns>SHA-256 digest of the canonicalised manifest bytes.</returns>
public static byte[] Compute(BundleManifest manifest)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(manifest);
var canonical = manifest with
{
ContentHash = string.Empty,
Encryption = null,
};
var canonicalBytes = JsonSerializer.SerializeToUtf8Bytes(canonical, JsonOptions);
return SHA256.HashData(canonicalBytes);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Types.Transport;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Transport.Encryption;
/// <summary>
/// AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption with a PBKDF2-SHA256 derived key.
/// Output format is <c>ciphertext || tag</c> (tag is the GCM authentication tag).
/// Each encrypt call produces a fresh random salt + nonce so re-encrypting the
/// same plaintext yields a different ciphertext.
/// </summary>
public sealed class BundleSecretEncryptor
{
private const int KeyBytes = 32; // AES-256.
private const int SaltBytes = 16;
private const int NonceBytes = 12; // GCM standard.
private const int TagBytes = 16;
/// <summary>
/// Encrypts plaintext using AES-256-GCM with a PBKDF2-derived key and a fresh random salt and nonce.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="plaintext">The data to encrypt.</param>
/// <param name="passphrase">The passphrase used to derive the encryption key.</param>
/// <param name="iterations">PBKDF2 iteration count for key derivation.</param>
/// <param name="associatedData">
/// T-005: optional AES-GCM Associated Authenticated Data — typically
/// <see cref="BundleManifestAad.Compute"/>(manifest). Binds the manifest's
/// non-derivative fields (source environment, exporter, summary, …) to the
/// ciphertext so any tampering of those fields yields an authentication-tag
/// mismatch on decrypt. Pass <see cref="ReadOnlySpan{Byte}.Empty"/> for the
/// legacy no-AAD format; the decrypter must mirror the choice.
/// </param>
/// <returns>The ciphertext (with appended GCM tag) and the encryption metadata needed to decrypt.</returns>
public (byte[] Ciphertext, EncryptionMetadata Metadata) Encrypt(
ReadOnlySpan<byte> plaintext,
string passphrase,
int iterations,
ReadOnlySpan<byte> associatedData = default)
{
var salt = RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(SaltBytes);
var nonce = RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(NonceBytes);
var key = DeriveKey(passphrase, salt, iterations);
var ciphertext = new byte[plaintext.Length];
var tag = new byte[TagBytes];
using var aes = new AesGcm(key, TagBytes);
aes.Encrypt(nonce, plaintext, ciphertext, tag, associatedData);
// Format: ciphertext || tag.
var output = new byte[ciphertext.Length + TagBytes];
Buffer.BlockCopy(ciphertext, 0, output, 0, ciphertext.Length);
Buffer.BlockCopy(tag, 0, output, ciphertext.Length, TagBytes);
return (output, new EncryptionMetadata(
"AES-256-GCM", "PBKDF2-SHA256", iterations,
Convert.ToBase64String(salt),
Convert.ToBase64String(nonce)));
}
/// <summary>
/// Decrypts a payload produced by <see cref="Encrypt"/> using the supplied metadata and passphrase.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="payload">The ciphertext with appended GCM tag.</param>
/// <param name="metadata">Encryption metadata carrying the algorithm, KDF, salt, nonce, and iterations.</param>
/// <param name="passphrase">The passphrase used to derive the decryption key.</param>
/// <param name="associatedData">
/// T-005: AAD that was passed to <see cref="Encrypt"/>. Must match exactly —
/// any tampering of the manifest used to derive AAD yields an authentication-
/// tag mismatch (surfaces as <see cref="CryptographicException"/>, specifically
/// <c>AuthenticationTagMismatchException</c> on .NET 10).
/// </param>
/// <returns>The decrypted plaintext bytes.</returns>
public byte[] Decrypt(
ReadOnlySpan<byte> payload,
EncryptionMetadata metadata,
string passphrase,
ReadOnlySpan<byte> associatedData = default)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(metadata);
if (metadata.Algorithm != "AES-256-GCM" || metadata.Kdf != "PBKDF2-SHA256")
{
throw new CryptographicException("Unsupported bundle encryption parameters.");
}
var salt = Convert.FromBase64String(metadata.SaltB64);
var nonce = Convert.FromBase64String(metadata.IvB64);
var key = DeriveKey(passphrase, salt, metadata.Iterations);
if (payload.Length < TagBytes)
{
throw new CryptographicException("Bundle payload too short.");
}
var ctLen = payload.Length - TagBytes;
var ciphertext = payload[..ctLen];
var tag = payload[ctLen..];
var plaintext = new byte[ctLen];
using var aes = new AesGcm(key, TagBytes);
aes.Decrypt(nonce, ciphertext, tag, plaintext, associatedData);
return plaintext;
}
private static byte[] DeriveKey(string passphrase, byte[] salt, int iterations)
{
return Rfc2898DeriveBytes.Pbkdf2(passphrase, salt, iterations, HashAlgorithmName.SHA256, KeyBytes);
}
}