feat(grpc): host CentralControlService on the central node (T1A.2)

Central now ALSO listens for the seven site→central control messages over
gRPC, alongside the existing ClusterClient path. Nothing flips to gRPC yet —
sites keep CentralTransport=Akka (T1A.3's job); central simply starts also
accepting.

- CentralControlGrpcService (Communication.Grpc): decodes each RPC onto the
  SAME in-process message the ClusterClient path carries, Asks the existing
  CentralCommunicationActor (zero handler-logic changes), encodes the reply via
  the T1A.1 mapper. Readiness-gated like SiteStreamGrpcServer.SetReady —
  Unavailable until AkkaHostedService hands the actor over. Heartbeat stays
  fire-and-forget (Tell, always-OK, never gated on readiness). Ingest reuses the
  shared SiteStreamGrpcServer.AuditIngestAskTimeout constant. Fault→status
  mapping is retry-aware: Unavailable (never dispatched, safe to cross-node
  retry) vs DeadlineExceeded/Internal (it ran, do not re-send elsewhere).

- CentralControlAuthInterceptor (Host): a SEPARATE interceptor class, not a
  variant constructor on ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor. Central's model is per-site
  (verify the Bearer token against the key for the site in the required
  x-scadabridge-site header, via ISitePskProvider) where a site verifies its one
  own-key — a genuinely different model. Fail-closed on every branch: missing or
  blank header, unresolvable key, and mismatched token all → PermissionDenied,
  never pass-through. One public constructor only (the explicit-prefix ctor is
  internal), pinned by a reflection test — a second public ctor makes
  Grpc.AspNetCore's GetFactory() throw per-call and silently disables the gate.

- Explicit Kestrel h2c listener on new option ScadaBridge:Node:CentralGrpcPort
  (default 8083, symmetric with sites), mirroring the Site branch. Additive to
  central's :5000 HTTP/1 surface, which is untouched — gRPC does NOT go through
  Traefik (HTTP/1 only). Registered by type on AddGrpc; service mapped with
  MapGrpcService. Port range-validated by NodeOptionsValidator.

- Rig: publish the central gRPC port 9013:8083 / 9014:8083 on both central nodes
  so a later task can exercise it.

Tests: CentralControlEndToEndTests (Host.Tests, TestServer + real interceptor +
real service over a stub actor) proves auth positives/negatives are
distinguishable and covers unary + the ingest bridge shapes; the interceptor is
registered BY TYPE, never in DI. CentralControlAuthInterceptorTests pins the
per-site gate + one-public-ctor invariant. CentralControlGrpcServiceTests
(Communication.Tests, TestKit) covers the readiness gate, fire-and-forget
heartbeat, and the DeadlineExceeded-vs-Unavailable status mapping. No active
<Protobuf> item. Communication.Tests (356) + Host.Tests (384) green.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-07-22 18:53:59 -04:00
parent d7455577a8
commit 780bb9c369
10 changed files with 1245 additions and 0 deletions
+2
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ services:
ports:
- "9001:5000" # Web UI + Inbound API
- "9011:8081" # Akka remoting (host access for CLI/debugging)
- "9013:8083" # gRPC control plane (CentralControlService, T1A.2)
volumes:
- ./central-node-a/appsettings.Central.json:/app/appsettings.Central.json:ro
- ./central-node-a/logs:/app/logs
@@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ services:
ports:
- "9002:5000" # Web UI + Inbound API
- "9012:8081" # Akka remoting
- "9014:8083" # gRPC control plane (CentralControlService, T1A.2)
volumes:
- ./central-node-b/appsettings.Central.json:/app/appsettings.Central.json:ro
- ./central-node-b/logs:/app/logs
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
using Akka.Actor;
using Google.Protobuf.WellKnownTypes;
using Grpc.Core;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Messages.Audit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Messages.Deployment;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Messages.Health;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Messages.Notification;
using GrpcStatus = Grpc.Core.Status;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication.Grpc;
/// <summary>
/// Central-hosted gRPC face of the seven site→central control messages
/// (<c>Protos/central_control.proto</c>). Decodes each request onto the SAME in-process
/// message type the Akka <c>ClusterClient</c> path already carries, <c>Ask</c>s
/// <see cref="Actors.CentralCommunicationActor"/>, and encodes the reply back.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// <b>Direction is inverted from <see cref="SiteStreamGrpcServer"/>.</b> That server runs on a
/// site and central dials in; this one runs on CENTRAL and the site dials in. The two listen on
/// the same port number (8083) on their respective nodes, which is symmetry, not a collision —
/// a node is either central or a site, never both.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>Zero handler logic lives here.</b> Every RPC lands on a receive
/// <c>CentralCommunicationActor</c> already implements for the ClusterClient path, so the two
/// transports cannot drift in behaviour: the actor is the single implementation, and this class
/// is a codec plus an <c>Ask</c>. That is also why the service takes the actor through
/// <see cref="SetReady"/> rather than resolving anything from DI — the actor is created by the
/// host's Akka bootstrap, not by the container.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>Fault semantics deliberately differ from <see cref="SiteStreamGrpcServer"/>'s ingest
/// RPCs.</b> That server answers a failed audit ingest with an EMPTY <c>IngestAck</c>; this one
/// fails the call with a non-OK status. Both leave the site's rows <c>Pending</c> for the next
/// drain, so the outcome is the same — but this service replaces the ClusterClient path, whose
/// documented behaviour is to propagate the fault (<c>CentralCommunicationActor</c>'s
/// <c>HandleIngestAuditEvents</c> pipes a <c>Status.Failure</c> back), and preserving that keeps
/// a lost batch visible as a failure rather than as a successful call that acked nothing.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>Status mapping, and why it is not uniform.</b> A site transport may safely re-send a call
/// to the peer central node only when the call provably never ran. So:
/// </para>
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item><see cref="StatusCode.Unavailable"/> — this node is not ready; nothing was dispatched,
/// so a cross-node retry is safe and correct.</item>
/// <item><see cref="StatusCode.DeadlineExceeded"/> — the <c>Ask</c> timed out. The message WAS
/// delivered and may have been processed; retrying it on the other node would duplicate work.</item>
/// <item><see cref="StatusCode.Internal"/> — the handler faulted (a piped
/// <see cref="Akka.Actor.Status.Failure"/>, e.g. a database error inside reconcile). Same
/// reasoning: it ran, so do not re-send it elsewhere.</item>
/// </list>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class CentralControlGrpcService : CentralControlService.CentralControlServiceBase
{
private readonly ILogger<CentralControlGrpcService> _logger;
private readonly CommunicationOptions _options;
// Null until the host's Akka bootstrap hands the actor over. Doubles as the readiness
// flag: a call arriving before then cannot be served and is refused with Unavailable.
// Volatile because SetReady runs on the startup thread while calls are served on
// Kestrel's thread pool.
private volatile IActorRef? _central;
/// <summary>
/// Creates the service. <b>This must remain the only public constructor</b> — see
/// <see cref="SetReady"/> for how the actor arrives, and the Host's
/// <c>CentralControlAuthInterceptor</c> for the interceptor-side version of the same rule.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="logger">Logger for readiness and fault diagnostics.</param>
/// <param name="options">Communication options supplying the per-RPC <c>Ask</c> timeouts.</param>
public CentralControlGrpcService(
ILogger<CentralControlGrpcService> logger,
IOptions<CommunicationOptions> options)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(logger);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(options);
_logger = logger;
_options = options.Value;
}
/// <summary>
/// Hands the <c>CentralCommunicationActor</c> to the service and opens the gate. Mirrors
/// <see cref="SiteStreamGrpcServer.SetReady"/>: the gRPC service is a DI singleton created
/// before the actor system exists, so the actor arrives post-construction.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The contract is deliberately narrow, exactly as on the site side: it asserts that the
/// actor exists and can receive, NOT that every downstream singleton proxy
/// (<c>notification-outbox</c>, <c>audit-log-ingest</c>) has registered itself yet. Those
/// register moments later in the same startup path, and the actor already answers a call
/// that beats them with the same "not available, retry" reply it gives on the ClusterClient
/// path — so gating readiness on them would add nothing but a longer window in which sites
/// see <see cref="StatusCode.Unavailable"/>.
/// </remarks>
/// <param name="centralCommunicationActor">The central communication actor.</param>
public void SetReady(IActorRef centralCommunicationActor)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(centralCommunicationActor);
_central = centralCommunicationActor;
}
/// <summary>Exposed for wiring assertions in tests.</summary>
internal bool IsReady => _central is not null;
/// <inheritdoc />
public override async Task<NotificationSubmitAckDto> SubmitNotification(
NotificationSubmitDto request, ServerCallContext context)
{
var central = RequireReady(context);
var ack = await AskAsync<NotificationSubmitAck>(
central,
CentralControlDtoMapper.FromDto(request),
_options.NotificationForwardTimeout,
context).ConfigureAwait(false);
return CentralControlDtoMapper.ToDto(ack);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public override async Task<NotificationStatusResponseDto> QueryNotificationStatus(
NotificationStatusQueryDto request, ServerCallContext context)
{
var central = RequireReady(context);
var response = await AskAsync<NotificationStatusResponse>(
central,
CentralControlDtoMapper.FromDto(request),
_options.NotificationForwardTimeout,
context).ConfigureAwait(false);
return CentralControlDtoMapper.ToDto(response);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public override async Task<IngestAck> IngestAuditEvents(
AuditEventBatch request, ServerCallContext context)
{
// An empty batch is a no-op the actor need never see; answering it here also means a
// site that drains an empty queue does not fail against a not-yet-ready central.
if (request.Events.Count == 0)
{
return new IngestAck();
}
var central = RequireReady(context);
var reply = await AskAsync<IngestAuditEventsReply>(
central,
CentralControlDtoMapper.FromDto(request),
SiteStreamGrpcServer.AuditIngestAskTimeout,
context).ConfigureAwait(false);
return CentralControlDtoMapper.ToIngestAck(reply.AcceptedEventIds);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public override async Task<IngestAck> IngestCachedTelemetry(
CachedTelemetryBatch request, ServerCallContext context)
{
if (request.Packets.Count == 0)
{
return new IngestAck();
}
var central = RequireReady(context);
var reply = await AskAsync<IngestCachedTelemetryReply>(
central,
CentralControlDtoMapper.FromDto(request),
SiteStreamGrpcServer.AuditIngestAskTimeout,
context).ConfigureAwait(false);
return CentralControlDtoMapper.ToIngestAck(reply.AcceptedEventIds);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public override async Task<ReconcileSiteResponseDto> ReconcileSite(
ReconcileSiteRequestDto request, ServerCallContext context)
{
var central = RequireReady(context);
var response = await AskAsync<ReconcileSiteResponse>(
central,
CentralControlDtoMapper.FromDto(request),
_options.QueryTimeout,
context).ConfigureAwait(false);
return CentralControlDtoMapper.ToDto(response);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public override async Task<SiteHealthReportAckDto> ReportSiteHealth(
SiteHealthReportDto request, ServerCallContext context)
{
var central = RequireReady(context);
var ack = await AskAsync<SiteHealthReportAck>(
central,
CentralControlDtoMapper.FromDto(request),
_options.HealthReportTimeout,
context).ConfigureAwait(false);
return CentralControlDtoMapper.ToDto(ack);
}
/// <summary>
/// Application heartbeat — <b>always answers OK</b>, even when this node is not ready.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The heartbeat is fire-and-forget on both sides: nothing on the site consumes the reply,
/// and the site's heartbeat timer must never take a fault (a failing heartbeat that raised
/// an error would be a self-inflicted outage on a purely informational signal). So this is
/// the one RPC that does not go through <see cref="RequireReady"/>: a heartbeat arriving
/// before the actor exists is logged and dropped, exactly as the actor itself drops one
/// that arrives before <c>ICentralHealthAggregator</c> is resolvable. Liveness is still
/// detected — the aggregator's offline timeout fires when the heartbeats stop landing.
/// </remarks>
/// <param name="request">The heartbeat.</param>
/// <param name="context">The gRPC call context.</param>
/// <returns>An empty reply, always.</returns>
public override Task<Empty> Heartbeat(HeartbeatDto request, ServerCallContext context)
{
var central = _central;
if (central is null)
{
_logger.LogDebug(
"Dropped a heartbeat from site {SiteId}: the central communication actor is not "
+ "ready yet. Heartbeats are fire-and-forget, so the call still succeeds.",
request.SiteId);
return Task.FromResult(new Empty());
}
// Tell, never Ask: the actor's HandleHeartbeat sends no reply.
central.Tell(CentralControlDtoMapper.FromDto(request), ActorRefs.NoSender);
return Task.FromResult(new Empty());
}
/// <summary>
/// Returns the central communication actor, or throws <see cref="StatusCode.Unavailable"/>
/// when the host has not finished bringing the actor system up.
/// </summary>
private IActorRef RequireReady(ServerCallContext context)
{
var central = _central;
if (central is not null)
{
return central;
}
_logger.LogWarning(
"Refused a control-plane call to {Method}: the central communication actor is not "
+ "ready yet. Nothing was dispatched, so the caller may retry (including against "
+ "the peer central node).",
context.Method);
throw new RpcException(new GrpcStatus(
StatusCode.Unavailable,
"Central control plane is not ready: the actor system is still starting."));
}
/// <summary>
/// Asks the central actor and maps a fault onto the status code that tells the caller
/// whether a cross-node retry is safe. See the class remarks for the mapping rationale.
/// </summary>
private async Task<TReply> AskAsync<TReply>(
IActorRef central, object message, TimeSpan timeout, ServerCallContext context)
{
try
{
return await central.Ask<TReply>(message, timeout, context.CancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (AskTimeoutException ex)
{
_logger.LogWarning(ex,
"Control-plane call {Method} timed out after {Timeout} waiting for the central "
+ "communication actor.",
context.Method, timeout);
throw new RpcException(new GrpcStatus(
StatusCode.DeadlineExceeded,
$"Central did not answer within {timeout}."));
}
catch (OperationCanceledException)
{
// The client gave up or its deadline expired; there is no one left to answer.
throw new RpcException(new GrpcStatus(
StatusCode.Cancelled, "The call was cancelled."));
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.LogError(ex,
"Control-plane call {Method} faulted inside the central communication actor.",
context.Method);
throw new RpcException(new GrpcStatus(
StatusCode.Internal, "Central failed to process the call."));
}
}
}
@@ -436,6 +436,19 @@ akka {{
ClusterClientReceptionist.Get(_actorSystem).RegisterService(centralCommActor);
_logger.LogInformation("CentralCommunicationActor registered with ClusterClientReceptionist");
// Hand the same actor to the central-hosted gRPC control plane (T1A.2) and open its
// readiness gate — the gRPC face Asks this exact actor, so both transports resolve to
// one handler implementation. Mirrors SiteStreamGrpcServer.SetReady on the site side:
// the service is a DI singleton created before the actor system exists, so the actor
// arrives here post-construction. Null on a host that did not register the service
// (e.g. an in-process test harness), so the wiring is a guarded no-op there.
var centralControlGrpc = _serviceProvider
.GetService<ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication.Grpc.CentralControlGrpcService>();
centralControlGrpc?.SetReady(centralCommActor);
_logger.LogInformation(
"CentralControlGrpcService readiness set (service bound: {Bound})",
centralControlGrpc is not null);
// Wire up the CommunicationService with the actor reference
var commService = _serviceProvider.GetService<CommunicationService>();
commService?.SetCommunicationActor(centralCommActor);
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text;
using Grpc.Core;
using Grpc.Core.Interceptors;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication.Grpc;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Host;
/// <summary>
/// Gates the central-hosted gRPC control plane (<c>CentralControlService</c>) with each site's
/// preshared key. The sibling of <see cref="ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor"/>, but with the
/// verification model inverted: a site checks one bearer token against its own single key, whereas
/// central must check the presented token against the key belonging to the SITE that sent it.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// <b>Why a separate class rather than a second constructor on
/// <see cref="ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor"/>.</b> <c>Grpc.AspNetCore</c> registers a
/// type-registered interceptor through <c>InterceptorRegistration.GetFactory()</c>, which throws
/// <c>"Multiple constructors accepting all given argument types have been found"</c> the moment a
/// second public constructor is applicable. That throw lands inside the pipeline on every call and
/// surfaces as <c>Unknown / "Exception was thrown by handler"</c> — the node boots healthy and
/// every gated call dies looking like a handler bug, with correct/wrong/no key all producing the
/// identical error. It shipped once with a fully green suite and was caught only on the rig.
/// Central's model genuinely differs (per-site key by header, not the site's one own-key), so it
/// gets its own class with its own single public constructor rather than a variant ctor on the
/// site interceptor. Both classes are pinned by a reflection test asserting exactly one public
/// constructor.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>Fail-closed on every branch.</b> A gated call is refused with
/// <see cref="StatusCode.PermissionDenied"/> when: the <c>x-scadabridge-site</c> header is
/// missing or blank; no key can be resolved for that site (<see cref="ISitePskProvider"/> throws);
/// or the presented bearer token does not match. There is no pass-through — an unresolvable or
/// absent identity never degrades to "let it in". Non-gated services (should any share the
/// listener) return immediately, matching the site interceptor's shape.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// The comparison is <see cref="CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals"/> over UTF-8, the same
/// constant-time compare the site interceptor and LocalDb sync use.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class CentralControlAuthInterceptor : Interceptor
{
/// <summary>
/// Service prefixes gated by default — the one central-hosted control-plane service. Taken
/// from the generated <c>package scadabridge.centralcontrol.v1; service CentralControlService</c>.
/// </summary>
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> DefaultGatedPrefixes =
new[] { $"/{CentralControlService.Descriptor.FullName}/" };
private readonly IReadOnlyList<string> _gatedPrefixes;
private readonly ISitePskProvider _pskProvider;
private readonly ILogger<CentralControlAuthInterceptor> _logger;
/// <summary>
/// Creates the interceptor gating <see cref="DefaultGatedPrefixes"/>.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <b>This must remain the ONLY public constructor</b> — see the class remarks for why a
/// second one silently disables the gate. Pinned by
/// <c>CentralControlAuthInterceptorTests.TheInterceptorHasExactlyOnePublicConstructor</c>.
/// </remarks>
/// <param name="pskProvider">Resolves each site's preshared key.</param>
/// <param name="logger">Logger for denial diagnostics.</param>
public CentralControlAuthInterceptor(
ISitePskProvider pskProvider,
ILogger<CentralControlAuthInterceptor> logger)
: this(pskProvider, logger, DefaultGatedPrefixes)
{
}
/// <summary>
/// Creates the interceptor gating an explicit prefix set. <b>Internal</b> — a public second
/// constructor would reintroduce the ambiguous-constructor defect described on the class.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="pskProvider">Resolves each site's preshared key.</param>
/// <param name="logger">Logger for denial diagnostics.</param>
/// <param name="gatedPrefixes">Method-path prefixes to gate.</param>
internal CentralControlAuthInterceptor(
ISitePskProvider pskProvider,
ILogger<CentralControlAuthInterceptor> logger,
IReadOnlyList<string> gatedPrefixes)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(pskProvider);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(logger);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(gatedPrefixes);
_pskProvider = pskProvider;
_logger = logger;
_gatedPrefixes = gatedPrefixes;
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public override async Task<TResponse> UnaryServerHandler<TRequest, TResponse>(
TRequest request,
ServerCallContext context,
UnaryServerMethod<TRequest, TResponse> continuation)
{
await AuthorizeAsync(context).ConfigureAwait(false);
return await continuation(request, context).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public override async Task DuplexStreamingServerHandler<TRequest, TResponse>(
IAsyncStreamReader<TRequest> requestStream,
IServerStreamWriter<TResponse> responseStream,
ServerCallContext context,
DuplexStreamingServerMethod<TRequest, TResponse> continuation)
{
await AuthorizeAsync(context).ConfigureAwait(false);
await continuation(requestStream, responseStream, context).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public override async Task<TResponse> ClientStreamingServerHandler<TRequest, TResponse>(
IAsyncStreamReader<TRequest> requestStream,
ServerCallContext context,
ClientStreamingServerMethod<TRequest, TResponse> continuation)
{
await AuthorizeAsync(context).ConfigureAwait(false);
return await continuation(requestStream, context).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public override async Task ServerStreamingServerHandler<TRequest, TResponse>(
TRequest request,
IServerStreamWriter<TResponse> responseStream,
ServerCallContext context,
ServerStreamingServerMethod<TRequest, TResponse> continuation)
{
await AuthorizeAsync(context).ConfigureAwait(false);
await continuation(request, responseStream, context).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
/// <summary>
/// Throws <see cref="RpcException"/> with <see cref="StatusCode.PermissionDenied"/> unless a
/// gated call carries a valid <c>x-scadabridge-site</c> header AND a bearer token matching
/// that site's resolved key. Non-gated calls return immediately.
/// </summary>
private async Task AuthorizeAsync(ServerCallContext context)
{
if (!IsGated(context.Method))
{
return;
}
var siteId = ExtractSiteId(context.RequestHeaders);
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(siteId))
{
_logger.LogWarning(
"Rejected a central control-plane call to {Method}: the required "
+ "'{Header}' metadata header is missing or blank, so there is no per-site key to "
+ "verify against.",
context.Method, ControlPlaneCredentials.SiteHeader);
throw Denied("missing site identity header");
}
string expected;
try
{
expected = await _pskProvider.GetAsync(siteId, context.CancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (OperationCanceledException)
{
throw;
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
// Fail-closed: an unresolvable key is a denial, never a pass-through. The provider
// has already logged the specific cause (missing secret / missing config entry).
_logger.LogWarning(ex,
"Rejected a central control-plane call to {Method}: no preshared key could be "
+ "resolved for site {SiteId}.",
context.Method, siteId);
throw Denied("no key configured for the presented site");
}
var presented = ExtractBearerToken(context.RequestHeaders);
if (presented is null || !FixedTimeEquals(presented, expected))
{
_logger.LogWarning(
"Rejected a central control-plane call to {Method} from site {SiteId}: {Reason}.",
context.Method, siteId,
presented is null ? "no bearer token presented" : "bearer token did not match");
throw Denied("control plane authentication failed");
}
}
private static RpcException Denied(string reason)
=> new(new Status(StatusCode.PermissionDenied, $"Control plane authentication failed: {reason}."));
private bool IsGated(string method)
{
foreach (var prefix in _gatedPrefixes)
{
if (method.StartsWith(prefix, StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
private static string? ExtractSiteId(Metadata headers)
{
foreach (var entry in headers)
{
if (string.Equals(entry.Key, ControlPlaneCredentials.SiteHeader,
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
return entry.Value;
}
}
return null;
}
private static string? ExtractBearerToken(Metadata headers)
{
// gRPC lowercases header keys on the wire; compare case-insensitively so a hand-built
// Metadata in a test behaves the same as a real request.
foreach (var entry in headers)
{
if (!string.Equals(entry.Key, ControlPlaneCredentials.AuthorizationHeader,
StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
continue;
}
var value = entry.Value;
if (value is not null && value.StartsWith("Bearer ", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
return value["Bearer ".Length..];
}
}
return null;
}
private static bool FixedTimeEquals(string presented, string expected)
=> CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals(
Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(presented), Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(expected));
}
@@ -21,6 +21,15 @@ public class NodeOptions
/// <summary>Gets or sets the gRPC port for the site stream server.</summary>
public int GrpcPort { get; set; } = 8083;
/// <summary>
/// HTTP/2 (h2c) port the CENTRAL node listens on for the site→central
/// <c>CentralControlService</c> gRPC control plane. Default 8083 — deliberately symmetric
/// with the site <see cref="GrpcPort"/>, since a node is either central or a site and the
/// two never share a process. This listener is distinct from central's <c>:5000</c> HTTP/1
/// surface (Central UI, Management/Inbound API), which stays exactly as-is: gRPC does NOT go
/// through Traefik (HTTP/1 only). Ignored on site nodes.
/// </summary>
public int CentralGrpcPort { get; set; } = 8083;
/// <summary>
/// HTTP/1.1 port serving the Prometheus /metrics scrape endpoint on site nodes.
/// Defaults to 8084 — deliberately distinct from <see cref="RemotingPort"/> (8082)
/// and <see cref="GrpcPort"/> (8083) so the Kestrel metrics listener never contends
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ public sealed class NodeOptionsValidator : OptionsValidatorBase<NodeOptions>
RequirePort(builder, options.RemotingPort, nameof(NodeOptions.RemotingPort));
RequirePort(builder, options.GrpcPort, nameof(NodeOptions.GrpcPort));
RequirePort(builder, options.MetricsPort, nameof(NodeOptions.MetricsPort));
RequirePort(builder, options.CentralGrpcPort, nameof(NodeOptions.CentralGrpcPort));
}
// 0 stays valid (dynamic-port request); reject only out-of-TCP-range values.
+42
View File
@@ -97,6 +97,24 @@ try
// Windows Service support (no-op when not running as a Windows Service)
builder.Host.UseWindowsService();
// Explicit Kestrel h2c listener for the central-hosted gRPC control plane
// (CentralControlService). Mirrors the site branch's gRPC listener: HTTP/2-only,
// on its own port (default 8083, symmetric with the site GrpcPort — a node is
// either central or a site, never both). This is ADDITIVE to central's :5000
// HTTP/1 surface (Central UI + Management/Inbound API from ASPNETCORE_URLS),
// which is untouched: gRPC does NOT go through Traefik (HTTP/1 only), sites reach
// this port by container name. T1A.2 hosts the server here; sites keep dialing over
// Akka ClusterClient until T1A.3 flips CentralTransport — this listener simply also
// accepts.
var centralGrpcPort = configuration.GetValue<int>("ScadaBridge:Node:CentralGrpcPort", 8083);
builder.WebHost.ConfigureKestrel(options =>
{
options.ListenAnyIP(centralGrpcPort, listenOptions =>
{
listenOptions.Protocols = Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.HttpProtocols.Http2;
});
});
// Shared components
builder.Services.AddClusterInfrastructure();
builder.Services.AddCommunication();
@@ -108,6 +126,22 @@ try
// node uses for its single key). Registered before the clients that consume it.
builder.Services.AddSingleton<
ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication.Grpc.ISitePskProvider, SitePskProvider>();
// Central-hosted gRPC control plane (T1A.2). CentralControlAuthInterceptor is the
// per-site sibling of the site's ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor: it verifies the Bearer
// token against the key for the site named in the required x-scadabridge-site header,
// resolved through the ISitePskProvider registered just above. Registered BY TYPE on
// AddGrpc exactly as the site branch registers its interceptors — NOT as a DI singleton,
// which would let DI hand the instance back and bypass Grpc.AspNetCore's own activation
// path (the shape that once hid a two-public-constructor defect until the rig caught it).
// CentralControlGrpcService decodes each request onto the same in-process message the
// ClusterClient path carries and Asks CentralCommunicationActor — zero handler logic here.
builder.Services.AddGrpc(options =>
{
options.Interceptors.Add<CentralControlAuthInterceptor>();
});
builder.Services.AddSingleton<
ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication.Grpc.CentralControlGrpcService>();
builder.Services.AddHealthMonitoring();
builder.Services.AddCentralHealthAggregation();
builder.Services.AddExternalSystemGateway();
@@ -462,6 +496,14 @@ try
// Requires endpoint routing (app.UseRouting() above).
app.MapZbMetrics();
// Central-hosted gRPC control plane (T1A.2) — the site→central CentralControlService.
// Runs on the dedicated h2c listener configured above (default :8083), gated by
// CentralControlAuthInterceptor and readiness-gated by the service itself (Unavailable
// until AkkaHostedService hands the CentralCommunicationActor over via SetReady). It
// shares the app's endpoint routing with the HTTP/1 surface; Kestrel steers each
// connection to the right pipeline by listener/protocol.
app.MapGrpcService<ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication.Grpc.CentralControlGrpcService>();
app.MapStaticAssets();
app.MapCentralUI<ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Host.Components.App>();
app.MapInboundAPI();
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
using Akka.Actor;
using Akka.TestKit;
using Akka.TestKit.Xunit2;
using Grpc.Core;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using NSubstitute;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Messages.Audit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Messages.Notification;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication.Grpc;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication.Tests.Grpc;
/// <summary>
/// Behaviour of <see cref="CentralControlGrpcService"/> that does not need a real gRPC pipeline:
/// the readiness gate, the fire-and-forget heartbeat contract, the ingest-timeout status
/// mapping, and the shared audit-ingest timeout constant. The auth interceptor + real transport
/// are proven separately in <c>CentralControlEndToEndTests</c> (Host.Tests).
/// </summary>
public class CentralControlGrpcServiceTests : TestKit
{
private static ServerCallContext NewContext(CancellationToken ct = default)
{
var context = Substitute.For<ServerCallContext>();
context.CancellationToken.Returns(ct);
return context;
}
private CentralControlGrpcService CreateService(CommunicationOptions? options = null)
=> new(
NullLogger<CentralControlGrpcService>.Instance,
Options.Create(options ?? new CommunicationOptions()));
[Fact]
public async Task BeforeSetReady_AUnaryCall_IsUnavailable()
{
// Nothing was dispatched, so Unavailable is the right status — it tells a site transport
// the call never ran and a cross-node retry is safe.
var service = CreateService();
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<RpcException>(
() => service.SubmitNotification(new NotificationSubmitDto(), NewContext()));
Assert.Equal(StatusCode.Unavailable, ex.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task BeforeSetReady_ANonEmptyIngestBatch_IsUnavailable()
{
var service = CreateService();
var batch = new AuditEventBatch();
batch.Events.Add(NewAuditDto());
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<RpcException>(
() => service.IngestAuditEvents(batch, NewContext()));
Assert.Equal(StatusCode.Unavailable, ex.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task AfterSetReady_AUnaryCall_ReachesTheActor()
{
var stub = Sys.ActorOf(Props.Create(() => new StubActor()));
var service = CreateService();
service.SetReady(stub);
var ack = await service.SubmitNotification(NewNotificationDto(), NewContext());
Assert.True(ack.Accepted);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Heartbeat_BeforeSetReady_SucceedsAndIsDropped()
{
// Fire-and-forget end-to-end: a heartbeat must never fault the site's timer, so even
// with no actor wired the call returns OK rather than Unavailable.
var service = CreateService();
var reply = await service.Heartbeat(NewHeartbeatDto(), NewContext());
Assert.NotNull(reply);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Heartbeat_AfterSetReady_TellsTheActor_AndNeverAsks()
{
// A black-hole actor that never replies would hang an Ask forever; the heartbeat still
// returns immediately, proving it is a Tell, not an Ask.
var blackHole = Sys.ActorOf(Props.Create(() => new NeverRepliesActor()));
var service = CreateService();
service.SetReady(blackHole);
var reply = await service.Heartbeat(NewHeartbeatDto(), NewContext());
Assert.NotNull(reply);
}
[Fact]
public async Task WhenTheActorNeverReplies_TheCall_IsDeadlineExceeded_NotUnavailable()
{
// The message WAS delivered (Unavailable would wrongly invite a duplicate retry on the
// peer node); a timeout is DeadlineExceeded, which callers never cross-node-retry.
var blackHole = Sys.ActorOf(Props.Create(() => new NeverRepliesActor()));
var service = CreateService(new CommunicationOptions
{
NotificationForwardTimeout = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(200),
});
service.SetReady(blackHole);
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<RpcException>(
() => service.SubmitNotification(NewNotificationDto(), NewContext()));
Assert.Equal(StatusCode.DeadlineExceeded, ex.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task EmptyIngestBatch_ShortCircuits_EvenBeforeSetReady()
{
// An empty batch is a no-op the actor need never see; it must not depend on readiness.
var service = CreateService();
var ack = await service.IngestAuditEvents(new AuditEventBatch(), NewContext());
Assert.Empty(ack.AcceptedEventIds);
}
[Fact]
public void TheAuditIngestTimeout_IsTheOneSharedConstant()
{
// The plan calls SiteStreamGrpcServer.AuditIngestAskTimeout "one source of truth" shared
// between the two audit-ingest transports; the central service must not re-declare 30s.
Assert.Equal(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30), SiteStreamGrpcServer.AuditIngestAskTimeout);
}
// The mapper reads SiteEnqueuedAt unconditionally, so a DTO that reaches mapping must carry
// a timestamp. Only DTOs that get past the readiness/auth gate map, so the negative tests
// above can pass a bare DTO.
private static NotificationSubmitDto NewNotificationDto() => new()
{
NotificationId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(),
ListName = "ops",
SiteEnqueuedAt = Google.Protobuf.WellKnownTypes.Timestamp.FromDateTime(
DateTime.SpecifyKind(new DateTime(2026, 5, 20, 10, 0, 0), DateTimeKind.Utc)),
};
private static HeartbeatDto NewHeartbeatDto() => new()
{
SiteId = "site-a",
NodeHostname = "node-a",
IsActive = true,
Timestamp = Google.Protobuf.WellKnownTypes.Timestamp.FromDateTime(
DateTime.SpecifyKind(new DateTime(2026, 5, 20, 10, 0, 0), DateTimeKind.Utc)),
};
private static AuditEventDto NewAuditDto() => new()
{
EventId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(),
OccurredAtUtc = Google.Protobuf.WellKnownTypes.Timestamp.FromDateTime(
DateTime.SpecifyKind(new DateTime(2026, 5, 20, 10, 0, 0), DateTimeKind.Utc)),
Channel = "ApiOutbound",
Kind = "ApiCall",
Status = "Delivered",
SourceSiteId = "site-a",
};
private sealed class StubActor : ReceiveActor
{
public StubActor()
{
Receive<NotificationSubmit>(msg =>
Sender.Tell(new NotificationSubmitAck(msg.NotificationId, Accepted: true, Error: null)));
}
}
/// <summary>Swallows every message and never replies, so an Ask against it times out.</summary>
private sealed class NeverRepliesActor : ReceiveActor
{
public NeverRepliesActor() => ReceiveAny(_ => { });
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
using Grpc.Core;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication.Grpc;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Host.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Central's inbound gate for the site→central gRPC control plane (T1A.2). The mirror of
/// <see cref="ControlPlaneAuthInterceptorTests"/>, but central's verification model is inverted:
/// it looks up the key for the site named in the <c>x-scadabridge-site</c> header and checks the
/// bearer token against THAT, rather than against one own-key.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Central genuinely needs a distinct verification model, so it is a separate class with its own
/// single public constructor — not a variant ctor on <see cref="ControlPlaneAuthInterceptor"/>,
/// whose two-public-constructor form once silently disabled the gate. The one-public-ctor
/// invariant is pinned below exactly as the sibling pins it.
/// </remarks>
public class CentralControlAuthInterceptorTests
{
private const string ControlMethod =
"/scadabridge.centralcontrol.v1.CentralControlService/SubmitNotification";
private const string SiteStreamMethod = "/sitestream.SiteStreamService/SubscribeInstance";
private const string SiteA = "site-a";
private const string SiteAKey = "site-a-preshared-key";
private const string SiteB = "site-b";
private const string SiteBKey = "site-b-preshared-key";
/// <summary>An <see cref="ISitePskProvider"/> backed by a fixed site→key map; throws for unknown sites.</summary>
private sealed class MapPskProvider(IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string> keys) : ISitePskProvider
{
public ValueTask<string> GetAsync(string siteId, CancellationToken ct)
=> keys.TryGetValue(siteId, out var key)
? new ValueTask<string>(key)
: throw new InvalidOperationException($"no key for '{siteId}'");
public void Invalidate(string siteId) { }
}
private static CentralControlAuthInterceptor CreateInterceptor()
=> new(
new MapPskProvider(new Dictionary<string, string> { [SiteA] = SiteAKey, [SiteB] = SiteBKey }),
NullLogger<CentralControlAuthInterceptor>.Instance);
private static ServerCallContext CreateContext(
string method, string? siteHeader, string? authorizationHeader)
{
var headers = new Metadata();
if (siteHeader is not null)
headers.Add(ControlPlaneCredentials.SiteHeader, siteHeader);
if (authorizationHeader is not null)
headers.Add(ControlPlaneCredentials.AuthorizationHeader, authorizationHeader);
return new FakeServerCallContext(method, headers);
}
private sealed class FakeServerCallContext(string method, Metadata requestHeaders)
: ServerCallContext
{
protected override string MethodCore => method;
protected override string HostCore => "localhost";
protected override string PeerCore => "ipv4:127.0.0.1:12345";
protected override DateTime DeadlineCore => DateTime.UtcNow.AddMinutes(1);
protected override Metadata RequestHeadersCore => requestHeaders;
protected override CancellationToken CancellationTokenCore => CancellationToken.None;
protected override Metadata ResponseTrailersCore { get; } = [];
protected override Status StatusCore { get; set; }
protected override WriteOptions? WriteOptionsCore { get; set; }
protected override AuthContext AuthContextCore { get; } =
new(null, new Dictionary<string, List<AuthProperty>>());
protected override ContextPropagationToken CreatePropagationTokenCore(
ContextPropagationOptions? options)
=> throw new NotSupportedException();
protected override Task WriteResponseHeadersAsyncCore(Metadata responseHeaders)
=> Task.CompletedTask;
}
private static Task<string> Invoke(
CentralControlAuthInterceptor interceptor, ServerCallContext context)
=> interceptor.UnaryServerHandler<string, string>(
"request", context, (_, _) => Task.FromResult("ok"));
[Fact]
public async Task NonGatedMethod_PassesThrough()
{
// Central's interceptor gates only CentralControlService; anything else on the listener
// (there is nothing today) is not its concern.
var interceptor = CreateInterceptor();
var context = CreateContext(SiteStreamMethod, siteHeader: null, authorizationHeader: null);
Assert.Equal("ok", await Invoke(interceptor, context));
}
[Fact]
public async Task CorrectSiteAndKey_IsAccepted()
{
var interceptor = CreateInterceptor();
var context = CreateContext(ControlMethod, SiteA, $"Bearer {SiteAKey}");
Assert.Equal("ok", await Invoke(interceptor, context));
}
[Fact]
public async Task MissingSiteHeader_IsDenied()
{
// Fail-closed: no header means no per-site key to verify against, so there is nothing to
// pass through TO. A present bearer token does not rescue it.
var interceptor = CreateInterceptor();
var context = CreateContext(ControlMethod, siteHeader: null, $"Bearer {SiteAKey}");
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<RpcException>(() => Invoke(interceptor, context));
Assert.Equal(StatusCode.PermissionDenied, ex.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task BlankSiteHeader_IsDenied()
{
var interceptor = CreateInterceptor();
var context = CreateContext(ControlMethod, siteHeader: " ", $"Bearer {SiteAKey}");
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<RpcException>(() => Invoke(interceptor, context));
Assert.Equal(StatusCode.PermissionDenied, ex.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task UnknownSite_IsDenied_NotPassedThrough()
{
// The provider throws for an unknown site; the interceptor must turn that into a denial,
// never swallow it and let the call proceed unauthenticated.
var interceptor = CreateInterceptor();
var context = CreateContext(ControlMethod, "site-nonexistent", "Bearer whatever");
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<RpcException>(() => Invoke(interceptor, context));
Assert.Equal(StatusCode.PermissionDenied, ex.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task NoBearerToken_IsDenied()
{
var interceptor = CreateInterceptor();
var context = CreateContext(ControlMethod, SiteA, authorizationHeader: null);
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<RpcException>(() => Invoke(interceptor, context));
Assert.Equal(StatusCode.PermissionDenied, ex.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task WrongKeyForTheSite_IsDenied()
{
// site-a presents site-b's key. Both keys are valid keys; the point is the token must
// match the key for THIS site, not just be a key central knows.
var interceptor = CreateInterceptor();
var context = CreateContext(ControlMethod, SiteA, $"Bearer {SiteBKey}");
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<RpcException>(() => Invoke(interceptor, context));
Assert.Equal(StatusCode.PermissionDenied, ex.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task EachSiteIsVerifiedAgainstItsOwnKey()
{
// site-b with site-b's key is accepted by the same interceptor instance that rejected
// site-a-with-site-b's-key above — proving the per-site lookup, not a single shared key.
var interceptor = CreateInterceptor();
var context = CreateContext(ControlMethod, SiteB, $"Bearer {SiteBKey}");
Assert.Equal("ok", await Invoke(interceptor, context));
}
[Fact]
public void TheInterceptorHasExactlyOnePublicConstructor()
{
// Grpc.AspNetCore registers this interceptor BY TYPE; InterceptorRegistration.GetFactory()
// throws "Multiple constructors accepting all given argument types have been found" the
// moment a second public constructor is applicable, and the throw lands inside the
// pipeline on every call — a gate that authorizes nothing while looking like a handler
// bug. The explicit-prefix constructor is internal to keep it from recurring; this pins
// that. (Same invariant as ControlPlaneAuthInterceptorTests.)
var publicCtors = typeof(CentralControlAuthInterceptor).GetConstructors();
Assert.Single(publicCtors);
}
[Fact]
public void DefaultGatedPrefixes_MatchTheRealCentralControlServicePath()
{
// A typo here disables the whole gate silently: every call would pass through. Pin it
// against the generated service descriptor, not the proto text.
var method = CentralControlService.Descriptor.FullName;
Assert.Contains(
CentralControlAuthInterceptor.DefaultGatedPrefixes,
p => p == $"/{method}/");
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
using Akka.Actor;
using Google.Protobuf.WellKnownTypes;
using Grpc.Core;
using Grpc.Net.Client;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Builder;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Hosting;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Messages.Audit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Commons.Messages.Notification;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication;
using ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Communication.Grpc;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.Host.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// End-to-end proof of the central-hosted gRPC control plane (T1A.2): the real
/// <see cref="CentralControlAuthInterceptor"/> AND the real
/// <see cref="CentralControlGrpcService"/> over a real gRPC stack, the service Asking a real
/// (stub) <c>CentralCommunicationActor</c> stand-in.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The interceptor is registered <b>BY TYPE on <c>AddGrpc</c></b>, exactly as <c>Program.cs</c>
/// does, and is deliberately NOT placed in DI as a singleton — pre-registering it lets DI hand
/// the instance back and bypasses <c>Grpc.AspNetCore</c>'s own activation path, which is how the
/// two-public-constructor defect escaped a green suite once before. This harness copies the
/// shape of <see cref="ControlPlaneAuthEndToEndTests"/> for the same reason.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Runs in-process over <see cref="TestServer"/>: no ports, no containers. A tiny Akka actor
/// stands in for <c>CentralCommunicationActor</c> so the test never touches MSSQL or a cluster;
/// the method paths, message types and mapper are the real generated/production ones.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public class CentralControlEndToEndTests : IAsyncLifetime
{
private const string SiteA = "site-a";
private const string SiteAKey = "site-a-preshared-key";
private const string SiteB = "site-b";
private const string SiteBKey = "site-b-preshared-key";
// The deterministic id the stub actor "accepts" for every ingest batch, so the ingest
// bridge can be asserted without extracting ids out of a decoded AuditEvent.
private static readonly Guid AcceptedId = Guid.Parse("11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111");
private IHost _host = null!;
private TestServer _server = null!;
private ActorSystem _actorSystem = null!;
private CentralControlGrpcService _service = null!;
/// <inheritdoc />
public async Task InitializeAsync()
{
_actorSystem = ActorSystem.Create("centralcontrol-e2e-test");
var stub = _actorSystem.ActorOf(Props.Create(() => new StubCentralActor(AcceptedId)), "central-stub");
_service = new CentralControlGrpcService(
NullLogger<CentralControlGrpcService>.Instance,
Options.Create(new CommunicationOptions()));
_service.SetReady(stub);
var pskProvider = new MapPskProvider(new Dictionary<string, string>
{
[SiteA] = SiteAKey,
[SiteB] = SiteBKey,
});
_host = await new HostBuilder()
.ConfigureWebHost(web => web
.UseTestServer()
.ConfigureServices(services =>
{
// BY TYPE, and NOT also in DI — see the class remarks.
services.AddGrpc(o => o.Interceptors.Add<CentralControlAuthInterceptor>());
services.AddSingleton<ISitePskProvider>(pskProvider);
services.AddSingleton(_service);
})
.Configure(app =>
{
app.UseRouting();
app.UseEndpoints(e => e.MapGrpcService<CentralControlGrpcService>());
}))
.StartAsync();
_server = _host.GetTestServer();
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public async Task DisposeAsync()
{
await _host.StopAsync();
_host.Dispose();
await _actorSystem.Terminate();
}
/// <summary>Builds a channel credentialed for <paramref name="siteId"/> with <paramref name="key"/>.</summary>
private GrpcChannel Channel(string? key, string siteId)
{
var options = new GrpcChannelOptions { HttpHandler = _server.CreateHandler() };
if (key is not null)
{
options.WithSiteCredentials(new FixedPskProvider(key), siteId);
}
return GrpcChannel.ForAddress(_server.BaseAddress, options);
}
private CentralControlService.CentralControlServiceClient Client(string? key, string siteId)
=> new(Channel(key, siteId));
// ---- Auth positives / negatives, all through the real pipeline ----
[Fact]
public async Task CorrectSiteAndKey_ReachesTheService_OnAUnaryCall()
{
var client = Client(SiteAKey, SiteA);
var ack = await client.SubmitNotificationAsync(NewNotificationDto());
Assert.True(ack.Accepted);
}
[Fact]
public async Task NoCredentialsAtAll_IsRejected_WithPermissionDenied()
{
var client = Client(key: null, SiteA);
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<RpcException>(
async () => await client.SubmitNotificationAsync(new NotificationSubmitDto()));
Assert.Equal(StatusCode.PermissionDenied, ex.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task WrongKeyForTheSite_IsRejected_WithPermissionDenied()
{
// site-a presents site-b's (valid, but wrong-for-this-site) key.
var client = Client(SiteBKey, SiteA);
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<RpcException>(
async () => await client.SubmitNotificationAsync(new NotificationSubmitDto()));
Assert.Equal(StatusCode.PermissionDenied, ex.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task UnknownSite_IsRejected_WithPermissionDenied()
{
var client = Client("any-key", "site-nonexistent");
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<RpcException>(
async () => await client.SubmitNotificationAsync(new NotificationSubmitDto()));
Assert.Equal(StatusCode.PermissionDenied, ex.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task TheAcceptAndRejectPathsAreDistinguishable()
{
// A gate whose accept and reject paths produce the same observable result is not a gate.
// Correct key → the service answers (Accepted:true); wrong key → PermissionDenied,
// never reaching the service. These are two different outcomes, which is the whole point.
var ok = await Client(SiteAKey, SiteA).SubmitNotificationAsync(NewNotificationDto());
Assert.True(ok.Accepted);
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<RpcException>(
async () => await Client("wrong", SiteA).SubmitNotificationAsync(new NotificationSubmitDto()));
Assert.Equal(StatusCode.PermissionDenied, ex.StatusCode);
}
// ---- One RPC per shape: unary (above) + the ingest bridge ----
[Fact]
public async Task IngestAuditEvents_DecodesTheBatch_AsksTheActor_EncodesTheAck()
{
var client = Client(SiteAKey, SiteA);
var batch = new AuditEventBatch();
batch.Events.Add(NewAuditDto());
batch.Events.Add(NewAuditDto());
var ack = await client.IngestAuditEventsAsync(batch);
// The stub actor accepts one deterministic id per non-empty batch; its presence proves
// the full DTO→command→Ask→reply→ack bridge ran, gated call and all.
Assert.Contains(AcceptedId.ToString(), ack.AcceptedEventIds);
}
[Fact]
public async Task IngestAuditEvents_EmptyBatch_ShortCircuits_WithoutAskingTheActor()
{
// Even the empty-batch fast path is behind the gate — it still needs a valid key.
var client = Client(SiteAKey, SiteA);
var ack = await client.IngestAuditEventsAsync(new AuditEventBatch());
Assert.Empty(ack.AcceptedEventIds);
}
// The mapper reads SiteEnqueuedAt unconditionally; only DTOs that clear the gate reach it,
// so the accept-path tests carry a timestamp while the negative tests can pass a bare DTO.
private static NotificationSubmitDto NewNotificationDto() => new()
{
NotificationId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(),
ListName = "ops",
SiteEnqueuedAt = Timestamp.FromDateTime(
DateTime.SpecifyKind(new DateTime(2026, 5, 20, 10, 0, 0), DateTimeKind.Utc)),
};
private static AuditEventDto NewAuditDto() => new()
{
EventId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(),
OccurredAtUtc = Timestamp.FromDateTime(
DateTime.SpecifyKind(new DateTime(2026, 5, 20, 10, 0, 0), DateTimeKind.Utc)),
Channel = "ApiOutbound",
Kind = "ApiCall",
Status = "Delivered",
SourceSiteId = SiteA,
};
private sealed class FixedPskProvider(string key) : ISitePskProvider
{
public ValueTask<string> GetAsync(string siteId, CancellationToken ct) => new(key);
public void Invalidate(string siteId) { }
}
private sealed class MapPskProvider(IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string> keys) : ISitePskProvider
{
public ValueTask<string> GetAsync(string siteId, CancellationToken ct)
=> keys.TryGetValue(siteId, out var key)
? new ValueTask<string>(key)
: throw new InvalidOperationException($"no key for '{siteId}'");
public void Invalidate(string siteId) { }
}
/// <summary>
/// Minimal stand-in for <c>CentralCommunicationActor</c>: answers the two RPC shapes this
/// test exercises. Replies straight to the Ask's temp sender, exactly as the real actor's
/// Forward/PipeTo paths do.
/// </summary>
private sealed class StubCentralActor : ReceiveActor
{
public StubCentralActor(Guid acceptedId)
{
Receive<NotificationSubmit>(msg =>
Sender.Tell(new NotificationSubmitAck(msg.NotificationId, Accepted: true, Error: null)));
Receive<IngestAuditEventsCommand>(_ =>
Sender.Tell(new IngestAuditEventsReply(new[] { acceptedId })));
}
}
}