fix(scriptanalysis): M3.1 review — Pass 2 self-sufficient descent, pin nested-forbidden + nameof cases, drop dead code

This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-06-16 19:29:59 -04:00
parent 4f2b17ce6d
commit 069c0e0b1a
2 changed files with 80 additions and 10 deletions
@@ -38,6 +38,14 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.ScadaBridge.ScriptAnalysis;
/// is a true sandbox — this is best-effort defence-in-depth; genuine containment
/// needs a runtime boundary.
/// </para>
///
/// <para>
/// A forbidden type reference inside <c>nameof(...)</c> (e.g.
/// <c>nameof(System.IO.File)</c>) is deliberately flagged: this is
/// conservative/fail-safe — <c>nameof</c> is rare in scripts and a script has
/// no business naming a forbidden type even there, so we prefer fail-safe over
/// adding special-case suppression logic to a security trust boundary.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public static class ScriptTrustValidator
{
@@ -287,11 +295,18 @@ public static class ScriptTrustValidator
var text = StripWhitespace(node.ToString());
// An allowed-exception name (or a strict prefix of one, e.g.
// "System.Threading" under "System.Threading.Tasks") is OK — stop
// descending so the bare forbidden-namespace qualifier of an allowed
// type is not re-examined and falsely flagged.
// "System.Threading" under "System.Threading.Tasks") must NOT be
// reported — but we STILL DESCEND into its children so a forbidden
// type nested inside (e.g. a generic argument under an allowed
// System.Threading.Tasks.TaskCompletionSource<System.Threading.Mutex>)
// is independently visited and flagged by this pass. Suppress the
// outer report, do not stop the walk. (Pass 2 is self-sufficient and
// does not rely on the semantic pass to catch nested forbidden refs.)
if (IsAllowedExceptionPrefix(text))
{
base.VisitQualifiedName(node);
return;
}
// Check the longest qualified name; do not descend so a single
// System.IO.File reference is reported once, not three times.
@@ -323,13 +338,21 @@ public static class ScriptTrustValidator
// Still descend: the receiver may contain a further violation.
}
// An allowed-exception member-access (or a strict prefix of one) is
// OK — stop descending so the bare forbidden-namespace qualifier of
// an allowed type (e.g. the "System.Threading" inside
// "System.Threading.Tasks.Task.Delay") is not re-examined and
// falsely flagged.
// An allowed-exception member-access (or a strict prefix of one)
// must NOT be reported — the bare forbidden-namespace qualifier of an
// allowed type (e.g. the "System.Threading" inside
// "System.Threading.Tasks.Task.Delay") is a false positive. But we
// STILL DESCEND into its children so a forbidden reference nested
// inside (e.g. a System.IO.File access in an allowed
// System.Threading.Tasks.Task.Run(...) lambda body) is independently
// visited and flagged by this pass. Suppress the outer report, do not
// stop the walk. (Pass 2 is self-sufficient — it does not rely on the
// semantic pass to catch nested forbidden refs.)
if (IsAllowedExceptionPrefix(text))
{
base.VisitMemberAccessExpression(node);
return;
}
// Catches fully-qualified expressions such as System.IO.File.Delete(...).
if (IsForbiddenDottedName(text))
@@ -356,8 +379,8 @@ public static class ScriptTrustValidator
}
// A bare reference to a reflection entry-point type. 'Activator' has
// no non-reflection use.
if (ScriptTrustPolicy.ForbiddenIdentifiers.Contains(text) && text != "dynamic")
// no non-reflection use. ('dynamic' already returned above.)
if (ScriptTrustPolicy.ForbiddenIdentifiers.Contains(text))
{
_violations.Add($"forbidden reflection type reference '{text}'");
return;
@@ -100,6 +100,53 @@ public class ScriptTrustValidatorTests
Assert.NotEmpty(ScriptTrustValidator.FindViolations(code));
}
[Fact]
public void Rejects_ForbiddenIo_NestedInAllowedTaskRunLambda()
{
// A forbidden System.IO reference buried inside an allowed Task.Run lambda.
// The allowed-exception prefix on the outer member access must NOT shadow
// the nested forbidden reference — Pass 2 must descend into the lambda.
var code = "await System.Threading.Tasks.Task.Run(() => System.IO.File.ReadAllText(\"x\"));";
Assert.NotEmpty(ScriptTrustValidator.FindViolations(code));
}
[Fact]
public void Rejects_ForbiddenMutex_AsGenericArg_UnderAllowedTasksPrefix()
{
// System.Threading.Mutex (forbidden) appears as a generic argument of an
// allowed System.Threading.Tasks.TaskCompletionSource<T>. The allowed
// outer name must not shadow the forbidden generic arg.
var code = "System.Threading.Tasks.TaskCompletionSource<System.Threading.Mutex> tcs = null;";
Assert.NotEmpty(ScriptTrustValidator.FindViolations(code));
}
[Fact]
public void Rejects_DirectThreadingMutex_NotThreadSleep()
{
// A direct forbidden System.Threading type (not Thread.Sleep) — pins that
// the broad System.Threading deny-list catches more than the one cased test.
var code = "var m = new System.Threading.Mutex();";
Assert.NotEmpty(ScriptTrustValidator.FindViolations(code));
}
[Fact]
public void Rejects_ForbiddenFileInfo_AsGenericArg()
{
// System.IO.FileInfo (forbidden) as a generic argument of an allowed
// System.Collections.Generic.List<T>.
var code = "System.Collections.Generic.List<System.IO.FileInfo> x = null;";
Assert.NotEmpty(ScriptTrustValidator.FindViolations(code));
}
[Fact]
public void Rejects_NameOf_ForbiddenType()
{
// Conservative fail-safe: naming a forbidden type inside nameof(...) is
// deliberately flagged (a script has no business naming it even there).
var code = "var s = nameof(System.IO.File);";
Assert.NotEmpty(ScriptTrustValidator.FindViolations(code));
}
// ---- Clean (empty violations) -------------------------------------------
[Fact]