Block a user
Phase 3 PR 29 — Account/session page with roles + capabilities
d5fa1f450e
Phase 3 PR 29 — Account/session page expanding the minimal sidebar role display into a dedicated /account route. Shows the authenticated operator's identity (username from ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier, display name from ClaimTypes.Name), their Admin roles as badges (from ClaimTypes.Role), the raw LDAP groups that mapped to those roles (from the 'ldap_group' claim added by Login.razor at sign-in), and a capability table listing each Admin capability with its required role and a Yes/No badge showing whether this session has it. Capability list mirrors the Program.cs authorization policies + each page's [Authorize] attribute so operators can self-service check whether their session has access without trial-and-error navigation — capabilities covered: view clusters + fleet status (all roles), edit configuration drafts (ConfigEditor or FleetAdmin per CanEdit policy), publish generations (FleetAdmin per CanPublish policy), manage certificate trust (FleetAdmin per PR 28 Certificates page attribute), manage external-ID reservations (ConfigEditor or FleetAdmin per Reservations page attribute).
6fdaee3a71
Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 28 — Admin UI cert-trust management page' (#27) from phase-3-pr28-cert-trust into v2
ed88835d34
Phase 3 PR 28 — Admin UI cert-trust management page. New /certificates route (FleetAdmin-only) surfaces the OPC UA server's PKI store rejected + trusted certs and gives operators Trust / Delete / Revoke actions so rejected client certs can be promoted without touching disk. CertTrustService reads $PkiStoreRoot/{rejected,trusted}/certs/*.der files directly via X509CertificateLoader — no Opc.Ua dependency in the Admin project, which keeps the Admin host runnable on a machine that doesn't have the full Server install locally (only needs the shared PKI directory reachable; typical deployment has Admin + Server side-by-side on the same box and PkiStoreRoot defaults match so a plain-vanilla install needs no override). CertTrustOptions bound from the Admin's 'CertTrust:PkiStoreRoot' section, default %ProgramData%\OtOpcUa\pki (matches OpcUaServerOptions.PkiStoreRoot default). Trust action moves the .der from rejected/certs/ to trusted/certs/ via File.Move(overwrite:true) — idempotent, tolerates a concurrent operator doing the same move. Delete wipes the file. Revoke removes from trusted/certs/ (Opc.Ua re-reads the Directory store on each new client handshake, so no explicit reload signal is needed; operators retry the rejected connection after trusting). Thumbprint matching is case-insensitive because X509Certificate2.Thumbprint is upper-case hex but operators copy-paste from logs that sometimes lowercase it. Malformed files in the store are logged + skipped — a single bad .der can't take the whole management page offline. Missing store directories produce empty lists rather than exceptions so a pristine install (Server never run yet, no rejected/trusted dirs yet) doesn't crash the page.
Phase 3 PR 28 — Admin UI cert-trust management page
Phase 3 PR 28 — Admin UI cert-trust management page
ed88835d34
Phase 3 PR 28 — Admin UI cert-trust management page. New /certificates route (FleetAdmin-only) surfaces the OPC UA server's PKI store rejected + trusted certs and gives operators Trust / Delete / Revoke actions so rejected client certs can be promoted without touching disk. CertTrustService reads $PkiStoreRoot/{rejected,trusted}/certs/*.der files directly via X509CertificateLoader — no Opc.Ua dependency in the Admin project, which keeps the Admin host runnable on a machine that doesn't have the full Server install locally (only needs the shared PKI directory reachable; typical deployment has Admin + Server side-by-side on the same box and PkiStoreRoot defaults match so a plain-vanilla install needs no override). CertTrustOptions bound from the Admin's 'CertTrust:PkiStoreRoot' section, default %ProgramData%\OtOpcUa\pki (matches OpcUaServerOptions.PkiStoreRoot default). Trust action moves the .der from rejected/certs/ to trusted/certs/ via File.Move(overwrite:true) — idempotent, tolerates a concurrent operator doing the same move. Delete wipes the file. Revoke removes from trusted/certs/ (Opc.Ua re-reads the Directory store on each new client handshake, so no explicit reload signal is needed; operators retry the rejected connection after trusting). Thumbprint matching is case-insensitive because X509Certificate2.Thumbprint is upper-case hex but operators copy-paste from logs that sometimes lowercase it. Malformed files in the store are logged + skipped — a single bad .der can't take the whole management page offline. Missing store directories produce empty lists rather than exceptions so a pristine install (Server never run yet, no rejected/trusted dirs yet) doesn't crash the page.
b5f8661e98
Phase 3 PR 27 — Fleet status dashboard page. New /fleet route shows per-node apply state (ClusterNodeGenerationState joined with ClusterNode for the ClusterId) in a sortable table with summary cards for Total / Applied / Stale / Failed node counts. Stale detection: LastSeenAt older than 30s triggers a table-warning row class + yellow count card. Failed rows get table-danger + red card. Badge classes per LastAppliedStatus: Applied=bg-success, Failed=bg-danger, Applying=bg-info, unknown=bg-secondary. Timestamps rendered as relative-age strings ('42s ago', '15m ago', '3h ago', then absolute date for >24h). Error column is truncated to 320px with the full message in a tooltip so the table stays readable on wide fleets. Initial data load on OnInitializedAsync; auto-refresh every 5s via a Timer that calls InvokeAsync(RefreshAsync) — matches the FleetStatusPoller's 5s cadence so the dashboard sees the most recent state without polling ahead of the broadcaster. A Refresh button also kicks a manual reload; _refreshing gate prevents double-runs when the timer fires during an in-flight query. IServiceScopeFactory (matches FleetStatusPoller's pattern) creates a fresh DI scope per refresh so the per-page DbContext can't race the timer with the render thread; no new DI registrations needed. Live SignalR hub push is deliberately deferred to a follow-up PR — the existing FleetStatusHub + NodeStateChangedMessage already works for external JavaScript clients; wiring an in-process Blazor Server consumer adds HubConnectionBuilder plumbing that's worth its own focused change. Sidebar link added to MainLayout between Overview and Clusters. Full Admin.Tests Unit suite 14 pass / 0 fail — unchanged, no tests regressed. Full Admin build clean (0 errors, 0 warnings). Closes the 'no per-driver dashboard' gap from lmx-followups item #7 at the fleet level; per-host (platform/engine/Modbus PLC) granularity still needs a dedicated page that consumes IHostConnectivityProbe.GetHostStatuses from the Server process — that's the live-SignalR follow-up.
Phase 3 PR 27 — Fleet status dashboard page
Phase 3 PR 27 — Fleet status dashboard page
b5f8661e98
Phase 3 PR 27 — Fleet status dashboard page. New /fleet route shows per-node apply state (ClusterNodeGenerationState joined with ClusterNode for the ClusterId) in a sortable table with summary cards for Total / Applied / Stale / Failed node counts. Stale detection: LastSeenAt older than 30s triggers a table-warning row class + yellow count card. Failed rows get table-danger + red card. Badge classes per LastAppliedStatus: Applied=bg-success, Failed=bg-danger, Applying=bg-info, unknown=bg-secondary. Timestamps rendered as relative-age strings ('42s ago', '15m ago', '3h ago', then absolute date for >24h). Error column is truncated to 320px with the full message in a tooltip so the table stays readable on wide fleets. Initial data load on OnInitializedAsync; auto-refresh every 5s via a Timer that calls InvokeAsync(RefreshAsync) — matches the FleetStatusPoller's 5s cadence so the dashboard sees the most recent state without polling ahead of the broadcaster. A Refresh button also kicks a manual reload; _refreshing gate prevents double-runs when the timer fires during an in-flight query. IServiceScopeFactory (matches FleetStatusPoller's pattern) creates a fresh DI scope per refresh so the per-page DbContext can't race the timer with the render thread; no new DI registrations needed. Live SignalR hub push is deliberately deferred to a follow-up PR — the existing FleetStatusHub + NodeStateChangedMessage already works for external JavaScript clients; wiring an in-process Blazor Server consumer adds HubConnectionBuilder plumbing that's worth its own focused change. Sidebar link added to MainLayout between Overview and Clusters. Full Admin.Tests Unit suite 14 pass / 0 fail — unchanged, no tests regressed. Full Admin build clean (0 errors, 0 warnings). Closes the 'no per-driver dashboard' gap from lmx-followups item #7 at the fleet level; per-host (platform/engine/Modbus PLC) granularity still needs a dedicated page that consumes IHostConnectivityProbe.GetHostStatuses from the Server process — that's the live-SignalR follow-up.
dohertj2
created branch phase-3-pr27-fleet-dashboard in dohertj2/lmxopcua
2026-04-18 13:14:02 -04:00
4058b88784
Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 26 — server-layer write authorization by role' (#25) from phase-3-pr26-server-write-authz into v2
6b04a85f86
Phase 3 PR 26 — server-layer write authorization gating by role. Per the user's ACL-at-server-layer directive (saved as feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md in memory), write authorization is enforced in DriverNodeManager.OnWriteValue and never delegated to the driver or to driver-specific auth (the v1 Galaxy-provided security path is explicitly not part of v2 — drivers report SecurityClassification as discovery metadata only). New WriteAuthzPolicy static class in Server/Security/ maps SecurityClassification → required role per the table documented in docs/Configuration.md: FreeAccess = no role required (anonymous sessions can write), Operate + SecuredWrite = WriteOperate, Tune = WriteTune, VerifiedWrite + Configure = WriteConfigure, ViewOnly = deny regardless of roles. Role matching is case-insensitive and role requirements do NOT cascade — a session with WriteConfigure can write Configure attributes but needs WriteOperate separately to write Operate attributes; this is deliberate so escalation is an explicit LDAP group assignment, not a hierarchy the policy silently grants. DriverNodeManager gains a _securityByFullRef Dictionary populated during Variable() registration (parallel to the existing _variablesByFullRef) so OnWriteValue can look up the classification in O(1) on the hot path. OnWriteValue casts the session's context.UserIdentity to the new IRoleBearer interface (implemented by OtOpcUaServer.RoleBasedIdentity from PR 19) — empty Roles collection when the session is anonymous; the same WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed check then either short-circuits true (FreeAccess), false (ViewOnly), or walks the roles list looking for the required one. On deny, OnWriteValue logs 'Write denied for {FullRef}: classification=X userRoles=[...]' at Information level (readable trail for operator complaints) and returns BadUserAccessDenied without touching IWritable.WriteAsync — drivers never see a request we'd have refused. IRoleBearer kept as a minimal server-side interface rather than reusing some abstraction from Core.Abstractions because the concept is OPC-UA-session-scoped and doesn't generalize (the driver side has no notion of a user session). Tests — WriteAuthzPolicyTests (17 new cases): FreeAccess allows write with empty role set + arbitrary roles; ViewOnly denies write even with every role; Operate requires WriteOperate; role match is case-insensitive; Operate denies empty role set + wrong role; SecuredWrite shares Operate's requirement; Tune requires WriteTune; Tune denies WriteOperate-only (asserts roles don't cascade — this is the test that catches a future regression where someone 'helpfully' adds a role-escalation table); Configure requires WriteConfigure; VerifiedWrite shares Configure's requirement; multi-role session allowed when any role matches; unrelated roles denied; RequiredRole theory covering all 5 classified-and-mapped rows + null for FreeAccess/ViewOnly special cases. lmx-followups.md follow-up #2 marked DONE with a back-reference to this PR and the memory note. Full Server.Tests Unit suite: 38 pass / 0 fail (17 new WriteAuthz + 14 SecurityConfiguration from PR 19 + 2 NodeBootstrap + 5 others). Server.Tests Integration (Category=Integration) 2 pass — existing PR 17 anonymous-endpoint smoke tests stay green since the read path doesn't hit OnWriteValue.
Phase 3 PR 26 — server-layer write authorization by role
Phase 3 PR 26 — server-layer write authorization by role
dohertj2
created branch phase-3-pr26-server-write-authz in dohertj2/lmxopcua
2026-04-18 13:02:32 -04:00
6b04a85f86
Phase 3 PR 26 — server-layer write authorization gating by role. Per the user's ACL-at-server-layer directive (saved as feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md in memory), write authorization is enforced in DriverNodeManager.OnWriteValue and never delegated to the driver or to driver-specific auth (the v1 Galaxy-provided security path is explicitly not part of v2 — drivers report SecurityClassification as discovery metadata only). New WriteAuthzPolicy static class in Server/Security/ maps SecurityClassification → required role per the table documented in docs/Configuration.md: FreeAccess = no role required (anonymous sessions can write), Operate + SecuredWrite = WriteOperate, Tune = WriteTune, VerifiedWrite + Configure = WriteConfigure, ViewOnly = deny regardless of roles. Role matching is case-insensitive and role requirements do NOT cascade — a session with WriteConfigure can write Configure attributes but needs WriteOperate separately to write Operate attributes; this is deliberate so escalation is an explicit LDAP group assignment, not a hierarchy the policy silently grants. DriverNodeManager gains a _securityByFullRef Dictionary populated during Variable() registration (parallel to the existing _variablesByFullRef) so OnWriteValue can look up the classification in O(1) on the hot path. OnWriteValue casts the session's context.UserIdentity to the new IRoleBearer interface (implemented by OtOpcUaServer.RoleBasedIdentity from PR 19) — empty Roles collection when the session is anonymous; the same WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed check then either short-circuits true (FreeAccess), false (ViewOnly), or walks the roles list looking for the required one. On deny, OnWriteValue logs 'Write denied for {FullRef}: classification=X userRoles=[...]' at Information level (readable trail for operator complaints) and returns BadUserAccessDenied without touching IWritable.WriteAsync — drivers never see a request we'd have refused. IRoleBearer kept as a minimal server-side interface rather than reusing some abstraction from Core.Abstractions because the concept is OPC-UA-session-scoped and doesn't generalize (the driver side has no notion of a user session). Tests — WriteAuthzPolicyTests (17 new cases): FreeAccess allows write with empty role set + arbitrary roles; ViewOnly denies write even with every role; Operate requires WriteOperate; role match is case-insensitive; Operate denies empty role set + wrong role; SecuredWrite shares Operate's requirement; Tune requires WriteTune; Tune denies WriteOperate-only (asserts roles don't cascade — this is the test that catches a future regression where someone 'helpfully' adds a role-escalation table); Configure requires WriteConfigure; VerifiedWrite shares Configure's requirement; multi-role session allowed when any role matches; unrelated roles denied; RequiredRole theory covering all 5 classified-and-mapped rows + null for FreeAccess/ViewOnly special cases. lmx-followups.md follow-up #2 marked DONE with a back-reference to this PR and the memory note. Full Server.Tests Unit suite: 38 pass / 0 fail (17 new WriteAuthz + 14 SecurityConfiguration from PR 19 + 2 NodeBootstrap + 5 others). Server.Tests Integration (Category=Integration) 2 pass — existing PR 17 anonymous-endpoint smoke tests stay green since the read path doesn't hit OnWriteValue.
cd8691280a
Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 25 — Modbus test plan + DL205 quirk catalog' (#24) from phase-3-pr25-modbus-test-plan into v2
77d09bf64e
Phase 3 PR 25 — modbus-test-plan.md: integration-test playbook with per-device quirk catalog. ModbusPal is the chosen simulator; AutomationDirect DL205 is the first target device class with 6 pending quirks to document and cover with named tests (word order for 32-bit values, register-zero access policy, coil addressing base, maximum registers per FC03, response framing under sustained load, exception code on protected-bit coil write). Each quirk placeholder has a proposed test name so the user's validation work translates directly into integration tests. Test conventions section codifies the named-per-quirk pattern, skip-when-unreachable guard, real ModbusTcpTransport usage, and inter-test isolation. Sets up the harness-and-catalog structure future device families (Allen-Bradley Micrologix, Siemens S7-1200 Modbus gateway, Schneider M340, whatever the user hits) will slot into — same per-device catalog shape, cross-device patterns section for recurring quirks that can get promoted into driver defaults. Next concrete PRs proposed: PR 26 for the integration test project scaffold + DL205 profile + fixture with skip-guard + one smoke test, PR 27+ for the individual confirmed quirks one-per-PR.
Phase 3 PR 25 — Modbus test plan + DL205 quirk catalog