scadaproj/ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets

ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets

A reusable, envelope-encrypted secrets manager for the ZB.MOM.WW.* SCADA family: store secrets (SQL passwords, API tokens, connection strings) encrypted at rest and get the plaintext back on demand — from application code, from configuration, or from an operator UI.

Packages

Package	Purpose
ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Abstractions	Contracts only (ISecretStore, ISecretResolver, IMasterKeyProvider, ISecretCipher, ISecretReplicator, ISecretCacheInvalidator, ISecretActorAccessor), value types, exceptions. Dependency-light.
ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets	Implementation: AES-256-GCM envelope cipher, env/file/DPAPI master-key providers, SQLite store, TTL resolver (audited), ${secret:} config expander, AddZbSecrets.
ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Ui	Blazor RCL on ZB.MOM.WW.Theme: list / add / rotate / delete + policy-gated, audited reveal.

A secret CLI (set / get / list / rm / rotate / rewrap-all) ships in the repo (not packed).

How it protects secrets

Each value is encrypted with a fresh data key (DEK) using AES-256-GCM; the DEK is then wrapped by a master KEK that never touches the database. The AAD binds the ciphertext to the secret's name and the wrapped DEK to the KEK id, so rows can't be swapped and a tampered/mis-keyed row fails closed (SecretDecryptionException) rather than returning a wrong value. The master KEK is resolved through a pluggable IMasterKeyProvider (environment variable, key file, or Windows DPAPI).

Wiring it up

builder.Services.AddZbSecrets(builder.Configuration, "Secrets");

// After config load, BEFORE options validation — expand ${secret:...} references:
var expander = new SecretReferenceExpander(app.Services.GetRequiredService<ISecretResolver>());
await expander.ExpandConfigurationAsync((IConfigurationRoot)builder.Configuration, ct);

// appsettings.json
"Secrets": {
  "SqlitePath": "secrets.db",
  "MasterKey": { "Source": "Environment", "EnvVarName": "ZB_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY" },
  "RunMigrationsOnStartup": true,
  "ResolveCacheTtl": "00:00:30"
},
// Keep plaintext out of config — reference a stored secret instead:
"ConnectionStrings": {
  "Historian": "Server=...;User Id=sa;Password=${secret:sql/historian-password}"
}

The master key is 32 bytes, provided base64 in ZB_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY (Environment source). A missing/invalid key fails closed at startup (MasterKeyUnavailableException).

Rotating the master KEK

Because each row is a body sealed under a per-secret DEK that is wrapped by the KEK, rotating the master key only re-wraps DEKs — bodies are never re-encrypted and no value history changes. The secret rewrap-all CLI verb (backed by KekRotationService) migrates every row from the old KEK to the new one; it is idempotent and safe to re-run:

# New KEK defaults to the configured Secrets:MasterKey; supply the OLD key by env-var name or path.
ZB_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY=<new-base64>  ZB_SECRETS_OLD_KEY=<old-base64> \
  secret rewrap-all --old-key-env ZB_SECRETS_OLD_KEY
# → {"action":"rewrap-all","total":N,"rewrapped":N,"alreadyCurrent":0}

Run it with resolve traffic quiesced and once per independent store (once for a shared SQL-Server store; once per node for per-node SQLite on a shared KEK). See the operator runbook: docs/operations/kek-rotation.md.

Runtime + human access

• App code: inject ISecretResolver and call GetAsync(name, ct). Every resolve is audited via ZB.MOM.WW.Audit (name + outcome only — the value is never logged).
• Operators: mount the ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Ui /admin/secrets page. The list shows metadata only; revealing a value requires the secrets:reveal authorization policy and is audited. Add/rotate/delete require secrets:manage.

Clustered deployments

Secrets storage is local SQLite by default. The schema already carries the revision / updated_utc / tombstone columns and an ISecretReplicator seam for cluster replication, but the Akka replicator (ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Akka) is a deferred follow-on. When replicating across a node pair, every node must resolve the same master KEK (e.g. the same mounted key file) — a row wrapped by an unknown KEK fails closed.