Joseph Doherty
dd0a846b64
Secrets were per-node SQLite, so a secret written on one node was invisible to the rest of a cluster. G-7's design resolved the "shared SQL store vs Akka replicator" fork to build only the former; both are built here so the choice is a deployment decision (availability vs partition tolerance) rather than a library limitation. Two new packages — ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Replicator.SqlServer (shared store, plus a local-store-with-hub mode) and .Replicator.AkkaDotNet (peer-to-peer over distributed pub/sub). Core gains ISecretsStoreMigrator, one shared SecretLastWriterWins predicate so no two stores can disagree on a tie, the transport-agnostic reconciler, and ReplicatingSecretStore — which closes a real gap: nothing had ever called ISecretReplicator.PublishAsync, so the seam was inert and local writes would not have propagated at all. Verified 182 pass / 1 skip / 0 warnings, including 15 live tests against a real SQL Server 2022 (the SQLite suite ported case-for-case, so any behavioural divergence between the stores fails) and a 9-test in-process 2-node Akka cluster over real remoting. A post-build review caught six defects, all fixed and now covered: both replication modes could not resolve from the container (no test had built one), an unbounded fetch that broke past SQL Server's 2100-parameter cap, a poison row that aborted the rest of its batch forever, Enum.Parse on peer input that could restart the actor in a loop, null crypto blobs crossing the trust boundary, and a silently dropped pull-read failure. Packed at 0.2.0 and vulnerability-scanned clean; not yet published to the feed. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL2Vu1ESDQ9SCN4gVKkdts
Secrets (encrypted secret store + ${secret:} resolution)
Normalizes how the family stores and consumes secrets — SQL/login passwords, API-key HMAC
peppers, LDAP bind passwords, connection strings, TLS material — which are handled ad-hoc
and inconsistently across the three apps today (Data-Protection-encrypted connection
strings in ScadaBridge; peppers/passwords in environment variables; LDAP passwords in
appsettings).
The goal is the shared ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets library: AES-256-GCM envelope encryption at
rest, a pluggable master-key provider and store, an audited ISecretResolver +
${secret:name} config expander for app runtime, and a Blazor /admin/secrets management
UI. The library is built, published (0.1.2), and live-proven via its reference consumer;
per-app adoption is the tracked follow-on.
- Target:
spec/SPEC.md - Realized API:
shared-contract/ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.md - Implementation:
../../ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets/· designdocs/plans/2026-07-15-secrets-manager-design.md - Adoption backlog:
GAPS.md
Status
| State | |
|---|---|
| Library | Built + published — ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets{,.Abstractions,.Ui} 0.1.2 on the dohertj2-gitea feed; .Cli in-repo (not packed); .Akka replicator deferred (design only) |
| Reference consumer | HistorianGateway — adopted + live-proven (2026-07-16): historian password sourced via ${secret:}, authenticated read against the real wonder historian |
| Three sister apps | Not yet adopted — see per-app current-state + GAPS |
Per-project current state
| Project | Today (baseline) | Doc |
|---|---|---|
| OtOpcUa | (code-verified baseline) | current-state/otopcua/CURRENT-STATE.md |
| MxAccessGateway | (code-verified baseline) | current-state/mxaccessgw/CURRENT-STATE.md |
| ScadaBridge | (code-verified baseline) | current-state/scadabridge/CURRENT-STATE.md |
Not applicable as a fourth adopter row but the exemplar: HistorianGateway already consumes the lib — its wiring is the template the three apps follow (see the shared-contract "Consumer wiring" section).