d82d3451e7
G-8 (KEK rotation) — built in ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets, lib 0.1.2->0.1.3: - ISecretCipher.Rewrap(row, oldKek, newKek): re-wraps the per-secret DEK only (bodies never re-encrypted; revision/timestamps preserved -> invisible to cluster LWW). Fail-closed on wrong old-KEK id, wrong key bytes, and malformed wraps; DEK zeroed on all paths. - ISecretStore.ApplyRewrapAsync(rewrappedRow, expectedCurrentWrappedDek): updates only the 4 wrap columns + kek_id, compare-and-swap on the current wrapped DEK so a concurrent set/rotate cannot corrupt a row (closes a review-caught TOCTOU). - KekRotationService.RewrapAllAsync + RewrapReport: enumerate all rows incl. tombstones, idempotent/resumable skip-already-current, bounded CAS-retry, fail-closed on unknown/identical KEK. - `secret rewrap-all` CLI verb: key material only via env-var name / file path, JSON counts report; README section + operator runbook. Verified: full offline suite green (82 core + 15 UI, 0 regressions) + end-to-end CLI smoke + adversarial crypto review (all 7 categories PASS; TOCTOU fixed). G-7 (clustered replication) — designed + planned, no code: - Fork resolved to build Option A (shared SQL-Server ISecretStore); Akka replicator ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Akka is a deferred phase-2. Design doc + executable plan + .tasks.json under docs/plans/2026-07-17-secrets-g7-*. Tracking: components/secrets/GAPS.md + CLAUDE.md secrets row updated.
217 lines
8.4 KiB
C#
217 lines
8.4 KiB
C#
using System.Text;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Abstractions;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Crypto;
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using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Tests.Fakes;
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namespace ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Tests.Crypto;
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public class AesGcmEnvelopeCipherTests
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{
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[Fact]
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public void RoundTrips()
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{
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var provider = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1");
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var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(provider);
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var name = new SecretName("sql/foo");
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StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(name, "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text);
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Assert.Equal("k1", row.KekId);
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// Ciphertext must not leak the plaintext in the clear.
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byte[] plaintextBytes = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes("hunter2");
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Assert.False(Contains(row.Ciphertext, plaintextBytes));
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string decrypted = cipher.Decrypt(row);
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Assert.Equal("hunter2", decrypted);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void TwoEncryptsProduceDifferentNonces()
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{
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var provider = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1");
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var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(provider);
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var name = new SecretName("sql/foo");
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// Same plaintext + name encrypted twice must yield a fresh nonce (and therefore a distinct
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// ciphertext) each time — the AES-GCM (key, nonce) uniqueness invariant.
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StoredSecret first = cipher.Encrypt(name, "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text);
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StoredSecret second = cipher.Encrypt(name, "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text);
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Assert.False(first.Nonce.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(second.Nonce));
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Assert.False(first.Ciphertext.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(second.Ciphertext));
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}
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[Fact]
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public void TamperedCiphertextThrows()
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{
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var provider = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1");
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var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(provider);
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var name = new SecretName("sql/foo");
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StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(name, "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text);
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row.Ciphertext[0] ^= 0xFF;
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Assert.Throws<SecretDecryptionException>(() => cipher.Decrypt(row));
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}
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[Fact]
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public void AadBindingRejectsRenamedRow()
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{
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var provider = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1");
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var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(provider);
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StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text);
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var renamed = row with { Name = new SecretName("sql/bar") };
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Assert.Throws<SecretDecryptionException>(() => cipher.Decrypt(renamed));
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}
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[Fact]
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public void WrongKekThrows()
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{
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// Both providers report KekId "k1" but hold different random key bytes.
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var providerA = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1");
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var providerB = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1");
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var cipherA = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(providerA);
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var cipherB = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(providerB);
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StoredSecret row = cipherA.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text);
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// Matching KekId string but wrong key material must still fail closed (unwrap tag mismatch).
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Assert.Throws<SecretDecryptionException>(() => cipherB.Decrypt(row));
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}
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[Fact]
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public void UnknownKekIdThrows()
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{
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var providerK1 = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1");
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var providerK2 = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k2");
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var cipherK1 = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(providerK1);
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var cipherK2 = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(providerK2);
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StoredSecret row = cipherK1.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text);
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var ex = Assert.Throws<SecretDecryptionException>(() => cipherK2.Decrypt(row));
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Assert.Contains("unknown KEK", ex.Message, StringComparison.Ordinal);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Rewrap_RewrapsDek_BodyStillDecryptsUnderNewKek()
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{
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var oldKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old");
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var newKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-new");
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var oldCipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(oldKek);
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var name = new SecretName("sql/foo");
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StoredSecret row = oldCipher.Encrypt(name, "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text);
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Assert.Equal("kek-old", row.KekId);
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// Rewrap is provider-explicit — it can be driven through any cipher instance.
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StoredSecret rewrapped = oldCipher.Rewrap(row, oldKek, newKek);
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Assert.Equal("kek-new", rewrapped.KekId);
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// The DEK-sealed body is untouched; only the KEK-wrap envelope changed.
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Assert.True(rewrapped.Ciphertext.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(row.Ciphertext));
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Assert.True(rewrapped.Nonce.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(row.Nonce));
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Assert.True(rewrapped.Tag.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(row.Tag));
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Assert.False(rewrapped.WrappedDek.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(row.WrappedDek));
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// The rewrapped row decrypts under the NEW KEK...
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var newCipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(newKek);
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Assert.Equal("hunter2", newCipher.Decrypt(rewrapped));
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// ...and no longer under the OLD KEK (kek_id now names the new KEK; old cipher fails closed).
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Assert.Throws<SecretDecryptionException>(() => oldCipher.Decrypt(rewrapped));
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Rewrap_PreservesRevisionTimestampsTombstoneAndMetadata()
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{
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var oldKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old");
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var newKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-new");
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var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(oldKek);
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StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text) with
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{
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Revision = 7,
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IsDeleted = true,
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DeletedUtc = DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
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CreatedUtc = DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
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UpdatedUtc = DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch.AddMinutes(5),
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CreatedBy = "alice",
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UpdatedBy = "bob",
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Description = "the foo password",
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};
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StoredSecret rewrapped = cipher.Rewrap(row, oldKek, newKek);
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// Only the wrap envelope + kek_id change — a rewrap must be invisible to (updated_utc, revision) LWW.
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Assert.Equal(7, rewrapped.Revision);
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Assert.True(rewrapped.IsDeleted);
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Assert.Equal(row.DeletedUtc, rewrapped.DeletedUtc);
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Assert.Equal(row.CreatedUtc, rewrapped.CreatedUtc);
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Assert.Equal(row.UpdatedUtc, rewrapped.UpdatedUtc);
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Assert.Equal("alice", rewrapped.CreatedBy);
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Assert.Equal("bob", rewrapped.UpdatedBy);
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Assert.Equal("the foo password", rewrapped.Description);
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Assert.Equal(SecretContentType.Text, rewrapped.ContentType);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Rewrap_WrongOldKekId_FailsClosed()
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{
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var actualKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old");
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var wrongOld = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-somethingelse");
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var newKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-new");
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var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(actualKek);
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StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text);
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// Row is wrapped by "kek-old" but the caller claims the old KEK is "kek-somethingelse".
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var ex = Assert.Throws<SecretDecryptionException>(() => cipher.Rewrap(row, wrongOld, newKek));
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Assert.Contains("kek-old", ex.Message, StringComparison.Ordinal);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Rewrap_CorrectKekIdButWrongKeyMaterial_FailsClosed()
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{
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// Same KEK-id string, different key bytes → the unwrap must fail closed (tag mismatch),
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// never emitting a garbage DEK.
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var realOld = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old");
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var imposterOld = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old"); // same id, fresh random bytes
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var newKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-new");
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var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(realOld);
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StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text);
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Assert.Throws<SecretDecryptionException>(() => cipher.Rewrap(row, imposterOld, newKek));
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}
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private static bool Contains(byte[] haystack, byte[] needle)
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{
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if (needle.Length == 0 || haystack.Length < needle.Length)
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{
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return false;
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}
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for (int i = 0; i <= haystack.Length - needle.Length; i++)
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{
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bool match = true;
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for (int j = 0; j < needle.Length; j++)
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{
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if (haystack[i + j] != needle[j])
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{
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match = false;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (match)
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{
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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}
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