scadaproj/ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets/CHANGELOG.md

Changelog

All notable changes to the ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets family are recorded here. Format loosely follows Keep a Changelog; versions are shared across every package in the family (see Directory.Build.props) even when a given release only touches one of them.

0.6.3 — 2026-09-28

Added

• gRPC hub follower sweeps are observable. GrpcSecretSyncService (package ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Replicator.Grpc) now logs every sweep outcome instead of only the sweeps that pull a change:
  • EventId 4 (Debug) — a sweep found nothing new; logged on every in-sync sweep.
  • EventId 5 (Information) — an in-sync heartbeat, at most once per SecretsGrpcHubClientOptions.InSyncLogInterval (new, default 1 hour, validated positive), so "the loop is alive and still agrees with the hub" is visible at the default log level without a line every 30 seconds.
  • EventId 6 (Information) — the first successful sweep after one or more failures, naming the failure count.
• ISecretsHubSyncStatus — a public, DI-registered read model of the follower loop: LastSweepUtc, LastSuccessUtc, ConsecutiveFailures, LastError. Getters are synchronized with the writer, so a health check or status page reads a consistent snapshot.

No behaviour change to syncing itself, and no wire or schema change. Only hub followers gain anything from this release; other consumers can stay on 0.6.2.

0.6.2 — 2026-08-11

Changed

• The under-content-root rejection message now teaches the container case. Suggested by the OtOpcUa session, which is the only real containerized deployment in this family and the one that hit the false positive. A store on a volume mounted inside the content root is durable across container replacement but is rejected anyway, because the rule cannot tell a mount from an ordinary directory. The message now says so, gives the fix (mount the same volume at a second path outside the content root; the file sits at the volume root either way, so an existing store carries over), and forecloses the wrong fix by stating that no override exists.

  A false positive's entire cost is the confusion in the moment, so a boot error that names its own fix costs nothing on the true-positive path and converts the false positive into a two-minute edit. Message only — no behaviour change. Existing 0.6.1 consumers can take this whenever they next touch the pin; it does not warrant a re-pin round on its own.

  Their argument for keeping the rule strict is recorded because it is better than the trade-off I had written down: the workaround is an improvement rather than a concession (it separates the application from its durable state at the filesystem level — the exact distinction the incident blurred); an AllowStoreUnderContentRoot flag has the lifecycle of a knob set once to clear a symptom and never revisited, surviving the redeploy that changes the layout it was reasoned against; and mount detection would make the verdict depend on runtime platform state, so the same path would pass on one host and fail on another — strictly worse than a stable false positive with a cheap documented fix.

0.6.1 — 2026-08-11

Fixed

• The 0.6.0 guard had a hole at exactly the moment the store file is created (found by the HistorianGateway adoption of 0.6.0, which probed the rejected paths rather than observing a clean boot). An application that expands ${secret:} references before building its host composes this subsystem in a throwaway ServiceCollection with no IHostEnvironment in it, then migrates the store from that container. SecretsOptionsValidator resolves the content root from IHostEnvironment and skips the under-content-root rule when it is absent — so pre-host an absolute in-content-root path passed the only rule still applying, the migrator created the database, and the boot then failed a second later once the real host registered IHostEnvironment and the rule finally fired.

  The observable result was a rejected boot that still left an empty store, with -wal/-shm siblings, sitting at the rejected path — the same artifact that made the outage this guard exists to prevent read as "the database is there, it's just empty". A relative path was unaffected, because the absolute-path rule fires with or without a content root; that asymmetry is what exposed it.

  Conflating "no IHostEnvironment registered" with "no content root exists" was the mistake. New overload AddZbSecrets(services, config, sectionPath, contentRootPath) takes the content root explicitly; the 3-argument overload is unchanged and still falls back to IHostEnvironment. Pre-host composition should pass it — e.g. builder.Environment.ContentRootPath. Passing null remains correct only where there genuinely is no content root, such as the CLI. SecretsOptionsValidator gains a string? constructor alongside the IHostEnvironment? one.

Known interaction: containers, where the rule deliberately over-rejects

• A containerized deployment can put the store on a mounted volume inside the content root, and 0.6.1 will reject it. Observed on the OtOpcUa docker-dev rig: Secrets__SqlitePath was /app/data/… with /app the container content root and /app/data a mounted volume — absolute, durable across container replacement, and entirely deliberate. The rule rejects it anyway.

  This is a true positive for the rule as written and a false positive for the operator's intent, and the difference is real: in a container the image is replaced on upgrade but the volume is not, so "inside the content root" is a weaker proxy for "destroyed on upgrade" there than it is for a Windows service whose whole directory gets renamed.

  It is not being relaxed, and no opt-out flag is being added. Distinguishing a mount from an ordinary directory means reading platform-specific mount tables, and an AllowStoreUnderContentRoot escape hatch is the kind of switch that gets set once to clear a boot failure and then outlives the reason — which is precisely the failure mode the guard exists to close. The workaround is one line: mount the same volume at a second path outside the content root (the rig used /data) and point Secrets:SqlitePath there. The file is at the volume root either way, so seeded stores carry over with no migration.

Upgrade note (applies to 0.6.0 as well)

• A store seeded under the pre-0.6.0 default is orphaned, not migrated, and nothing says so. The old default was the relative secrets.db, which resolved against the process working directory; the new default is absolute. An application that relied on the old default silently starts using a different file, and anything previously seeded into the old one is stranded. This is a dev-loop concern for the apps in this family (every deployment sets an explicit absolute path), but check for a stray *-secrets.db beside your project before assuming an empty store after upgrade means the store was lost. Deleting the key from configuration, rather than leaving a relative value, is what makes the new default apply.

0.6.0 — 2026-08-11

Added

• ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets — fail-closed validation of the store path. Secrets:SqlitePath is now validated at startup (ValidateOnStart) by SecretsOptionsValidator, using two rules in the new public SecretsStorePathRules. Both come from production incidents and neither implies the other:

  • Must be absolute. A relative value resolves against the process working directory — for a Windows service that is C:\Windows\System32, so the store lands outside the installation entirely; in a dev loop it lands in the source tree (observed: a gateway wrote its secrets database into src/ and tripped that repo's own tree-hygiene test).
  • Must not be inside the application content root. An absolute path can still point into the directory every deployment procedure in this family replaces or renames on upgrade. On 2026-08-09 a gateway's credential store sat inside its Server\ directory; the deploy renamed Server to Server.bak.*, the database left with it, and the process created a fresh empty one at the same path. Every consumer lost its credential, silently, for two days. The existing "absolute path" convention did not help — the path was absolute.

  The rules reject rather than relocate: silently moving a credential store presents later as an authentication failure pointing nowhere near the configuration that caused it, whereas a boot error is seen immediately by whoever caused it. Validation is deliberately not exempted in Development — a guard that never runs in a dev loop or in CI rots, and the configuration behind the outage looked entirely reasonable.

  The content-root rule is skipped when no IHostEnvironment is available (the CLI composes the subsystem without a host); the absolute-path rule still applies.

Changed

• BREAKING (configuration, not API): SecretsOptions.SqlitePath now defaults to an absolute per-user path — ZB.MOM.WW/secrets.db under LocalApplicationData (~/.local/share on Linux and macOS, %LOCALAPPDATA% on Windows), exposed as SecretsOptions.DefaultSqlitePath. It was secrets.db, which the new rules reject.

  A consuming application that configures a relative Secrets:SqlitePath will now fail to boot. The fix is to remove the key (accepting the default) or set an absolute path outside the content root. Every deployment of this family already sets an absolute path, so this bites dev loops and unconfigured installs, not production — but verify before upgrading: a host that relied on the old default now looks in a new location, finds nothing, and creates an empty store, which is the same failure this release exists to prevent.

  Per-user rather than machine-wide is deliberate. CommonApplicationData is /usr/share on Linux and macOS, which a normal user cannot write; as a library default that would fail every consuming application's boot on a developer machine. An application is free to compute its own default (a machine-wide Windows service reasonably prefers CommonApplicationData alongside its other stores) — the configured value always wins.

• AddZbSecrets registration of the validator is idempotent. AddZbSecrets is legitimately called more than once in real compositions (a replication package calls it after the application already has), and TryAddEnumerable cannot de-duplicate a factory-built descriptor — it de-duplicates on implementation type, which a factory does not carry, so it throws on the second call rather than skipping.

• ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets now depends on ZB.MOM.WW.Configuration (0.1.0) for the shared OptionsValidatorBase/ValidationBuilder vocabulary. Every consumer already references it.

0.5.1 — 2026-08-07

Fixed

• ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Replicator.SqlServer — virgin-database concurrent migrator race (present since 0.2.0; found by the ScadaBridge central shared-store live gate). The migrator's doc claimed simultaneous provisioning of a virgin database converges, but its retry filter covered only deadlock victims (1205): Serializable isolation does not serialize the IF NOT EXISTS metadata probes against another session's in-flight CREATE, so of two nodes booting together against an empty database the loser died with SqlException 2714 ("There is already an object named 'zbsecrets'") and aborted its host — observed live on an ordinary docker compose up of the ScadaBridge central pair. The retry filter now also treats the lost-CREATE/lost-INSERT race outcomes as retryable — 2714 (schema/table already exists), 1913 (index already exists), 2627 (schema_version MERGE-insert PK violation) — since losing such a race means the object now exists, which is the desired end state; the retry re-runs the idempotent IF NOT EXISTS path and proceeds. Classification scans the whole SqlException.Errors collection (a failed DDL batch stacks follow-on errors such as 2759, so the retryable number is not guaranteed first), and the retry cap (5) keeps a genuine conflict — e.g. an unrelated pre-existing object colliding with the schema name — failing closed. 2705 (duplicate column) is deliberately not retried: every column lives inside a single CREATE TABLE statement, so no cross-session race can produce it. The error-number predicate is now an internal static pinned by offline tests, and the live suite gains an N-concurrent-migrators virgin-database test.

0.5.0 — 2026-08-07

Added

• ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Replicator.Grpc — hub endpoint failover for followers (scadaproj#4). SecretsGrpcHubClientOptions gains FallbackEndpoints: additional hub addresses tried, in order, when a call to the primary Endpoint (or an earlier fallback) fails with a transport-level gRPC error. The answering endpoint is sticky — a sweep that failed over does not re-pay the dead endpoint's full CallDeadline on every subsequent call — and rotation wraps, so a recovered primary is retried the next time the stuck-to endpoint fails. Only RpcException triggers failover; cancellation and everything else propagate untouched, and when every endpoint fails the last RpcException is rethrown so the sweep degrades to last-known-good exactly as before. Each failover logs a Warning naming the failed and next endpoint URIs (never any credential material).
  • Same-store requirement: list only endpoints that serve the SAME store — for ScadaBridge, the central pair over one shared SQL Server store. Endpoints backed by independent stores turn a primary outage into a silent convergence stop (failing over to an emptier hub "succeeds"), which is the exact defect scadaproj#4 recorded.
  • Validation fails startup on a blank/relative fallback or one duplicating the primary or another fallback (a duplicated endpoint silently halves the configured failover).

Unchanged

• With FallbackEndpoints empty (the default), the registration graph is identical to 0.4.x — one keyed channel, one GrpcSecretsHubClient, no failover wrapper — and the wire behavior of every call is byte-identical. Every other package in the family is behaviorally unchanged in this release.

0.4.1 — 2026-08-07

Fixed

• ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Replicator.Grpc — the hub now logs its denials. A ScadaBridge live gate found that SecretsHubAuthInterceptor refused calls correctly but wrote nothing about it: the only trace of a refusal was a framework Grpc.AspNetCore.Server Information line, so a follower whose bearer token had been mis-rotated silently stopped converging and the hub showed it only at INF. Every denial is now counted, and a Warning summarising the window is emitted on the first denial after startup or after 60 quiet seconds — carrying the number of denials since the previous summary plus a breakdown by cause (missing/malformed credential, wrong credential, hub token unconfigured). A single probe is therefore visible immediately, while a sustained attack is bounded to one log line per minute — the endpoint is unauthenticated by construction, so a per-denial warning would be an unbounded log write driven by an unauthenticated caller.

Unchanged

• Wire behavior is byte-identical. The cause breakdown is server-side diagnostics only; every rejection still returns the same uniform Unauthenticated status with the same detail, and the credential comparison is still constant-time. No token material, presented or configured, appears in any log line at any level.
• The existing warn-once-on-unconfigured-token line is unchanged and still emitted exactly once; denials in that state also count toward the new summary's unconfigured category.
• Every other package in the family is behaviorally unchanged in this release.

0.4.0 — 2026-08-07

Added

• New package ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Replicator.Grpc — a central-hosted secrets_hub.v1 gRPC hub for the sites-talk-to-central production topology (scadaproj#3; design doc docs/plans/2026-08-07-secrets-production-topology-and-grpc-hub.md).
  • Pull-only by construction: the proto exposes no write RPC. Updates originate at central only; a site never pushes a secret upstream.
  • Fail-closed bearer auth on the hub server: constant-time comparison, uniform denial response (no signal distinguishing "wrong token" from "missing token"), a warn-once log on an unconfigured/empty token rather than a silent open door.
  • GetSecrets enforces a batch-size cap, rejecting an oversized request with ResourceExhausted instead of serving it partially or unbounded.
  • Site-side GrpcSecretSyncService sweeps the hub on an interval with per-row parse isolation — one malformed/undecryptable row logs and is skipped, it does not fault the whole sweep.
  • Keyed GrpcChannel registration so multiple hub targets can be wired in one process without channel collisions.
  • Offline behavior is last-known-good: if the hub is unreachable, the site keeps serving the most recently synced values rather than failing secret resolution.

Unchanged

• ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Abstractions, ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets, ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Ui, ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Replicator.SqlServer, and ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Replicator.AkkaDotNet are behaviorally unchanged in this release — no breaking changes to any existing package.

0.3.0 — 2026-07-19

• Menu-driven Spectre.Console interactive operator console added to the secret CLI (list / set / reveal / delete, reference audit & seed, KEK doctor, ciphertext-only bundle export/import). See docs/operations/interactive-console.md.

0.2.3 — 2026-07-19

• ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Ui: fixed the delete-confirmation modal being permanently invisible on every Bootstrap host (ConfirmDeleteModal used bare class="modal" with no shipped CSS; Bootstrap's .modal{display:none} hid it everywhere but mxaccessgw). Fixed via a zb-secrets-modal* class rename plus a component-emitted <style> block.

0.2.2 — 2026-07-18

• Fixed the Akka replicator's hosted-process DI deadlock (a circular singleton dependency hidden behind factory lambdas that MS.DI's StackGuard turned into a silent cross-thread hang rather than a stack overflow). New DeferredSecretCacheInvalidator defers the one cycle-closing edge to first eviction.

0.2.1 — 2026-07-18

• Fixed the Akka replicator being silently inert since 0.2.0 (a TryAdd registration-order bug published into a no-op sink and never spawned an actor). SQL-Server replication was never affected.

0.2.0 — 2026-07-18

• Added clustered replication (G-7): ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Replicator.SqlServer (shared store, or local-store-with-hub) and ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Replicator.AkkaDotNet (peer-to-peer over distributed pub/sub).