# Secrets — GAPS (adoption backlog)

The delta between each project's [`current-state`](current-state/) and the
[`SPEC`](spec/SPEC.md), as prioritized work. The library itself is **built + published +
reference-consumer-proven**; everything here is per-app adoption of an existing lib (not lib
construction).

## Execution status (2026-07-16)

- **mxaccessgw — G-4 + G-5 + G-6 DONE.** Executed via the plan below (8 tasks, subagent-driven,
  classification-driven reviews), **merged + pushed to `origin/main` (mxaccessgw @ `e088dfa`)**.
  Offline: 0-warning build, full suite 781 pass / 44 pre-existing worker-COM (0 non-worker),
  behavioral claim-type authz test, no Data-Protection disturbance. Box-verified on windev
  (real .NET 10.0.8): fail-closed on unseeded `${secret:}` (`SecretNotFoundException`, refuses
  to start) + CLI seed/`get` decrypt round-trip + **zero plaintext in the SQLite store at rest**.
  (`/admin/secrets` interactive reveal not re-proven on this box — same shared `.Ui` component
  already live-proven via HistorianGateway; box gateway runs LDAP-disabled/anonymous so a real
  LDAP-via-secret login wasn't exercised there.) Two review-caught fixes folded in: the LDAP
  password change's test/doc blast radius (validator-helper + host-test-bootstrap + doc truth),
  and the live-LDAP integration suite now honors the `MxGateway__Ldap__ServiceAccountPassword`
  env override. **G-4/G-5/G-6 below are the remaining OtOpcUa + ScadaBridge scope.**
- **OtOpcUa, ScadaBridge — planned, NOT executed** (recommended order: OtOpcUa next, then ScadaBridge).

## Design + implementation plans (2026-07-16)

G-2 … G-6 are now planned. Shared design +  three per-repo executable plans (task-metadata'd,
code-verified anchors, co-located `.tasks.json`):

- [`docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-design.md`](../../docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-design.md)
  — shared design: library API, the two resolution layers (pre-host `${secret:}` config
  expander vs runtime `ISecretResolver`), wiring template, master-key/clustering fork.
- [`docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-otopcua.md`](../../docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-otopcua.md)
  — **G-2 + G-4 + G-5 + G-6** (10 tasks, 2 slices; Layer-A config + Layer-B driver secrets).
- [`docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-scadabridge.md`](../../docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-scadabridge.md)
  — **G-3 + G-4 + G-5 + G-6** (10 tasks; incl. claim-type verification + committed-plaintext cleanup).
- [`docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-mxaccessgw.md`](../../docs/plans/2026-07-16-secrets-adoption-mxaccessgw.md)
  — **G-4 + G-5 + G-6** (8 tasks; single-box, no Layer B).

G-7/G-8 remain design-only/deferred (below).

## Cross-cutting observations

- **No app has `${secret:}` resolution today.** All three assemble config with the stock
  `AddJsonFile`+`AddEnvironmentVariables` chain and read secrets verbatim. Two already lean
  on the *pattern* the expander formalizes: ScadaBridge's non-functional `${SCADABRIDGE_*}`
  placeholders (whole-key env override) and OtOpcUa's driver-level `GalaxySecretRef`
  (`env:`/`file:`/`dev:`/literal). These are the natural first swaps.
- **The common high-value gap is plaintext credentials in appsettings/env:** LDAP
  service-account passwords (all three), SQL connection-string passwords (OtOpcUa ConfigDb,
  ScadaBridge ConfigDb + MachineDataDb), JWT/HS256 signing keys (OtOpcUa, ScadaBridge), and
  API-key peppers (all three, runtime-supplied but plaintext).
- **Secrets already stored in a DB in plaintext are the sharpest edge:** OtOpcUa's OpcUaClient
  `Password`/`UserCertificatePassword` and the `dev:`/literal Galaxy API key live cleartext in
  the central config DB; ScadaBridge's MxGateway per-endpoint `ApiKey` lives plaintext in the
  ConfigDb `DataConnections` JSON. These leak at rest to anyone with DB read.
- **Existing at-rest crypto is Data Protection, and only ScadaBridge applies it to secrets**
  (4 encrypted ConfigDb columns via `EncryptedStringConverter`). OtOpcUa/mxaccessgw use Data
  Protection only for cookies/tokens. None use DPAPI or `ProtectKeysWith*`; key rings are
  unencrypted-at-rest. `ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets` adds envelope encryption with a KEK held **outside**
  the store — a stronger boundary than "the DB is the only protection."
- **Peppered-HMAC API-key stores stay bespoke** (mxaccessgw + ScadaBridge): they are hashed,
  not reversibly stored — already correct. Secrets only takes over the *pepper value* supply.

## Backlog (prioritized)

### G-1 — HistorianGateway reference consumer ✅ DONE
Adopted + live-proven 2026-07-16 (historian password via `${secret:}`, authenticated read
against the real wonder historian). This is the wiring template for the three apps.

### G-2 — OtOpcUa: cleartext-in-DB driver secrets (highest value)
Add a `secret:` arm to `GalaxySecretRef` (its own comment anticipates this) and to the
OpcUaClient driver options, resolving through `ISecretResolver` — retire the `dev:`/literal
and plaintext `Password`/`UserCertificatePassword` DB paths.

### G-3 — ScadaBridge: MxGateway `ApiKey` plaintext-in-ConfigDb
Resolve via `ISecretResolver` or extend the existing `EncryptedStringConverter` to that JSON
column.

### G-4 — Pre-host `${secret:}` for plaintext config secrets (all three)
LDAP passwords, SQL connstr passwords, JWT signing keys, deploy API key (OtOpcUa),
peppers — swap to `${secret:…}` tokens, expander running **before** each app's existing
validator (`ConfigPreflight` / `Ldap`+`OpcUa` validators / `GatewayOptionsValidator`).
Delete committed dev plaintext and the loose `*_login.txt` files (ScadaBridge).

### G-5 — Master-key provider per deployment
Env (`ZB_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY`) for containers; DPAPI for the Windows boxes; **File (shared
mounted key)** for clustered pairs (hard requirement — same KEK on every node).

### G-6 — Mount `/admin/secrets` UI (all three)
Add the RCL page to each dashboard (OtOpcUa AdminUI, MxGateway Server, ScadaBridge CentralUI)
and map each app's admin role onto `secrets:manage` / `secrets:reveal`.

### G-7 — Clustered replication (ScadaBridge, OtOpcUa) — build `ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Akka`
Deferred until G-2…G-6 land for a clustered app. Options per SPEC: shared SQL-Server
`ISecretStore` (simplest — mirrors the shared Data-Protection key ring) **or** the Akka
replicator (LWW, anti-entropy resync, tombstones). Requires a shared KEK.

### G-8 — KEK-rotation runbook + `RewrapAll`
The `RewrapAll(oldKek, newKek)` admin primitive + an operator runbook. Deferred (design-only
in this cut).

## Out of scope (this component)

- Akka remoting authentication/TLS (ScadaBridge plain TCP remoting) — a separate hardening
  concern, not secret storage.
- SQL-Server `ISecretStore` provider construction (seam supports it; build with G-7).