using System.Text; using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Abstractions; using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Crypto; using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Tests.Fakes; namespace ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Tests.Crypto; public class AesGcmEnvelopeCipherTests { [Fact] public void RoundTrips() { var provider = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1"); var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(provider); var name = new SecretName("sql/foo"); StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(name, "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text); Assert.Equal("k1", row.KekId); // Ciphertext must not leak the plaintext in the clear. byte[] plaintextBytes = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes("hunter2"); Assert.False(Contains(row.Ciphertext, plaintextBytes)); string decrypted = cipher.Decrypt(row); Assert.Equal("hunter2", decrypted); } [Fact] public void TwoEncryptsProduceDifferentNonces() { var provider = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1"); var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(provider); var name = new SecretName("sql/foo"); // Same plaintext + name encrypted twice must yield a fresh nonce (and therefore a distinct // ciphertext) each time — the AES-GCM (key, nonce) uniqueness invariant. StoredSecret first = cipher.Encrypt(name, "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text); StoredSecret second = cipher.Encrypt(name, "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text); Assert.False(first.Nonce.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(second.Nonce)); Assert.False(first.Ciphertext.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(second.Ciphertext)); } [Fact] public void TamperedCiphertextThrows() { var provider = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1"); var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(provider); var name = new SecretName("sql/foo"); StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(name, "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text); row.Ciphertext[0] ^= 0xFF; Assert.Throws(() => cipher.Decrypt(row)); } [Fact] public void AadBindingRejectsRenamedRow() { var provider = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1"); var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(provider); StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text); var renamed = row with { Name = new SecretName("sql/bar") }; Assert.Throws(() => cipher.Decrypt(renamed)); } [Fact] public void WrongKekThrows() { // Both providers report KekId "k1" but hold different random key bytes. var providerA = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1"); var providerB = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1"); var cipherA = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(providerA); var cipherB = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(providerB); StoredSecret row = cipherA.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text); // Matching KekId string but wrong key material must still fail closed (unwrap tag mismatch). Assert.Throws(() => cipherB.Decrypt(row)); } [Fact] public void UnknownKekIdThrows() { var providerK1 = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k1"); var providerK2 = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("k2"); var cipherK1 = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(providerK1); var cipherK2 = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(providerK2); StoredSecret row = cipherK1.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text); var ex = Assert.Throws(() => cipherK2.Decrypt(row)); Assert.Contains("unknown KEK", ex.Message, StringComparison.Ordinal); } [Fact] public void Rewrap_RewrapsDek_BodyStillDecryptsUnderNewKek() { var oldKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old"); var newKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-new"); var oldCipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(oldKek); var name = new SecretName("sql/foo"); StoredSecret row = oldCipher.Encrypt(name, "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text); Assert.Equal("kek-old", row.KekId); // Rewrap is provider-explicit — it can be driven through any cipher instance. StoredSecret rewrapped = oldCipher.Rewrap(row, oldKek, newKek); Assert.Equal("kek-new", rewrapped.KekId); // The DEK-sealed body is untouched; only the KEK-wrap envelope changed. Assert.True(rewrapped.Ciphertext.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(row.Ciphertext)); Assert.True(rewrapped.Nonce.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(row.Nonce)); Assert.True(rewrapped.Tag.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(row.Tag)); Assert.False(rewrapped.WrappedDek.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(row.WrappedDek)); // The rewrapped row decrypts under the NEW KEK... var newCipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(newKek); Assert.Equal("hunter2", newCipher.Decrypt(rewrapped)); // ...and no longer under the OLD KEK (kek_id now names the new KEK; old cipher fails closed). Assert.Throws(() => oldCipher.Decrypt(rewrapped)); } [Fact] public void Rewrap_PreservesRevisionTimestampsTombstoneAndMetadata() { var oldKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old"); var newKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-new"); var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(oldKek); StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text) with { Revision = 7, IsDeleted = true, DeletedUtc = DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch, CreatedUtc = DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch, UpdatedUtc = DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch.AddMinutes(5), CreatedBy = "alice", UpdatedBy = "bob", Description = "the foo password", }; StoredSecret rewrapped = cipher.Rewrap(row, oldKek, newKek); // Only the wrap envelope + kek_id change — a rewrap must be invisible to (updated_utc, revision) LWW. Assert.Equal(7, rewrapped.Revision); Assert.True(rewrapped.IsDeleted); Assert.Equal(row.DeletedUtc, rewrapped.DeletedUtc); Assert.Equal(row.CreatedUtc, rewrapped.CreatedUtc); Assert.Equal(row.UpdatedUtc, rewrapped.UpdatedUtc); Assert.Equal("alice", rewrapped.CreatedBy); Assert.Equal("bob", rewrapped.UpdatedBy); Assert.Equal("the foo password", rewrapped.Description); Assert.Equal(SecretContentType.Text, rewrapped.ContentType); } [Fact] public void Rewrap_WrongOldKekId_FailsClosed() { var actualKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old"); var wrongOld = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-somethingelse"); var newKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-new"); var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(actualKek); StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text); // Row is wrapped by "kek-old" but the caller claims the old KEK is "kek-somethingelse". var ex = Assert.Throws(() => cipher.Rewrap(row, wrongOld, newKek)); Assert.Contains("kek-old", ex.Message, StringComparison.Ordinal); } [Fact] public void Rewrap_CorrectKekIdButWrongKeyMaterial_FailsClosed() { // Same KEK-id string, different key bytes → the unwrap must fail closed (tag mismatch), // never emitting a garbage DEK. var realOld = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old"); var imposterOld = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old"); // same id, fresh random bytes var newKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-new"); var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(realOld); StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text); Assert.Throws(() => cipher.Rewrap(row, imposterOld, newKek)); } private static bool Contains(byte[] haystack, byte[] needle) { if (needle.Length == 0 || haystack.Length < needle.Length) { return false; } for (int i = 0; i <= haystack.Length - needle.Length; i++) { bool match = true; for (int j = 0; j < needle.Length; j++) { if (haystack[i + j] != needle[j]) { match = false; break; } } if (match) { return true; } } return false; } }