Review follow-ups: the warning now carries only the two endpoint URIs and the
status code — attaching the exception object would let any real sink render
its ToString(), which for RpcException includes server-authored Status.Detail.
The leak pin test now also asserts no exception rides on the warning, via a
new WarningExceptions capture on RecordingLogger. Plus two cosmetic nits:
unified ThrowIfNull idiom, documented that FallbackEndpoints mutation after
Validate is unsupported.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
Adds the end-to-end layer the unit suites structurally cannot reach: a real
in-process ASP.NET Core host serving SecretsHubService through
AddZbSecretsGrpcHub/MapZbSecretsHub, a follower built by the shipped
AddZbSecretsGrpcHubClient, a real gRPC call between them, and real SQLite
stores on both sides. The class of defect this catches is pieces that are each
individually correct and are never connected to one another — for instance the
interceptor's warn-once, which only holds if the container really hands gRPC
the singleton it registered.
Covered: byte-identical convergence over the wire (every ciphertext/nonce/tag/
wrapped-DEK byte, kek_id, revision, both timestamps INCLUDING their offsets,
across a tombstone, a nulls-everywhere row and an empty-string-description row);
delete propagation; a hub unreachable at follower boot leaving the last-known-
good store intact and converging once it answers; the auth negatives fail-closed
across the wire with one uniform denial detail; the per-request name cap as
ResourceExhausted; and an RpcException from the call invoker escaping the hub
client unchanged, so a transport fault stays distinguishable from a parse fault.
The credential-hygiene assertions are made against logs captured at Trace on
BOTH hosts, so "no token material ever reaches a sink" is asserted at the most
verbose setting a deployment could switch on.
SecretsHubContractPinTests reads the generated descriptor — not the .proto text
— and pins the RPC set to exactly {GetManifest, GetSecrets}, plus unary-only and
the package-qualified service name. The hub is pull-only by construction:
updates originate at central only, and the absence of a write RPC is what
enforces that, not authorization a mis-wired follower may hold more of than
intended. A third RPC silently retires the guarantee, so the failure message
says so.
Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost pinned at 10.0.7 — the version ZB.MOM.WW.LocalDb,
OtOpcUa and ScadaBridge already pin, matching the Microsoft.Extensions.* line.
Full suite: 436 passed / 0 failed / 15 skipped, no new warnings.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
A single malformed row or manifest entry poisoned the whole sweep, permanently.
WireToDomain.ToRows/ToManifest materialized eagerly, so one unparseable element
threw out of the fetch callback, past SecretReplicationReconciler's per-batch
handling, into SweepSafelyAsync's whole-sweep catch. The follower's pull set is
derived from the hub's manifest, so the identical bad element arrived in the
identical batch on every interval and nothing ever converged — logged as "sync
failed", indistinguishable from a hub outage.
Isolation now matches the Akka sibling's split exactly: WireToDomain stays a
strict per-item parser and loses its two batch entry points (their absence is
pinned by a reflection test), while GrpcSecretsHubClient converts each item
inside its own try — the same shape as SecretReplicationActor.Materialize.
A dropped item costs one warning naming the secret and a reason category, and
every well-formed sibling still converges. Only parse-shaped exceptions are
caught (ArgumentException, FormatException); a defect still propagates. A row
whose own name is unparseable is logged under a marker rather than echoing the
untrusted string, and no ciphertext, DEK or credential reaches a log line.
GrpcSecretsHubClient had zero coverage — the existing fake implements the
ISecretsHubReader seam directly, bypassing the header, the deadline and the
conversion, which are the only things that class does. It is now driven for
real through a fake CallInvoker handed to the generated client.
The stale doc comment claiming the reconciler isolated the failure is replaced
by one describing the mechanism that actually exists, and Endpoint gains a note
that a plain-http hub sends the bearer token cleartext (doc only, no validation
change).
Tests 52 -> 67 in the package suite; solution green, no new warnings.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
Joseph Doherty