4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Joseph Doherty baea6cc2e0 docs(secrets): interactive-console quickstart + discoverability sweep
- new task-first quickstart (deployment seeding + KEK-lockout walkthroughs)
- runbook: document the sixth ReferenceStatus (PresentUnverified) + quickstart link
- README + shared-contract + umbrella CLAUDE.md secrets row updated for 0.3.0 console
- CLI usage text now mentions the interactive console (was undiscoverable from --help)
2026-07-19 14:55:53 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 6dbb372adf docs(secrets): interactive console runbook + 0.3.0 version bump 2026-07-19 10:37:37 -04:00
Joseph Doherty dd0a846b64 feat(secrets): cluster replication via SQL Server and Akka.NET (G-7, 0.2.0)
Secrets were per-node SQLite, so a secret written on one node was invisible to
the rest of a cluster. G-7's design resolved the "shared SQL store vs Akka
replicator" fork to build only the former; both are built here so the choice is
a deployment decision (availability vs partition tolerance) rather than a
library limitation.

Two new packages — ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Replicator.SqlServer (shared store, plus a
local-store-with-hub mode) and .Replicator.AkkaDotNet (peer-to-peer over
distributed pub/sub). Core gains ISecretsStoreMigrator, one shared
SecretLastWriterWins predicate so no two stores can disagree on a tie, the
transport-agnostic reconciler, and ReplicatingSecretStore — which closes a real
gap: nothing had ever called ISecretReplicator.PublishAsync, so the seam was
inert and local writes would not have propagated at all.

Verified 182 pass / 1 skip / 0 warnings, including 15 live tests against a real
SQL Server 2022 (the SQLite suite ported case-for-case, so any behavioural
divergence between the stores fails) and a 9-test in-process 2-node Akka
cluster over real remoting. A post-build review caught six defects, all fixed
and now covered: both replication modes could not resolve from the container
(no test had built one), an unbounded fetch that broke past SQL Server's
2100-parameter cap, a poison row that aborted the rest of its batch forever,
Enum.Parse on peer input that could restart the actor in a loop, null crypto
blobs crossing the trust boundary, and a silently dropped pull-read failure.

Packed at 0.2.0 and vulnerability-scanned clean; not yet published to the feed.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL2Vu1ESDQ9SCN4gVKkdts
2026-07-18 04:08:23 -04:00
Joseph Doherty d82d3451e7 feat(secrets): build G-8 KEK rotation (RewrapAll); design+plan G-7 clustered replication
G-8 (KEK rotation) — built in ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets, lib 0.1.2->0.1.3:
- ISecretCipher.Rewrap(row, oldKek, newKek): re-wraps the per-secret DEK only
  (bodies never re-encrypted; revision/timestamps preserved -> invisible to
  cluster LWW). Fail-closed on wrong old-KEK id, wrong key bytes, and malformed
  wraps; DEK zeroed on all paths.
- ISecretStore.ApplyRewrapAsync(rewrappedRow, expectedCurrentWrappedDek):
  updates only the 4 wrap columns + kek_id, compare-and-swap on the current
  wrapped DEK so a concurrent set/rotate cannot corrupt a row (closes a
  review-caught TOCTOU).
- KekRotationService.RewrapAllAsync + RewrapReport: enumerate all rows incl.
  tombstones, idempotent/resumable skip-already-current, bounded CAS-retry,
  fail-closed on unknown/identical KEK.
- `secret rewrap-all` CLI verb: key material only via env-var name / file path,
  JSON counts report; README section + operator runbook.

Verified: full offline suite green (82 core + 15 UI, 0 regressions) + end-to-end
CLI smoke + adversarial crypto review (all 7 categories PASS; TOCTOU fixed).

G-7 (clustered replication) — designed + planned, no code:
- Fork resolved to build Option A (shared SQL-Server ISecretStore); Akka
  replicator ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Akka is a deferred phase-2. Design doc +
  executable plan + .tasks.json under docs/plans/2026-07-17-secrets-g7-*.

Tracking: components/secrets/GAPS.md + CLAUDE.md secrets row updated.
2026-07-17 02:55:43 -04:00