feat(secrets): build G-8 KEK rotation (RewrapAll); design+plan G-7 clustered replication

G-8 (KEK rotation) — built in ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets, lib 0.1.2->0.1.3:
- ISecretCipher.Rewrap(row, oldKek, newKek): re-wraps the per-secret DEK only
  (bodies never re-encrypted; revision/timestamps preserved -> invisible to
  cluster LWW). Fail-closed on wrong old-KEK id, wrong key bytes, and malformed
  wraps; DEK zeroed on all paths.
- ISecretStore.ApplyRewrapAsync(rewrappedRow, expectedCurrentWrappedDek):
  updates only the 4 wrap columns + kek_id, compare-and-swap on the current
  wrapped DEK so a concurrent set/rotate cannot corrupt a row (closes a
  review-caught TOCTOU).
- KekRotationService.RewrapAllAsync + RewrapReport: enumerate all rows incl.
  tombstones, idempotent/resumable skip-already-current, bounded CAS-retry,
  fail-closed on unknown/identical KEK.
- `secret rewrap-all` CLI verb: key material only via env-var name / file path,
  JSON counts report; README section + operator runbook.

Verified: full offline suite green (82 core + 15 UI, 0 regressions) + end-to-end
CLI smoke + adversarial crypto review (all 7 categories PASS; TOCTOU fixed).

G-7 (clustered replication) — designed + planned, no code:
- Fork resolved to build Option A (shared SQL-Server ISecretStore); Akka
  replicator ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Akka is a deferred phase-2. Design doc +
  executable plan + .tasks.json under docs/plans/2026-07-17-secrets-g7-*.

Tracking: components/secrets/GAPS.md + CLAUDE.md secrets row updated.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-07-17 02:55:43 -04:00
parent b009507e10
commit d82d3451e7
24 changed files with 1280 additions and 12 deletions
@@ -95,6 +95,97 @@ public class AesGcmEnvelopeCipherTests
Assert.Contains("unknown KEK", ex.Message, StringComparison.Ordinal);
}
[Fact]
public void Rewrap_RewrapsDek_BodyStillDecryptsUnderNewKek()
{
var oldKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old");
var newKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-new");
var oldCipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(oldKek);
var name = new SecretName("sql/foo");
StoredSecret row = oldCipher.Encrypt(name, "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text);
Assert.Equal("kek-old", row.KekId);
// Rewrap is provider-explicit — it can be driven through any cipher instance.
StoredSecret rewrapped = oldCipher.Rewrap(row, oldKek, newKek);
Assert.Equal("kek-new", rewrapped.KekId);
// The DEK-sealed body is untouched; only the KEK-wrap envelope changed.
Assert.True(rewrapped.Ciphertext.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(row.Ciphertext));
Assert.True(rewrapped.Nonce.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(row.Nonce));
Assert.True(rewrapped.Tag.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(row.Tag));
Assert.False(rewrapped.WrappedDek.AsSpan().SequenceEqual(row.WrappedDek));
// The rewrapped row decrypts under the NEW KEK...
var newCipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(newKek);
Assert.Equal("hunter2", newCipher.Decrypt(rewrapped));
// ...and no longer under the OLD KEK (kek_id now names the new KEK; old cipher fails closed).
Assert.Throws<SecretDecryptionException>(() => oldCipher.Decrypt(rewrapped));
}
[Fact]
public void Rewrap_PreservesRevisionTimestampsTombstoneAndMetadata()
{
var oldKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old");
var newKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-new");
var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(oldKek);
StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text) with
{
Revision = 7,
IsDeleted = true,
DeletedUtc = DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
CreatedUtc = DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
UpdatedUtc = DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch.AddMinutes(5),
CreatedBy = "alice",
UpdatedBy = "bob",
Description = "the foo password",
};
StoredSecret rewrapped = cipher.Rewrap(row, oldKek, newKek);
// Only the wrap envelope + kek_id change — a rewrap must be invisible to (updated_utc, revision) LWW.
Assert.Equal(7, rewrapped.Revision);
Assert.True(rewrapped.IsDeleted);
Assert.Equal(row.DeletedUtc, rewrapped.DeletedUtc);
Assert.Equal(row.CreatedUtc, rewrapped.CreatedUtc);
Assert.Equal(row.UpdatedUtc, rewrapped.UpdatedUtc);
Assert.Equal("alice", rewrapped.CreatedBy);
Assert.Equal("bob", rewrapped.UpdatedBy);
Assert.Equal("the foo password", rewrapped.Description);
Assert.Equal(SecretContentType.Text, rewrapped.ContentType);
}
[Fact]
public void Rewrap_WrongOldKekId_FailsClosed()
{
var actualKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old");
var wrongOld = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-somethingelse");
var newKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-new");
var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(actualKek);
StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text);
// Row is wrapped by "kek-old" but the caller claims the old KEK is "kek-somethingelse".
var ex = Assert.Throws<SecretDecryptionException>(() => cipher.Rewrap(row, wrongOld, newKek));
Assert.Contains("kek-old", ex.Message, StringComparison.Ordinal);
}
[Fact]
public void Rewrap_CorrectKekIdButWrongKeyMaterial_FailsClosed()
{
// Same KEK-id string, different key bytes → the unwrap must fail closed (tag mismatch),
// never emitting a garbage DEK.
var realOld = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old");
var imposterOld = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-old"); // same id, fresh random bytes
var newKek = new FakeMasterKeyProvider("kek-new");
var cipher = new AesGcmEnvelopeCipher(realOld);
StoredSecret row = cipher.Encrypt(new SecretName("sql/foo"), "hunter2", SecretContentType.Text);
Assert.Throws<SecretDecryptionException>(() => cipher.Rewrap(row, imposterOld, newKek));
}
private static bool Contains(byte[] haystack, byte[] needle)
{
if (needle.Length == 0 || haystack.Length < needle.Length)