docs(plan): PROD install gets the NAM AD LDAP settings (§3A): block, _PROD mappings, secret before first start, D-P5..D-P7

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AD5mc2BnaaAfY3hqqQ
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-11-19 16:24:04 -05:00
parent 9789b01acd
commit 8e415212fa
@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@
**State: PLAN ONLY. Nothing has been executed, and no prod box has been touched.** This is the first production **State: PLAN ONLY. Nothing has been executed, and no prod box has been touched.** This is the first production
tier for the family. Until now `deployment.md` said "no production box has been identified". tier for the family. Until now `deployment.md` said "no production box has been identified".
**The DEPLOY HOLD still applies to QA and PROD** (owner, 2026-11-17; lifted for DEV only on 2026-11-19). Every **The DEPLOY HOLD still applies to PROD** (owner, 2026-11-17). DEV and QA have both run the candidate builds with NAM AD
phase below that touches QA or a prod box needs its own explicit owner go. login since 2026-11-19 (QA window approved that day). Every phase below that touches a prod box needs its own explicit
owner go. **LDAP settings for PROD: §3A** (added 2026-11-19 after the DEV and QA cutovers).
## 1. Target topology ## 1. Target topology
@@ -28,7 +29,8 @@ boundary for the first time. It is the main new risk in this install.
which refuse zero-role logins) and mxgw `e74918cc`. Prod gets the **same zips, byte-identical** to the ones which refuse zero-role logins) and mxgw `e74918cc`. Prod gets the **same zips, byte-identical** to the ones
that soaked on QA. that soaked on QA.
- **D-P3 NAM AD over LDAPS from day one.** This uses `_PROD` groups only and separate PROD accounts. There is - **D-P3 NAM AD over LDAPS from day one.** This uses `_PROD` groups only and separate PROD accounts. There is
no GLAuth in prod. no GLAuth in prod. The settings, the secret handling and the open bind-account / Deployer / cookie decisions
(D-P5–D-P7) are in §3A.
- **D-P4 content: a signed config bundle from QA**, limited to the machines selected for prod. Prod - **D-P4 content: a signed config bundle from QA**, limited to the machines selected for prod. Prod
connections are re-pointed at the prod gateways, and prod mints its own inbound API keys. connections are re-pointed at the prod gateways, and prod mints its own inbound API keys.
@@ -73,7 +75,7 @@ for `sqlvd03`). Whether `adm_dohertj2` is a local admin on the wonder prod boxes
**DELMIA prod is `dnc-app-vp01`** (10.201.207.106). For Q8, that box is the prod Delmia caller of **DELMIA prod is `dnc-app-vp01`** (10.201.207.106). For Q8, that box is the prod Delmia caller of
ScadaBridge's `DelmiaRecipeDownload`. Prod runs an older Downloader than QA (`delmia` project memory), so check ScadaBridge's `DelmiaRecipeDownload`. Prod runs an older Downloader than QA (`delmia` project memory), so check
the prod integration's shape before you assume it matches QA's. the prod integration's shape before you assume it matches QA's.
| Q7 | TLS: is there a corporate cert for the Central UI (HTTPS) and for the mxgw dashboard? LDAPS needs `zimmer-rootca` in the machine store (cutover-plan D4), and `AllowInsecure=false` in prod. | Phases 4–5 | | Q7 | TLS: is there a corporate cert for the Central UI (HTTPS) and for the mxgw dashboard? It decides the cookie setting (D-P7, §3A). LDAPS needs `zimmer-rootca` in the machine store (cutover-plan D4), and `AllowInsecure=false` in prod. DEV and QA already had the root CA (thumbprint `78D941D7…`, exp 2036) and validated nam1/nam2 over TLS 1.3. | Phases 4–5 |
| Q8 | Which machines (SAPIDs / Galaxy objects) go to prod on day one? What is the `SiteId`? Do the BTDB connection, MES and Delmia endpoints, and SMTP/EWS have prod equivalents? | Phase 7 | | Q8 | Which machines (SAPIDs / Galaxy objects) go to prod on day one? What is the `SiteId`? Do the BTDB connection, MES and Delmia endpoints, and SMTP/EWS have prod equivalents? | Phase 7 |
| Q9 | Will any machine be driven by two ScadaBridge stacks at once (QA and prod)? Prod writes to the real Galaxy. A machine moved to prod should be undeployed from QA, or QA must be on a different Galaxy. | Phase 7 | | Q9 | Will any machine be driven by two ScadaBridge stacks at once (QA and prod)? Prod writes to the real Galaxy. A machine moved to prod should be undeployed from QA, or QA must be on a different Galaxy. | Phase 7 |
@@ -87,6 +89,8 @@ the prod integration's shape before you assume it matches QA's.
- G3 `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_PROD`; - G3 `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_PROD`;
- a **membership review** of `UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_PROD`, `APP_IDE_PROD`, `APP_IDE_RO_PROD` and `BTMGR_RO_PROD`. - a **membership review** of `UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_PROD`, `APP_IDE_PROD`, `APP_IDE_RO_PROD` and `BTMGR_RO_PROD`.
These groups were built for System Platform, so mapping them grants their members app roles in prod. These groups were built for System Platform, so mapping them grants their members app roles in prod.
Current members are in §3A.2. Also confirm no NAM group is named `SCADA-*` (ScadaBridge's seed rows).
Decide D-P5 (bind account) and D-P6 (Deployer) if A1P or G3 will not exist by go-live.
2. Extend scadaproj#58 for A1P (comment). File a `cross-repo` umbrella issue in scadaproj, plus a `type:deploy-gate` 2. Extend scadaproj#58 for A1P (comment). File a `cross-repo` umbrella issue in scadaproj, plus a `type:deploy-gate`
issue in ScadaBridge and in mxaccessgw, cross-linked. issue in ScadaBridge and in mxaccessgw, cross-linked.
3. Firewall requests, from the §4 matrix. 3. Firewall requests, from the §4 matrix.
@@ -114,8 +118,9 @@ the prod integration's shape before you assume it matches QA's.
4. **Soak on QA for at least 3 working days.** The gates are the QA record's set: ready 200 ×4, one active per 4. **Soak on QA for at least 3 working days.** The gates are the QA record's set: ready 200 ×4, one active per
pair, MxGateway 2196/2196 good, LocalDb sync connected, and zero-role login refused (#144/#145 negative pair, MxGateway 2196/2196 good, LocalDb sync connected, and zero-role login refused (#144/#145 negative
control). control).
5. Optionally, do QA's NAM cutover (plan Phases A–7) before prod. **Recommended.** QA is then the first 5. ~~Optionally, do QA's NAM cutover before prod.~~ **Done 2026-11-19**, in the same window as the QA deploy of these
environment that proves NAM AD over LDAPS on these exact builds, so prod is not the first. builds (record `docs/deploy/2026-11-19-qa-nam-ldap/`). The QA soak therefore covers NAM AD over LDAPS on the exact
PROD candidates; it started 2026-11-19, so the 3-working-day gate is met on 2026-11-24 at the earliest.
### Phase 2: box prep (all four, no service started) ### Phase 2: box prep (all four, no service started)
@@ -128,6 +133,9 @@ the prod integration's shape before you assume it matches QA's.
- Optional, and recommended for parity: the `ZbOtelCollector` loopback collector (`infra/otel-collector/wonder/`). - Optional, and recommended for parity: the `ZbOtelCollector` loopback collector (`infra/otel-collector/wonder/`).
- Gate: SHA re-verified on each box, MXAccess COM registered (Q3), and the boxes resolve each other by the FQDN - Gate: SHA re-verified on each box, MXAccess COM registered (Q3), and the boxes resolve each other by the FQDN
that the config will use. that the config will use.
- LDAP gate (§3A), read-only, per box: nam1 and nam2 reachable on 636; `zimmer-rootca` in `LocalMachine\Root`; an
LDAPS handshake to both validates with no policy errors (the QA `preflight.ps1` steps 1–2). Stage the Secrets CLI 0.6.6
under `E:\ApiInstall\_tools\secret-0.6.6\`, plus the SQL-aware build on the centrals.
### Phase 3: ConfigDb ### Phase 3: ConfigDb
@@ -139,6 +147,7 @@ the prod integration's shape before you assume it matches QA's.
3. Gate: 65 rows in `__EFMigrationsHistory`, the `zbauth` schema present (inbound API keys, Auth 3. Gate: 65 rows in `__EFMigrationsHistory`, the `zbauth` schema present (inbound API keys, Auth
`ApiKeys.SqlServer`), and the Secrets SqlServer store tables present. `ApiKeys.SqlServer`), and the Secrets SqlServer store tables present.
4. First backup: `COPY_ONLY, CHECKSUM, COMPRESSION` + `VERIFYONLY`. 4. First backup: `COPY_ONLY, CHECKSUM, COMPRESSION` + `VERIFYONLY`.
5. Insert the `_PROD` role rows by SQL (§3A.3). Gate: the rows read back; ids 1–5 (`SCADA-*`) untouched.
### Phase 4: MxAccessGateway ×4 ### Phase 4: MxAccessGateway ×4
@@ -149,9 +158,9 @@ the connection to the local PAR gateways as a normal connection edit and instanc
Use `Install-MxGatewayService.ps1`, always with `-DryRun` first, and review the masked env before the real run. Use `Install-MxGatewayService.ps1`, always with `-DryRun` first, and review the masked env before the real run.
- Environment `Production`, which **requires login on**. LDAPS to NAM (nam1/nam2 + `FallbackServers`), the A1P - Environment `Production`, which **requires login on**. The LDAP env block and `GroupToRole` from §3A.3 go into the
bind, and GroupToRole for `_PROD` groups only: `APP_ADMIN_PROD`→Administrator, `APP_IDE_PROD`→Viewer, `-EnvFile`; delete `GwAdmin`/`GwReader` from the base `appsettings.json` before the first start.
`APP_IDE_RO_PROD`→Viewer (`ldap_mapping.md` §4.1). - Install **without `-Start`**, seed `nam-ldap-svc-password` (§3A.4), review the masked env, then start.
- **Fresh prod secrets on each box:** `ZB_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY`, `MxGateway__ApiKeyPepper`. Nothing is copied from - **Fresh prod secrets on each box:** `ZB_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY`, `MxGateway__ApiKeyPepper`. Nothing is copied from
QA. Choose one of two patterns and record the choice: QA. Choose one of two patterns and record the choice:
(a) **Recommended:** the PAR pair shares one pepper and one API-key store (QA's 2026-08-14 clone pattern), so (a) **Recommended:** the PAR pair shares one pepper and one API-key store (QA's 2026-08-14 clone pattern), so
@@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Use `Install-MxGatewayService.ps1`, always with `-DryRun` first, and review the
- Galaxy SQL and the alarm subscription per Q2. `SqlitePath` values are absolute and outside the content root. - Galaxy SQL and the alarm subscription per Q2. `SqlitePath` values are absolute and outside the content root.
- Mint client keys: `scadabridge-site-prod` on the PAR gateways, plus whatever Q4 decides for the app boxes. - Mint client keys: `scadabridge-site-prod` on the PAR gateways, plus whatever Q4 decides for the app boxes.
Tokens go to the Keychain and to ScadaBridge's secret store, and nowhere else. Tokens go to the Keychain and to ScadaBridge's secret store, and nowhere else.
- Gates: dashboard login with a NAM `_PROD` user succeeds; a user with zero roles is refused; with the client - Gates: §3A.5 (dashboard login as `dohertj2` → Administrator; bogus refused; no service-bind line); with the client
token, `galaxy-test-connection` returns `ok:true`, and a session open/close works on each box; a bogus key token, `galaxy-test-connection` returns `ok:true`, and a session open/close works on each box; a bogus key
gets a typed auth error; a worker session reports ready. gets a typed auth error; a worker session reports ready.
@@ -172,9 +181,10 @@ Use `Install-MxGatewayService.ps1`, always with `-DryRun` first, and review the
- the ConfigDb connection string; `Secrets:Store:Provider=SqlServer` (one store shared by both centrals); - the ConfigDb connection string; `Secrets:Store:Provider=SqlServer` (one store shared by both centrals);
- a **shared `JwtSigningKey`** (≥ 32 random characters), shared ASP.NET Data Protection keys, and an - a **shared `JwtSigningKey`** (≥ 32 random characters), shared ASP.NET Data Protection keys, and an
`ApiKeyPepper`; `ApiKeyPepper`;
- NAM LDAPS with `AllowInsecure=false` and the A1P bind; - NAM LDAPS: the §3A.3 block in each node's `appsettings.Central.json`, no `Auth` block, no LDAP env entry,
- GroupToRole for `_PROD` only, including `APP_DEPLOY_PROD`→Deployer (`Administrator` does not include `RequireHttpsCookie` per D-P7; the secret seeded once into the shared store before the first start (§3A.4);
Deployer); - roles come from the `LdapGroupMappings` rows inserted in Phase 3 (`_PROD` only, `APP_DEPLOY_PROD`→Deployer or
the D-P6 fallback; `Administrator` does not include Deployer);
- downing `leader-auto-down` (the shipped default); OTLP to loopback if Phase 2 installed the collector. - downing `leader-auto-down` (the shipped default); OTLP to loopback if Phase 2 installed the collector.
Start from the QA Central env **key names** (names only, never values) plus QA's appsettings shape. Write a Start from the QA Central env **key names** (names only, never values) plus QA's appsettings shape. Write a
per-node diff table before anything starts. per-node diff table before anything starts.
@@ -184,8 +194,10 @@ Use `Install-MxGatewayService.ps1`, always with `-DryRun` first, and review the
boundary the runbook describes). boundary the runbook describes).
- Start order: vp03, wait for ready 200, then vp04. - Start order: vp03, wait for ready 200, then vp04.
- Gates: ready 200 on both; active 200 on one node and 503 on the other; `required-singletons` healthy; - Gates: ready 200 on both; active 200 on one node and 503 on the other; `required-singletons` healthy;
`bundle-signing-policy` healthy; a NAM login works in the UI and in the CLI (`--url`, A3P or a named `bundle-signing-policy` healthy; §3A.5 on the active central: `dohertj2` in the UI, at `/auth/token` (role claims)
deployer); a zero-role user is refused at `/auth/login`, `/auth/token` and `/management`. and in the CLI (`--url`, `--password-file`), bogus refused, no service-bind line; then the same login against the
other central after a failover drill in Phase 8. A zero-role user is refused at `/auth/login`, `/auth/token` and
`/management` where §3A.5 item 4 has an account for it.
### Phase 6: ScadaBridge site pair (PAR-VP03, PAR-VP04) ### Phase 6: ScadaBridge site pair (PAR-VP03, PAR-VP04)
@@ -227,6 +239,128 @@ Use `Install-MxGatewayService.ps1`, always with `-DryRun` first, and review the
- Overview: decide whether prod gets its own Overview, or a `Prod` registry on an existing box. It is not in - Overview: decide whether prod gets its own Overview, or a `Prod` registry on an existing box. It is not in
scope unless the owner asks. scope unless the owner asks.
## 3A. LDAP settings (NAM AD) for PROD
Login is on from the first start (D-P3). This section is the PROD form of the family cutover
([`2026-11-15-nam-ldap-cutover.md`](2026-11-15-nam-ldap-cutover.md)), which already ran on DEV and QA with these
exact builds (records [`docs/deploy/2026-11-19-vd03-nam-ldap/`](../deploy/2026-11-19-vd03-nam-ldap/README.md) and
[`docs/deploy/2026-11-19-qa-nam-ldap/`](../deploy/2026-11-19-qa-nam-ldap/README.md)). Differences from QA: PROD is
greenfield, so there is no GLAuth config to replace, and the settings are written at install time, before the first start.
### 3A.1 Decisions
| # | Decision | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|
| D-P5 | **Bind account.** PROD binds as **A1P `svc_zbmomww_prod`** (T6; no lockout, read-only). DEV and QA run on the interim `svc_igntadmin`, which belongs to the Ignition team. | **Wait for A1P.** Using `svc_igntadmin` in PROD means one Ignition-owned password (and one lockout) spans every tier and the Ignition PROD stack. Only with an explicit owner go **and** the Ignition team's OK; then the A1P swap is a re-seed of `nam-ldap-svc-password` in every PROD store plus a rolling restart. |
| D-P6 | **ScadaBridge Deployer.** `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_PROD` (G3, T6). | **Wait for G3.** Fallback, as on DEV/QA: `UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_PROD`→Deployer. Note it is **not** the same membership as `APP_ADMIN_PROD` in PROD (4 vs 5 members on 2026-11-19: `millerh5` is admin but not hist-admin), so with the fallback that admin cannot deploy. |
| D-P7 | **Cookies over plain HTTP.** Each app's auth cookie must be `Secure` only when the endpoint is HTTPS. | If Q7 delivers certs: HTTPS endpoints and `RequireHttpsCookie=true`. Without TLS: `RequireHttpsCookie=false` on mxgw and ScadaBridge (as on QA), recorded as a known gap. |
### 3A.2 Directory facts (2026-11-19 dump; re-verify in Phase 0)
| Group | Members | ScadaBridge | MxAccessGateway |
|---|---|---|---|
| `UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_PROD` | 5 (chamalas, millerh5, marting4, dohertj2, Luis Bastidas) | Administrator | Administrator |
| `UG_WW_APP_IDE_PROD` | 4 (chamalas, marting4, dohertj2, Luis Bastidas) | Designer | Viewer |
| `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_PROD` | **does not exist yet** (G3) | Deployer | — |
| `UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_PROD` | 1 (oswaltk) | Viewer | Viewer |
| `UG_WW_BTMGR_RO_PROD` | 4 (benjamd2, marting4, oswaltk, Luis Bastidas) | Viewer | — |
| `UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_PROD` | 4 | (D-P6 fallback only) | — |
`UG_WW_BTMGR_{BE,MC}_PROD` and `UG_WW_CITRIX_PROD` are **never** mapped here (§4.2 rows wait for later). Each PROD
deployment lists **only `_PROD` groups**; a `_DEV`/`_QA` name in a PROD config is a defect. The T6 membership review
must finish before the mapping goes live: `BTMGR_RO_PROD` gives 4 people ScadaBridge Viewer.
**Test identity:** `NAM\dohertj2` is in `APP_ADMIN_PROD` and `APP_IDE_PROD`, so it is the PROD login probe (expected
roles: ScadaBridge Administrator+Designer, plus Deployer once G3 or D-P6 lands; mxgw Administrator). Its password is in
the Keychain as `winrm-cli/vq03`. `adm_dohertj2` is the box-admin account for winrm/SMB only, never a login probe.
### 3A.3 The block (identical on every app; only the key prefix differs)
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| `Enabled` | `true` |
| `Server` / `Port` / `Transport` | `uswap-vdc-nam1.nam.zimmer.com` / `636` / `Ldaps` |
| `FallbackServers[0]` | `uswap-vdc-nam2.nam.zimmer.com:636` |
| `AllowInsecure` | `false` (needs `zimmer-rootca` in `LocalMachine\Root`; Phase 2 gate) |
| `SearchBase` | `DC=nam,DC=zimmer,DC=com` |
| `ServiceAccountDn` | `svc_zbmomww_prod@nam.zimmer.com` (A1P; D-P5) |
| `ServiceAccountPassword` | `${secret:nam-ldap-svc-password}`, never a literal |
| `UserNameAttribute` / `DisplayNameAttribute` / `GroupAttribute` | `sAMAccountName` / `name` / `memberOf` |
| `BindMode` | `ServiceAccount` |
**MxAccessGateway (×4): NSSM env**, through `Install-MxGatewayService.ps1 -EnvFile` (the QA pattern; the upgrade script
never writes the env, so it survives every redeploy):
```
MxGateway__Ldap__Enabled=true
MxGateway__Ldap__Server=uswap-vdc-nam1.nam.zimmer.com
MxGateway__Ldap__Port=636
MxGateway__Ldap__Transport=Ldaps
MxGateway__Ldap__AllowInsecure=false
MxGateway__Ldap__FallbackServers__0=uswap-vdc-nam2.nam.zimmer.com:636
MxGateway__Ldap__SearchBase=DC=nam,DC=zimmer,DC=com
MxGateway__Ldap__ServiceAccountDn=svc_zbmomww_prod@nam.zimmer.com
MxGateway__Ldap__ServiceAccountPassword=${secret:nam-ldap-svc-password}
MxGateway__Ldap__UserNameAttribute=sAMAccountName
MxGateway__Ldap__DisplayNameAttribute=name
MxGateway__Ldap__GroupAttribute=memberOf
MxGateway__Ldap__BindMode=ServiceAccount
MxGateway__Dashboard__GroupToRole__UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_PROD=Administrator
MxGateway__Dashboard__GroupToRole__UG_WW_APP_IDE_PROD=Viewer
MxGateway__Dashboard__GroupToRole__UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_PROD=Viewer
MxGateway__Dashboard__RequireHttpsCookie=<per D-P7>
```
Plus, in the base `app\appsettings.json`, **delete `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole` (`GwAdmin`/`GwReader`)** before the
first start: configuration merges the file map with the env map, so the GLAuth names would otherwise stay mapped. The
upgrade script carries the edited file forward on later upgrades.
**ScadaBridge Central (×2): `app\appsettings.Central.json`**, section `ScadaBridge:Security:Ldap` (the QA shape; each
node's file is written separately, never copied over the other), with no `Auth` block (`DisableLogin` /
`AllowOutsideDevelopment` absent) and `ScadaBridge:Security:RequireHttpsCookie` per D-P7. **No
`ScadaBridge__Security__Ldap__*` env entry**: an env password would override the `${secret:}` reference. Sites have no
login and get no LDAP settings.
**ScadaBridge role rows**, in `dbo.LdapGroupMappings` (the central database, not config). With login on from the first
start nobody can sign in until they exist, so insert them **by SQL after Phase 3** with the idempotent script
`docs/deploy/2026-11-19-vd03-nam-ldap/sb-role-mappings.ps1` retargeted to these rows:
`UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_PROD`→Administrator, `UG_WW_APP_IDE_PROD`→Designer, `UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_PROD`→Viewer,
`UG_WW_BTMGR_RO_PROD`→Viewer, `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_PROD`→Deployer (or the D-P6 fallback). Later changes go through the CLI
(audited). The migration seeds five `SCADA-*` rows (ids 1–5); they grant nothing unless a NAM group with that exact
name exists, which Phase 0 checks (`LdapProbe -g 'SCADA-*'` returns none).
### 3A.4 The secret, before the first start
Each app's pre-host expander fails closed on a missing `${secret:}`, so `nam-ldap-svc-password` must be in the store
before the service is started for the first time:
| Store | Where | How |
|---|---|---|
| mxgw ×4 | each box's `Secrets__SqlitePath` (absolute, outside the content root), KEK per that service's env | `Install-MxGatewayService.ps1` **without `-Start`**, then `seed-secret.ps1` (the QA one; it reads the store path and KEK from the service env), then start |
| ScadaBridge centrals | the shared SQL Server store (`zbsecrets`, `Secrets:Store:Provider=SqlServer`), **once** | the SQL-aware Secrets CLI build (the headless 0.6.6 CLI writes SQLite only; QA finding 2). Both centrals must hold the **same KEK file** (check the hash on both) |
The value goes Keychain → 0600 temp file → SMB → ACL'd file → CLI stdin → deleted; read back and compared on the box.
It is never on argv, in chat or in a log. Use the **Secrets CLI 0.6.6** (stdin); 0.6.2 stores "-" literally.
### 3A.5 Verification and stop rule (after each app's first start)
1. Anonymous `GET /` → 302 `/login`.
2. A bogus user is refused, with no `system-side` / service-bind line in the log.
3. `dohertj2` signs in with the expected roles (ScadaBridge: cookie, `/auth/token` claims, and the CLI over HTTP Basic
against the active central; mxgw: dashboard).
4. Zero-role refusal: needs a NAM account the operator controls that is in no `_PROD` group. If there is none, rely on
the DEV/QA proofs of #144/#145 and say so in the record.
5. Logs: the app's own log or the `ZbOtelCollector` export if Phase 2 installed it (HG-style empty app logs happened on DEV).
**Stop at the first service-account bind failure** (the A1P account is no-lockout, but stop anyway and check with IT),
not the second. No LDAP DC-failover drill (blocking nam1 or pointing at a closed port) and no ad-hoc firewall rules for
testing (owner, 2026-11-19, for the DEV/QA cutover; carried over here). The §4 inbound rules are a separate, planned change.
### 3A.6 Rollback
PROD is greenfield until Phase 7 step 5, so an LDAP problem before then means: stop the service, fix the env, file or
rows, start again. There is no GLAuth to fall back to and none is installed.
## 4. Port and firewall matrix (to request in Phase 0) ## 4. Port and firewall matrix (to request in Phase 0)
| From | To | Port | Purpose | | From | To | Port | Purpose |
@@ -264,6 +398,8 @@ the existing site gRPC listener.
| The central↔site boundary (`8083`) is blocked or filtered in one direction only. QA never exercised it, because it was co-located | Phase 0 firewall ticket; Phase 6 round-trip gate in **both** directions | | The central↔site boundary (`8083`) is blocked or filtered in one direction only. QA never exercised it, because it was co-located | Phase 0 firewall ticket; Phase 6 round-trip gate in **both** directions |
| One machine driven by two stacks (Q9) | Undeploy from QA before the prod deploy | | One machine driven by two stacks (Q9) | Undeploy from QA before the prod deploy |
| `_PROD` groups grant wider access than intended | T6 membership review before mapping | | `_PROD` groups grant wider access than intended | T6 membership review before mapping |
| A service-account lockout breaks every app | A1P is no-lockout; stop after 2 service-account failures in 15 minutes (cutover runbook rule) | | A service-account lockout breaks every app | A1P is no-lockout; stop at the **first** service-account bind failure (§3A.5). Using the Ignition-owned `svc_igntadmin` in PROD (D-P5 fallback) would tie PROD to Ignition's password |
| `${secret:nam-ldap-svc-password}` missing at first start (the expander fails closed and the service will not boot) | Seed before the first start (§3A.4); install mxgw without `-Start` |
| A `_DEV`/`_QA` group name in a PROD config grants lower-tier admins PROD roles | §3A.2 rule; review the env file and the role rows against §3A.3 before the start |
| The mxgw upgrade script aborts on a slow start | Phase 1 step 1 fix | | The mxgw upgrade script aborts on a slow start | Phase 1 step 1 fix |
| The security software flags remote exec | Q6. Batch the on-box steps into a few scripts per phase, and stop at the first alert | | The security software flags remote exec | Q6. Batch the on-box steps into a few scripts per phase, and stop at the first alert |