docs(plan): PROD LDAP decisions D-P5..D-P7 = as QA (svc_igntadmin bind, HIST_ADMIN_PROD->Deployer, RequireHttpsCookie=false)

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AD5mc2BnaaAfY3hqqQ
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-11-19 16:35:20 -05:00
parent 8e415212fa
commit 7261b18539
2 changed files with 33 additions and 24 deletions
@@ -28,9 +28,11 @@ boundary for the first time. It is the main new risk in this install.
- **D-P2 builds: current `main`, promoted through QA first.** ScadaBridge `2e0ce81e` (includes #144/#145,
which refuse zero-role logins) and mxgw `e74918cc`. Prod gets the **same zips, byte-identical** to the ones
that soaked on QA.
- **D-P3 NAM AD over LDAPS from day one.** This uses `_PROD` groups only and separate PROD accounts. There is
no GLAuth in prod. The settings, the secret handling and the open bind-account / Deployer / cookie decisions
(D-P5–D-P7) are in §3A.
- **D-P3 NAM AD over LDAPS from day one.** This uses `_PROD` groups only. There is no GLAuth in prod. The settings
and the secret handling are in §3A.
- **D-P5–D-P7 (owner, 2026-11-19): "same bind account. do same as qa for the others".** PROD binds as
`svc_igntadmin` like DEV and QA, maps `UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_PROD`→Deployer as QA does, and runs
`RequireHttpsCookie=false` as QA does (§3A.1).
- **D-P4 content: a signed config bundle from QA**, limited to the machines selected for prod. Prod
connections are re-pointed at the prod gateways, and prod mints its own inbound API keys.
@@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ for `sqlvd03`). Whether `adm_dohertj2` is a local admin on the wonder prod boxes
**DELMIA prod is `dnc-app-vp01`** (10.201.207.106). For Q8, that box is the prod Delmia caller of
ScadaBridge's `DelmiaRecipeDownload`. Prod runs an older Downloader than QA (`delmia` project memory), so check
the prod integration's shape before you assume it matches QA's.
| Q7 | TLS: is there a corporate cert for the Central UI (HTTPS) and for the mxgw dashboard? It decides the cookie setting (D-P7, §3A). LDAPS needs `zimmer-rootca` in the machine store (cutover-plan D4), and `AllowInsecure=false` in prod. DEV and QA already had the root CA (thumbprint `78D941D7…`, exp 2036) and validated nam1/nam2 over TLS 1.3. | Phases 4–5 |
| Q7 | TLS: is there a corporate cert for the Central UI (HTTPS) and for the mxgw dashboard? Not a go-live gate for login: D-P7 runs plain HTTP with `RequireHttpsCookie=false` as on QA; a later cert flips it to `true`. LDAPS needs `zimmer-rootca` in the machine store (cutover-plan D4), and `AllowInsecure=false` in prod. DEV and QA already had the root CA (thumbprint `78D941D7…`, exp 2036) and validated nam1/nam2 over TLS 1.3. | Phases 4–5 |
| Q8 | Which machines (SAPIDs / Galaxy objects) go to prod on day one? What is the `SiteId`? Do the BTDB connection, MES and Delmia endpoints, and SMTP/EWS have prod equivalents? | Phase 7 |
| Q9 | Will any machine be driven by two ScadaBridge stacks at once (QA and prod)? Prod writes to the real Galaxy. A machine moved to prod should be undeployed from QA, or QA must be on a different Galaxy. | Phase 7 |
@@ -84,13 +86,16 @@ the prod integration's shape before you assume it matches QA's.
### Phase 0: approvals and external prerequisites (owner + IT, before any box work)
1. **Ticket T6** (`nam_ad_requests.md` §6), filed with IT:
- A1P `svc_zbmomww_prod`: the LDAP lookup account, no lockout, read-only;
- A1P `svc_zbmomww_prod`: the LDAP lookup account, no lockout, read-only. **Not a go-live gate** (D-P5: PROD
starts on `svc_igntadmin`); it replaces the interim on all three tiers later, under scadaproj#58;
- A3P `svc_zbmomww_auto_prod`, if the owner allows PROD automation (plan D3);
- G3 `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_PROD`;
- G3 `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_PROD`. **Not a go-live gate** (D-P6: `HIST_ADMIN_PROD`→Deployer until it exists);
- a **membership review** of `UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_PROD`, `APP_IDE_PROD`, `APP_IDE_RO_PROD` and `BTMGR_RO_PROD`.
These groups were built for System Platform, so mapping them grants their members app roles in prod.
Current members are in §3A.2. Also confirm no NAM group is named `SCADA-*` (ScadaBridge's seed rows).
Decide D-P5 (bind account) and D-P6 (Deployer) if A1P or G3 will not exist by go-live.
**Tell the Ignition team** before go-live: PROD adds the 4 mxgw stores and the ScadaBridge central store that
reference their `svc_igntadmin` password, so a password change or lockout of that account now also breaks
PROD logins on these apps (re-seed `nam-ldap-svc-password` in every store on a rotation).
2. Extend scadaproj#58 for A1P (comment). File a `cross-repo` umbrella issue in scadaproj, plus a `type:deploy-gate`
issue in ScadaBridge and in mxaccessgw, cross-linked.
3. Firewall requests, from the §4 matrix.
@@ -182,9 +187,9 @@ Use `Install-MxGatewayService.ps1`, always with `-DryRun` first, and review the
- a **shared `JwtSigningKey`** (≥ 32 random characters), shared ASP.NET Data Protection keys, and an
`ApiKeyPepper`;
- NAM LDAPS: the §3A.3 block in each node's `appsettings.Central.json`, no `Auth` block, no LDAP env entry,
`RequireHttpsCookie` per D-P7; the secret seeded once into the shared store before the first start (§3A.4);
- roles come from the `LdapGroupMappings` rows inserted in Phase 3 (`_PROD` only, `APP_DEPLOY_PROD`→Deployer or
the D-P6 fallback; `Administrator` does not include Deployer);
`RequireHttpsCookie=false` (D-P7); the secret seeded once into the shared store before the first start (§3A.4);
- roles come from the `LdapGroupMappings` rows inserted in Phase 3 (`_PROD` only, `HIST_ADMIN_PROD`→Deployer per
D-P6; `Administrator` does not include Deployer);
- downing `leader-auto-down` (the shipped default); OTLP to loopback if Phase 2 installed the collector.
Start from the QA Central env **key names** (names only, never values) plus QA's appsettings shape. Write a
per-node diff table before anything starts.
@@ -251,9 +256,13 @@ greenfield, so there is no GLAuth config to replace, and the settings are writte
| # | Decision | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|
| D-P5 | **Bind account.** PROD binds as **A1P `svc_zbmomww_prod`** (T6; no lockout, read-only). DEV and QA run on the interim `svc_igntadmin`, which belongs to the Ignition team. | **Wait for A1P.** Using `svc_igntadmin` in PROD means one Ignition-owned password (and one lockout) spans every tier and the Ignition PROD stack. Only with an explicit owner go **and** the Ignition team's OK; then the A1P swap is a re-seed of `nam-ldap-svc-password` in every PROD store plus a rolling restart. |
| D-P6 | **ScadaBridge Deployer.** `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_PROD` (G3, T6). | **Wait for G3.** Fallback, as on DEV/QA: `UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_PROD`→Deployer. Note it is **not** the same membership as `APP_ADMIN_PROD` in PROD (4 vs 5 members on 2026-11-19: `millerh5` is admin but not hist-admin), so with the fallback that admin cannot deploy. |
| D-P7 | **Cookies over plain HTTP.** Each app's auth cookie must be `Secure` only when the endpoint is HTTPS. | If Q7 delivers certs: HTTPS endpoints and `RequireHttpsCookie=true`. Without TLS: `RequireHttpsCookie=false` on mxgw and ScadaBridge (as on QA), recorded as a known gap. |
**DECIDED (owner, 2026-11-19): "same bind account. do same as qa for the others".**
| # | Decision | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| D-P5 | **Bind account: `svc_igntadmin@nam.zimmer.com`, the same interim account as DEV and QA.** | One Ignition-owned password (and one lockout) now spans DEV, QA, PROD and Ignition's own stack. Tell the Ignition team (Phase 0). When scadaproj#58 delivers A1P `svc_zbmomww_prod`, swap all three tiers together: re-seed `nam-ldap-svc-password` in every store, change `ServiceAccountDn`, rolling restart. |
| D-P6 | **ScadaBridge Deployer: `UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_PROD`→Deployer** (the QA interim) until `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_PROD` exists. | `HIST_ADMIN_PROD` (4) is not the same as `APP_ADMIN_PROD` (5) on 2026-11-19: `millerh5` is an Administrator who cannot deploy. Raise it in the T6 membership review. Swap the row when G3 exists (CLI, audited). |
| D-P7 | **Plain HTTP, `RequireHttpsCookie=false`** on mxgw and ScadaBridge, as on QA. | The auth cookie (and ScadaBridge's cookie-embedded JWT) travels in cleartext; both apps log a startup warning saying so. Recorded as a known gap until Q7 delivers certs; then HTTPS endpoints and `true`. |
### 3A.2 Directory facts (2026-11-19 dump; re-verify in Phase 0)
@@ -261,17 +270,17 @@ greenfield, so there is no GLAuth config to replace, and the settings are writte
|---|---|---|---|
| `UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_PROD` | 5 (chamalas, millerh5, marting4, dohertj2, Luis Bastidas) | Administrator | Administrator |
| `UG_WW_APP_IDE_PROD` | 4 (chamalas, marting4, dohertj2, Luis Bastidas) | Designer | Viewer |
| `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_PROD` | **does not exist yet** (G3) | Deployer | — |
| `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_PROD` | **does not exist yet** (G3) | Deployer, once it exists | — |
| `UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_PROD` | 1 (oswaltk) | Viewer | Viewer |
| `UG_WW_BTMGR_RO_PROD` | 4 (benjamd2, marting4, oswaltk, Luis Bastidas) | Viewer | — |
| `UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_PROD` | 4 | (D-P6 fallback only) | — |
| `UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_PROD` | 4 (chamalas, marting4, dohertj2, Luis Bastidas) | **Deployer (interim, D-P6)** | — |
`UG_WW_BTMGR_{BE,MC}_PROD` and `UG_WW_CITRIX_PROD` are **never** mapped here (§4.2 rows wait for later). Each PROD
deployment lists **only `_PROD` groups**; a `_DEV`/`_QA` name in a PROD config is a defect. The T6 membership review
must finish before the mapping goes live: `BTMGR_RO_PROD` gives 4 people ScadaBridge Viewer.
**Test identity:** `NAM\dohertj2` is in `APP_ADMIN_PROD` and `APP_IDE_PROD`, so it is the PROD login probe (expected
roles: ScadaBridge Administrator+Designer, plus Deployer once G3 or D-P6 lands; mxgw Administrator). Its password is in
roles: ScadaBridge Administrator+Designer+Deployer, as on QA; mxgw Administrator). Its password is in
the Keychain as `winrm-cli/vq03`. `adm_dohertj2` is the box-admin account for winrm/SMB only, never a login probe.
### 3A.3 The block (identical on every app; only the key prefix differs)
@@ -283,7 +292,7 @@ the Keychain as `winrm-cli/vq03`. `adm_dohertj2` is the box-admin account for wi
| `FallbackServers[0]` | `uswap-vdc-nam2.nam.zimmer.com:636` |
| `AllowInsecure` | `false` (needs `zimmer-rootca` in `LocalMachine\Root`; Phase 2 gate) |
| `SearchBase` | `DC=nam,DC=zimmer,DC=com` |
| `ServiceAccountDn` | `svc_zbmomww_prod@nam.zimmer.com` (A1P; D-P5) |
| `ServiceAccountDn` | `svc_igntadmin@nam.zimmer.com` (D-P5; A1P later, all tiers together) |
| `ServiceAccountPassword` | `${secret:nam-ldap-svc-password}`, never a literal |
| `UserNameAttribute` / `DisplayNameAttribute` / `GroupAttribute` | `sAMAccountName` / `name` / `memberOf` |
| `BindMode` | `ServiceAccount` |
@@ -299,7 +308,7 @@ MxGateway__Ldap__Transport=Ldaps
MxGateway__Ldap__AllowInsecure=false
MxGateway__Ldap__FallbackServers__0=uswap-vdc-nam2.nam.zimmer.com:636
MxGateway__Ldap__SearchBase=DC=nam,DC=zimmer,DC=com
MxGateway__Ldap__ServiceAccountDn=svc_zbmomww_prod@nam.zimmer.com
MxGateway__Ldap__ServiceAccountDn=svc_igntadmin@nam.zimmer.com
MxGateway__Ldap__ServiceAccountPassword=${secret:nam-ldap-svc-password}
MxGateway__Ldap__UserNameAttribute=sAMAccountName
MxGateway__Ldap__DisplayNameAttribute=name
@@ -308,7 +317,7 @@ MxGateway__Ldap__BindMode=ServiceAccount
MxGateway__Dashboard__GroupToRole__UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_PROD=Administrator
MxGateway__Dashboard__GroupToRole__UG_WW_APP_IDE_PROD=Viewer
MxGateway__Dashboard__GroupToRole__UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_PROD=Viewer
MxGateway__Dashboard__RequireHttpsCookie=<per D-P7>
MxGateway__Dashboard__RequireHttpsCookie=false
```
Plus, in the base `app\appsettings.json`, **delete `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole` (`GwAdmin`/`GwReader`)** before the
@@ -317,7 +326,7 @@ upgrade script carries the edited file forward on later upgrades.
**ScadaBridge Central (×2): `app\appsettings.Central.json`**, section `ScadaBridge:Security:Ldap` (the QA shape; each
node's file is written separately, never copied over the other), with no `Auth` block (`DisableLogin` /
`AllowOutsideDevelopment` absent) and `ScadaBridge:Security:RequireHttpsCookie` per D-P7. **No
`AllowOutsideDevelopment` absent) and `ScadaBridge:Security:RequireHttpsCookie=false` (D-P7). **No
`ScadaBridge__Security__Ldap__*` env entry**: an env password would override the `${secret:}` reference. Sites have no
login and get no LDAP settings.
@@ -325,7 +334,7 @@ login and get no LDAP settings.
start nobody can sign in until they exist, so insert them **by SQL after Phase 3** with the idempotent script
`docs/deploy/2026-11-19-vd03-nam-ldap/sb-role-mappings.ps1` retargeted to these rows:
`UG_WW_APP_ADMIN_PROD`→Administrator, `UG_WW_APP_IDE_PROD`→Designer, `UG_WW_APP_IDE_RO_PROD`→Viewer,
`UG_WW_BTMGR_RO_PROD`→Viewer, `UG_WW_APP_DEPLOY_PROD`→Deployer (or the D-P6 fallback). Later changes go through the CLI
`UG_WW_BTMGR_RO_PROD`→Viewer, **`UG_WW_HIST_ADMIN_PROD`→Deployer** (D-P6; `APP_DEPLOY_PROD` replaces it later). Later changes go through the CLI
(audited). The migration seeds five `SCADA-*` rows (ids 1–5); they grant nothing unless a NAM group with that exact
name exists, which Phase 0 checks (`LdapProbe -g 'SCADA-*'` returns none).
@@ -352,7 +361,7 @@ It is never on argv, in chat or in a log. Use the **Secrets CLI 0.6.6** (stdin);
the DEV/QA proofs of #144/#145 and say so in the record.
5. Logs: the app's own log or the `ZbOtelCollector` export if Phase 2 installed it (HG-style empty app logs happened on DEV).
**Stop at the first service-account bind failure** (the A1P account is no-lockout, but stop anyway and check with IT),
**Stop at the first service-account bind failure** (`svc_igntadmin` is Ignition's account: ask IT for its lockout state before any retry),
not the second. No LDAP DC-failover drill (blocking nam1 or pointing at a closed port) and no ad-hoc firewall rules for
testing (owner, 2026-11-19, for the DEV/QA cutover; carried over here). The §4 inbound rules are a separate, planned change.
@@ -398,7 +407,7 @@ the existing site gRPC listener.
| The central↔site boundary (`8083`) is blocked or filtered in one direction only. QA never exercised it, because it was co-located | Phase 0 firewall ticket; Phase 6 round-trip gate in **both** directions |
| One machine driven by two stacks (Q9) | Undeploy from QA before the prod deploy |
| `_PROD` groups grant wider access than intended | T6 membership review before mapping |
| A service-account lockout breaks every app | A1P is no-lockout; stop at the **first** service-account bind failure (§3A.5). Using the Ignition-owned `svc_igntadmin` in PROD (D-P5 fallback) would tie PROD to Ignition's password |
| A service-account lockout or password change breaks every app on every tier, and Ignition | D-P5 accepted by the owner. Stop at the **first** bind failure (§3A.5); the Ignition team knows to warn before a rotation; A1P (#58) later removes the coupling |
| `${secret:nam-ldap-svc-password}` missing at first start (the expander fails closed and the service will not boot) | Seed before the first start (§3A.4); install mxgw without `-Start` |
| A `_DEV`/`_QA` group name in a PROD config grants lower-tier admins PROD roles | §3A.2 rule; review the env file and the role rows against §3A.3 before the start |
| The mxgw upgrade script aborts on a slow start | Phase 1 step 1 fix |