fix(localdb): sync endpoint enforces the configured ApiKey (scadaproj#36)
LocalDbSyncService never read request headers, so setting LocalDb:Replication:ApiKey on both nodes left the passive endpoint open (LocalDb-001). It now requires Authorization: Bearer <key> (constant-time) before the handshake and before newest-wins takeover, refusing anything else with Unauthenticated. A blank key keeps the old accept-all behaviour and logs a startup warning. Wire-compatible: the initiator has always sent the header when the key is set; ScadaBridge/OtOpcUa interceptors use the same key. LocalDb 0.3.5 -> 0.3.6 (unpublished). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV
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@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ node still pushes its own deltas back. Only one side needs `PeerAddress`.
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| Key | Default | Meaning |
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|---|---|---|
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| `PeerAddress` | `""` | gRPC address to dial. Empty ⇒ passive (initiator idles). |
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| `ApiKey` | `null` | Bearer token the initiator presents on its channel; `null` ⇒ no key header. |
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| `ApiKey` | `null` | Shared pair key — set the **same** value on both nodes. The initiator sends it as `Authorization: Bearer <key>`; since 0.3.6 the passive endpoint **requires** it and refuses any other stream with `Unauthenticated`. Blank ⇒ no header sent and no check (any caller is accepted; a startup warning is logged). |
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| `FlushInterval` | `250 ms` | How often the change pump flushes pending oplog deltas. |
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| `MaxBatchBytes` | `2 MB` | **Primary** batch cap: summed serialized bytes per outbound delta/snapshot message. Sized under the 4 MB gRPC default; a single row above the budget is still sent, alone. |
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| `MaxBatchSize` | `500` | **Secondary** row-count cap per outbound batch (also the snapshot DB page size). |
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@@ -380,10 +380,20 @@ provider is wired or the poll threw, so a DB failure never reads as "0 backlog")
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- The **`__localdb_dead_letter`** table holds poison rows (bad JSON, null-row non-tombstone
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entries) and over-drift rejects (when `FailClosedOnDrift`). Inspect it to diagnose
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rejects.
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- **Peer auth**: `ApiKey` is sent by the initiator as a static `Authorization: Bearer …`
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header on its channel. The library's passive service does **not** itself verify the key
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— the passive host enforces whatever gRPC auth the host application configures (e.g.
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`ZB.MOM.WW.Auth`). Configure host-side authorization to actually gate inbound streams.
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- **Peer auth** (0.3.6+): with `ApiKey` set, the initiator sends `Authorization: Bearer <key>`
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and the passive `LocalDbSyncService` verifies it (constant-time) **before** the handshake and
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before it displaces the current stream — a caller without the key gets `Unauthenticated`, sees
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no table names or schema digests, and cannot evict the real peer. With `ApiKey` blank on a
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node, that node's endpoint accepts any caller (exactly the pre-0.3.6 behaviour) and logs a
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warning at startup; protect it by network isolation or a host interceptor. Up to 0.3.5 the
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library never checked the key, so ScadaBridge and OtOpcUa each added a fail-closed
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`LocalDbSyncAuthInterceptor` over the same key — those keep working unchanged and are now
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redundant with the library check (they still add fail-closed-when-blank, which the library
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deliberately does not, so a key-less pair keeps syncing).
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- **Rollout:** the wire is unchanged (the initiator has always sent the header when the key
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is set). Set the key on both nodes; a node with the key refuses a peer without it, so a
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pair with mismatched keys stops syncing until both agree. A pair where neither node has a
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key is unaffected.
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## Testing
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