fix(secrets): Grpc hub server review follow-ups — GetSecrets batch cap, DI single-registration guard + tests
Five review items on the Task 2 server half. 1. GetSecrets now enforces a server-side cap on request.Names, refusing an over-cap batch with ResourceExhausted BEFORE any store read runs. The well-behaved follower chunks at 500, but client discipline is not a server defence — the family precedent (HistorianGateway's max_values) is that the server declines regardless. The new SecretsGrpcHubServerOptions. MaxNamesPerRequest defaults to 1000, comfortably above that chunk so a compliant sweep never meets it, and Validate() refuses a non-positive value at startup rather than letting it read at runtime as a broken follower. The refusal states the cap and the received count — neither is secret, and an operator cannot resize a batch without them — and never a name. The cap sits behind the interceptor, so it is defence in depth against a misbehaving token holder, not an anonymous-DoS control. 2. AddZbSecretsGrpcHub now refuses a second registration. The two calls do not compose: options binding MERGES (a key absent from the second section leaves the first section's value standing) while the SectionPath stamp is last-one-wins, so a hub registered twice could serve a token bound from one section while every failure message named the other. Detected via a private marker registration. The extension also gains real DI coverage — the intended single-call path asserted for token/SectionPath coherence through a built provider, a custom section path stamped end to end, a missing token throwing from the registration call itself, and the duplicate call throwing. 3. Client-streaming and duplex-streaming denial tests, so all four gated handler shapes are pinned rather than only unary and server-streaming, plus a valid-token test that reaches all three streaming continuations. 4. A cancellation test: GetSecrets hands the ServerCallContext token through to the store, pinned against a fake that records it. 5. The proto's service comment stated the ISecretReplicationHub mapping in prose that no longer matched the RPC name; it now says GetManifestAsync -> GetManifest and GetManyAsync -> GetSecrets explicitly. Comment-only — no message or rpc definition is touched. The GetSecrets rpc comment also notes the new RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED cap, which a client author has to know about. Grpc server suite 50 -> 73 tests; full solution suite green, 0 new warnings. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014WNM4vjoVksyyBraTXSZE1
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@@ -22,12 +22,30 @@ public sealed class SecretsGrpcHubServerOptions
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/// <summary>The configuration section the hub is bound from unless a host overrides it.</summary>
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internal const string DefaultSectionPath = "Secrets:GrpcHub";
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/// <summary>
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/// The default ceiling on names in one <c>GetSecrets</c> call. Set comfortably above the
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/// follower's own fetch chunk so a compliant sweep never approaches it.
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/// </summary>
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internal const int DefaultMaxNamesPerRequest = 1000;
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/// <summary>
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/// The shared bearer token a follower must present. Required — an unset token is not "open
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/// access", it is a hub that refuses every call (see <see cref="SecretsHubAuthInterceptor"/>).
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/// </summary>
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public string BearerToken { get; set; } = string.Empty;
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/// <summary>
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/// The most names a single <c>GetSecrets</c> call may carry. A larger request is refused with
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/// <c>ResourceExhausted</c> rather than served.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// The well-behaved follower already chunks its fetches well below this, so the cap is not a
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/// throughput knob — it is the server declining to let one authenticated caller turn a single
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/// request into an unbounded sequential store sweep. The cap sits behind authentication, so it
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/// is defence in depth against a misbehaving token holder, not an anonymous-DoS control.
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/// </remarks>
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public int MaxNamesPerRequest { get; set; } = DefaultMaxNamesPerRequest;
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/// <summary>
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/// The configuration section this instance was bound from, used so failure messages name the
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/// key an operator actually has to set.
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@@ -43,7 +61,9 @@ public sealed class SecretsGrpcHubServerOptions
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/// Throws if the options are unusable. Called by the registration extension so a hub with no
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/// token fails at startup, rather than starting and rejecting every follower at runtime.
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/// </summary>
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/// <exception cref="InvalidOperationException">The bearer token is missing or blank.</exception>
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/// <exception cref="InvalidOperationException">
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/// The bearer token is missing or blank, or the request cap is not positive.
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/// </exception>
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public void Validate()
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{
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if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(BearerToken))
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@@ -54,5 +74,14 @@ public sealed class SecretsGrpcHubServerOptions
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$"The gRPC secrets hub requires a shared bearer token ({SectionPath}:BearerToken). " +
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"Until it is set the hub refuses every call.");
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}
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if (MaxNamesPerRequest <= 0)
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{
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// A zero or negative cap would refuse every GetSecrets call, which reads at runtime like
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// a broken follower rather than a typo in configuration — so it is refused at startup.
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throw new InvalidOperationException(
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$"The gRPC secrets hub request cap ({SectionPath}:MaxNamesPerRequest) must be " +
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$"greater than zero; it is {MaxNamesPerRequest}.");
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}
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}
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}
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