docs(ldap): NAM AD setup notes + live TLS probe results; backup-DC failover design (Auth 0.2.0)
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Joseph Doherty
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# Zimmer NAM — LDAP / Active Directory Auth Setup
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Reference for configuring services to authenticate against the Zimmer NAM domain.
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Extracted from the production Ignition 8.1 gateway `Ignition-IGNTN-APP-VP01`
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(`config.idb`, `NAM` AD-Hybrid user source), audited 2026-08-05. Full audit:
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`~/Desktop/config-idb-users-groups.md`.
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## Directory / connection
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| Setting | Value |
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|---------|-------|
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| Domain | `nam.zimmer.com` |
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| Primary DC | `uswap-vdc-nam1:389` |
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| Secondary DC | `uswap-vdc-nam2:389` |
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| Encryption | **None** — plain LDAP on 389 (no LDAPS/StartTLS in the Ignition config) |
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| SASL | `DIGEST-MD5`, `CRAM-MD5` offered; QoP `auth-conf,auth-int,auth`; strength `high,medium,low`; no mutual auth |
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| Referrals | FOLLOW |
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| Read timeout | 60 000 ms |
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| Paging | 1000 entries/page |
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| Anonymous bind | Disallowed |
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## Bind identity (UPN, not DN)
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- Service account: `svc_igntnapp`
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- Binds by **UPN**: `svc_igntnapp@nam.zimmer.com` — there is no bind DN/CN anywhere
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in the working config; end users also authenticate as `<sAMAccountName>@nam.zimmer.com`
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(automatic suffix).
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- Password: held encrypted by the gateway; obtain from the credential owner — never
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commit it (in this repo's services use a `${secret:NAME}` reference).
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## User lookup
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| Setting | Value |
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|---------|-------|
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| Search base | domain root `DC=nam,DC=zimmer,DC=com` (Ignition field left empty) |
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| User search filter | `(&(objectClass=user)(sAMAccountName={0}))` |
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| User enumeration filter | `(&(objectClass=user)(!(objectClass=computer)))` |
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| Username attribute | `sAMAccountName` |
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| Display name | `name` |
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| Email | `mail` |
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| Phone / SMS | `telephoneNumber` / `mobile` |
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## Groups / roles
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**The working setup does not use LDAP groups at all.** The Ignition profile is
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AD-Hybrid: AD answers *who you are*, while *what you may do* (roles
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Administrator, Designer, Engineer, Maintenance, Management, Mfg_Tech, Operator)
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is assigned manually per user inside the application. AD security-group
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membership grants nothing.
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Implication for new services: don't assume a `memberOf`-based authorization
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scheme exists to mirror — there is no established group→role convention in this
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domain's SCADA stack. Either keep app-local role assignment (matching the
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existing pattern) or define new AD groups deliberately; standard AD attributes
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(`memberOf`, filter `(&(objectClass=group)(member={0}))`) are available if we
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choose to.
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## Behavioral notes from the working config
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- Users are **populated on demand**: a local record is created on first
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successful AD login (with no roles until granted).
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- Failover: soft failover to the local internal user source, 60 s credential-cache
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validation — cached logins keep working through a DC outage.
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- Lockout: 5 failed attempts / 15-minute window.
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## Cautions
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- Port 389 without TLS means simple binds transit cleartext unless SASL
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confidentiality is negotiated — for new .NET services prefer LDAPS (636) or
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StartTLS against the same DCs.
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## TLS probe results (verified 2026-08-10, from the dev Mac)
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Both DCs were live-probed; **LDAPS and StartTLS both work on both DCs.**
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| Check | uswap-vdc-nam1 | uswap-vdc-nam2 |
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|---|---|---|
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| Ports open | 389, 636, 3268, 3269 | 389, 636, 3268, 3269 |
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| LDAPS (636) handshake | TLSv1.3 OK | TLSv1.3 OK |
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| StartTLS on 389 | OK | OK |
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| Anonymous rootDSE over LDAPS | `result: 0 Success` | `result: 0 Success` |
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| Cert subject/SAN | `USWAP-VDC-NAM1.nam.zimmer.com` (matches FQDN) | `USWAP-VDC-NAM2.nam.zimmer.com` (matches FQDN) |
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| Cert validity | 2026-03-21 → 2027-03-21 | 2026-03-20 → 2027-03-20 |
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| Chain | leaf ← `zimmer-issueca1` ← `zimmer-rootca` (intermediate served, root not) | same |
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| **Key size** | **RSA 1024-bit** (sha256 sig) | **RSA 1024-bit** (sha256 sig) |
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Implications for new .NET services:
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- **Use LDAPS 636** (or StartTLS) — no reason to accept cleartext binds.
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- **Trust:** `zimmer-rootca` is an internal CA, not in default OS/container trust
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stores. Either install the root (+ intermediate) into the host/container trust
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store, or pin the chain via `LdapOptions.ServerCertificateValidationCallback`
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(code-only seam in `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Ldap`).
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- **⚠️ RSA 1024-bit DC certs:** OpenSSL at default security level (SECLEVEL=2 —
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what Debian-based .NET containers ship) **rejects 1024-bit keys**
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(`EE certificate key too weak`, observed in this probe), so a Linux/container
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client may fail the TLS handshake even with the CA trusted. Windows/Schannel
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hosts accept them. Options: get the DC cert template reissued at 2048+ (right
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fix, needs AD PKI owner), or lower SECLEVEL / use a custom validation callback
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in affected containers (workaround). Certs expire 2027-03 — a reissue
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opportunity.
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- Hostnames resolve from the dev network: nam1 = `10.201.216.2`,
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nam2 = `10.201.138.78`.
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