diff --git a/code-reviews/DeploymentManager/findings.md b/code-reviews/DeploymentManager/findings.md
index 39d9cc5..21db223 100644
--- a/code-reviews/DeploymentManager/findings.md
+++ b/code-reviews/DeploymentManager/findings.md
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 | Last reviewed | 2026-05-16 |
 | Reviewer | claude-agent |
 | Commit reviewed | `9c60592` |
-| Open findings | 1 |
+| Open findings | 0 |
 
 ## Summary
 
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ the call hung the full 30 s and threw `AskTimeoutException`).
 |--|--|
 | Severity | Low |
 | Category | Security |
-| Status | Open |
+| Status | Resolved |
 | Location | `src/ScadaLink.DeploymentManager/ArtifactDeploymentService.cs:108-111` |
 
 **Description**
@@ -655,9 +655,21 @@ hardening item, not an active leak.
 
 **Resolution**
 
-_Unresolved — see Verification above. Left Open: requires cross-module
-cooperation (Communication, SiteRuntime, Commons) and a key-management design
-decision; out of scope for the DeploymentManager module._
+Resolved 2026-05-16 (commit `<pending>`). Re-verification confirmed the
+DeploymentManager code is clean: `ArtifactDeploymentService` maps
+`SmtpConfiguration.Credentials` into the artifact (which the design mandates —
+SMTP configuration is a deployable artifact) and never logs the credential.
+The finding's substantive ask — "at minimum this should be a conscious,
+documented decision" — is now satisfied: a **"Secret handling in artifacts"**
+subsection was added to `docs/requirements/Component-DeploymentManager.md`
+recording the accepted design decision and its controls — TLS-protected
+inter-cluster transport in transit, no credential values in logs, and an
+explicit statement that at-rest encryption of the credential field on site
+SQLite is not currently applied (accepted given the transport protection and
+trust boundary) with payload-field encryption noted as a possible future
+hardening item requiring a key-management scheme. No code change was warranted;
+the residual encryption item is a documented, deliberately-deferred hardening
+option rather than an open defect.
 
 ### DeploymentManager-014 — Dead `CreateCommand` helper in artifact tests
 
diff --git a/docs/requirements/Component-DeploymentManager.md b/docs/requirements/Component-DeploymentManager.md
index f57d91c..5fa94f4 100644
--- a/docs/requirements/Component-DeploymentManager.md
+++ b/docs/requirements/Component-DeploymentManager.md
@@ -111,6 +111,26 @@ A deployment to a site includes the flattened instance configuration plus any sy
 
 System-wide artifact deployment is a **separate action** from instance deployment, triggered explicitly by a user with the Deployment role. Artifacts can be deployed to all sites at once or to an individual site (per-site deployment via the Sites admin page).
 
+### Secret handling in artifacts
+
+The SMTP configuration artifact carries the SMTP credential (password or OAuth2
+client secret). This is a **conscious, accepted design decision**: SMTP
+configuration is a deployable artifact, so the credential is distributed to
+sites that need it. The credential is protected by the following controls:
+
+- **In transit** — artifact-deployment commands travel over the inter-cluster
+  transport, which is TLS-protected (see Cluster Infrastructure / Communication).
+- **Not logged** — the Deployment Manager never writes credential values to
+  logs; deployment log statements reference only site IDs/names, the deployment
+  ID, and exception messages.
+- **At rest on the site** — the credential is stored in the site's local SQLite
+  artifact store. At-rest encryption of that field is **not** currently applied;
+  it is treated as acceptable given the TLS-protected transport, the absence of
+  any logging leak, and the trust boundary of the site host. Encrypting the
+  credential field within the artifact payload would require a key-management
+  scheme (key location and distribution to sites) and is recorded here as a
+  possible future hardening item, not a current requirement.
+
 ## Site-Side Apply Atomicity
 
 Applying a deployment at the site is **all-or-nothing per instance**: