test(auditlog): redaction safety net edge cases (#23 M5)
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
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using ScadaLink.AuditLog.Configuration;
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using ScadaLink.AuditLog.Payload;
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using ScadaLink.Commons.Entities.Audit;
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using ScadaLink.Commons.Types.Enums;
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namespace ScadaLink.AuditLog.Tests.Payload;
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/// <summary>
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/// Bundle D (M5-T10) safety-net edge cases for
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/// <see cref="DefaultAuditPayloadFilter"/>. Bundle B already pinned the
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/// happy-path safety net (catastrophic-backtracking timeout →
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/// <c><redacted: redactor error></c> + counter bump); this fixture covers
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/// the pathological / config-mistake corners that production operators will
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/// hit when typoing a regex or shipping a half-baked redactor list.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// The invariants under test:
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/// </para>
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/// <list type="bullet">
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/// <item>An UNCOMPILABLE pattern (e.g. <c>[unclosed</c>) is logged at warning
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/// on first encounter and cached as invalid so it never throws again,
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/// but the redactor-failure COUNTER is not bumped at bind time —
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/// per the contract on <see cref="IAuditRedactionFailureCounter"/>
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/// the counter tracks RUNTIME redaction failures only.</item>
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/// <item>One throwing regex in the middle of a list does NOT poison the
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/// other patterns — the filter stops at the failing pattern,
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/// over-redacts the offending field, but lets every other field keep
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/// the prior cleanly-redacted state and lets the rest of the writer
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/// pipeline run.</item>
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/// <item>A live config change that introduces a broken pattern does not
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/// crash the filter — the bad pattern is silently dropped (logged once)
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/// and the still-valid patterns continue to redact normally.</item>
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/// </list>
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/// </remarks>
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public class RedactionSafetyNetTests
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{
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private static IOptionsMonitor<AuditLogOptions> Monitor(AuditLogOptions? opts = null) =>
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new StaticMonitor(opts ?? new AuditLogOptions());
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private static AuditEvent NewEvent(
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AuditStatus status = AuditStatus.Delivered,
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string? request = null,
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string? response = null,
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string? errorDetail = null,
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string? extra = null,
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string? target = null) => new()
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{
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EventId = Guid.NewGuid(),
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OccurredAtUtc = DateTime.UtcNow,
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Channel = AuditChannel.ApiOutbound,
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Kind = AuditKind.ApiCall,
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Status = status,
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Target = target,
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RequestSummary = request,
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ResponseSummary = response,
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ErrorDetail = errorDetail,
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Extra = extra,
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};
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[Fact]
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public void RegexNotCompilable_AtBindTime_LoggedAndSkipped()
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{
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// `[unclosed` is a structurally invalid character class — the .NET
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// regex engine throws ArgumentException at compile time. We assert:
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// * the filter does NOT throw,
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// * the OTHER (valid) pattern still redacts hunter2,
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// * the failure counter is NOT incremented at compile time
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// (it tracks runtime redaction failures only),
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// * a warning is logged exactly once.
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const string badPattern = "[unclosed";
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const string goodPattern = "\"password\":\\s*\"[^\"]*\"";
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var opts = new AuditLogOptions
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{
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GlobalBodyRedactors = new List<string> { badPattern, goodPattern },
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};
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var counter = new CountingRedactionFailureCounter();
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var spy = new SpyLogger<DefaultAuditPayloadFilter>();
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var filter = new DefaultAuditPayloadFilter(Monitor(opts), spy, counter);
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var evt = NewEvent(request: "{\"user\":\"alice\",\"password\":\"hunter2\"}");
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var result = filter.Apply(evt);
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Assert.NotNull(result.RequestSummary);
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Assert.DoesNotContain("hunter2", result.RequestSummary);
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Assert.Contains("<redacted>", result.RequestSummary);
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Assert.Equal(0, counter.Count);
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// Apply twice — the invalid-pattern compile must run AT MOST once;
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// the sentinel-cache entry stops repeat compile attempts.
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_ = filter.Apply(evt);
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var badPatternWarnings = spy.Entries
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.Where(e => e.Level == LogLevel.Warning && e.Message.Contains(badPattern))
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.Count();
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Assert.Equal(1, badPatternWarnings);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void MultipleRedactors_OneThrows_OthersStillApply_ToOtherFields()
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{
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// Pattern set: [valid-A, evil, valid-B]. The evil pattern is
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// catastrophic-backtracking on the RequestSummary input (all-'a's +
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// mismatching suffix) — that field is over-redacted with the error
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// marker as soon as evil throws. ResponseSummary is processed
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// INDEPENDENTLY; its input does not trigger evil's backtracking, so
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// valid-A and valid-B both still apply on that field. This proves a
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// per-field redactor failure does not poison the rest of the writer
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// call (the SQL-param stage, the truncation stage, and the other
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// fields all continue normally).
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const string validA = "SECRET-[A-Z0-9]+";
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const string evil = "^(a+)+$"; // catastrophic on long all-'a' string
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const string validB = "PIN-\\d{4}";
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var opts = new AuditLogOptions
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{
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GlobalBodyRedactors = new List<string> { validA, evil, validB },
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};
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var counter = new CountingRedactionFailureCounter();
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var filter = new DefaultAuditPayloadFilter(
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Monitor(opts),
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NullLogger<DefaultAuditPayloadFilter>.Instance,
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counter);
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// Request: ALL 'a's + a non-'a' suffix character. valid-A does not
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// match (no SECRET-X prefix), so the buffer reaches `evil` untouched
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// and triggers the backtracking explosion.
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var request = new string('a', 30) + "!";
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// Response: short, mismatches the evil pattern cleanly (no
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// backtracking), so both valid-A and valid-B run and redact.
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const string response = "SECRET-ABC456 PIN-9999 other-text";
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var result = filter.Apply(NewEvent(request: request, response: response));
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// RequestSummary: over-redacted (evil pattern threw).
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Assert.Equal("<redacted: redactor error>", result.RequestSummary);
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Assert.True(counter.Count >= 1, $"expected counter >= 1, got {counter.Count}");
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// ResponseSummary: clean — both valid regexes still applied; the evil
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// one ran without throwing on this short input.
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Assert.NotNull(result.ResponseSummary);
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Assert.DoesNotContain("SECRET-ABC456", result.ResponseSummary);
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Assert.DoesNotContain("PIN-9999", result.ResponseSummary);
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Assert.Contains("<redacted>", result.ResponseSummary);
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Assert.Contains("other-text", result.ResponseSummary);
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}
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// Edge case 3 (RedactorReturnsNonStringExceptionType) intentionally
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// skipped — the brief permits dropping it: there is no portable way to
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// artificially trigger an OutOfMemoryException inside System.Text.RegularExpressions
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// from a unit test without writing native interop, and the existing
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// per-stage try/catch already covers Exception (which OOM and similar
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// would derive from). Bundle B's RegexThrowsTimeout coverage exercises
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// the same catch path with a deterministic trigger.
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[Fact]
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public void ConfigChange_WithBadRegex_LiveTrafficKeepsApplyingValidRegexes()
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{
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// Initial config: one valid global redactor — hunter2 is redacted.
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// Reload: ADD a malformed pattern alongside the original. Per the
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// safety contract, the bad pattern is logged + skipped, the original
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// valid pattern keeps redacting, and the filter NEVER throws on the
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// hot path. The counter must not be bumped at reload time (the
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// CompiledRegex sentinel covers the bind error before runtime even
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// sees it).
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var monitor = new MutableMonitor(new AuditLogOptions
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{
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GlobalBodyRedactors = new List<string> { "\"password\":\\s*\"[^\"]*\"" },
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});
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var counter = new CountingRedactionFailureCounter();
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var spy = new SpyLogger<DefaultAuditPayloadFilter>();
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var filter = new DefaultAuditPayloadFilter(monitor, spy, counter);
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var evt = NewEvent(request: "{\"user\":\"alice\",\"password\":\"hunter2\"}");
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var before = filter.Apply(evt);
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Assert.DoesNotContain("hunter2", before.RequestSummary!);
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// Reload: malformed pattern added to the list.
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monitor.Set(new AuditLogOptions
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{
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GlobalBodyRedactors = new List<string>
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{
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"\"password\":\\s*\"[^\"]*\"",
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"[unclosed",
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},
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});
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var after = filter.Apply(evt);
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Assert.NotNull(after.RequestSummary);
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Assert.DoesNotContain("hunter2", after.RequestSummary);
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Assert.Contains("<redacted>", after.RequestSummary);
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Assert.Equal(0, counter.Count);
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// Compile-time warning logged for the broken pattern.
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Assert.Contains(
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spy.Entries,
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e => e.Level == LogLevel.Warning && e.Message.Contains("[unclosed"));
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}
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/// <summary>Counts <see cref="IAuditRedactionFailureCounter.Increment"/> calls.</summary>
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private sealed class CountingRedactionFailureCounter : IAuditRedactionFailureCounter
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{
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private int _count;
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public int Count => _count;
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public void Increment() => System.Threading.Interlocked.Increment(ref _count);
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}
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/// <summary>IOptionsMonitor test double — returns the same snapshot on every read.</summary>
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private sealed class StaticMonitor : IOptionsMonitor<AuditLogOptions>
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{
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private readonly AuditLogOptions _value;
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public StaticMonitor(AuditLogOptions value) => _value = value;
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public AuditLogOptions CurrentValue => _value;
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public AuditLogOptions Get(string? name) => _value;
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public IDisposable? OnChange(Action<AuditLogOptions, string?> listener) => null;
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// IOptionsMonitor test double that supports a live <see cref="Set"/> —
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/// mirrors the helper used in
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/// <see cref="ScadaLink.AuditLog.Tests.Configuration.AuditLogOptionsBindingTests"/>;
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/// kept private here so the safety-net test file remains self-contained.
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/// </summary>
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private sealed class MutableMonitor : IOptionsMonitor<AuditLogOptions>
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{
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private AuditLogOptions _current;
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public MutableMonitor(AuditLogOptions initial) => _current = initial;
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public AuditLogOptions CurrentValue => _current;
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public AuditLogOptions Get(string? name) => _current;
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public IDisposable? OnChange(Action<AuditLogOptions, string?> listener) => null;
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public void Set(AuditLogOptions value) => _current = value;
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Minimal ILogger that records each formatted log line so tests can
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/// assert on the compile-time warning emission contract — counting
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/// warnings and grepping the message text.
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/// </summary>
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private sealed class SpyLogger<T> : ILogger<T>
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{
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private readonly List<LogEntry> _entries = new();
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public IReadOnlyList<LogEntry> Entries
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{
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get { lock (_entries) return _entries.ToArray(); }
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}
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public IDisposable BeginScope<TState>(TState state) where TState : notnull => NullScope.Instance;
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public bool IsEnabled(LogLevel logLevel) => true;
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public void Log<TState>(
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LogLevel logLevel,
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EventId eventId,
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TState state,
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Exception? exception,
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Func<TState, Exception?, string> formatter)
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{
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var msg = formatter(state, exception);
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lock (_entries) _entries.Add(new LogEntry(logLevel, msg));
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}
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private sealed class NullScope : IDisposable
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{
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public static readonly NullScope Instance = new();
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public void Dispose() { }
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}
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}
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public sealed record LogEntry(LogLevel Level, string Message);
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}
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