Files
mxaccessgw/src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server/Configuration/GatewayOptionsValidator.cs
T

698 lines
33 KiB
C#

using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions.Ldap;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Configuration;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Workers;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Configuration;
public sealed class GatewayOptionsValidator : OptionsValidatorBase<GatewayOptions>
{
private const int MinimumMaxMessageBytes = 1024;
private const int MaximumMaxMessageBytes = 256 * 1024 * 1024;
// Bounds on the worker's outbound event-queue capacity. The floor keeps enough headroom that a
// normal subscription burst cannot overflow the queue (an overflow faults the whole session);
// the ceiling keeps a mistyped value from committing the x86 worker to an unbounded backlog.
private const int MinimumWorkerEventQueueCapacity = 1000;
private const int MaximumWorkerEventQueueCapacity = 1_000_000;
// Whether the host is running in the Production environment. Drives the production-only
// hard-stops (dashboard login disabled, plaintext LDAP transport) that must abort startup
// rather than merely warn. Non-production hosts keep the permissive dev posture.
private readonly bool _isProduction;
// The application content root. Store paths must not live under it — see
// GatewayConfigPathRules.AddIfUnderContentRoot. Null for non-DI callers that supply no
// environment, which skips the rule rather than inventing a root to test against.
private readonly string? _contentRootPath;
/// <summary>
/// Initializes a new instance of the <see cref="GatewayOptionsValidator"/> class for the
/// dependency-injection path, deriving the production posture and content root from the host
/// environment.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="environment">The host environment.</param>
public GatewayOptionsValidator(IHostEnvironment environment)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(environment);
_isProduction = environment.IsProduction();
_contentRootPath = environment.ContentRootPath;
}
/// <summary>
/// Initializes a new instance of the <see cref="GatewayOptionsValidator"/> class for unit
/// tests and non-DI callers. Defaults to a non-production posture so the production-only
/// hard-stops do not fire; pass <see langword="true"/> to exercise them.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="isProduction">Whether to treat the host as running in Production.</param>
/// <param name="contentRootPath">
/// Content root to test store paths against; <see langword="null"/> leaves the content-root
/// rule inactive, which is what a caller with no real host wants.
/// </param>
internal GatewayOptionsValidator(bool isProduction = false, string? contentRootPath = null)
{
_isProduction = isProduction;
_contentRootPath = contentRootPath;
}
/// <inheritdoc />
protected override void Validate(ValidationBuilder builder, GatewayOptions options)
{
ValidateAuthentication(options.Authentication, _contentRootPath, builder);
ValidateLdap(options.Ldap, builder, _isProduction);
ValidateWorker(options.Worker, builder);
ValidateSessions(options.Sessions, builder);
ValidateEvents(options.Events, builder);
ValidateDashboard(options.Dashboard, builder, _isProduction);
ValidateProtocol(options.Protocol, builder);
ValidateFrameSizeHeadroom(options.Worker, options.Protocol, builder);
ValidateAlarms(options.Alarms, builder);
ValidateTls(options.Tls, builder);
ValidateSecurity(options.Security, builder);
}
private static void ValidateSecurity(SecurityOptions options, ValidationBuilder builder)
{
// Cache/coalesce windows may be 0 (disables that mechanism); negatives are invalid.
AddIfNegative(
options.ApiKeyVerificationCacheSeconds,
"MxGateway:Security:ApiKeyVerificationCacheSeconds must be greater than or equal to zero (0 disables the verification cache).",
builder);
AddIfNegative(
options.ApiKeyLastUsedCoalesceSeconds,
"MxGateway:Security:ApiKeyLastUsedCoalesceSeconds must be greater than or equal to zero (0 forwards every last_used write).",
builder);
// Rate-limit knobs must be positive: a zero permit/window/limit is a misconfiguration that
// would either reject every request or divide by zero rather than express an intent.
AddIfNotPositive(
options.LoginRateLimitPermitLimit,
"MxGateway:Security:LoginRateLimitPermitLimit must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
options.LoginRateLimitWindowSeconds,
"MxGateway:Security:LoginRateLimitWindowSeconds must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
options.ApiKeyFailureLimit,
"MxGateway:Security:ApiKeyFailureLimit must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
options.ApiKeyFailureWindowSeconds,
"MxGateway:Security:ApiKeyFailureWindowSeconds must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
options.ApiKeyFailureTrackedPeers,
"MxGateway:Security:ApiKeyFailureTrackedPeers must be greater than zero.",
builder);
// Retention must be at least one day: 0 would sweep the audit table on every pass, which
// is a way to silently disable auditing rather than an expression of intent.
AddIfNotPositive(
options.AuditRetentionDays,
"MxGateway:Security:AuditRetentionDays must be greater than zero (at least one day of audit history is retained).",
builder);
// The two-layer limiter knobs accept 0 as "disable this layer": a zero aggregate
// limit turns off cross-peer counting, and a zero probe interval restores absolute blocking.
// Negatives express no intent.
AddIfNegative(
options.ApiKeyFailureAggregateLimit,
"MxGateway:Security:ApiKeyFailureAggregateLimit must be greater than or equal to zero (0 disables the per-key aggregate layer).",
builder);
AddIfNegative(
options.ApiKeyFailureProbeIntervalSeconds,
"MxGateway:Security:ApiKeyFailureProbeIntervalSeconds must be greater than or equal to zero (0 blocks absolutely instead of admitting probes).",
builder);
}
private static void ValidateAuthentication(
AuthenticationOptions options,
string? contentRootPath,
ValidationBuilder builder)
{
if (!Enum.IsDefined(options.Mode))
{
builder.Add("MxGateway:Authentication:Mode must be a supported authentication mode.");
return;
}
if (options.Mode == AuthenticationMode.ApiKey)
{
AddIfBlank(
options.SqlitePath,
"MxGateway:Authentication:SqlitePath is required when API-key authentication is enabled.",
builder);
AddIfInvalidPath(
options.SqlitePath,
"MxGateway:Authentication:SqlitePath must be a valid filesystem path.",
builder);
AddIfNotRooted(
options.SqlitePath,
"MxGateway:Authentication:SqlitePath must be an absolute (rooted) path so the credential store never lands in the launch working directory.",
builder);
AddIfUnderContentRoot(
options.SqlitePath,
contentRootPath,
$"MxGateway:Authentication:SqlitePath must not be inside the application directory ({contentRootPath}). The upgrade procedure renames that directory, which abandons the credential store and silently starts an empty one — every API key is lost and no client can authenticate.",
builder);
AddIfBlank(
options.PepperSecretName,
"MxGateway:Authentication:PepperSecretName is required when API-key authentication is enabled.",
builder);
}
}
private static void ValidateLdap(LdapOptions options, ValidationBuilder builder, bool isProduction)
{
if (!options.Enabled)
{
return;
}
AddIfBlank(options.Server, "MxGateway:Ldap:Server is required when LDAP login is enabled.", builder);
AddIfBlank(options.SearchBase, "MxGateway:Ldap:SearchBase is required when LDAP login is enabled.", builder);
AddIfBlank(
options.ServiceAccountDn,
"MxGateway:Ldap:ServiceAccountDn is required when LDAP login is enabled.",
builder);
AddIfBlank(
options.ServiceAccountPassword,
"MxGateway:Ldap:ServiceAccountPassword is required when LDAP login is enabled. "
+ "Never commit it: on dev boxes set user-secrets "
+ "(dotnet user-secrets set \"MxGateway:Ldap:ServiceAccountPassword\" <value>); "
+ "on deployed hosts set the environment variable "
+ "MxGateway__Ldap__ServiceAccountPassword. "
+ "(appsettings.json ships the ${secret:ldap/mxgateway/bind} store reference as the default.)",
builder);
AddIfBlank(
options.UserNameAttribute,
"MxGateway:Ldap:UserNameAttribute is required when LDAP login is enabled.",
builder);
AddIfBlank(
options.DisplayNameAttribute,
"MxGateway:Ldap:DisplayNameAttribute is required when LDAP login is enabled.",
builder);
AddIfBlank(
options.GroupAttribute,
"MxGateway:Ldap:GroupAttribute is required when LDAP login is enabled.",
builder);
builder.Port(options.Port, "MxGateway:Ldap:Port");
if (options.Transport == LdapTransport.None && !options.AllowInsecure)
{
builder.Add("MxGateway:Ldap:AllowInsecure must be true when Transport is None (plaintext).");
}
// Production hard-stop: plaintext LDAP binds send the operator's password in the clear.
// The permissive dev default (Transport=None against the shared GLAuth instance) is
// acceptable off-production but must never ship to a Production host. Deployed hosts must
// set Transport=Ldaps/StartTls; see docs/GatewayConfiguration.md and glauth.md.
if (isProduction && options.Transport == LdapTransport.None)
{
builder.Add(
"MxGateway:Ldap:Transport must not be None (plaintext) in the Production environment; use Ldaps or StartTls.");
}
}
private static void ValidateWorker(WorkerOptions options, ValidationBuilder builder)
{
AddIfBlank(options.ExecutablePath, "MxGateway:Worker:ExecutablePath is required.", builder);
AddIfInvalidPath(
options.ExecutablePath,
"MxGateway:Worker:ExecutablePath must be a valid filesystem path.",
builder);
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(options.ExecutablePath)
&& !string.Equals(Path.GetExtension(options.ExecutablePath), ".exe", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
builder.Add("MxGateway:Worker:ExecutablePath must point to a .exe file.");
}
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(options.WorkingDirectory))
{
AddIfInvalidPath(
options.WorkingDirectory,
"MxGateway:Worker:WorkingDirectory must be a valid filesystem path.",
builder);
}
if (!Enum.IsDefined(options.RequiredArchitecture))
{
builder.Add("MxGateway:Worker:RequiredArchitecture must be a supported worker architecture.");
}
AddIfNotPositive(
options.StartupTimeoutSeconds,
"MxGateway:Worker:StartupTimeoutSeconds must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
options.StartupProbeRetryAttempts,
"MxGateway:Worker:StartupProbeRetryAttempts must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
options.StartupProbeRetryDelayMilliseconds,
"MxGateway:Worker:StartupProbeRetryDelayMilliseconds must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
options.PipeConnectAttemptTimeoutMilliseconds,
"MxGateway:Worker:PipeConnectAttemptTimeoutMilliseconds must be greater than zero.",
builder);
if (options.WriteCompletionWaitMilliseconds < 0)
{
builder.Add("MxGateway:Worker:WriteCompletionWaitMilliseconds must be greater than or equal to zero.");
}
AddIfNotPositive(
options.ShutdownTimeoutSeconds,
"MxGateway:Worker:ShutdownTimeoutSeconds must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
options.HeartbeatIntervalSeconds,
"MxGateway:Worker:HeartbeatIntervalSeconds must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
options.HeartbeatGraceSeconds,
"MxGateway:Worker:HeartbeatGraceSeconds must be greater than zero.",
builder);
if (options.HeartbeatGraceSeconds < options.HeartbeatIntervalSeconds)
{
builder.Add(
"MxGateway:Worker:HeartbeatGraceSeconds must be greater than or equal to HeartbeatIntervalSeconds.");
}
if (options.EventQueueCapacity is < MinimumWorkerEventQueueCapacity or > MaximumWorkerEventQueueCapacity)
{
builder.Add(
$"MxGateway:Worker:EventQueueCapacity must be between {MinimumWorkerEventQueueCapacity} and {MaximumWorkerEventQueueCapacity}.");
}
if (options.MaxMessageBytes is < MinimumMaxMessageBytes or > MaximumMaxMessageBytes)
{
builder.Add(
$"MxGateway:Worker:MaxMessageBytes must be between {MinimumMaxMessageBytes} and {MaximumMaxMessageBytes}.");
}
}
private static void ValidateSessions(SessionOptions options, ValidationBuilder builder)
{
AddIfNotPositive(
options.DefaultCommandTimeoutSeconds,
"MxGateway:Sessions:DefaultCommandTimeoutSeconds must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(options.MaxSessions, "MxGateway:Sessions:MaxSessions must be greater than zero.", builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
options.MaxPendingCommandsPerSession,
"MxGateway:Sessions:MaxPendingCommandsPerSession must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
options.DefaultLeaseSeconds,
"MxGateway:Sessions:DefaultLeaseSeconds must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
options.LeaseSweepIntervalSeconds,
"MxGateway:Sessions:LeaseSweepIntervalSeconds must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
options.MaxEventSubscribersPerSession,
"MxGateway:Sessions:MaxEventSubscribersPerSession must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNegative(
options.DetachGraceSeconds,
"MxGateway:Sessions:DetachGraceSeconds must be zero or greater (0 disables detach-grace retention).",
builder);
AddIfNegative(
options.FaultedGraceSeconds,
"MxGateway:Sessions:FaultedGraceSeconds must be zero or greater (0 reaps a faulted session on the next sweep).",
builder);
AddIfNegative(
options.WorkerReadyWaitTimeoutMs,
"MxGateway:Sessions:WorkerReadyWaitTimeoutMs must be greater than or equal to zero.",
builder);
// NOTE: We intentionally do NOT reject !AllowMultipleEventSubscribers &&
// MaxEventSubscribersPerSession > 1 as a hard validation error here. The default
// SessionOptions ships with AllowMultipleEventSubscribers=false and
// MaxEventSubscribersPerSession=8; making those defaults a validation failure would
// break every deployment that has not explicitly set the cap. The cap is simply
// ignored in single-subscriber mode (AttachEventSubscriber derives effectiveCap=1),
// so the only practical consequence of the apparent inconsistency is a dead config
// knob, not incorrect behavior.
}
// QueueCapacity flows into WorkerClient as EventChannelCapacity, where the staging channel is
// sized checked(2 * EventChannelCapacity). Cap it at int.MaxValue/2 so that doubling
// cannot overflow and throw OverflowException at session creation; mirrors the MaxSparseArrayLength
// upper-bound pattern.
private const int MaximumEventQueueCapacity = int.MaxValue / 2;
private static void ValidateEvents(EventOptions options, ValidationBuilder builder)
{
AddIfNotPositive(options.QueueCapacity, "MxGateway:Events:QueueCapacity must be greater than zero.", builder);
if (options.QueueCapacity > MaximumEventQueueCapacity)
{
builder.Add(
$"MxGateway:Events:QueueCapacity must be less than or equal to {MaximumEventQueueCapacity} "
+ "so the derived worker event-staging channel (2 x QueueCapacity) cannot overflow.");
}
if (!Enum.IsDefined(options.BackpressurePolicy))
{
builder.Add("MxGateway:Events:BackpressurePolicy must be a supported backpressure policy.");
}
// ReplayBufferCapacity and ReplayRetentionSeconds are bounds on the replay ring
// buffer; 0 is a valid value (disables that dimension), so only negatives fail.
AddIfNegative(
options.ReplayBufferCapacity,
"MxGateway:Events:ReplayBufferCapacity must be greater than or equal to zero.",
builder);
builder.RequireThat(
options.ReplayRetentionSeconds >= 0,
"MxGateway:Events:ReplayRetentionSeconds must be greater than or equal to zero.");
builder.RequireThat(
options.MaxSparseArrayLength >= 1 && options.MaxSparseArrayLength <= Array.MaxLength,
$"MxGateway:Events:MaxSparseArrayLength must be between 1 and {Array.MaxLength}.");
}
private static void ValidateDashboard(DashboardOptions options, ValidationBuilder builder, bool isProduction)
{
// Production hard-stop: DisableLogin swaps in an auto-login handler that authenticates
// EVERY request (remote included) as AutoLoginUser holding both roles, turning the whole
// dashboard — API-key CRUD and worker Kill included — into an unauthenticated admin
// surface on a 0.0.0.0-bound port. It is a dev/test-only convenience; abort startup if it
// is set in Production. Non-production hosts keep the existing runtime warning.
if (isProduction && options.DisableLogin)
{
builder.Add(
"MxGateway:Dashboard:DisableLogin must not be true in the Production environment; it disables all dashboard authentication.");
}
// GroupToRole shape is validated even when the dashboard is disabled so
// misconfiguration surfaces at startup; emptiness is allowed, with the
// consequence that no LDAP user can sign in (login returns "no roles
// mapped"). Operators who disable the dashboard or want a closed
// deployment can ship without a mapping.
foreach (KeyValuePair<string, string> entry in options.GroupToRole)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(entry.Key))
{
builder.Add("MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole keys (LDAP group names) must be non-blank.");
}
if (!string.Equals(entry.Value, Dashboard.DashboardRoles.Admin, StringComparison.Ordinal)
&& !string.Equals(entry.Value, Dashboard.DashboardRoles.Viewer, StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
builder.Add(
$"MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole['{entry.Key}'] must be '{Dashboard.DashboardRoles.Admin}' or '{Dashboard.DashboardRoles.Viewer}'.");
}
}
// GroupToTag is validated for shape only, and independently of GroupToRole:
// a group may grant a role, a tag, both, or neither. An empty map is legal —
// it yields Viewers with no tag grant, which (under the default AdminOnly)
// means they observe no session's events. That is the fail-closed posture.
foreach (KeyValuePair<string, string[]> entry in options.GroupToTag)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(entry.Key))
{
builder.Add("MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag keys (LDAP group names) must be non-blank.");
}
if (entry.Value is null)
{
builder.Add($"MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag['{entry.Key}'] must be a list of tags, not null.");
continue;
}
if (Array.Exists(entry.Value, string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace))
{
builder.Add($"MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag['{entry.Key}'] tags must be non-blank.");
}
}
if (!Enum.IsDefined(options.UntaggedSessionVisibility))
{
builder.Add(
$"MxGateway:Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility must be '{nameof(UntaggedSessionVisibility.AdminOnly)}' "
+ $"or '{nameof(UntaggedSessionVisibility.AllViewers)}'.");
}
AddIfNotPositive(
options.SnapshotIntervalMilliseconds,
"MxGateway:Dashboard:SnapshotIntervalMilliseconds must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNegative(
options.RecentFaultLimit,
"MxGateway:Dashboard:RecentFaultLimit must be greater than or equal to zero.",
builder);
AddIfNegative(
options.RecentSessionLimit,
"MxGateway:Dashboard:RecentSessionLimit must be greater than or equal to zero.",
builder);
}
private static readonly string[] ValidAlarmFallbackModes = ["Auto", "ForceAlarmManager", "ForceSubtag"];
private const int MinimumAlarmPollIntervalMilliseconds = 100;
// One hour. Above this the cadence stops being a cadence: int.MaxValue
// milliseconds is ~24 days, which silently disables alarm polling instead
// of reporting the misconfiguration.
private const int MaximumAlarmPollIntervalMilliseconds = 3_600_000;
private const int MinimumMaxAlarmsPerFetch = 64;
// The worker is a 32-bit process and materializes each fetch as one BSTR
// plus a full XmlDocument over it, so an unbounded cap is an out-of-memory
// fault on the STA rather than a slow poll.
private const int MaximumMaxAlarmsPerFetch = 65_536;
private static void ValidateAlarms(AlarmsOptions options, ValidationBuilder builder)
{
// Validated regardless of Enabled: both values are stamped onto every
// worker launch environment, so a bad value is a misconfiguration even
// before the central monitor is switched on.
if (options.PollIntervalMilliseconds is < MinimumAlarmPollIntervalMilliseconds
or > MaximumAlarmPollIntervalMilliseconds)
{
builder.Add(
$"MxGateway:Alarms:PollIntervalMilliseconds must be between {MinimumAlarmPollIntervalMilliseconds} and {MaximumAlarmPollIntervalMilliseconds}.");
}
if (options.MaxAlarmsPerFetch is < MinimumMaxAlarmsPerFetch or > MaximumMaxAlarmsPerFetch)
{
builder.Add(
$"MxGateway:Alarms:MaxAlarmsPerFetch must be between {MinimumMaxAlarmsPerFetch} and {MaximumMaxAlarmsPerFetch}.");
}
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(options.AckClientName)
|| options.AckClientName.Length > 64
|| options.AckClientName.Any(char.IsControl))
{
builder.Add("MxGateway:Alarms:AckClientName must be 1-64 printable characters.");
}
if (!options.Enabled)
{
return;
}
// When the central alarm monitor is enabled, it needs either a canonical
// SubscriptionExpression or a DefaultArea to compose one from. Validating
// it at startup makes the misconfiguration fail-fast at boot, in line
// with every other section.
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(options.SubscriptionExpression)
&& string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(options.DefaultArea))
{
builder.Add(
"MxGateway:Alarms requires either a non-blank SubscriptionExpression or a non-blank DefaultArea when Enabled is true.");
}
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(options.SubscriptionExpression)
&& !options.SubscriptionExpression.StartsWith(@"\\", StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
builder.Add(
@"MxGateway:Alarms:SubscriptionExpression must start with '\\' (canonical \\<host>\Galaxy!<area> shape).");
}
ValidateAlarmFallback(options.Fallback, builder);
}
private static void ValidateAlarmFallback(AlarmFallbackOptions fallback, ValidationBuilder builder)
{
// Validate Mode is one of the recognised values (case-insensitive).
bool modeValid = Array.Exists(
ValidAlarmFallbackModes,
m => string.Equals(m, fallback.Mode, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
if (!modeValid)
{
builder.Add(
$"MxGateway:Alarms:Fallback:Mode must be one of: {string.Join(", ", ValidAlarmFallbackModes)} (was '{fallback.Mode}').");
}
// ForceSubtag requires either Galaxy Repository discovery or an explicit IncludeAttributes list.
if (modeValid
&& string.Equals(fallback.Mode, "ForceSubtag", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
&& !fallback.Discovery.UseGalaxyRepository
&& fallback.Discovery.IncludeAttributes.Length == 0)
{
builder.Add(
"MxGateway:Alarms:Fallback ForceSubtag requires Galaxy Repository discovery or a non-empty Discovery:IncludeAttributes list.");
}
// Floor validation: numeric thresholds must be at least 1.
AddIfNotPositive(
fallback.ConsecutiveFailureThreshold,
"MxGateway:Alarms:Fallback:ConsecutiveFailureThreshold must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
fallback.FailbackProbeIntervalSeconds,
"MxGateway:Alarms:Fallback:FailbackProbeIntervalSeconds must be greater than zero.",
builder);
AddIfNotPositive(
fallback.FailbackStableProbes,
"MxGateway:Alarms:Fallback:FailbackStableProbes must be greater than zero.",
builder);
}
private const int MinimumCertValidityYears = 1;
private const int MaximumCertValidityYears = 100;
private static void ValidateTls(TlsOptions options, ValidationBuilder builder)
{
if (options.ValidityYears is < MinimumCertValidityYears or > MaximumCertValidityYears)
{
builder.Add(
$"MxGateway:Tls:ValidityYears must be between {MinimumCertValidityYears} and {MaximumCertValidityYears}.");
}
// The default is non-blank, so this only catches an explicitly-blanked path.
AddIfBlank(
options.SelfSignedCertPath,
"MxGateway:Tls:SelfSignedCertPath must not be blank.",
builder);
AddIfInvalidPath(
options.SelfSignedCertPath,
"MxGateway:Tls:SelfSignedCertPath must be a valid filesystem path.",
builder);
AddIfNotRooted(
options.SelfSignedCertPath,
"MxGateway:Tls:SelfSignedCertPath must be an absolute (rooted) path so the generated private key never lands in the launch working directory.",
builder);
foreach (string dns in options.AdditionalDnsNames)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(dns))
{
builder.Add("MxGateway:Tls:AdditionalDnsNames entries must be non-blank.");
}
}
}
private static void ValidateProtocol(ProtocolOptions options, ValidationBuilder builder)
{
if (options.WorkerProtocolVersion != GatewayContractInfo.WorkerProtocolVersion)
{
builder.Add(
$"MxGateway:Protocol:WorkerProtocolVersion must be {GatewayContractInfo.WorkerProtocolVersion}.");
}
if (options.MaxGrpcMessageBytes is < MinimumMaxMessageBytes or > MaximumMaxMessageBytes)
{
builder.Add(
$"MxGateway:Protocol:MaxGrpcMessageBytes must be between {MinimumMaxMessageBytes} and {MaximumMaxMessageBytes}.");
}
}
// The worker-frame (pipe) maximum must stay above the public gRPC cap by the envelope-overhead
// reserve, otherwise a maximally-sized accepted gRPC payload does not fit one worker frame once
// wrapped in a WorkerEnvelope and the outbound write faults the whole session. Fail fast
// at startup rather than mid-traffic. Only checked when both knobs are themselves in range so the
// message is not doubled up with the individual range errors.
//
// The coupling also has an upper half. The worker budgets a DrainEvents reply against the
// negotiated frame maximum less two reserves, and that same MxCommandReply is then returned
// verbatim through Invoke, where the gateway's gRPC MaxSendMessageSize (= MaxGrpcMessageBytes)
// applies. Letting the pipe maximum run arbitrarily far above the gRPC cap lets the worker pack a
// reply the pipe carries and the gRPC layer then refuses to send — with the drained events already
// removed from the worker queue, so they are lost to both the caller and the event stream. Keeping
// the pipe maximum within two reserves of the gRPC cap makes "frame max - 2x reserve" a budget that
// is always at or below the gRPC cap, so the wrapper always has a full reserve of margin.
private static void ValidateFrameSizeHeadroom(
WorkerOptions worker,
ProtocolOptions protocol,
ValidationBuilder builder)
{
bool workerInRange = worker.MaxMessageBytes is >= MinimumMaxMessageBytes and <= MaximumMaxMessageBytes;
bool grpcInRange = protocol.MaxGrpcMessageBytes is >= MinimumMaxMessageBytes and <= MaximumMaxMessageBytes;
if (!workerInRange || !grpcInRange)
{
return;
}
long requiredWorkerMax =
(long)protocol.MaxGrpcMessageBytes + WorkerFrameProtocolOptions.EnvelopeOverheadReserveBytes;
if (worker.MaxMessageBytes < requiredWorkerMax)
{
builder.Add(
$"MxGateway:Worker:MaxMessageBytes ({worker.MaxMessageBytes}) must be at least "
+ $"MxGateway:Protocol:MaxGrpcMessageBytes ({protocol.MaxGrpcMessageBytes}) plus the "
+ $"{WorkerFrameProtocolOptions.EnvelopeOverheadReserveBytes}-byte worker-frame envelope reserve "
+ $"(>= {requiredWorkerMax}).");
}
long permittedWorkerMax =
(long)protocol.MaxGrpcMessageBytes + (2L * WorkerFrameProtocolOptions.EnvelopeOverheadReserveBytes);
if (worker.MaxMessageBytes > permittedWorkerMax)
{
builder.Add(
$"MxGateway:Worker:MaxMessageBytes ({worker.MaxMessageBytes}) must be at most "
+ $"MxGateway:Protocol:MaxGrpcMessageBytes ({protocol.MaxGrpcMessageBytes}) plus twice the "
+ $"{WorkerFrameProtocolOptions.EnvelopeOverheadReserveBytes}-byte worker-frame envelope reserve "
+ $"(<= {permittedWorkerMax}). The worker budgets a DrainEvents reply against the negotiated "
+ "frame maximum less two reserves; a pipe maximum further above the gRPC cap lets the worker "
+ "pack a reply the pipe carries but the gRPC send cap refuses, losing the already-drained "
+ "events. Lower MxGateway:Worker:MaxMessageBytes or raise MxGateway:Protocol:MaxGrpcMessageBytes.");
}
}
private static void AddIfBlank(string? value, string message, ValidationBuilder builder)
{
builder.RequireThat(!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(value), message);
}
private static void AddIfNotPositive(int value, string message, ValidationBuilder builder)
{
builder.RequireThat(value > 0, message);
}
private static void AddIfNegative(int value, string message, ValidationBuilder builder)
{
builder.RequireThat(value >= 0, message);
}
// Path rooting/validity rules are shared with GalaxyRepositoryOptionsValidator (both write a
// host file) so the two validators cannot drift; see GatewayConfigPathRules. Rooting is checked
// against the running OS via Path.IsPathRooted — a Windows drive/UNC literal on a Unix host now
// fails fast instead of being blessed and written as a junk-named relative file.
private static void AddIfNotRooted(string? value, string message, ValidationBuilder builder)
=> GatewayConfigPathRules.AddIfNotRooted(value, message, builder);
private static void AddIfInvalidPath(string? value, string message, ValidationBuilder builder)
=> GatewayConfigPathRules.AddIfInvalidPath(value, message, builder);
// Rooted is not the same as safe: an absolute path inside the app directory passes
// AddIfNotRooted and is still renamed away by the upgrade procedure. See
// GatewayConfigPathRules.AddIfUnderContentRoot.
private static void AddIfUnderContentRoot(
string? value,
string? contentRoot,
string message,
ValidationBuilder builder)
=> GatewayConfigPathRules.AddIfUnderContentRoot(value, contentRoot, message, builder);
}