Compare commits

..

10 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Joseph Doherty d05f38b661 docs(plans): closeout tasks 1-10 complete
ci / nightly-windev (push) Has been skipped
ci / windows-x86 (push) Successful in 1m20s
ci / java (push) Successful in 2m13s
ci / portable (push) Successful in 8m2s
2026-08-17 04:54:36 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 64da630258 docs(rust-client): field-access notation fix in the truncation note (review nit) 2026-08-17 04:52:20 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 1d8a4a6442 test(dashboard)+docs: SEC-25 live-LDAP ACL coverage; design marked implemented
The per-session dashboard event ACL shipped in 693a78d + 7ec0b35 with unit
coverage over a fabricated principal. What a fabricated principal cannot show is
that the group names the shared directory actually returns -- short RDN values,
not DNs -- are the ones Dashboard:GroupToTag keys match. Two [LiveLdapFact]s
close that: gw-viewer binds for real, its GwReader membership grants team-a, and
IDashboardSessionAcl then admits a team-a-tagged session and refuses a
team-b-tagged one; multi-role takes the Administrator bypass. The mapping is
config-side only -- no GLAuth entry, group, or membership was added, and
glauth.md records that explicitly so a future reader does not go looking for a
directory change that never happened.

multi-role is a member of GwReader as well as GwAdmin, so it holds team-a too.
Its bypass is therefore asserted on team-b and on the untagged session -- the two
it would lose if the Administrator branch were ever dropped -- rather than on
team-a, which would pass either way.

One cheap hardening from a prior review: a GatewayOptionsTests case binds
Dashboard:GroupToTag through a real ConfigurationBuilder and looks the group up
mis-cased. The property initializer seeds an OrdinalIgnoreCase dictionary, but
only the binder decides whether that instance survives; if it did not, a
mis-cased group name from the directory would grant no tags and the ACL would
deny with no diagnostic.

Docs follow the shipped shape: docs/Sessions.md gains the session-tag model
(owner-key sourced, immutable, visibility-not-access), gateway.md and CLAUDE.md
gain the ACL in their dashboard-auth paragraphs, and three
GatewayDashboardDesign.md passages that still described the ACL as outstanding
now describe both gated seams and the decision order. GatewayConfiguration.md's
ShowTagValues row no longer claims the redaction is the only thing between a
Viewer and another session's values -- it is now the second of two independent
layers. gateway.md's hub-token lifetime corrected 30 minutes -> 5, matching
HubTokenService. Authentication.md disambiguates --dashboard-tags as the only
constraint flag that splits on commas. The plan doc header is Implemented; its
as-built section 12 already existed and is not duplicated.

Verified: NonWindows.slnx builds clean; GatewayOptions/DashboardSessionAcl/
EventsHub filters 37/37; the live-LDAP suite skips cleanly without the env var
and runs 7/7 green against the shared GLAuth with it.
2026-08-17 04:48:34 -04:00
Joseph Doherty d9ea8a81f1 chore(clients): regenerate for alarm truncation fields; READMEs note the degraded flag
Task 8 added ActiveAlarmSnapshot.from_truncated_snapshot = 16 and
QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload.snapshot_truncated = 2. Regenerate every
downstream binding from the canonical Contracts protos:

- client descriptor set (protoc 34.1 pin)
- Go (protoc-gen-go v1.36.11 / protoc-gen-go-grpc 1.6.2)
- Python (grpcio-tools 1.80.0 pin)
- Java (gradle generateProto)
- Rust vendored protos under clients/rust/protos, which build.rs falls back
  to for out-of-repo tarball builds and which must track Contracts

.NET needed no regeneration - the client compiles against the Contracts
Generated/ output already committed with the proto change. No client has a
typed wrapper model around ActiveAlarmSnapshot; all five pass the generated
type straight through, so codegen alone carries the field.

Each client README's alarm section gains a paragraph on the flag: the
snapshot set may omit actives and absence-implies-cleared inference was
suspended, so callers must not reconcile deletions from a truncated set.
Distinguished from the per-record 'degraded' subtag-fallback flag, which it
is easily confused with.
2026-08-17 04:48:20 -04:00
Joseph Doherty b9fb0dd720 fix(alarms): atomic snapshot+truncation read; direct tests for the flag plumbing (review)
Review found AlarmDispatcher.SnapshotActiveAlarms reading the snapshot and the
truncation verdict through two independent lock acquisitions, defended by a
comment claiming read-order made a race "widen only, never narrow". That claim
was false: a not-truncated -> truncated poll landing between the two reads pairs
a stale false with a capped snapshot, which is exactly the false all-clear the
feature exists to prevent. It was safe only because AlarmCommandHandler
STA-serializes consumer calls — an accident of the call graph, not an invariant.

Made the invariant structural instead of documented. IMxAccessAlarmConsumer now
exposes ONE accessor, `IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms(
out bool truncated)`, which implementations must satisfy from a single
acquisition of the lock guarding the retained snapshot — mirroring the write
side, where FoldFetch already updates snapshot and verdict together. The
separate LastSnapshotTruncated property is gone from every layer, so there is no
second read left to pair badly. `out` over a result struct follows the file's
established idiom (FoldFetch, ParseSnapshotXml).

The same threading applies one level up: IAlarmCommandHandler.QueryActive now
carries `out bool snapshotTruncated`, so MxAccessCommandExecutor stamps the reply
payload from the value the records were stamped with rather than reading the
state a second time.

Direct tests for the three hops that were only covered end-to-end:
- AlarmDispatcherTests: truncated consumer snapshot stamps FromTruncatedSnapshot
  on every mapped record, with a complete-snapshot control, plus an assertion
  that the independent per-record Degraded flag is not dragged along.
- AlarmCommandHandlerTests: the verdict delegates through the dispatcher
  (Theory over both values), and survives a prefix filter that removes every
  record — the case the per-record flag cannot cover.
- AlarmCommandExecutorTests: the reply payload's SnapshotTruncated comes from the
  handler (Theory over both values), including the zero-record case.
The WnWrapAlarmConsumer truncation tests now assert through
SnapshotActiveAlarms(out ...) rather than an internal field, because the pairing
is the contract.

Also: GatewayAlarmMonitor's _snapshotTruncated comment now says "as of the last
full reconcile" rather than implying it tracks the current _alarms contents,
which live transitions keep moving via ApplyTransition between passes.

Detection heuristic still untouched (fetchedRecordCount >= maxAlarmsPerFetch);
no @COUNT parsing, per docs/AlarmProbeFindings.md. Still additive gateway
metadata about our fetch mechanics, not MXAccess behavior — not a parity
deviation, and no event is synthesized.

Gateway: NonWindows.slnx builds clean (0 warnings); ~Alarm filter 107/107 pass.
Worker + Worker.Tests are windev-gated; the signature change was reviewed by
inspection across all 7 IMxAccessAlarmConsumer implementers, all 3
IAlarmCommandHandler implementers, and every call site.
2026-08-17 04:39:33 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 7ec0b3594c fix(dashboard): close AttachEventsAsync re-entrancy window; pin ACL decision-table corners (SEC-25 review)
Follow-up to the per-session event ACL. Part of that change rode into 693a78d
via a concurrent agent's pathspec-less commit; this commit carries the review
fixes and uses pathspecs on the commit itself so it cannot recur in either
direction.

Gating the page's subscribe seam made AttachEvents asynchronous — it awaits the
authentication state — and that await is a suspension point the synchronous
version did not have. On a rapid A -> B navigation the suspended A continuation
resumes after B's parameter set has run to completion, re-reads the live
SessionId (now B's), and attaches B a SECOND time. The ACL is not bypassed —
the newer attach already cleared that same session — but the fields holding B's
first subscription are overwritten in place, so nothing ever disposes it: its
EventsHubViewerRegistry entry is never released, which keeps the mirror cloning
events for a session the page is no longer watching through that handle, and
its pump is never cancelled. A resource leak the ACL work introduced.

OnParametersSetAsync now claims a monotonic _attachGeneration synchronously,
before its first await, and AttachEventsAsync re-checks it after the await and
before any field write or Subscribe call. A stale attach returns rather than
detaching: it owns nothing, and tearing down there would destroy the newer
attach's subscription. DetachEventsAsync needs no such guard — it captures and
nulls the live fields synchronously before it awaits, so a resumed detach only
unwinds what it already took ownership of. Same dispatcher-owned identity idea
as the existing ReferenceEquals guards in PumpEventsAsync and
MarkDisconnectedAsync, one level up.

The interleaving is not expressible with the static HtmlRenderer idiom the other
page tests use: it renders a root component once and exposes no parameter-update
seam. The new test therefore adds a minimal Renderer subclass whose only job is
to mount a component and drive a second SetParametersAsync into it while the
first is parked on a gated AuthenticationStateProvider. That subclass is the
lone reason for a narrowly scoped BL0006 suppression, justified in place: it is
test-only scaffolding that never ships, and the cost of the warning coming true
is a compile break in one test file on an SDK bump. Confirmed non-vacuous by
mutation — with the generation check disabled the test goes red on the doubled
subscription and the two passing ACL tests stay green.

Two decision-table corners are now pinned rather than implied. Admin x
nonexistent session id resolves to ALLOW, because the admin bypass is evaluated
before the registry lookup; a plausible "look the session up first, it reads
better" refactor would flip it, so a test documents the ordering. EventsHub's
remarks said "an unknown session id is denied" without qualification, which read
as universal; they now state that the bypass is checked first and every rule
below it is a non-Admin rule.

HubTokenServiceTests gains the truly-absent-field case: a hand-built payload
JSON with no Tags key at all, protected through the same purpose, which is the
shape every in-flight token has across the deploy that introduces the field. The
existing test covered present-but-empty, which does not exercise the null
coalesce that stands between a legacy token and a crash on the hub auth path.
ProtectorPurpose became internal so the test cannot drift from the real purpose
string.

Tag-count cardinality cap considered and recorded as a deliberate non-goal.

Build 0 warnings / 0 errors; 48 filtered (ACL/hub/token/page) and 257 dashboard
tests pass.
2026-08-17 04:35:59 -04:00
Joseph Doherty 693a78db7d feat(alarms): structural degraded-status signal for truncated alarm snapshots
The truncation-cliff fix made alarm transitions truncation-safe but silent:
when GetXmlCurrentAlarms2 returns exactly maxAlmCnt records the worker
suppresses absence-implies-Clear inference and says so only in a rate-limited
stderr warning. No client and no operator could tell a complete active set
from a capped one.

Two additive proto3 booleans carry the verdict out:

- QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload.snapshot_truncated = 2 (worker IPC reply)
- ActiveAlarmSnapshot.from_truncated_snapshot = 16 (per record)

The per-record field is not an aesthetic choice. QueryActiveAlarms returns a
bare `stream ActiveAlarmSnapshot` with no envelope, header, or trailer, so a
per-record boolean is the only carrier that stays wire-compatible; an envelope
message would change every existing client's stream element type. The reply
payload states it too because a prefix filter can leave zero records and a
truncated fetch with nothing to report still has to say so. The flag means
"this set may be incomplete", never "this record is unreliable" — it is
independent of the subtag-fallback `degraded` field.

Detection is deliberately UNCHANGED: IsTruncatedFetch remains
`fetchedRecordCount >= maxAlarmsPerFetch`. The live probe (docs/AlarmProbeFindings.md,
ce5d8ae) could not verify whether ALARM_RECORDS/@COUNT reports the total active
count or only the records in the reply, so @COUNT is not parsed for detection;
switching to it stays blocked on probe evidence. The probe's comment
annotations in WnWrapAlarmConsumer.cs are preserved.

Reset semantics: not latched. WnWrapAlarmConsumer.FoldFetch replaces the
verdict on every poll under the same lock as the snapshot merge, so the first
sub-cap fetch clears it; GatewayAlarmMonitor.ClearCache drops it with the cache
generation it describes. A caveat that never turns off is one operators learn
to ignore.

Flow: WnWrapAlarmConsumer.LastSnapshotTruncated -> AlarmDispatcher (stamps every
record) / IAlarmCommandHandler (payload) -> MxAccessCommandExecutor reply ->
GatewayAlarmMonitor._snapshotTruncated -> IGatewayAlarmService.SnapshotTruncated
-> DashboardAlarmQueryResult -> AlarmsPage warning banner (render-side only; the
poll loop and DisposeAsync drain are untouched). The public QueryActiveAlarms
RPC forwards worker snapshots unmodified, so the per-record flag needed no
mapper change — a test pins that.

Parity: this describes OUR fetch mechanics — additive gateway metadata — not
MXAccess provider behavior. No event is synthesized and no MXAccess-observable
semantics change, so it is not a parity deviation.

Tests: worker LastSnapshotTruncated set/reset/consecutive-burst (windev-run);
gateway end-to-end truncated reply -> monitor -> public stream, with the
complete-reply control as the load-bearing assertion; AlarmsPage banner
present/absent. Docs: gateway.md alarm surface, docs/DesignDecisions.md entry.
2026-08-17 04:18:34 -04:00
Joseph Doherty b8b7b69ba0 fix(worker): observe detached drain faults per NEXT-04 discipline
Both tasks the detached-lock-wait path starts and discards now carry the
file's fault-observing continuation, factored out of ObserveAbandonedFault as
ObserveFault so the idiom has one definition. DrainDetachedAsync swallows the
drain but its _writeLock.Release() sits in a finally outside that catch, so a
Release that ever throws — a SemaphoreFullException from some future
double-release regression — had no awaiter and would have surfaced on net48 as
TaskScheduler.UnobservedTaskException at finalization instead of an
attributable failure. Same for a throw out of OnDetachedLockWaitSettled.

Review's Minor (distinguishing a cancelled from a faulted lock wait before
tombstoning) is deliberately not taken: a faulted WaitAsync is unreachable
here — nothing disposes _writeLock — so the branch would be untestable new
logic whose only effect is internal state, the caller already receiving the
fault itself from the rethrow. Recorded as a comment at the site instead.

edited on macOS, windev verification pending (plan Task 11). Re-ran the net10
scratch harness over WorkerFrameWriter and the writer suite: 0 warnings,
31/31 pass.
2026-08-17 04:07:44 -04:00
Joseph Doherty ce5d8ae7c2 docs(alarms): wnwrap live-probe findings — GUID identity, ALARM_RECORDS COUNT
Both questions stay open, and the reason is the finding: the dev rig's alarm
UDAs reject a plain MXAccess Write with SecurityError/detail=1008 from the
responding automation object, so no alarm instance can be created to follow
through an acknowledge and no population can be built to overflow a capped
fetch. The rig is otherwise live — objects deployed and on scan, wnwrap
subscribed, GetXmlCurrentAlarms2 returning well-formed XML — which is what
makes the blocker specific and the unblock (engine-side script, or
AuthenticateUser + WriteSecured, or reclassifying the UDAs) actionable.

Comment-only changes in WnWrapAlarmConsumer: scope the GUID-identity claim to
the leg live capture actually covers, and record that ALARM_RECORDS/@COUNT
exists as a candidate exact truncation signal but is deliberately not trusted
because its semantics under a capped reply are unverified. No behavior change.
2026-08-17 04:03:39 -04:00
Joseph Doherty a212e145ac feat(security): DashboardTags on API-key constraints; sessions inherit owner tags (SEC-25 groundwork)
Adds a dashboard event-visibility tag to ApiKeyConstraints, riding in the existing
constraints JSON blob so no auth-store schema migration is needed (design
docs/plans/2026-07-10-dashboard-session-acl-tst15.md sections 3/3.1, open call
settled per its own recommendation). The tag is visibility-only: no read, write,
browse, or subscribe path consults it, and HasRead/HasWriteConstraints ignore it.

GatewaySession gains an immutable, ordinal-ignore-case Tags set stamped at
construction from the owning API key, forwarded by MxAccessGatewayService.OpenSession
from the resolved ApiKeyIdentity — never from the wire request, so a client cannot
label its own session with another tenant's tag. ISessionManager gains a tag-carrying
OpenSessionAsync overload whose default implementation forwards to the tagless one, so
an implementation that does not model tags opens an untagged (least visible) session.

apikey create-key gains --dashboard-tags team-a,team-b (repeatable, trimmed,
de-duplicated; an empty segment is rejected rather than dropped) and list-keys prints
the tags column. No enforcement yet — the EventsHub ACL that consumes the tag is a
later change.
2026-08-17 03:58:14 -04:00
80 changed files with 4454 additions and 765 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ Gateway gRPC clients authenticate with an API key in metadata: `authorization: B
Session event streaming is **owner-scoped**: the API key that opened a session is recorded on the session, and every `StreamEvents` attach/reattach is rejected with `PermissionDenied` unless the caller's key id matches the owner. Possessing the `event` scope and knowing a session id is not sufficient — this closes the reconnect/fan-out trust boundary (detach-grace and replay retention are on by default) so an `event`-scoped key cannot attach to another key's retained session.
Dashboard auth is LDAP-backed (separate from the gRPC API-key model). `/login` binds against `MxGateway:Ldap` and maps the user's LDAP groups to `Admin` or `Viewer` via `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole`, then issues an HTTP-only secure cookie named `__Host-MxGatewayDashboard` when `Dashboard:RequireHttpsCookie` is true (default) and no `Dashboard:CookieName` override is set, else the plain `MxGatewayDashboard` (the `__Host-` prefix requires a Secure cookie). SignalR hubs at `/hubs/{snapshot,alarms,events}` accept either the cookie or a 5-minute bearer minted at `/hubs/token`. `Dashboard:AllowAnonymousLocalhost` (default `true`) grants **read-only** loopback access — it satisfies the Viewer requirement but never the Admin-only requirement, so anonymous localhost can view the dashboard but not reach API-key CRUD or session Close/Kill (`Authentication:Mode=Disabled` is scoped the same way). `Dashboard:DisableLogin` (default `false`) auto-authenticates every dashboard request — including remote browsers — as `Dashboard:AutoLoginUser` (default `multi-role`) with both Admin and Viewer roles; dev/test only, never enable in production.
Dashboard auth is LDAP-backed (separate from the gRPC API-key model). `/login` binds against `MxGateway:Ldap` and maps the user's LDAP groups to `Admin` or `Viewer` via `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole`, then issues an HTTP-only secure cookie named `__Host-MxGatewayDashboard` when `Dashboard:RequireHttpsCookie` is true (default) and no `Dashboard:CookieName` override is set, else the plain `MxGatewayDashboard` (the `__Host-` prefix requires a Secure cookie). SignalR hubs at `/hubs/{snapshot,alarms,events}` accept either the cookie or a 5-minute bearer minted at `/hubs/token`. Dashboard event visibility is **tag-scoped per session** (`IDashboardSessionAcl`, gating both the events hub and the session-details page's in-process subscribe): an Administrator sees every session, while any other caller sees a session only when its tags — inherited from the owning API key's `apikey --dashboard-tags`, never from the client's request — intersect the tags their LDAP groups grant via `Dashboard:GroupToTag`; untagged sessions follow `Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility` (default `AdminOnly`), and a principal with no tag claims (anonymous localhost included) is an empty-grant Viewer. `Dashboard:AllowAnonymousLocalhost` (default `true`) grants **read-only** loopback access — it satisfies the Viewer requirement but never the Admin-only requirement, so anonymous localhost can view the dashboard but not reach API-key CRUD or session Close/Kill (`Authentication:Mode=Disabled` is scoped the same way). `Dashboard:DisableLogin` (default `false`) auto-authenticates every dashboard request — including remote browsers — as `Dashboard:AutoLoginUser` (default `multi-role`) with both Admin and Viewer roles; dev/test only, never enable in production.
## Process / Platform Notes
+2 -1
View File
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ Full design + implementation for each row lives in the linked domain doc under i
| TST-12 | Medium | P0 | S | — | Done | CLAUDE.md misstates default retention behaviour |
| TST-13 | Medium | P2 | S | — | Done | gateway.md carries stale design-era sketches |
| TST-14 | Medium | P2 | S | — | Not started | Repo-root working artifacts need triage |
| TST-15 | Medium | P2 | M | TST-04 | Not started | Dashboard EventsHub has no per-session ACL |
| TST-15 | Medium | P2 | M | TST-04 | Done | Dashboard EventsHub has no per-session ACL |
| TST-16 | Medium | — | S | — | Not started | `Dashboard:ShowTagValues` is a dead flag |
| TST-17 | Medium | — | S | — | Not started | Vendor-gated alarm parity residuals silently lossy |
| TST-18 | Low | — | S | — | Not started | Hosted-service wrappers untested |
@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ Findings the review flagged as one coordinated design pass — sequence them tog
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
| 2026-08-17 | **TST-15 → `Done` (discharges the ACL half of SEC-25): per-session dashboard event ACL shipped** (branch `feat/deferred-closeout`, commits `693a78d` + `7ec0b35`). Implements `docs/plans/2026-07-10-dashboard-session-acl-tst15.md`, whose header is now `Implemented` with as-built notes in its §12. `IDashboardSessionAcl.CanViewSession` is the single decision **both** subscribe seams consult — `EventsHub.SubscribeSession` (denial is a `HubException`; the caller is neither joined to the group nor registered in `EventsHubViewerRegistry`, so the mirror stays off) and `SessionDetailsPage`'s in-process subscribe (inline denial, no subscription) — so neither path is the weaker one and the `TODO(per-session-acl)` is gone. Decision order, fail-closed on every branch: authenticated Administrator → allow (evaluated **before** the registry lookup, so Admin × unknown-session allows — pinned by a test because reordering the two checks is a plausible refactor); session not found → deny; untagged session → `Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility` (`AdminOnly` default); else allow iff `session.Tags ∩ zb:dashboardtag` claims, ordinal-ignore-case. Session tags are inherited from the owning API key's `dashboard_tags` constraint (`apikey --dashboard-tags`, already in the `ApiKeyConstraints` JSON blob — no SQLite migration) and never from the client's wire request. Viewer grants come from `Dashboard:GroupToTag` over the user's LDAP groups, stamped at cookie login (`DashboardAuthenticator.CreatePrincipal`) and **re-resolved, not copied**, at hub-token mint (`HubTokenService.Issue`), so the 5-minute token lifetime bounds a stale grant. Anonymous localhost is an empty-grant Viewer; `Dashboard:DisableLogin` auto-login carries both roles and so takes the admin bypass unchanged. Tests: `DashboardSessionAclTests` (decision table, every branch asserted in its denying direction too), `EventsHubTests`, `DashboardAuthenticatorTests`, `HubTokenServiceTests`, a `GatewayOptionsTests` case proving `Dashboard:GroupToTag` keeps its ordinal-ignore-case lookup through configuration binding, and two `[LiveLdapFact]`s in `DashboardLdapLiveTests` that drive a real bind against the shared GLAuth (`gw-viewer` → `team-a` grant admits the `team-a` session and refuses the `team-b` one; `multi-role` bypasses on the sessions its own grant does not cover). The live pair needed **no GLAuth change** — the tag layer is config-side, keyed on the existing `GwAdmin`/`GwReader` groups (recorded in `glauth.md`). Docs: `docs/Sessions.md` (session-tag model), `gateway.md` + CLAUDE.md dashboard-auth paragraphs, `docs/GatewayDashboardDesign.md` (three passages that described the ACL as outstanding), `docs/GatewayConfiguration.md` (`ShowTagValues` row: redaction is now the second of two layers, not the only one), `docs/Authentication.md` (`--dashboard-tags` is the only *constraint* flag that splits on commas). |
| 2026-08-10 | **TST-25 acceptance Check 6 (forced-failure nightly issue) → Done.** The 2026-07-13 record wrote this check off as "abandoned to shared-runner congestion"; that was wrong on both counts. The 2026-07-13 probe *did* land (issue #125, `[CHECK6 PROBE]`, run 375), and since 2026-07-17 the `nightly-windev` `if: failure()` step has filed an issue on **every** red nightly — #126–#139, all authored by the `gitea-actions` bot. Traced run 672 (schedule, main, red) line by line: main step fails → `exitcode '1': failure` → the `if: failure()` step runs → `POST /api/v1/repos/dohertj2/mxaccessgw/issues` with the built-in token masked to `***` → issue #139 created at the matching timestamp. Re-confirmed by a fresh forced-failure probe on the throwaway branch `test/tst25-check6-nightly-issue` (temporary `tst25-check6-probe.yml` reproducing the job shape with `exit 1` for the live step; run 677 → issue #140). Branch deleted, issues #125 and #140 closed with explanatory comments. **One real defect found and fixed** (`fix/tst25-nightly-issue-path`, not merged): `${{ github.server_url }}` is the runner-internal `http://gitea:3000`, so every filed issue's run link was unreachable from a browser. The API call must keep using it (the job container resolves `gitea` only on the docker network and has no LAN egress to the public origin), so the fix adds a `PUBLIC_SERVER_URL: https://gitea.dohertylan.com` job env used **only** for the browser-facing link in the issue body; the probe validated the fixed template (#140 carries a `https://gitea.dohertylan.com/...` link that returns 200). **Separately observed, not fixed:** the nightly has been red continuously since at least 2026-07-17 (run 672: `x86 Worker.Tests failed with exit code 1`, 1 failed / 398 passed / 11 skipped — the known `EventBurst_DrainLoopCoalescesFlushes` class of flake), and the step de-duplicates nothing, so 14 issues are open, seven of them (#132–#138) for the identical SHA `47c0b64`. Worth a follow-up: fix the red nightly, and consider having the step reuse an open issue with the same title instead of filing a new one. |
| 2026-08-10 | **TST-24 → `Done`: per-client wire tests land for the two clients that lacked them** (branch `feat/tst-24-client-wire-tests`). Audit first corrected the finding's premise: **Go, Rust, and Java already had real-server wire tests** — `newBufconnClient`/`fakeGatewayServer` over `grpc/test/bufconn`, `spawn_fake_gateway` over a loopback `TcpListener` with tonic's `Server`, and `InProcessGateway`/`TestGatewayService` over `InProcessServerBuilder` — each already asserting the round trip, the server-observed `authorization` bearer header, and the `ReplayGap` sentinel. The real gaps were **.NET** (every test substituted `FakeGatewayTransport` for `IMxGatewayClientTransport`, and the test project had no server package) and **Python** (stub monkeypatching everywhere except one opt-in TLS test serving only `OpenSession`). Added `WireFakeGatewayServer` + `MxGatewayClientWireTests` (Kestrel h2c on `127.0.0.1:0` serving `MxAccessGatewayBase`; new `Grpc.AspNetCore.Server` 2.76.0 + `Microsoft.AspNetCore.App` refs on the test project) and `clients/python/tests/test_wire_fake_gateway.py` (`grpc.aio` server on `127.0.0.1:0`, no new deps). Four shapes each: full round trip with every reply field asserted, the bearer header **as received by the server** on the streaming RPC too, the `ReplayGap` sentinel surfaced as the client's typed signal, and a genuine `PERMISSION_DENIED` mapping to the typed authorization error. CI: the `portable` job only *built* the .NET client, so a `dotnet test` step was added. **The new tests immediately caught a shipped bug** — Python `GatewayClient.connect()`/`GalaxyRepositoryClient.connect()` constructed the `grpc.aio` channel inside `asyncio.to_thread`, which raises `RuntimeError: There is no current event loop in thread 'asyncio_0'` because a `grpc.aio` channel binds to the loop current on the constructing thread; every non-stub connection failed, and the one test guarding the off-loop behaviour (Client.Python-028) monkeypatched `create_channel` and so asserted the bug. Fixed by splitting `resolve_channel_security` (blocking TOFU probe, off-loop) from `create_channel` (on-loop), with the `-028` tests retargeted to assert both halves. Verified: .NET 133 passed/1 skipped (pre-existing live-gateway skip), Python 168 passed/1 skipped plus 6/6 opt-in TLS. Docs: `docs/GatewayTesting.md` § Client Wire Tests, `clients/dotnet/README.md`, `clients/python/README.md`. |
| 2026-08-10 | **TST-05 revisited under the restored Windows tier → `Partially done`** (branch `feat/tst-24-client-wire-tests`, doc/tracker-only). The finding's **scheduling** half is closed: cycle-2 TST-25's `nightly-windev` job (cron `0 6 * * *`) runs `scripts/ci/run-windev-ci.sh live` → `windev-worker-ci.ps1 -Mode live`, which sets `MXGATEWAY_RUN_LIVE_MXACCESS_TESTS=1`, runs `WorkerLiveMxAccessSmokeTests` on windev after the x86 build/Worker.Tests/full-slnx steps, and files a Gitea issue when red. The **coverage-audit** half is *not* closed, and the audit the design asked for now has a negative answer: the suite's eight `[LiveMxAccessFact]`s cover all six late-added COM commands (`Suspend`, `Activate`, `AuthenticateUser`, `ArchestrAUserToId`, `AddBufferedItem`, `SetBufferedUpdateInterval`) but zero of the five control commands — `MxCommandKind.{Ping,GetSessionState,GetWorkerInfo,DrainEvents,ShutdownWorker}` appear nowhere in `WorkerLiveMxAccessSmokeTests.cs`, so the exact paths the Finding calls masked are still only proven against `FakeWorkerHarness` canned replies while the real implementations live in `Worker/Ipc/WorkerPipeSession.cs`. Residual work (two `[LiveMxAccessFact]`s, windev-only to author and verify) is specified in [60-testing-docs-gaps.md](60-testing-docs-gaps.md#tst-05--real-worker-controlcom-paths-verified-opt-in-only---medium--p1). |
@@ -457,6 +457,8 @@ This document turns every finding in the Security/Dashboard/Observability review
- Tests: broadcaster test asserting values redacted when `ShowTagValues=false`.
- Docs: `docs/GatewayDashboardDesign.md` — clarify the current v1 posture.
**Update 2026-08-17 — the deferred half landed.** The scoping mechanism this finding waited on shipped as TST-15 (`693a78d` + `7ec0b35`): `IDashboardSessionAcl` gates `SubscribeSession` *and* the session-details page's in-process subscribe, so the `TODO(per-session-acl)` is gone and the redaction is no longer the only thing between a low-trust Viewer and another session's events. See the TST-15 section in [60-testing-docs-gaps.md](60-testing-docs-gaps.md#tst-15--dashboard-eventshub-has-no-per-session-acl) and the 2026-08-17 change-log row in [00-tracking.md](00-tracking.md#change-log). Redaction stays — the two layers are independent: the ACL decides who may subscribe, `ShowTagValues` decides what a permitted subscriber sees.
**Verification.** `dotnet build src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server` and the events-hub/broadcaster test filter.
---
@@ -335,11 +335,11 @@ If TST-02's interim mitigation (flip retention off) is chosen instead of impleme
**Impact.** Acceptable for a single-tenant dashboard; wrong the moment `GroupToRole` admits low-trust viewers. It is the dashboard-side twin of the gRPC owner-revalidation gap (TST-02).
**Design.** Fully fleshed out in `docs/plans/2026-07-10-dashboard-session-acl-tst15.md` (epic Phase 4, Tasks 16–19, TST-04). In brief: the dashboard authenticates LDAP users (Admin/Viewer) while sessions are API-key-owned (`OwnerKeyId`) — two disjoint identity domains — so the ACL needs a bridge: a **session tag** sourced from the owning API key (riding in the existing `ApiKeyConstraints` JSON blob, no SQLite migration). Admin sees all; a Viewer may `SubscribeSession` iff `session.Tags ∩ viewer.GrantedTags ≠ ∅` (granted via a new `Dashboard:GroupToTag` map, carried into the hub token as tag claims); untagged sessions are Admin-only by default. The Viewer-default decision (admin-sees-all vs strict) is settled there. Until Phase 4 lands, keep the TODO (it correctly documents the accepted single-tenant assumption); do not silently remove it.
**Design.** Fully fleshed out in `docs/plans/2026-07-10-dashboard-session-acl-tst15.md` (epic Phase 4, Tasks 16–19, TST-04). In brief: the dashboard authenticates LDAP users (Admin/Viewer) while sessions are API-key-owned (`OwnerKeyId`) — two disjoint identity domains — so the ACL needs a bridge: a **session tag** sourced from the owning API key (riding in the existing `ApiKeyConstraints` JSON blob, no SQLite migration). Admin sees all; a Viewer may `SubscribeSession` iff `session.Tags ∩ viewer.GrantedTags ≠ ∅` (granted via a new `Dashboard:GroupToTag` map, carried into the hub token as tag claims); untagged sessions are Admin-only by default. The Viewer-default decision (admin-sees-all vs strict) is settled there.
**Implementation.** `Dashboard/Hubs/EventsHub.cs` (ACL check on group join), hub-token minting to carry the session tag, `Configuration/DashboardOptions.cs` for any group-to-tag config (Task 17). Tests: `...Tests/Gateway/Dashboard/` hub ACL cases incl. live-LDAP users (Task 19). Docs: `docs/Sessions.md`/`gateway.md` dashboard section document the ACL model; CLAUDE.md dashboard-auth paragraph.
**Implementation.** Shipped 2026-08-17 on `feat/deferred-closeout` (`693a78d` + `7ec0b35`); the `TODO(per-session-acl)` is gone. `Dashboard/IDashboardSessionAcl.cs` + `Dashboard/DashboardSessionAcl.cs` hold the single decision, consulted by `Dashboard/Hubs/EventsHub.cs` (`SubscribeSession` → `HubException` on denial, no group join and no viewer registration) and by `Dashboard/Components/Pages/SessionDetailsPage.razor`'s in-process subscribe — the design's one correction, since the page path was not a hub client and would otherwise have been the unguarded seam. Tags ride from the owning key via `ISessionManager.OpenSessionAsync`'s tagged overload into the immutable `GatewaySession.Tags`; grants are stamped by `DashboardAuthenticator.CreatePrincipal` and re-resolved at `HubTokenService.Issue`. Config: `Dashboard:GroupToTag` and `Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility` on `Configuration/DashboardOptions.cs`. Tests: `Tests/Gateway/Dashboard/DashboardSessionAclTests.cs`, `EventsHubTests.cs`, a `Configuration/GatewayOptionsTests.cs` binding case for the `GroupToTag` comparer, and two `[LiveLdapFact]`s in `IntegrationTests/DashboardLdapLiveTests.cs`. Docs: `docs/Sessions.md`, `gateway.md`, CLAUDE.md, `docs/GatewayDashboardDesign.md`, `docs/GatewayConfiguration.md`, `glauth.md`.
**Verification.** `dotnet test ... --filter FullyQualifiedName~EventsHub`; `dotnet build src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server`.
**Verification.** `dotnet build src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.NonWindows.slnx`; `dotnet test ... --filter FullyQualifiedName~DashboardSessionAclTests`, `~EventsHubTests`, `~GatewayOptionsTests`; live-LDAP pair run green against the shared GLAuth with `MXGATEWAY_RUN_LIVE_LDAP_TESTS=1` (and skipping cleanly without it).
---
+7
View File
@@ -149,6 +149,13 @@ token and pass through the `MxGateway:Alarms` configuration on the
server — when alarms are disabled, the gateway returns an empty list / empty
stream rather than failing.
`ActiveAlarmSnapshot.FromTruncatedSnapshot` marks a record that came from a
provider fetch which hit the per-fetch cap: the snapshot set may omit active
alarms, and the gateway suspended its absence-implies-cleared inference for that
poll. Treat the set as possibly incomplete rather than reconciling deletions
from it. It is set-level degraded status, not a comment on the record's own
fidelity, and is distinct from `Degraded` (the subtag fallback provider).
`MxGatewaySession.CloseAsync` is explicit and idempotent. Repeated calls return
the first `CloseSessionReply` instead of sending another close request.
+8
View File
@@ -145,6 +145,14 @@ call returns a `StreamAlarmsClient`; cancel its context to terminate the
stream. All three pass straight through to the gateway's central alarm
monitor.
`ActiveAlarmSnapshot.GetFromTruncatedSnapshot()` reports that the record came
from a provider fetch which hit the per-fetch cap: the snapshot set may omit
active alarms, and the gateway suspended its absence-implies-cleared inference
for that poll. Treat the set as possibly incomplete rather than reconciling
deletions from it. It is set-level degraded status, not a comment on the
record's own fidelity, and is distinct from `Degraded` (the subtag fallback
provider).
## Write Semantics And Common Pitfalls
These are MXAccess parity behaviors that surprise new callers. The gateway
@@ -6103,10 +6103,17 @@ func (x *AcknowledgeAlarmReplyPayload) GetNativeStatus() int32 {
// an ActiveAlarmSnapshot proto for the gateway-side ConditionRefresh
// stream.
type QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload struct {
state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
Snapshots []*ActiveAlarmSnapshot `protobuf:"bytes,1,rep,name=snapshots,proto3" json:"snapshots,omitempty"`
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
Snapshots []*ActiveAlarmSnapshot `protobuf:"bytes,1,rep,name=snapshots,proto3" json:"snapshots,omitempty"`
// True when the provider fetch backing this reply came back holding the
// per-fetch cap (MxGateway:Alarms:MaxAlarmsPerFetch). The reply may then omit
// active alarms, and the worker suspends its absence-implies-Clear inference
// for that poll — so a reference missing from `snapshots` is not evidence the
// alarm cleared. Carried on the payload as well as per-record because a
// truncated fetch that filters down to zero records still has to say so.
SnapshotTruncated bool `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=snapshot_truncated,json=snapshotTruncated,proto3" json:"snapshot_truncated,omitempty"`
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
}
func (x *QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload) Reset() {
@@ -6146,6 +6153,13 @@ func (x *QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload) GetSnapshots() []*ActiveAlarmSnapshot {
return nil
}
func (x *QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload) GetSnapshotTruncated() bool {
if x != nil {
return x.SnapshotTruncated
}
return false
}
type MxEvent struct {
state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
Family MxEventFamily `protobuf:"varint,1,opt,name=family,proto3,enum=mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxEventFamily" json:"family,omitempty"`
@@ -6958,8 +6972,18 @@ type ActiveAlarmSnapshot struct {
// OnAlarmTransitionEvent.source_provider; always ALARMMGR or SUBTAG on the
// wire (never UNSPECIFIED).
SourceProvider AlarmProviderMode `protobuf:"varint,15,opt,name=source_provider,json=sourceProvider,proto3,enum=mxaccess_gateway.v1.AlarmProviderMode" json:"source_provider,omitempty"`
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
// True when the provider fetch that produced this snapshot hit the per-fetch
// cap: the snapshot set may omit active alarms, and the worker suspended its
// absence-implies-Clear inference for that poll. Says nothing about THIS
// record's fidelity — the record is as accurate as any other; it flags that
// the set it belongs to is possibly incomplete. QueryActiveAlarms returns a
// bare `stream ActiveAlarmSnapshot` with no envelope message, so a per-record
// boolean is the only additive way to carry set-level degraded status on that
// RPC. Distinct from `degraded`, which is about the subtag fallback provider.
// Additive (proto3): clients that ignore it deserialize the stream unchanged.
FromTruncatedSnapshot bool `protobuf:"varint,16,opt,name=from_truncated_snapshot,json=fromTruncatedSnapshot,proto3" json:"from_truncated_snapshot,omitempty"`
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
}
func (x *ActiveAlarmSnapshot) Reset() {
@@ -7097,6 +7121,13 @@ func (x *ActiveAlarmSnapshot) GetSourceProvider() AlarmProviderMode {
return AlarmProviderMode_ALARM_PROVIDER_MODE_UNSPECIFIED
}
func (x *ActiveAlarmSnapshot) GetFromTruncatedSnapshot() bool {
if x != nil {
return x.FromTruncatedSnapshot
}
return false
}
type AcknowledgeAlarmRequest struct {
state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
ClientCorrelationId string `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=client_correlation_id,json=clientCorrelationId,proto3" json:"client_correlation_id,omitempty"`
@@ -8979,9 +9010,10 @@ const file_mxaccess_gateway_proto_rawDesc = "" +
"\x10DrainEventsReply\x124\n" +
"\x06events\x18\x01 \x03(\v2\x1c.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxEventR\x06events\"C\n" +
"\x1cAcknowledgeAlarmReplyPayload\x12#\n" +
"\rnative_status\x18\x01 \x01(\x05R\fnativeStatus\"g\n" +
"\rnative_status\x18\x01 \x01(\x05R\fnativeStatus\"\x96\x01\n" +
"\x1dQueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload\x12F\n" +
"\tsnapshots\x18\x01 \x03(\v2(.mxaccess_gateway.v1.ActiveAlarmSnapshotR\tsnapshots\"\xb7\n" +
"\tsnapshots\x18\x01 \x03(\v2(.mxaccess_gateway.v1.ActiveAlarmSnapshotR\tsnapshots\x12-\n" +
"\x12snapshot_truncated\x18\x02 \x01(\bR\x11snapshotTruncated\"\xb7\n" +
"\n" +
"\aMxEvent\x12:\n" +
"\x06family\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2\".mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxEventFamilyR\x06family\x12\x1d\n" +
@@ -9046,7 +9078,7 @@ const file_mxaccess_gateway_proto_rawDesc = "" +
"\x04mode\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2&.mxaccess_gateway.v1.AlarmProviderModeR\x04mode\x12\x16\n" +
"\x06reason\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06reason\x12\x18\n" +
"\ahresult\x18\x03 \x01(\x05R\ahresult\x12*\n" +
"\x02at\x18\x04 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\x02at\"\xbd\x06\n" +
"\x02at\x18\x04 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\x02at\"\xf5\x06\n" +
"\x13ActiveAlarmSnapshot\x120\n" +
"\x14alarm_full_reference\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x12alarmFullReference\x126\n" +
"\x17source_object_reference\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x15sourceObjectReference\x12&\n" +
@@ -9064,7 +9096,8 @@ const file_mxaccess_gateway_proto_rawDesc = "" +
"\vlimit_value\x18\r \x01(\v2\x1c.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxValueR\n" +
"limitValue\x12\x1a\n" +
"\bdegraded\x18\x0e \x01(\bR\bdegraded\x12O\n" +
"\x0fsource_provider\x18\x0f \x01(\x0e2&.mxaccess_gateway.v1.AlarmProviderModeR\x0esourceProvider\"\xd0\x01\n" +
"\x0fsource_provider\x18\x0f \x01(\x0e2&.mxaccess_gateway.v1.AlarmProviderModeR\x0esourceProvider\x126\n" +
"\x17from_truncated_snapshot\x18\x10 \x01(\bR\x15fromTruncatedSnapshot\"\xd0\x01\n" +
"\x17AcknowledgeAlarmRequest\x122\n" +
"\x15client_correlation_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x13clientCorrelationId\x120\n" +
"\x14alarm_full_reference\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\x12alarmFullReference\x12\x18\n" +
+8
View File
@@ -117,6 +117,14 @@ yields alarm-feed messages from the gateway's central monitor), and
`acknowledgeAlarm` (ack by full alarm reference with an optional comment and
ack target). Close the subscription to cancel the underlying gRPC stream.
`ActiveAlarmSnapshot.getFromTruncatedSnapshot()` reports that the record came
from a provider fetch which hit the per-fetch cap: the snapshot set may omit
active alarms, and the gateway suspended its absence-implies-cleared inference
for that poll. Treat the set as possibly incomplete rather than reconciling
deletions from it. It is set-level degraded status, not a comment on the
record's own fidelity, and is distinct from `getDegraded()` (the subtag
fallback provider).
## Write Semantics And Common Pitfalls
These are MXAccess parity behaviors that surprise new callers. The gateway
@@ -71020,6 +71020,21 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
*/
mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxaccessGateway.ActiveAlarmSnapshotOrBuilder getSnapshotsOrBuilder(
int index);
/**
* <pre>
* True when the provider fetch backing this reply came back holding the
* per-fetch cap (MxGateway:Alarms:MaxAlarmsPerFetch). The reply may then omit
* active alarms, and the worker suspends its absence-implies-Clear inference
* for that poll — so a reference missing from `snapshots` is not evidence the
* alarm cleared. Carried on the payload as well as per-record because a
* truncated fetch that filters down to zero records still has to say so.
* </pre>
*
* <code>bool snapshot_truncated = 2;</code>
* @return The snapshotTruncated.
*/
boolean getSnapshotTruncated();
}
/**
* <pre>
@@ -71107,6 +71122,26 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
return snapshots_.get(index);
}
public static final int SNAPSHOT_TRUNCATED_FIELD_NUMBER = 2;
private boolean snapshotTruncated_ = false;
/**
* <pre>
* True when the provider fetch backing this reply came back holding the
* per-fetch cap (MxGateway:Alarms:MaxAlarmsPerFetch). The reply may then omit
* active alarms, and the worker suspends its absence-implies-Clear inference
* for that poll — so a reference missing from `snapshots` is not evidence the
* alarm cleared. Carried on the payload as well as per-record because a
* truncated fetch that filters down to zero records still has to say so.
* </pre>
*
* <code>bool snapshot_truncated = 2;</code>
* @return The snapshotTruncated.
*/
@java.lang.Override
public boolean getSnapshotTruncated() {
return snapshotTruncated_;
}
private byte memoizedIsInitialized = -1;
@java.lang.Override
public final boolean isInitialized() {
@@ -71124,6 +71159,9 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
for (int i = 0; i < snapshots_.size(); i++) {
output.writeMessage(1, snapshots_.get(i));
}
if (snapshotTruncated_ != false) {
output.writeBool(2, snapshotTruncated_);
}
getUnknownFields().writeTo(output);
}
@@ -71137,6 +71175,10 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
size += com.google.protobuf.CodedOutputStream
.computeMessageSize(1, snapshots_.get(i));
}
if (snapshotTruncated_ != false) {
size += com.google.protobuf.CodedOutputStream
.computeBoolSize(2, snapshotTruncated_);
}
size += getUnknownFields().getSerializedSize();
memoizedSize = size;
return size;
@@ -71154,6 +71196,8 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
if (!getSnapshotsList()
.equals(other.getSnapshotsList())) return false;
if (getSnapshotTruncated()
!= other.getSnapshotTruncated()) return false;
if (!getUnknownFields().equals(other.getUnknownFields())) return false;
return true;
}
@@ -71169,6 +71213,9 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
hash = (37 * hash) + SNAPSHOTS_FIELD_NUMBER;
hash = (53 * hash) + getSnapshotsList().hashCode();
}
hash = (37 * hash) + SNAPSHOT_TRUNCATED_FIELD_NUMBER;
hash = (53 * hash) + com.google.protobuf.Internal.hashBoolean(
getSnapshotTruncated());
hash = (29 * hash) + getUnknownFields().hashCode();
memoizedHashCode = hash;
return hash;
@@ -71314,6 +71361,7 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
snapshotsBuilder_.clear();
}
bitField0_ = (bitField0_ & ~0x00000001);
snapshotTruncated_ = false;
return this;
}
@@ -71360,6 +71408,9 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
private void buildPartial0(mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxaccessGateway.QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload result) {
int from_bitField0_ = bitField0_;
if (((from_bitField0_ & 0x00000002) != 0)) {
result.snapshotTruncated_ = snapshotTruncated_;
}
}
@java.lang.Override
@@ -71400,6 +71451,9 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
}
}
}
if (other.getSnapshotTruncated() != false) {
setSnapshotTruncated(other.getSnapshotTruncated());
}
this.mergeUnknownFields(other.getUnknownFields());
onChanged();
return this;
@@ -71439,6 +71493,11 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
}
break;
} // case 10
case 16: {
snapshotTruncated_ = input.readBool();
bitField0_ |= 0x00000002;
break;
} // case 16
default: {
if (!super.parseUnknownField(input, extensionRegistry, tag)) {
done = true; // was an endgroup tag
@@ -71696,6 +71755,65 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
return snapshotsBuilder_;
}
private boolean snapshotTruncated_ ;
/**
* <pre>
* True when the provider fetch backing this reply came back holding the
* per-fetch cap (MxGateway:Alarms:MaxAlarmsPerFetch). The reply may then omit
* active alarms, and the worker suspends its absence-implies-Clear inference
* for that poll — so a reference missing from `snapshots` is not evidence the
* alarm cleared. Carried on the payload as well as per-record because a
* truncated fetch that filters down to zero records still has to say so.
* </pre>
*
* <code>bool snapshot_truncated = 2;</code>
* @return The snapshotTruncated.
*/
@java.lang.Override
public boolean getSnapshotTruncated() {
return snapshotTruncated_;
}
/**
* <pre>
* True when the provider fetch backing this reply came back holding the
* per-fetch cap (MxGateway:Alarms:MaxAlarmsPerFetch). The reply may then omit
* active alarms, and the worker suspends its absence-implies-Clear inference
* for that poll — so a reference missing from `snapshots` is not evidence the
* alarm cleared. Carried on the payload as well as per-record because a
* truncated fetch that filters down to zero records still has to say so.
* </pre>
*
* <code>bool snapshot_truncated = 2;</code>
* @param value The snapshotTruncated to set.
* @return This builder for chaining.
*/
public Builder setSnapshotTruncated(boolean value) {
snapshotTruncated_ = value;
bitField0_ |= 0x00000002;
onChanged();
return this;
}
/**
* <pre>
* True when the provider fetch backing this reply came back holding the
* per-fetch cap (MxGateway:Alarms:MaxAlarmsPerFetch). The reply may then omit
* active alarms, and the worker suspends its absence-implies-Clear inference
* for that poll — so a reference missing from `snapshots` is not evidence the
* alarm cleared. Carried on the payload as well as per-record because a
* truncated fetch that filters down to zero records still has to say so.
* </pre>
*
* <code>bool snapshot_truncated = 2;</code>
* @return This builder for chaining.
*/
public Builder clearSnapshotTruncated() {
bitField0_ = (bitField0_ & ~0x00000002);
snapshotTruncated_ = false;
onChanged();
return this;
}
// @@protoc_insertion_point(builder_scope:mxaccess_gateway.v1.QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload)
}
@@ -83081,6 +83199,24 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
* @return The sourceProvider.
*/
mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxaccessGateway.AlarmProviderMode getSourceProvider();
/**
* <pre>
* True when the provider fetch that produced this snapshot hit the per-fetch
* cap: the snapshot set may omit active alarms, and the worker suspended its
* absence-implies-Clear inference for that poll. Says nothing about THIS
* record's fidelity — the record is as accurate as any other; it flags that
* the set it belongs to is possibly incomplete. QueryActiveAlarms returns a
* bare `stream ActiveAlarmSnapshot` with no envelope message, so a per-record
* boolean is the only additive way to carry set-level degraded status on that
* RPC. Distinct from `degraded`, which is about the subtag fallback provider.
* Additive (proto3): clients that ignore it deserialize the stream unchanged.
* </pre>
*
* <code>bool from_truncated_snapshot = 16;</code>
* @return The fromTruncatedSnapshot.
*/
boolean getFromTruncatedSnapshot();
}
/**
* <pre>
@@ -83623,6 +83759,29 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
return result == null ? mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxaccessGateway.AlarmProviderMode.UNRECOGNIZED : result;
}
public static final int FROM_TRUNCATED_SNAPSHOT_FIELD_NUMBER = 16;
private boolean fromTruncatedSnapshot_ = false;
/**
* <pre>
* True when the provider fetch that produced this snapshot hit the per-fetch
* cap: the snapshot set may omit active alarms, and the worker suspended its
* absence-implies-Clear inference for that poll. Says nothing about THIS
* record's fidelity — the record is as accurate as any other; it flags that
* the set it belongs to is possibly incomplete. QueryActiveAlarms returns a
* bare `stream ActiveAlarmSnapshot` with no envelope message, so a per-record
* boolean is the only additive way to carry set-level degraded status on that
* RPC. Distinct from `degraded`, which is about the subtag fallback provider.
* Additive (proto3): clients that ignore it deserialize the stream unchanged.
* </pre>
*
* <code>bool from_truncated_snapshot = 16;</code>
* @return The fromTruncatedSnapshot.
*/
@java.lang.Override
public boolean getFromTruncatedSnapshot() {
return fromTruncatedSnapshot_;
}
private byte memoizedIsInitialized = -1;
@java.lang.Override
public final boolean isInitialized() {
@@ -83682,6 +83841,9 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
if (sourceProvider_ != mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxaccessGateway.AlarmProviderMode.ALARM_PROVIDER_MODE_UNSPECIFIED.getNumber()) {
output.writeEnum(15, sourceProvider_);
}
if (fromTruncatedSnapshot_ != false) {
output.writeBool(16, fromTruncatedSnapshot_);
}
getUnknownFields().writeTo(output);
}
@@ -83744,6 +83906,10 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
size += com.google.protobuf.CodedOutputStream
.computeEnumSize(15, sourceProvider_);
}
if (fromTruncatedSnapshot_ != false) {
size += com.google.protobuf.CodedOutputStream
.computeBoolSize(16, fromTruncatedSnapshot_);
}
size += getUnknownFields().getSerializedSize();
memoizedSize = size;
return size;
@@ -83799,6 +83965,8 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
if (getDegraded()
!= other.getDegraded()) return false;
if (sourceProvider_ != other.sourceProvider_) return false;
if (getFromTruncatedSnapshot()
!= other.getFromTruncatedSnapshot()) return false;
if (!getUnknownFields().equals(other.getUnknownFields())) return false;
return true;
}
@@ -83849,6 +84017,9 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
getDegraded());
hash = (37 * hash) + SOURCE_PROVIDER_FIELD_NUMBER;
hash = (53 * hash) + sourceProvider_;
hash = (37 * hash) + FROM_TRUNCATED_SNAPSHOT_FIELD_NUMBER;
hash = (53 * hash) + com.google.protobuf.Internal.hashBoolean(
getFromTruncatedSnapshot());
hash = (29 * hash) + getUnknownFields().hashCode();
memoizedHashCode = hash;
return hash;
@@ -84025,6 +84196,7 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
}
degraded_ = false;
sourceProvider_ = 0;
fromTruncatedSnapshot_ = false;
return this;
}
@@ -84116,6 +84288,9 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
if (((from_bitField0_ & 0x00004000) != 0)) {
result.sourceProvider_ = sourceProvider_;
}
if (((from_bitField0_ & 0x00008000) != 0)) {
result.fromTruncatedSnapshot_ = fromTruncatedSnapshot_;
}
result.bitField0_ |= to_bitField0_;
}
@@ -84190,6 +84365,9 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
if (other.sourceProvider_ != 0) {
setSourceProviderValue(other.getSourceProviderValue());
}
if (other.getFromTruncatedSnapshot() != false) {
setFromTruncatedSnapshot(other.getFromTruncatedSnapshot());
}
this.mergeUnknownFields(other.getUnknownFields());
onChanged();
return this;
@@ -84299,6 +84477,11 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
bitField0_ |= 0x00004000;
break;
} // case 120
case 128: {
fromTruncatedSnapshot_ = input.readBool();
bitField0_ |= 0x00008000;
break;
} // case 128
default: {
if (!super.parseUnknownField(input, extensionRegistry, tag)) {
done = true; // was an endgroup tag
@@ -85616,6 +85799,74 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
return this;
}
private boolean fromTruncatedSnapshot_ ;
/**
* <pre>
* True when the provider fetch that produced this snapshot hit the per-fetch
* cap: the snapshot set may omit active alarms, and the worker suspended its
* absence-implies-Clear inference for that poll. Says nothing about THIS
* record's fidelity — the record is as accurate as any other; it flags that
* the set it belongs to is possibly incomplete. QueryActiveAlarms returns a
* bare `stream ActiveAlarmSnapshot` with no envelope message, so a per-record
* boolean is the only additive way to carry set-level degraded status on that
* RPC. Distinct from `degraded`, which is about the subtag fallback provider.
* Additive (proto3): clients that ignore it deserialize the stream unchanged.
* </pre>
*
* <code>bool from_truncated_snapshot = 16;</code>
* @return The fromTruncatedSnapshot.
*/
@java.lang.Override
public boolean getFromTruncatedSnapshot() {
return fromTruncatedSnapshot_;
}
/**
* <pre>
* True when the provider fetch that produced this snapshot hit the per-fetch
* cap: the snapshot set may omit active alarms, and the worker suspended its
* absence-implies-Clear inference for that poll. Says nothing about THIS
* record's fidelity — the record is as accurate as any other; it flags that
* the set it belongs to is possibly incomplete. QueryActiveAlarms returns a
* bare `stream ActiveAlarmSnapshot` with no envelope message, so a per-record
* boolean is the only additive way to carry set-level degraded status on that
* RPC. Distinct from `degraded`, which is about the subtag fallback provider.
* Additive (proto3): clients that ignore it deserialize the stream unchanged.
* </pre>
*
* <code>bool from_truncated_snapshot = 16;</code>
* @param value The fromTruncatedSnapshot to set.
* @return This builder for chaining.
*/
public Builder setFromTruncatedSnapshot(boolean value) {
fromTruncatedSnapshot_ = value;
bitField0_ |= 0x00008000;
onChanged();
return this;
}
/**
* <pre>
* True when the provider fetch that produced this snapshot hit the per-fetch
* cap: the snapshot set may omit active alarms, and the worker suspended its
* absence-implies-Clear inference for that poll. Says nothing about THIS
* record's fidelity — the record is as accurate as any other; it flags that
* the set it belongs to is possibly incomplete. QueryActiveAlarms returns a
* bare `stream ActiveAlarmSnapshot` with no envelope message, so a per-record
* boolean is the only additive way to carry set-level degraded status on that
* RPC. Distinct from `degraded`, which is about the subtag fallback provider.
* Additive (proto3): clients that ignore it deserialize the stream unchanged.
* </pre>
*
* <code>bool from_truncated_snapshot = 16;</code>
* @return This builder for chaining.
*/
public Builder clearFromTruncatedSnapshot() {
bitField0_ = (bitField0_ & ~0x00008000);
fromTruncatedSnapshot_ = false;
onChanged();
return this;
}
// @@protoc_insertion_point(builder_scope:mxaccess_gateway.v1.ActiveAlarmSnapshot)
}
@@ -105307,278 +105558,279 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
"\n\016mxaccess_clsid\030\004 \001(\t\"@\n\020DrainEventsRep" +
"ly\022,\n\006events\030\001 \003(\0132\034.mxaccess_gateway.v1" +
".MxEvent\"5\n\034AcknowledgeAlarmReplyPayload" +
"\022\025\n\rnative_status\030\001 \001(\005\"\\\n\035QueryActiveAl" +
"\022\025\n\rnative_status\030\001 \001(\005\"x\n\035QueryActiveAl" +
"armsReplyPayload\022;\n\tsnapshots\030\001 \003(\0132(.mx" +
"access_gateway.v1.ActiveAlarmSnapshot\"\217\010" +
"\n\007MxEvent\0222\n\006family\030\001 \001(\0162\".mxaccess_gat" +
"eway.v1.MxEventFamily\022\022\n\nsession_id\030\002 \001(" +
"\t\022\025\n\rserver_handle\030\003 \001(\005\022\023\n\013item_handle\030" +
"\004 \001(\005\022+\n\005value\030\005 \001(\0132\034.mxaccess_gateway." +
"v1.MxValue\022\017\n\007quality\030\006 \001(\005\0224\n\020source_ti" +
"mestamp\030\007 \001(\0132\032.google.protobuf.Timestam" +
"p\0224\n\010statuses\030\010 \003(\0132\".mxaccess_gateway.v" +
"1.MxStatusProxy\022\027\n\017worker_sequence\030\t \001(\004" +
"\0224\n\020worker_timestamp\030\n \001(\0132\032.google.prot" +
"obuf.Timestamp\022=\n\031gateway_receive_timest" +
"amp\030\013 \001(\0132\032.google.protobuf.Timestamp\022\024\n" +
"\007hresult\030\014 \001(\005H\001\210\001\001\022\022\n\nraw_status\030\r \001(\t\022" +
"7\n\nreplay_gap\030\016 \001(\0132\036.mxaccess_gateway.v" +
"1.ReplayGapH\002\210\001\001\022@\n\016on_data_change\030\024 \001(\013" +
"2&.mxaccess_gateway.v1.OnDataChangeEvent" +
"H\000\022F\n\021on_write_complete\030\025 \001(\0132).mxaccess" +
"_gateway.v1.OnWriteCompleteEventH\000\022I\n\022op" +
"eration_complete\030\026 \001(\0132+.mxaccess_gatewa" +
"y.v1.OperationCompleteEventH\000\022Q\n\027on_buff" +
"ered_data_change\030\027 \001(\0132..mxaccess_gatewa" +
"y.v1.OnBufferedDataChangeEventH\000\022J\n\023on_a" +
"larm_transition\030\030 \001(\0132+.mxaccess_gateway" +
".v1.OnAlarmTransitionEventH\000\022^\n\036on_alarm" +
"_provider_mode_changed\030\031 \001(\01324.mxaccess_" +
"gateway.v1.OnAlarmProviderModeChangedEve" +
"ntH\000B\006\n\004bodyB\n\n\010_hresultB\r\n\013_replay_gap\"" +
"P\n\tReplayGap\022 \n\030requested_after_sequence" +
"\030\001 \001(\004\022!\n\031oldest_available_sequence\030\002 \001(" +
"\004\"\023\n\021OnDataChangeEvent\"\026\n\024OnWriteComplet" +
"eEvent\"\030\n\026OperationCompleteEvent\"\324\001\n\031OnB" +
"ufferedDataChangeEvent\0222\n\tdata_type\030\001 \001(" +
"\0162\037.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxDataType\0224\n\016qu" +
"ality_values\030\002 \001(\0132\034.mxaccess_gateway.v1" +
".MxArray\0226\n\020timestamp_values\030\003 \001(\0132\034.mxa" +
"ccess_gateway.v1.MxArray\022\025\n\rraw_data_typ" +
"e\030\004 \001(\005\"\320\004\n\026OnAlarmTransitionEvent\022\034\n\024al" +
"arm_full_reference\030\001 \001(\t\022\037\n\027source_objec" +
"t_reference\030\002 \001(\t\022\027\n\017alarm_type_name\030\003 \001" +
"(\t\022A\n\017transition_kind\030\004 \001(\0162(.mxaccess_g" +
"ateway.v1.AlarmTransitionKind\022\020\n\010severit" +
"y\030\005 \001(\005\022<\n\030original_raise_timestamp\030\006 \001(" +
"\0132\032.google.protobuf.Timestamp\0228\n\024transit" +
"ion_timestamp\030\007 \001(\0132\032.google.protobuf.Ti" +
"mestamp\022\025\n\roperator_user\030\010 \001(\t\022\030\n\020operat" +
"or_comment\030\t \001(\t\022\020\n\010category\030\n \001(\t\022\023\n\013de" +
"scription\030\013 \001(\t\0223\n\rcurrent_value\030\014 \001(\0132\034" +
".mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxValue\0221\n\013limit_va" +
"lue\030\r \001(\0132\034.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxValue\022" +
"\020\n\010degraded\030\016 \001(\010\022?\n\017source_provider\030\017 \001" +
"(\0162&.mxaccess_gateway.v1.AlarmProviderMo" +
"de\"\240\001\n\037OnAlarmProviderModeChangedEvent\0224" +
"\n\004mode\030\001 \001(\0162&.mxaccess_gateway.v1.Alarm" +
"ProviderMode\022\016\n\006reason\030\002 \001(\t\022\017\n\007hresult\030" +
"\003 \001(\005\022&\n\002at\030\004 \001(\0132\032.google.protobuf.Time" +
"stamp\"\320\004\n\023ActiveAlarmSnapshot\022\034\n\024alarm_f" +
"ull_reference\030\001 \001(\t\022\037\n\027source_object_ref" +
"erence\030\002 \001(\t\022\027\n\017alarm_type_name\030\003 \001(\t\022\020\n" +
"\010severity\030\004 \001(\005\022<\n\030original_raise_timest" +
"amp\030\005 \001(\0132\032.google.protobuf.Timestamp\022?\n" +
"\rcurrent_state\030\006 \001(\0162(.mxaccess_gateway." +
"v1.AlarmConditionState\022\020\n\010category\030\007 \001(\t" +
"\022\023\n\013description\030\010 \001(\t\022=\n\031last_transition" +
"_timestamp\030\t \001(\0132\032.google.protobuf.Times" +
"tamp\022\025\n\roperator_user\030\n \001(\t\022\030\n\020operator_" +
"comment\030\013 \001(\t\0223\n\rcurrent_value\030\014 \001(\0132\034.m" +
"xaccess_gateway.v1.MxValue\0221\n\013limit_valu" +
"e\030\r \001(\0132\034.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxValue\022\020\n" +
"\010degraded\030\016 \001(\010\022?\n\017source_provider\030\017 \001(\016" +
"access_gateway.v1.ActiveAlarmSnapshot\022\032\n" +
"\022snapshot_truncated\030\002 \001(\010\"\217\010\n\007MxEvent\0222\n" +
"\006family\030\001 \001(\0162\".mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxEv" +
"entFamily\022\022\n\nsession_id\030\002 \001(\t\022\025\n\rserver_" +
"handle\030\003 \001(\005\022\023\n\013item_handle\030\004 \001(\005\022+\n\005val" +
"ue\030\005 \001(\0132\034.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxValue\022\017" +
"\n\007quality\030\006 \001(\005\0224\n\020source_timestamp\030\007 \001(" +
"\0132\032.google.protobuf.Timestamp\0224\n\010statuse" +
"s\030\010 \003(\0132\".mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxStatusPr" +
"oxy\022\027\n\017worker_sequence\030\t \001(\004\0224\n\020worker_t" +
"imestamp\030\n \001(\0132\032.google.protobuf.Timesta" +
"mp\022=\n\031gateway_receive_timestamp\030\013 \001(\0132\032." +
"google.protobuf.Timestamp\022\024\n\007hresult\030\014 \001" +
"(\005H\001\210\001\001\022\022\n\nraw_status\030\r \001(\t\0227\n\nreplay_ga" +
"p\030\016 \001(\0132\036.mxaccess_gateway.v1.ReplayGapH" +
"\002\210\001\001\022@\n\016on_data_change\030\024 \001(\0132&.mxaccess_" +
"gateway.v1.OnDataChangeEventH\000\022F\n\021on_wri" +
"te_complete\030\025 \001(\0132).mxaccess_gateway.v1." +
"OnWriteCompleteEventH\000\022I\n\022operation_comp" +
"lete\030\026 \001(\0132+.mxaccess_gateway.v1.Operati" +
"onCompleteEventH\000\022Q\n\027on_buffered_data_ch" +
"ange\030\027 \001(\0132..mxaccess_gateway.v1.OnBuffe" +
"redDataChangeEventH\000\022J\n\023on_alarm_transit" +
"ion\030\030 \001(\0132+.mxaccess_gateway.v1.OnAlarmT" +
"ransitionEventH\000\022^\n\036on_alarm_provider_mo" +
"de_changed\030\031 \001(\01324.mxaccess_gateway.v1.O" +
"nAlarmProviderModeChangedEventH\000B\006\n\004body" +
"B\n\n\010_hresultB\r\n\013_replay_gap\"P\n\tReplayGap" +
"\022 \n\030requested_after_sequence\030\001 \001(\004\022!\n\031ol" +
"dest_available_sequence\030\002 \001(\004\"\023\n\021OnDataC" +
"hangeEvent\"\026\n\024OnWriteCompleteEvent\"\030\n\026Op" +
"erationCompleteEvent\"\324\001\n\031OnBufferedDataC" +
"hangeEvent\0222\n\tdata_type\030\001 \001(\0162\037.mxaccess" +
"_gateway.v1.MxDataType\0224\n\016quality_values" +
"\030\002 \001(\0132\034.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxArray\0226\n\020" +
"timestamp_values\030\003 \001(\0132\034.mxaccess_gatewa" +
"y.v1.MxArray\022\025\n\rraw_data_type\030\004 \001(\005\"\320\004\n\026" +
"OnAlarmTransitionEvent\022\034\n\024alarm_full_ref" +
"erence\030\001 \001(\t\022\037\n\027source_object_reference\030" +
"\002 \001(\t\022\027\n\017alarm_type_name\030\003 \001(\t\022A\n\017transi" +
"tion_kind\030\004 \001(\0162(.mxaccess_gateway.v1.Al" +
"armTransitionKind\022\020\n\010severity\030\005 \001(\005\022<\n\030o" +
"riginal_raise_timestamp\030\006 \001(\0132\032.google.p" +
"rotobuf.Timestamp\0228\n\024transition_timestam" +
"p\030\007 \001(\0132\032.google.protobuf.Timestamp\022\025\n\ro" +
"perator_user\030\010 \001(\t\022\030\n\020operator_comment\030\t" +
" \001(\t\022\020\n\010category\030\n \001(\t\022\023\n\013description\030\013 " +
"\001(\t\0223\n\rcurrent_value\030\014 \001(\0132\034.mxaccess_ga" +
"teway.v1.MxValue\0221\n\013limit_value\030\r \001(\0132\034." +
"mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxValue\022\020\n\010degraded\030" +
"\016 \001(\010\022?\n\017source_provider\030\017 \001(\0162&.mxacces" +
"s_gateway.v1.AlarmProviderMode\"\240\001\n\037OnAla" +
"rmProviderModeChangedEvent\0224\n\004mode\030\001 \001(\016" +
"2&.mxaccess_gateway.v1.AlarmProviderMode" +
"\"\220\001\n\027AcknowledgeAlarmRequest\022\035\n\025client_c" +
"orrelation_id\030\002 \001(\t\022\034\n\024alarm_full_refere" +
"nce\030\003 \001(\t\022\017\n\007comment\030\004 \001(\t\022\025\n\roperator_u" +
"ser\030\005 \001(\tJ\004\010\001\020\002R\nsession_id\"\361\001\n\025Acknowle" +
"dgeAlarmReply\022\026\n\016correlation_id\030\002 \001(\t\022<\n" +
"\017protocol_status\030\003 \001(\0132#.mxaccess_gatewa" +
"y.v1.ProtocolStatus\022\024\n\007hresult\030\004 \001(\005H\000\210\001" +
"\001\0222\n\006status\030\005 \001(\0132\".mxaccess_gateway.v1." +
"MxStatusProxy\022\032\n\022diagnostic_message\030\006 \001(" +
"\tB\n\n\010_hresultJ\004\010\001\020\002R\nsession_id\"Q\n\023Strea" +
"mAlarmsRequest\022\035\n\025client_correlation_id\030" +
"\001 \001(\t\022\033\n\023alarm_filter_prefix\030\002 \001(\t\"\204\002\n\020A" +
"larmFeedMessage\022@\n\014active_alarm\030\001 \001(\0132(." +
"mxaccess_gateway.v1.ActiveAlarmSnapshotH" +
"\000\022\033\n\021snapshot_complete\030\002 \001(\010H\000\022A\n\ntransi" +
"tion\030\003 \001(\0132+.mxaccess_gateway.v1.OnAlarm" +
"TransitionEventH\000\022C\n\017provider_status\030\004 \001" +
"(\0132(.mxaccess_gateway.v1.AlarmProviderSt" +
"atusH\000B\t\n\007payload\"\230\001\n\023AlarmProviderStatu" +
"s\0224\n\004mode\030\001 \001(\0162&.mxaccess_gateway.v1.Al" +
"armProviderMode\022\020\n\010degraded\030\002 \001(\010\022\016\n\006rea" +
"son\030\003 \001(\t\022)\n\005since\030\004 \001(\0132\032.google.protob" +
"uf.Timestamp\"\353\001\n\rMxStatusProxy\022\017\n\007succes" +
"s\030\001 \001(\005\0227\n\010category\030\002 \001(\0162%.mxaccess_gat" +
"eway.v1.MxStatusCategory\0228\n\013detected_by\030" +
"\003 \001(\0162#.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxStatusSour" +
"ce\022\016\n\006detail\030\004 \001(\005\022\024\n\014raw_category\030\005 \001(\005" +
"\022\027\n\017raw_detected_by\030\006 \001(\005\022\027\n\017diagnostic_" +
"text\030\007 \001(\t\"\351\003\n\007MxValue\0222\n\tdata_type\030\001 \001(" +
"\0162\037.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxDataType\022\024\n\014va" +
"riant_type\030\002 \001(\t\022\017\n\007is_null\030\003 \001(\010\022\026\n\016raw" +
"_diagnostic\030\004 \001(\t\022\025\n\rraw_data_type\030\005 \001(\005" +
"\022\024\n\nbool_value\030\n \001(\010H\000\022\025\n\013int32_value\030\013 " +
"\001(\005H\000\022\025\n\013int64_value\030\014 \001(\003H\000\022\025\n\013float_va",
"lue\030\r \001(\002H\000\022\026\n\014double_value\030\016 \001(\001H\000\022\026\n\014s" +
"tring_value\030\017 \001(\tH\000\0225\n\017timestamp_value\030\020" +
" \001(\0132\032.google.protobuf.TimestampH\000\0223\n\013ar" +
"ray_value\030\021 \001(\0132\034.mxaccess_gateway.v1.Mx" +
"ArrayH\000\022\023\n\traw_value\030\022 \001(\014H\000\022@\n\022sparse_a" +
"rray_value\030\023 \001(\0132\".mxaccess_gateway.v1.M" +
"xSparseArrayH\000B\006\n\004kind\"\376\004\n\007MxArray\022:\n\021el" +
"ement_data_type\030\001 \001(\0162\037.mxaccess_gateway" +
".v1.MxDataType\022\024\n\014variant_type\030\002 \001(\t\022\022\n\n" +
"dimensions\030\003 \003(\r\022\026\n\016raw_diagnostic\030\004 \001(\t" +
"\022\035\n\025raw_element_data_type\030\005 \001(\005\0225\n\013bool_" +
"values\030\n \001(\0132\036.mxaccess_gateway.v1.BoolA" +
"rrayH\000\0227\n\014int32_values\030\013 \001(\0132\037.mxaccess_" +
"gateway.v1.Int32ArrayH\000\0227\n\014int64_values\030" +
"\014 \001(\0132\037.mxaccess_gateway.v1.Int64ArrayH\000" +
"\0227\n\014float_values\030\r \001(\0132\037.mxaccess_gatewa" +
"y.v1.FloatArrayH\000\0229\n\rdouble_values\030\016 \001(\013" +
"2 .mxaccess_gateway.v1.DoubleArrayH\000\0229\n\r" +
"string_values\030\017 \001(\0132 .mxaccess_gateway.v" +
"1.StringArrayH\000\022?\n\020timestamp_values\030\020 \001(" +
"\0132#.mxaccess_gateway.v1.TimestampArrayH\000" +
"\0223\n\nraw_values\030\021 \001(\0132\035.mxaccess_gateway." +
"v1.RawArrayH\000B\010\n\006values\"\231\001\n\rMxSparseArra" +
"y\022:\n\021element_data_type\030\001 \001(\0162\037.mxaccess_" +
"gateway.v1.MxDataType\022\024\n\014total_length\030\002 " +
"\001(\r\0226\n\010elements\030\003 \003(\0132$.mxaccess_gateway" +
".v1.MxSparseElement\"M\n\017MxSparseElement\022\r" +
"\n\005index\030\001 \001(\r\022+\n\005value\030\002 \001(\0132\034.mxaccess_" +
"gateway.v1.MxValue\"\033\n\tBoolArray\022\016\n\006value" +
"s\030\001 \003(\010\"\034\n\nInt32Array\022\016\n\006values\030\001 \003(\005\"\034\n" +
"\nInt64Array\022\016\n\006values\030\001 \003(\003\"\034\n\nFloatArra" +
"y\022\016\n\006values\030\001 \003(\002\"\035\n\013DoubleArray\022\016\n\006valu" +
"es\030\001 \003(\001\"\035\n\013StringArray\022\016\n\006values\030\001 \003(\t\"" +
"<\n\016TimestampArray\022*\n\006values\030\001 \003(\0132\032.goog" +
"le.protobuf.Timestamp\"\032\n\010RawArray\022\016\n\006val" +
"ues\030\001 \003(\014\"X\n\016ProtocolStatus\0225\n\004code\030\001 \001(" +
"\0162\'.mxaccess_gateway.v1.ProtocolStatusCo" +
"de\022\017\n\007message\030\002 \001(\t*\237\013\n\rMxCommandKind\022\037\n" +
"\033MX_COMMAND_KIND_UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022\034\n\030MX_COM" +
"MAND_KIND_REGISTER\020\001\022\036\n\032MX_COMMAND_KIND_" +
"UNREGISTER\020\002\022\034\n\030MX_COMMAND_KIND_ADD_ITEM" +
"\020\003\022\035\n\031MX_COMMAND_KIND_ADD_ITEM2\020\004\022\037\n\033MX_" +
"COMMAND_KIND_REMOVE_ITEM\020\005\022\032\n\026MX_COMMAND" +
"_KIND_ADVISE\020\006\022\035\n\031MX_COMMAND_KIND_UN_ADV" +
"ISE\020\007\022&\n\"MX_COMMAND_KIND_ADVISE_SUPERVIS" +
"ORY\020\010\022%\n!MX_COMMAND_KIND_ADD_BUFFERED_IT" +
"EM\020\t\0220\n,MX_COMMAND_KIND_SET_BUFFERED_UPD" +
"ATE_INTERVAL\020\n\022\033\n\027MX_COMMAND_KIND_SUSPEN" +
"D\020\013\022\034\n\030MX_COMMAND_KIND_ACTIVATE\020\014\022\031\n\025MX_" +
"COMMAND_KIND_WRITE\020\r\022\032\n\026MX_COMMAND_KIND_" +
"WRITE2\020\016\022!\n\035MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRITE_SECURE" +
"D\020\017\022\"\n\036MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRITE_SECURED2\020\020\022" +
"%\n!MX_COMMAND_KIND_AUTHENTICATE_USER\020\021\022(" +
"\n$MX_COMMAND_KIND_ARCHESTRA_USER_TO_ID\020\022" +
"\022!\n\035MX_COMMAND_KIND_ADD_ITEM_BULK\020\023\022$\n M" +
"X_COMMAND_KIND_ADVISE_ITEM_BULK\020\024\022$\n MX_" +
"COMMAND_KIND_REMOVE_ITEM_BULK\020\025\022\'\n#MX_CO" +
"MMAND_KIND_UN_ADVISE_ITEM_BULK\020\026\022\"\n\036MX_C" +
"OMMAND_KIND_SUBSCRIBE_BULK\020\027\022$\n MX_COMMA" +
"ND_KIND_UNSUBSCRIBE_BULK\020\030\022$\n MX_COMMAND" +
"_KIND_SUBSCRIBE_ALARMS\020\031\022&\n\"MX_COMMAND_K" +
"IND_UNSUBSCRIBE_ALARMS\020\032\022%\n!MX_COMMAND_K" +
"IND_ACKNOWLEDGE_ALARM\020\033\022\'\n#MX_COMMAND_KI" +
"ND_QUERY_ACTIVE_ALARMS\020\034\022-\n)MX_COMMAND_K" +
"IND_ACKNOWLEDGE_ALARM_BY_NAME\020\035\022\036\n\032MX_CO" +
"MMAND_KIND_WRITE_BULK\020\036\022\037\n\033MX_COMMAND_KI" +
"ND_WRITE2_BULK\020\037\022&\n\"MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRIT" +
"E_SECURED_BULK\020 \022\'\n#MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRIT" +
"E_SECURED2_BULK\020!\022\035\n\031MX_COMMAND_KIND_REA" +
"D_BULK\020\"\022\030\n\024MX_COMMAND_KIND_PING\020d\022%\n!MX" +
"_COMMAND_KIND_GET_SESSION_STATE\020e\022#\n\037MX_" +
"COMMAND_KIND_GET_WORKER_INFO\020f\022 \n\034MX_COM" +
"MAND_KIND_DRAIN_EVENTS\020g\022#\n\037MX_COMMAND_K" +
"IND_SHUTDOWN_WORKER\020h*z\n\021AlarmProviderMo" +
"de\022#\n\037ALARM_PROVIDER_MODE_UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022" +
" \n\034ALARM_PROVIDER_MODE_ALARMMGR\020\001\022\036\n\032ALA" +
"RM_PROVIDER_MODE_SUBTAG\020\002*\255\002\n\rMxEventFam" +
"ily\022\037\n\033MX_EVENT_FAMILY_UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022\"\n\036" +
"MX_EVENT_FAMILY_ON_DATA_CHANGE\020\001\022%\n!MX_E" +
"VENT_FAMILY_ON_WRITE_COMPLETE\020\002\022&\n\"MX_EV" +
"ENT_FAMILY_OPERATION_COMPLETE\020\003\022+\n\'MX_EV" +
"ENT_FAMILY_ON_BUFFERED_DATA_CHANGE\020\004\022\'\n#" +
"MX_EVENT_FAMILY_ON_ALARM_TRANSITION\020\005\0222\n" +
".MX_EVENT_FAMILY_ON_ALARM_PROVIDER_MODE_" +
"CHANGED\020\006*\312\001\n\023AlarmTransitionKind\022%\n!ALA" +
"RM_TRANSITION_KIND_UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022\037\n\033ALAR" +
"M_TRANSITION_KIND_RAISE\020\001\022%\n!ALARM_TRANS" +
"ITION_KIND_ACKNOWLEDGE\020\002\022\037\n\033ALARM_TRANSI" +
"TION_KIND_CLEAR\020\003\022#\n\037ALARM_TRANSITION_KI" +
"ND_RETRIGGER\020\004*\252\001\n\023AlarmConditionState\022%" +
"\n!ALARM_CONDITION_STATE_UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022 \n" +
"\034ALARM_CONDITION_STATE_ACTIVE\020\001\022&\n\"ALARM" +
"_CONDITION_STATE_ACTIVE_ACKED\020\002\022\"\n\036ALARM" +
"_CONDITION_STATE_INACTIVE\020\003*\245\003\n\020MxStatus" +
"Category\022\"\n\036MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_UNSPECIFI" +
"ED\020\000\022\036\n\032MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_UNKNOWN\020\001\022\031\n\025" +
"MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_OK\020\002\022\036\n\032MX_STATUS_CAT" +
"EGORY_PENDING\020\003\022\036\n\032MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_WA" +
"RNING\020\004\022*\n&MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_COMMUNICAT" +
"ION_ERROR\020\005\022*\n&MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_CONFIG" +
"URATION_ERROR\020\006\022(\n$MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_OP" +
"ERATIONAL_ERROR\020\007\022%\n!MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_" +
"SECURITY_ERROR\020\010\022%\n!MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_S" +
"OFTWARE_ERROR\020\t\022\"\n\036MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_OT" +
"HER_ERROR\020\n*\312\002\n\016MxStatusSource\022 \n\034MX_STA" +
"TUS_SOURCE_UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022\034\n\030MX_STATUS_SO" +
"URCE_UNKNOWN\020\001\022#\n\037MX_STATUS_SOURCE_REQUE" +
"STING_LMX\020\002\022#\n\037MX_STATUS_SOURCE_RESPONDI" +
"NG_LMX\020\003\022#\n\037MX_STATUS_SOURCE_REQUESTING_" +
"NMX\020\004\022#\n\037MX_STATUS_SOURCE_RESPONDING_NMX" +
"\020\005\0221\n-MX_STATUS_SOURCE_REQUESTING_AUTOMA" +
"TION_OBJECT\020\006\0221\n-MX_STATUS_SOURCE_RESPON" +
"DING_AUTOMATION_OBJECT\020\007*\335\004\n\nMxDataType\022" +
"\034\n\030MX_DATA_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022\030\n\024MX_DATA" +
"_TYPE_UNKNOWN\020\001\022\030\n\024MX_DATA_TYPE_NO_DATA\020" +
"\002\022\030\n\024MX_DATA_TYPE_BOOLEAN\020\003\022\030\n\024MX_DATA_T" +
"YPE_INTEGER\020\004\022\026\n\022MX_DATA_TYPE_FLOAT\020\005\022\027\n" +
"\023MX_DATA_TYPE_DOUBLE\020\006\022\027\n\023MX_DATA_TYPE_S" +
"TRING\020\007\022\025\n\021MX_DATA_TYPE_TIME\020\010\022\035\n\031MX_DAT" +
"A_TYPE_ELAPSED_TIME\020\t\022\037\n\033MX_DATA_TYPE_RE" +
"FERENCE_TYPE\020\n\022\034\n\030MX_DATA_TYPE_STATUS_TY" +
"PE\020\013\022\025\n\021MX_DATA_TYPE_ENUM\020\014\022-\n)MX_DATA_T" +
"YPE_SECURITY_CLASSIFICATION_ENUM\020\r\022\"\n\036MX" +
"_DATA_TYPE_DATA_QUALITY_TYPE\020\016\022\037\n\033MX_DAT" +
"A_TYPE_QUALIFIED_ENUM\020\017\022!\n\035MX_DATA_TYPE_" +
"QUALIFIED_STRUCT\020\020\022)\n%MX_DATA_TYPE_INTER" +
"NATIONALIZED_STRING\020\021\022\033\n\027MX_DATA_TYPE_BI" +
"G_STRING\020\022\022\024\n\020MX_DATA_TYPE_END\020\023*\243\003\n\022Pro" +
"tocolStatusCode\022$\n PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_" +
"UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022\033\n\027PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_OK" +
"\020\001\022(\n$PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_INVALID_REQUE" +
"ST\020\002\022*\n&PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_SESSION_NOT" +
"_FOUND\020\003\022*\n&PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_SESSION" +
"_NOT_READY\020\004\022+\n\'PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_WOR" +
"KER_UNAVAILABLE\020\005\022 \n\034PROTOCOL_STATUS_COD" +
"E_TIMEOUT\020\006\022!\n\035PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_CANC" +
"ELED\020\007\022+\n\'PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_PROTOCOL_" +
"VIOLATION\020\010\022)\n%PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_MXAC" +
"CESS_FAILURE\020\t*\277\002\n\014SessionState\022\035\n\031SESSI" +
"ON_STATE_UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022\032\n\026SESSION_STATE_" +
"CREATING\020\001\022!\n\035SESSION_STATE_STARTING_WOR" +
"KER\020\002\022\"\n\036SESSION_STATE_WAITING_FOR_PIPE\020" +
"\003\022\035\n\031SESSION_STATE_HANDSHAKING\020\004\022%\n!SESS" +
"ION_STATE_INITIALIZING_WORKER\020\005\022\027\n\023SESSI" +
"ON_STATE_READY\020\006\022\031\n\025SESSION_STATE_CLOSIN" +
"G\020\007\022\030\n\024SESSION_STATE_CLOSED\020\010\022\031\n\025SESSION" +
"_STATE_FAULTED\020\t2\303\005\n\017MxAccessGateway\022]\n\013" +
"OpenSession\022\'.mxaccess_gateway.v1.OpenSe" +
"ssionRequest\032%.mxaccess_gateway.v1.OpenS" +
"essionReply\022`\n\014CloseSession\022(.mxaccess_g" +
"ateway.v1.CloseSessionRequest\032&.mxaccess" +
"_gateway.v1.CloseSessionReply\022T\n\006Invoke\022" +
"%.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxCommandRequest\032#" +
".mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxCommandReply\022X\n\014S" +
"treamEvents\022(.mxaccess_gateway.v1.Stream" +
"EventsRequest\032\034.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxEv" +
"ent0\001\022l\n\020AcknowledgeAlarm\022,.mxaccess_gat" +
"eway.v1.AcknowledgeAlarmRequest\032*.mxacce" +
"ss_gateway.v1.AcknowledgeAlarmReply\022a\n\014S" +
"treamAlarms\022(.mxaccess_gateway.v1.Stream" +
"AlarmsRequest\032%.mxaccess_gateway.v1.Alar" +
"mFeedMessage0\001\022n\n\021QueryActiveAlarms\022-.mx" +
"access_gateway.v1.QueryActiveAlarmsReque" +
"st\032(.mxaccess_gateway.v1.ActiveAlarmSnap" +
"shot0\001B&\252\002#ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts" +
".Protob\006proto3"
"\022\016\n\006reason\030\002 \001(\t\022\017\n\007hresult\030\003 \001(\005\022&\n\002at\030" +
"\004 \001(\0132\032.google.protobuf.Timestamp\"\361\004\n\023Ac" +
"tiveAlarmSnapshot\022\034\n\024alarm_full_referenc" +
"e\030\001 \001(\t\022\037\n\027source_object_reference\030\002 \001(\t" +
"\022\027\n\017alarm_type_name\030\003 \001(\t\022\020\n\010severity\030\004 " +
"\001(\005\022<\n\030original_raise_timestamp\030\005 \001(\0132\032." +
"google.protobuf.Timestamp\022?\n\rcurrent_sta" +
"te\030\006 \001(\0162(.mxaccess_gateway.v1.AlarmCond" +
"itionState\022\020\n\010category\030\007 \001(\t\022\023\n\013descript" +
"ion\030\010 \001(\t\022=\n\031last_transition_timestamp\030\t" +
" \001(\0132\032.google.protobuf.Timestamp\022\025\n\roper" +
"ator_user\030\n \001(\t\022\030\n\020operator_comment\030\013 \001(" +
"\t\0223\n\rcurrent_value\030\014 \001(\0132\034.mxaccess_gate" +
"way.v1.MxValue\0221\n\013limit_value\030\r \001(\0132\034.mx" +
"access_gateway.v1.MxValue\022\020\n\010degraded\030\016 " +
"\001(\010\022?\n\017source_provider\030\017 \001(\0162&.mxaccess_" +
"gateway.v1.AlarmProviderMode\022\037\n\027from_tru" +
"ncated_snapshot\030\020 \001(\010\"\220\001\n\027AcknowledgeAla" +
"rmRequest\022\035\n\025client_correlation_id\030\002 \001(\t" +
"\022\034\n\024alarm_full_reference\030\003 \001(\t\022\017\n\007commen" +
"t\030\004 \001(\t\022\025\n\roperator_user\030\005 \001(\tJ\004\010\001\020\002R\nse" +
"ssion_id\"\361\001\n\025AcknowledgeAlarmReply\022\026\n\016co" +
"rrelation_id\030\002 \001(\t\022<\n\017protocol_status\030\003 " +
"\001(\0132#.mxaccess_gateway.v1.ProtocolStatus" +
"\022\024\n\007hresult\030\004 \001(\005H\000\210\001\001\0222\n\006status\030\005 \001(\0132\"" +
".mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxStatusProxy\022\032\n\022di" +
"agnostic_message\030\006 \001(\tB\n\n\010_hresultJ\004\010\001\020\002" +
"R\nsession_id\"Q\n\023StreamAlarmsRequest\022\035\n\025c" +
"lient_correlation_id\030\001 \001(\t\022\033\n\023alarm_filt" +
"er_prefix\030\002 \001(\t\"\204\002\n\020AlarmFeedMessage\022@\n\014" +
"active_alarm\030\001 \001(\0132(.mxaccess_gateway.v1" +
".ActiveAlarmSnapshotH\000\022\033\n\021snapshot_compl" +
"ete\030\002 \001(\010H\000\022A\n\ntransition\030\003 \001(\0132+.mxacce" +
"ss_gateway.v1.OnAlarmTransitionEventH\000\022C" +
"\n\017provider_status\030\004 \001(\0132(.mxaccess_gatew" +
"ay.v1.AlarmProviderStatusH\000B\t\n\007payload\"\230" +
"\001\n\023AlarmProviderStatus\0224\n\004mode\030\001 \001(\0162&.m" +
"xaccess_gateway.v1.AlarmProviderMode\022\020\n\010" +
"degraded\030\002 \001(\010\022\016\n\006reason\030\003 \001(\t\022)\n\005since\030" +
"\004 \001(\0132\032.google.protobuf.Timestamp\"\353\001\n\rMx" +
"StatusProxy\022\017\n\007success\030\001 \001(\005\0227\n\010category" +
"\030\002 \001(\0162%.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxStatusCat" +
"egory\0228\n\013detected_by\030\003 \001(\0162#.mxaccess_ga" +
"teway.v1.MxStatusSource\022\016\n\006detail\030\004 \001(\005\022" +
"\024\n\014raw_category\030\005 \001(\005\022\027\n\017raw_detected_by" +
"\030\006 \001(\005\022\027\n\017diagnostic_text\030\007 \001(\t\"\351\003\n\007MxVa" +
"lue\0222\n\tdata_type\030\001 \001(\0162\037.mxaccess_gatewa" +
"y.v1.MxDataType\022\024\n\014variant_type\030\002 \001(\t\022\017\n" +
"\007is_null\030\003 \001(\010\022\026\n\016raw_diagnostic\030\004 \001(\t\022\025" +
"\n\rraw_data_type\030\005 \001(\005\022\024\n\nbool_value\030\n \001(",
"\010H\000\022\025\n\013int32_value\030\013 \001(\005H\000\022\025\n\013int64_valu" +
"e\030\014 \001(\003H\000\022\025\n\013float_value\030\r \001(\002H\000\022\026\n\014doub" +
"le_value\030\016 \001(\001H\000\022\026\n\014string_value\030\017 \001(\tH\000" +
"\0225\n\017timestamp_value\030\020 \001(\0132\032.google.proto" +
"buf.TimestampH\000\0223\n\013array_value\030\021 \001(\0132\034.m" +
"xaccess_gateway.v1.MxArrayH\000\022\023\n\traw_valu" +
"e\030\022 \001(\014H\000\022@\n\022sparse_array_value\030\023 \001(\0132\"." +
"mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxSparseArrayH\000B\006\n\004k" +
"ind\"\376\004\n\007MxArray\022:\n\021element_data_type\030\001 \001" +
"(\0162\037.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxDataType\022\024\n\014v" +
"ariant_type\030\002 \001(\t\022\022\n\ndimensions\030\003 \003(\r\022\026\n" +
"\016raw_diagnostic\030\004 \001(\t\022\035\n\025raw_element_dat" +
"a_type\030\005 \001(\005\0225\n\013bool_values\030\n \001(\0132\036.mxac" +
"cess_gateway.v1.BoolArrayH\000\0227\n\014int32_val" +
"ues\030\013 \001(\0132\037.mxaccess_gateway.v1.Int32Arr" +
"ayH\000\0227\n\014int64_values\030\014 \001(\0132\037.mxaccess_ga" +
"teway.v1.Int64ArrayH\000\0227\n\014float_values\030\r " +
"\001(\0132\037.mxaccess_gateway.v1.FloatArrayH\000\0229" +
"\n\rdouble_values\030\016 \001(\0132 .mxaccess_gateway" +
".v1.DoubleArrayH\000\0229\n\rstring_values\030\017 \001(\013" +
"2 .mxaccess_gateway.v1.StringArrayH\000\022?\n\020" +
"timestamp_values\030\020 \001(\0132#.mxaccess_gatewa" +
"y.v1.TimestampArrayH\000\0223\n\nraw_values\030\021 \001(" +
"\0132\035.mxaccess_gateway.v1.RawArrayH\000B\010\n\006va" +
"lues\"\231\001\n\rMxSparseArray\022:\n\021element_data_t" +
"ype\030\001 \001(\0162\037.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxDataTy" +
"pe\022\024\n\014total_length\030\002 \001(\r\0226\n\010elements\030\003 \003" +
"(\0132$.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxSparseElement" +
"\"M\n\017MxSparseElement\022\r\n\005index\030\001 \001(\r\022+\n\005va" +
"lue\030\002 \001(\0132\034.mxaccess_gateway.v1.MxValue\"" +
"\033\n\tBoolArray\022\016\n\006values\030\001 \003(\010\"\034\n\nInt32Arr" +
"ay\022\016\n\006values\030\001 \003(\005\"\034\n\nInt64Array\022\016\n\006valu" +
"es\030\001 \003(\003\"\034\n\nFloatArray\022\016\n\006values\030\001 \003(\002\"\035" +
"\n\013DoubleArray\022\016\n\006values\030\001 \003(\001\"\035\n\013StringA" +
"rray\022\016\n\006values\030\001 \003(\t\"<\n\016TimestampArray\022*" +
"\n\006values\030\001 \003(\0132\032.google.protobuf.Timesta" +
"mp\"\032\n\010RawArray\022\016\n\006values\030\001 \003(\014\"X\n\016Protoc" +
"olStatus\0225\n\004code\030\001 \001(\0162\'.mxaccess_gatewa" +
"y.v1.ProtocolStatusCode\022\017\n\007message\030\002 \001(\t" +
"*\237\013\n\rMxCommandKind\022\037\n\033MX_COMMAND_KIND_UN" +
"SPECIFIED\020\000\022\034\n\030MX_COMMAND_KIND_REGISTER\020" +
"\001\022\036\n\032MX_COMMAND_KIND_UNREGISTER\020\002\022\034\n\030MX_" +
"COMMAND_KIND_ADD_ITEM\020\003\022\035\n\031MX_COMMAND_KI" +
"ND_ADD_ITEM2\020\004\022\037\n\033MX_COMMAND_KIND_REMOVE" +
"_ITEM\020\005\022\032\n\026MX_COMMAND_KIND_ADVISE\020\006\022\035\n\031M" +
"X_COMMAND_KIND_UN_ADVISE\020\007\022&\n\"MX_COMMAND" +
"_KIND_ADVISE_SUPERVISORY\020\010\022%\n!MX_COMMAND" +
"_KIND_ADD_BUFFERED_ITEM\020\t\0220\n,MX_COMMAND_" +
"KIND_SET_BUFFERED_UPDATE_INTERVAL\020\n\022\033\n\027M" +
"X_COMMAND_KIND_SUSPEND\020\013\022\034\n\030MX_COMMAND_K" +
"IND_ACTIVATE\020\014\022\031\n\025MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRITE\020" +
"\r\022\032\n\026MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRITE2\020\016\022!\n\035MX_COMM" +
"AND_KIND_WRITE_SECURED\020\017\022\"\n\036MX_COMMAND_K" +
"IND_WRITE_SECURED2\020\020\022%\n!MX_COMMAND_KIND_" +
"AUTHENTICATE_USER\020\021\022(\n$MX_COMMAND_KIND_A" +
"RCHESTRA_USER_TO_ID\020\022\022!\n\035MX_COMMAND_KIND" +
"_ADD_ITEM_BULK\020\023\022$\n MX_COMMAND_KIND_ADVI" +
"SE_ITEM_BULK\020\024\022$\n MX_COMMAND_KIND_REMOVE" +
"_ITEM_BULK\020\025\022\'\n#MX_COMMAND_KIND_UN_ADVIS" +
"E_ITEM_BULK\020\026\022\"\n\036MX_COMMAND_KIND_SUBSCRI" +
"BE_BULK\020\027\022$\n MX_COMMAND_KIND_UNSUBSCRIBE" +
"_BULK\020\030\022$\n MX_COMMAND_KIND_SUBSCRIBE_ALA" +
"RMS\020\031\022&\n\"MX_COMMAND_KIND_UNSUBSCRIBE_ALA" +
"RMS\020\032\022%\n!MX_COMMAND_KIND_ACKNOWLEDGE_ALA" +
"RM\020\033\022\'\n#MX_COMMAND_KIND_QUERY_ACTIVE_ALA" +
"RMS\020\034\022-\n)MX_COMMAND_KIND_ACKNOWLEDGE_ALA" +
"RM_BY_NAME\020\035\022\036\n\032MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRITE_BU" +
"LK\020\036\022\037\n\033MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRITE2_BULK\020\037\022&\n" +
"\"MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRITE_SECURED_BULK\020 \022\'\n" +
"#MX_COMMAND_KIND_WRITE_SECURED2_BULK\020!\022\035" +
"\n\031MX_COMMAND_KIND_READ_BULK\020\"\022\030\n\024MX_COMM" +
"AND_KIND_PING\020d\022%\n!MX_COMMAND_KIND_GET_S" +
"ESSION_STATE\020e\022#\n\037MX_COMMAND_KIND_GET_WO" +
"RKER_INFO\020f\022 \n\034MX_COMMAND_KIND_DRAIN_EVE" +
"NTS\020g\022#\n\037MX_COMMAND_KIND_SHUTDOWN_WORKER" +
"\020h*z\n\021AlarmProviderMode\022#\n\037ALARM_PROVIDE" +
"R_MODE_UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022 \n\034ALARM_PROVIDER_M" +
"ODE_ALARMMGR\020\001\022\036\n\032ALARM_PROVIDER_MODE_SU" +
"BTAG\020\002*\255\002\n\rMxEventFamily\022\037\n\033MX_EVENT_FAM" +
"ILY_UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022\"\n\036MX_EVENT_FAMILY_ON_" +
"DATA_CHANGE\020\001\022%\n!MX_EVENT_FAMILY_ON_WRIT" +
"E_COMPLETE\020\002\022&\n\"MX_EVENT_FAMILY_OPERATIO" +
"N_COMPLETE\020\003\022+\n\'MX_EVENT_FAMILY_ON_BUFFE" +
"RED_DATA_CHANGE\020\004\022\'\n#MX_EVENT_FAMILY_ON_" +
"ALARM_TRANSITION\020\005\0222\n.MX_EVENT_FAMILY_ON" +
"_ALARM_PROVIDER_MODE_CHANGED\020\006*\312\001\n\023Alarm" +
"TransitionKind\022%\n!ALARM_TRANSITION_KIND_" +
"UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022\037\n\033ALARM_TRANSITION_KIND_R" +
"AISE\020\001\022%\n!ALARM_TRANSITION_KIND_ACKNOWLE" +
"DGE\020\002\022\037\n\033ALARM_TRANSITION_KIND_CLEAR\020\003\022#" +
"\n\037ALARM_TRANSITION_KIND_RETRIGGER\020\004*\252\001\n\023" +
"AlarmConditionState\022%\n!ALARM_CONDITION_S" +
"TATE_UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022 \n\034ALARM_CONDITION_ST" +
"ATE_ACTIVE\020\001\022&\n\"ALARM_CONDITION_STATE_AC" +
"TIVE_ACKED\020\002\022\"\n\036ALARM_CONDITION_STATE_IN" +
"ACTIVE\020\003*\245\003\n\020MxStatusCategory\022\"\n\036MX_STAT" +
"US_CATEGORY_UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022\036\n\032MX_STATUS_C" +
"ATEGORY_UNKNOWN\020\001\022\031\n\025MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_" +
"OK\020\002\022\036\n\032MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_PENDING\020\003\022\036\n\032" +
"MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_WARNING\020\004\022*\n&MX_STATU" +
"S_CATEGORY_COMMUNICATION_ERROR\020\005\022*\n&MX_S" +
"TATUS_CATEGORY_CONFIGURATION_ERROR\020\006\022(\n$" +
"MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_OPERATIONAL_ERROR\020\007\022%" +
"\n!MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_SECURITY_ERROR\020\010\022%\n" +
"!MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_SOFTWARE_ERROR\020\t\022\"\n\036" +
"MX_STATUS_CATEGORY_OTHER_ERROR\020\n*\312\002\n\016MxS" +
"tatusSource\022 \n\034MX_STATUS_SOURCE_UNSPECIF" +
"IED\020\000\022\034\n\030MX_STATUS_SOURCE_UNKNOWN\020\001\022#\n\037M" +
"X_STATUS_SOURCE_REQUESTING_LMX\020\002\022#\n\037MX_S" +
"TATUS_SOURCE_RESPONDING_LMX\020\003\022#\n\037MX_STAT" +
"US_SOURCE_REQUESTING_NMX\020\004\022#\n\037MX_STATUS_" +
"SOURCE_RESPONDING_NMX\020\005\0221\n-MX_STATUS_SOU" +
"RCE_REQUESTING_AUTOMATION_OBJECT\020\006\0221\n-MX" +
"_STATUS_SOURCE_RESPONDING_AUTOMATION_OBJ" +
"ECT\020\007*\335\004\n\nMxDataType\022\034\n\030MX_DATA_TYPE_UNS" +
"PECIFIED\020\000\022\030\n\024MX_DATA_TYPE_UNKNOWN\020\001\022\030\n\024" +
"MX_DATA_TYPE_NO_DATA\020\002\022\030\n\024MX_DATA_TYPE_B" +
"OOLEAN\020\003\022\030\n\024MX_DATA_TYPE_INTEGER\020\004\022\026\n\022MX" +
"_DATA_TYPE_FLOAT\020\005\022\027\n\023MX_DATA_TYPE_DOUBL" +
"E\020\006\022\027\n\023MX_DATA_TYPE_STRING\020\007\022\025\n\021MX_DATA_" +
"TYPE_TIME\020\010\022\035\n\031MX_DATA_TYPE_ELAPSED_TIME" +
"\020\t\022\037\n\033MX_DATA_TYPE_REFERENCE_TYPE\020\n\022\034\n\030M" +
"X_DATA_TYPE_STATUS_TYPE\020\013\022\025\n\021MX_DATA_TYP" +
"E_ENUM\020\014\022-\n)MX_DATA_TYPE_SECURITY_CLASSI" +
"FICATION_ENUM\020\r\022\"\n\036MX_DATA_TYPE_DATA_QUA" +
"LITY_TYPE\020\016\022\037\n\033MX_DATA_TYPE_QUALIFIED_EN" +
"UM\020\017\022!\n\035MX_DATA_TYPE_QUALIFIED_STRUCT\020\020\022" +
")\n%MX_DATA_TYPE_INTERNATIONALIZED_STRING" +
"\020\021\022\033\n\027MX_DATA_TYPE_BIG_STRING\020\022\022\024\n\020MX_DA" +
"TA_TYPE_END\020\023*\243\003\n\022ProtocolStatusCode\022$\n " +
"PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_UNSPECIFIED\020\000\022\033\n\027PR" +
"OTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_OK\020\001\022(\n$PROTOCOL_STAT" +
"US_CODE_INVALID_REQUEST\020\002\022*\n&PROTOCOL_ST" +
"ATUS_CODE_SESSION_NOT_FOUND\020\003\022*\n&PROTOCO" +
"L_STATUS_CODE_SESSION_NOT_READY\020\004\022+\n\'PRO" +
"TOCOL_STATUS_CODE_WORKER_UNAVAILABLE\020\005\022 " +
"\n\034PROTOCOL_STATUS_CODE_TIMEOUT\020\006\022!\n\035PROT" +
"OCOL_STATUS_CODE_CANCELED\020\007\022+\n\'PROTOCOL_" +
"STATUS_CODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION\020\010\022)\n%PROT" +
"OCOL_STATUS_CODE_MXACCESS_FAILURE\020\t*\277\002\n\014" +
"SessionState\022\035\n\031SESSION_STATE_UNSPECIFIE" +
"D\020\000\022\032\n\026SESSION_STATE_CREATING\020\001\022!\n\035SESSI" +
"ON_STATE_STARTING_WORKER\020\002\022\"\n\036SESSION_ST" +
"ATE_WAITING_FOR_PIPE\020\003\022\035\n\031SESSION_STATE_" +
"HANDSHAKING\020\004\022%\n!SESSION_STATE_INITIALIZ" +
"ING_WORKER\020\005\022\027\n\023SESSION_STATE_READY\020\006\022\031\n" +
"\025SESSION_STATE_CLOSING\020\007\022\030\n\024SESSION_STAT" +
"E_CLOSED\020\010\022\031\n\025SESSION_STATE_FAULTED\020\t2\303\005" +
"\n\017MxAccessGateway\022]\n\013OpenSession\022\'.mxacc" +
"ess_gateway.v1.OpenSessionRequest\032%.mxac" +
"cess_gateway.v1.OpenSessionReply\022`\n\014Clos" +
"eSession\022(.mxaccess_gateway.v1.CloseSess" +
"ionRequest\032&.mxaccess_gateway.v1.CloseSe" +
"ssionReply\022T\n\006Invoke\022%.mxaccess_gateway." +
"v1.MxCommandRequest\032#.mxaccess_gateway.v" +
"1.MxCommandReply\022X\n\014StreamEvents\022(.mxacc" +
"ess_gateway.v1.StreamEventsRequest\032\034.mxa" +
"ccess_gateway.v1.MxEvent0\001\022l\n\020Acknowledg" +
"eAlarm\022,.mxaccess_gateway.v1.Acknowledge" +
"AlarmRequest\032*.mxaccess_gateway.v1.Ackno" +
"wledgeAlarmReply\022a\n\014StreamAlarms\022(.mxacc" +
"ess_gateway.v1.StreamAlarmsRequest\032%.mxa" +
"ccess_gateway.v1.AlarmFeedMessage0\001\022n\n\021Q" +
"ueryActiveAlarms\022-.mxaccess_gateway.v1.Q" +
"ueryActiveAlarmsRequest\032(.mxaccess_gatew" +
"ay.v1.ActiveAlarmSnapshot0\001B&\252\002#ZB.MOM.W" +
"W.MxGateway.Contracts.Protob\006proto3"
};
descriptor = com.google.protobuf.Descriptors.FileDescriptor
.internalBuildGeneratedFileFrom(descriptorData,
@@ -106023,7 +106275,7 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
internal_static_mxaccess_gateway_v1_QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload_fieldAccessorTable = new
com.google.protobuf.GeneratedMessage.FieldAccessorTable(
internal_static_mxaccess_gateway_v1_QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload_descriptor,
new java.lang.String[] { "Snapshots", });
new java.lang.String[] { "Snapshots", "SnapshotTruncated", });
internal_static_mxaccess_gateway_v1_MxEvent_descriptor =
getDescriptor().getMessageType(73);
internal_static_mxaccess_gateway_v1_MxEvent_fieldAccessorTable = new
@@ -106077,7 +106329,7 @@ public final class MxaccessGateway extends com.google.protobuf.GeneratedFile {
internal_static_mxaccess_gateway_v1_ActiveAlarmSnapshot_fieldAccessorTable = new
com.google.protobuf.GeneratedMessage.FieldAccessorTable(
internal_static_mxaccess_gateway_v1_ActiveAlarmSnapshot_descriptor,
new java.lang.String[] { "AlarmFullReference", "SourceObjectReference", "AlarmTypeName", "Severity", "OriginalRaiseTimestamp", "CurrentState", "Category", "Description", "LastTransitionTimestamp", "OperatorUser", "OperatorComment", "CurrentValue", "LimitValue", "Degraded", "SourceProvider", });
new java.lang.String[] { "AlarmFullReference", "SourceObjectReference", "AlarmTypeName", "Severity", "OriginalRaiseTimestamp", "CurrentState", "Category", "Description", "LastTransitionTimestamp", "OperatorUser", "OperatorComment", "CurrentValue", "LimitValue", "Degraded", "SourceProvider", "FromTruncatedSnapshot", });
internal_static_mxaccess_gateway_v1_AcknowledgeAlarmRequest_descriptor =
getDescriptor().getMessageType(82);
internal_static_mxaccess_gateway_v1_AcknowledgeAlarmRequest_fieldAccessorTable = new
+7
View File
@@ -115,6 +115,13 @@ messages from the gateway's central monitor), and
and ack target). Cancel the surrounding task or `aclose()` the iterator to
terminate the stream.
`ActiveAlarmSnapshot.from_truncated_snapshot` reports that the record came from
a provider fetch which hit the per-fetch cap: the snapshot set may omit active
alarms, and the gateway suspended its absence-implies-cleared inference for that
poll. Treat the set as possibly incomplete rather than reconciling deletions
from it. It is set-level degraded status, not a comment on the record's own
fidelity, and is distinct from `degraded` (the subtag fallback provider).
Canceling a Python task cancels the client-side gRPC call or stream wait. It
does not abort an in-flight MXAccess COM call inside the worker process.
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+10 -2
View File
@@ -121,8 +121,16 @@ creates an authenticated `tonic` client and attaches `authorization: Bearer
`close_session_raw`, `invoke_raw`, `stream_events`, `query_active_alarms`,
`stream_alarms`, `acknowledge_alarm`, and `raw_client`. `stream_alarms`
returns an `AlarmFeedStream` async stream of alarm-feed messages and
shares the gateway's central alarm monitor with every other client. The
session helpers keep MXAccess handles visible:
shares the gateway's central alarm monitor with every other client.
The `from_truncated_snapshot` field on `ActiveAlarmSnapshot` reports that the record came from
a provider fetch which hit the per-fetch cap: the snapshot set may omit active
alarms, and the gateway suspended its absence-implies-cleared inference for that
poll. Treat the set as possibly incomplete rather than reconciling deletions
from it. It is set-level degraded status, not a comment on the record's own
fidelity, and is distinct from `degraded` (the subtag fallback provider).
The session helpers keep MXAccess handles visible:
```rust
let session = client.open_session(request).await?;
@@ -726,6 +726,13 @@ message AcknowledgeAlarmReplyPayload {
// stream.
message QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload {
repeated ActiveAlarmSnapshot snapshots = 1;
// True when the provider fetch backing this reply came back holding the
// per-fetch cap (MxGateway:Alarms:MaxAlarmsPerFetch). The reply may then omit
// active alarms, and the worker suspends its absence-implies-Clear inference
// for that poll — so a reference missing from `snapshots` is not evidence the
// alarm cleared. Carried on the payload as well as per-record because a
// truncated fetch that filters down to zero records still has to say so.
bool snapshot_truncated = 2;
}
message MxEvent {
@@ -932,6 +939,16 @@ message ActiveAlarmSnapshot {
// OnAlarmTransitionEvent.source_provider; always ALARMMGR or SUBTAG on the
// wire (never UNSPECIFIED).
AlarmProviderMode source_provider = 15;
// True when the provider fetch that produced this snapshot hit the per-fetch
// cap: the snapshot set may omit active alarms, and the worker suspended its
// absence-implies-Clear inference for that poll. Says nothing about THIS
// record's fidelity — the record is as accurate as any other; it flags that
// the set it belongs to is possibly incomplete. QueryActiveAlarms returns a
// bare `stream ActiveAlarmSnapshot` with no envelope message, so a per-record
// boolean is the only additive way to carry set-level degraded status on that
// RPC. Distinct from `degraded`, which is about the subtag fallback provider.
// Additive (proto3): clients that ignore it deserialize the stream unchanged.
bool from_truncated_snapshot = 16;
}
enum AlarmConditionState {
+123
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
# Alarm Probe Findings
`WnWrapAlarmConsumer` rests on two assumptions that no unit test can settle, because both
are properties of AVEVA's alarm provider rather than of our code:
1. **GUID identity.** The snapshot diff in `ComputeTransitions` keys on the alarm record's
`GUID`. If wnwrap mints a fresh GUID when an alarm changes state, a single
`UNACK_ALM → ACK_ALM` transition reads as one alarm disappearing and a different one
appearing — a spurious clear plus a spurious raise on every acknowledge.
2. **`ALARM_RECORDS/@COUNT` semantics.** `IsTruncatedFetch` treats a reply holding exactly
`maxAlmCnt` records as truncated, because `GetXmlCurrentAlarms2` exposes no explicit
"more available" flag. If the reply's `COUNT` attribute carries the *total* active count
rather than the records-in-reply count, truncation detection can become exact instead of
conservative, and the bounded staleness `ApplySnapshotUpdate` accepts goes away.
This document records what a live probe run against the dev rig (`DESKTOP-6JL3KKO`,
2026-08-17) could and could not establish, so the next attempt starts from the blocker
rather than rediscovering it.
## Outcome
| Question | Status |
|---|---|
| GUID stable across polls and `ALM → RTN` | Answered — yes, by the 2026-05-01 capture in `AlarmClientDiscovery.md` |
| GUID stable across `UNACK → ACK`, and across clear-then-re-raise | **Open** |
| `COUNT` = total active vs records-in-reply under a capped fetch | **Open** |
Both open questions are blocked by the same thing: the rig has no active alarm and cannot
be driven into one over MXAccess, so there is no alarm instance whose GUID can be followed
through an acknowledge and no population large enough to overflow a capped fetch.
## Why The Rig Cannot Raise An Alarm
The rig is otherwise healthy, which is what makes the blocker specific rather than a
general "nothing works":
- `aaEngine`, `alarmmgr`, `NmxSvc`, and `wnwrapServerEx` are all running.
- `TestArea` (area of `TestMachine_001`…`_003`) and the objects themselves are deployed
(`deployed_version` non-null in the `ZB` Galaxy Repository) and on scan — the probe's
advised `ScanState` subtags report true, and every advised alarm attribute delivers an
initial value, so the MXAccess read path is live.
- The wnwrap consumer subscribes cleanly: `InitializeConsumer`, `RegisterConsumer`,
`Subscribe(\\DESKTOP-6JL3KKO\Galaxy!TestArea)`, and `SetXmlAlarmQuery` all return 0, and
`GetXmlCurrentAlarms2` returns well-formed XML on every poll.
What fails is the *write* that would set the alarm condition. Every `Write` to the alarm
UDAs completes with a security failure:
```
WRITE-COMPLETE hLMX=1 hItem=1 statuses=[success=0 category=SecurityError detectedBy=RespondingAutomationObject detail=1008 text=]
```
The status comes back from the responding automation object, not from the proxy, so the
request reaches the engine and the engine refuses it. The advised value confirms the
refusal is total rather than transient: neither the alarm UDA nor its `.InAlarm` /`.Acked`
subtags report any change after a write attempt, across six write attempts in one session
(raise, clear, re-raise, cleanup). The attributes carry a security classification that a
plain `Write` cannot satisfy.
The 2026-05-01 capture that answered the `ALM → RTN` leg did not hit this, because the
alarm condition was driven from *inside* the engine by a System Platform script rather than
from an external MXAccess client. That script is not running now, and the values sat idle
for the whole probe session.
### Unblocking
Any one of these makes both questions answerable, in rough order of cost:
- Re-enable the System Platform script that flips `TestMachine_001.TestAlarm001`
(referenced throughout `AlarmClientDiscovery.md`). It writes from inside the engine, so
the attribute's security classification does not apply.
- Drive the write through `AuthenticateUser` + `WriteSecured` with a Galaxy account
permitted on that classification. The worker already implements both verbs; the probe
used plain `Write`, which is the wrong verb for a secured attribute.
- Reclassify the test UDAs to free access in the IDE and redeploy `TestMachine_001`…`_003`.
Three separate objects are wired to the same alarm UDA name, so once writes land, a
`maxAlmCnt` of 1 or 2 forces truncation against three active alarms and answers the `COUNT`
question in the same run.
## Evidence
Snapshot payload, identical at every cap (1, 2, and 1024) and at every poll across the
~100-second session:
```xml
<?xml version="1.0"?><ALARM_RECORDS COUNT="0"></ALARM_RECORDS>
```
Two things follow from the empty case alone. `COUNT` is present on the root element in
every reply, so the attribute exists as a candidate signal rather than something wnwrap
omits. And `COUNT` agrees with the element count here — but trivially, since both are zero,
which is exactly the case that cannot discriminate the two hypotheses.
The probe used for the run was a throwaway file in the windev CI clone
(`C:\build\mxaccessgw-ci`), deleted afterwards; the clone is back to a clean tree at
`origin/main`. Nothing in this repository changed to run it. The reusable, Skip-gated
harness it was modelled on is
`src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Worker.Tests/Probes/WnWrapConsumerProbeTests.cs`.
## Implications
### Transition identity
`ComputeTransitions` keying on GUID is safe for the raise and clear legs, which is the
evidence `AlarmClientDiscovery.md` already carries. The acknowledge leg — the one where a
re-minted GUID would corrupt the feed, because an ack is the state change most likely to
create a new record in a provider that models acknowledgement as a separate event — is
still assumed rather than observed. Nothing here justifies changing the diff, but the
assumption should not be described in code as established.
### Truncation detection
`IsTruncatedFetch` stays as written. Tightening it to an exact test requires knowing that
`COUNT` reports the total, and this run cannot show that. The conservative rule keeps its
justification: at the cap, treating a complete fetch as truncated costs one poll of
staleness, while treating a truncated fetch as complete broadcasts clears for every alarm
past the cap.
The one substantive correction is to the phrasing rather than the logic. The reply is not
featureless — it carries a `COUNT` attribute the parser currently ignores. Whether that
attribute is a usable "more available" signal is unverified, not absent, and the comments
in `WnWrapAlarmConsumer` now say so.
+19 -2
View File
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ mxgateway apikey init-db
mxgateway apikey create-key --key-id ops.alice --display-name "Alice (ops)" --scopes read,write
mxgateway apikey create-key --key-id area1.reader --display-name "Area 1 reader" --scopes invoke:read,metadata:read --read-subtree "Area1/*" --browse-subtree "Area1/*"
mxgateway apikey create-key --key-id ops.temp --display-name "Temp contractor" --scopes invoke:read --expires 90d
mxgateway apikey create-key --key-id team-a.svc --display-name "Team A service" --scopes session:open,invoke:read --dashboard-tags team-a
mxgateway apikey create-key --key-id ops.audit --display-name "Audit window" --scopes metadata:read --expires 2027-01-01T00:00:00Z
mxgateway apikey list-keys --json
mxgateway apikey revoke-key --key-id ops.alice
@@ -272,8 +273,24 @@ mxgateway apikey rotate-key --key-id ops.alice
Constraint flags are optional. `--read-subtree`, `--write-subtree`,
`--read-tag-glob`, `--write-tag-glob`, and `--browse-subtree` are repeatable.
`--max-write-classification` accepts one integer. `--read-alarm-only` and
`--read-historized-only` are boolean flags. Existing rows with null constraints
remain fully unconstrained after migration.
`--read-historized-only` are boolean flags. `--dashboard-tags` takes a
comma-separated list (`--dashboard-tags team-a,team-b`) and is repeatable; its
segments are trimmed and de-duplicated ordinal-ignore-case, and an empty segment
is rejected rather than dropped so a stray comma cannot silently persist a grant
the operator did not write. It is the **only constraint flag** that splits its
value on commas (`--scopes`, which is not a constraint, is the other flag that
does): the repeatable subtree and glob flags each take exactly one value per
occurrence, so `--read-subtree "Area1/*,Area2/*"` is a single literal pattern
containing a comma, not two patterns. Repeat the flag instead. Existing rows with null constraints remain fully
unconstrained after migration; rows written before `--dashboard-tags` existed
deserialize as untagged, unchanged in every other respect.
`--dashboard-tags` is *not* a data-access constraint — it only labels the key for
dashboard event visibility, and sessions the key opens inherit it. See
[Authorization](./Authorization.md#constraint-enforcement).
`list-keys` prints the tags as a trailing tab-separated column (`-` when
untagged); the values are operator-chosen labels, not key material.
Key ids are restricted by the parser to ASCII letters, digits, periods, and hyphens
so they remain safe to embed in the token format and in URL paths used by
+24
View File
@@ -178,6 +178,30 @@ Supported constraints are:
| `browse_subtrees` | Contained-path globs used to filter Galaxy browse results and deploy-event counts. |
| `read_alarm_only` | Read/subscription commands must target objects with alarm-bearing attributes. |
| `read_historized_only` | Read/subscription commands must target objects with historized attributes. |
| `dashboard_tags` | Dashboard event-visibility tags. **Not a data-access constraint** — see below. |
`dashboard_tags` is the one member of the blob that constrains nothing on the
gRPC data path. No read, write, browse, or subscribe check consults it, and
`HasReadConstraints` / `HasWriteConstraints` deliberately ignore it: adding a tag
neither widens nor narrows what a key may read or write. It rides in the same
serialized blob only to avoid an auth-store schema migration
(`docs/plans/2026-07-10-dashboard-session-acl-tst15.md` §3.1).
Its sole purpose is dashboard event visibility. A session records the tags of the
API key that opened it (`GatewaySession.Tags`, immutable for the session's life,
compared ordinal-ignore-case). The tags come from the owning key, never from the
client's `OpenSession` request, so a client cannot label its own session with
another tenant's tag. A key with no tags opens untagged sessions.
Tags are set at key creation with
`apikey create-key --dashboard-tags team-a,team-b` (repeatable; segments are
trimmed and de-duplicated ordinal-ignore-case). Keys created from the dashboard
API Keys page are currently always untagged.
The tag is carried end to end today; the dashboard ACL that consumes it — scoping
a Viewer's `EventsHub` subscriptions to the sessions their LDAP groups are
granted — is a separate change. Until it lands, the tag affects nothing at
runtime.
Glob matching is anchored, case-insensitive, and supports `*` and `?`.
Subtree and tag glob lists are alternatives: matching either list allows that
+42 -4
View File
@@ -199,12 +199,50 @@ Consequences, and how this sits with the existing failover/reconcile design:
goes to the worker's console/stderr, which is captured on dev hosts but is
not a metric, not a dashboard tile, and not part of any session-status or
alarm-feed payload, so a production deployment can truncate indefinitely
without anyone noticing. Surfacing truncation as a **structural** degraded
status (a field on the alarm-provider mode/status surface the dashboard and
`StreamAlarms` consumers already read) is filed as a follow-up; until it
lands, the log line is the only signal. A galaxy that truncates persistently
without anyone noticing. The structural signal that fixes this landed
separately — see the next decision. A galaxy that truncates persistently
is a configuration problem: raise `MxGateway:Alarms:MaxAlarmsPerFetch`.
### Alarms — truncation is reported per record on the public snapshot stream
Decision (2026-08-17): the truncated-fetch verdict above is carried to clients as
`QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload.snapshot_truncated` on the worker IPC reply and as
`ActiveAlarmSnapshot.from_truncated_snapshot` on **every record** of the public
`QueryActiveAlarms` stream, with a matching `IGatewayAlarmService.SnapshotTruncated`
driving a dashboard banner. Both fields are additive proto3 booleans.
A per-record boolean is an odd shape for what is set-level status, so the reason
matters: `rpc QueryActiveAlarms(QueryActiveAlarmsRequest) returns (stream
ActiveAlarmSnapshot)` returns a *bare* message stream. There is no envelope, no
header message, and no trailing summary to hang a set-level field off. Adding one
would mean either a new wrapper message (breaking every existing client's stream
element type) or a trailing metadata convention (invisible to clients that stop
reading early). Stamping the flag identically on each record is the only carrier
that is additive on the wire: clients that ignore the field deserialize exactly
as before. Consumers should read it as "the set this record belongs to may be
incomplete", never as a statement about the record's own fidelity — that is what
`degraded` / `source_provider` mean, and the two are independent. The reply
payload carries the flag as well because a prefix filter (or an empty galaxy) can
leave zero records, and a truncated fetch with nothing to report still has to say
so.
The **detection heuristic is unchanged**: `IsTruncatedFetch` remains
`fetchedRecordCount >= maxAlarmsPerFetch`. The live probe run for this work could
not verify whether `ALARM_RECORDS/@COUNT` reports the total active count or only
the records in the reply (`docs/AlarmProbeFindings.md`), and an exact-looking
signal derived from an unverified attribute is worse than an honest heuristic —
it would read as precise while being wrong in the one direction that matters.
Switching to `@COUNT` stays blocked on probe evidence.
The flag is **not latched**. It is replaced by each fetch's verdict, so the first
sub-cap fetch clears it, and `GatewayAlarmMonitor.ClearCache` drops it with the
cache generation it describes. A caveat that never turns off is a caveat
operators learn to ignore.
This is gateway metadata about **our** fetch mechanics, not a claim about MXAccess
behaviour, so it is not a parity deviation: no event is synthesized and no
MXAccess-observable semantics change.
## Session-Resilience Epic Scope
Decision (2026-07-09, archreview TST-04; migrated here 2026-08-07 from the retired
+1 -1
View File
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ events (a "gap") and must re-snapshot; whatever is still retained is replayed.
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:SnapshotIntervalMilliseconds` | `1000` | Dashboard snapshot refresh interval used by the snapshot SignalR hub and the pages that subscribe to it. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:RecentFaultLimit` | `100` | Maximum number of fault summaries projected into each dashboard snapshot. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:RecentSessionLimit` | `200` | Maximum number of session summaries projected into each dashboard snapshot. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:ShowTagValues` | `false` | Controls whether tag values reach the dashboard's SignalR events hub mirror. `false` (default): `DashboardEventBroadcaster` blanks tag values from a deep-cloned copy of each `MxEvent` before it reaches any hub subscriber — event metadata (tag reference, quality, status, timestamps) still renders; see `docs/GatewayDashboardDesign.md`'s `EventsHub` row for the mechanism. Security-relevant because the per-session hub ACL that would scope a Viewer to specific sessions does not exist yet: with no per-session scoping, this redaction is currently the only thing standing between a low-trust Viewer and other sessions' tag values, so setting this `true` exposes every session's tag values to every authenticated dashboard viewer. The flag gates only the SignalR hub mirror — it does **not** cover the `/browse` live-value display, which remains a separate, still-open residual. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:ShowTagValues` | `false` | Controls whether tag values reach the dashboard's SignalR events hub mirror. `false` (default): `DashboardEventBroadcaster` blanks tag values from a deep-cloned copy of each `MxEvent` before it reaches any hub subscriber — event metadata (tag reference, quality, status, timestamps) still renders; see `docs/GatewayDashboardDesign.md`'s `EventsHub` row for the mechanism. This is now the second of two independent layers, not the only one: `IDashboardSessionAcl` decides *which* sessions a caller may subscribe to at all (see `GroupToTag` / `UntaggedSessionVisibility` below), while this flag decides what a permitted subscriber sees. Setting it `true` therefore exposes tag values to everyone the ACL admits — every Administrator, plus each Viewer holding a matching tag. The flag gates only the SignalR hub mirror — it does **not** cover the `/browse` live-value display, which remains a separate, still-open residual. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole` | _(empty)_ | LDAP group → dashboard role mapping. Keys are LDAP group names (short CN or full DN — leading-RDN match). Values must be `Admin` (read/write, API-key CRUD) or `Viewer` (read-only). A user whose LDAP groups don't intersect this map cannot sign in; with no mapping at all, only the loopback bypass admits anyone. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag` | _(empty)_ | LDAP group → dashboard visibility tags. Keys follow the same convention as `GroupToRole` (short CN or full DN — leading-RDN match, case-insensitive); values are tag lists. A dashboard user's granted tag set is the union over the groups they belong to; an unmapped group contributes nothing. **Visibility only:** tags scope which sessions' event streams a Viewer may observe on the dashboard — they never grant or deny data access, which stays with the API key's scopes and constraints. Independent of `GroupToRole`: a group may appear in either map, both, or neither. Empty (the default) means Viewers hold no tags, so under the default `UntaggedSessionVisibility` they observe no session's events. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility` | `AdminOnly` | Who may observe a session that carries no tags (its owning API key declared none). `AdminOnly` (default, fail-closed) restricts untagged sessions to dashboard Administrators. `AllViewers` shows them to every Viewer — opt-in for a single-tenant deployment that wants the pre-tag behaviour. Administrators always see every session regardless of tags. |
+27 -7
View File
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ bearer). Each hub class is `[Authorize(Policy = HubClientsPolicy)]`.
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `DashboardSnapshotHub` | `/hubs/snapshot` | `DashboardSnapshotPublisher` (BackgroundService consuming `IDashboardSnapshotService.WatchSnapshotsAsync`) | `DashboardSnapshot` | Sent to all connected clients on every snapshot tick, but only while at least one client is connected (see "Idle gating" below); new connections receive the current snapshot synchronously in `OnConnectedAsync`. |
| `AlarmsHub` | `/hubs/alarms` | `AlarmsHubPublisher` (BackgroundService consuming `IGatewayAlarmService.StreamAsync(filter: null)`) | `AlarmFeedMessage` (`active_alarm` / `snapshot_complete` / `transition`) | Connected clients auto-join `__alarms__`; all clients receive every message. Publisher auto-reconnects every 5s on stream faults. |
| `EventsHub` | `/hubs/events` | `DashboardEventBroadcaster` invoked by each session's internal dashboard-mirror subscriber on its `SessionEventDistributor` (registered when the session becomes Ready) | `MxEvent` | Clients call `SubscribeSession(sessionId)` to join `session:{id}`, which also registers them in `EventsHubViewerRegistry` — the mirror is gated on that registry, which counts hub and in-process viewers alike (see "Mirror gating" below). The dashboard is a first-class distributor subscriber, so it receives the session's events whether or not a gRPC client is streaming. It sees RAW session events — not the per-gRPC-subscriber `AfterWorkerSequence` filtering that `EventStreamService` applies at its own boundary — because the dashboard is a separate LDAP-authenticated monitoring view meant to show the session's full event activity. Tag values are stripped from the mirrored `MxEvent` copy by `DashboardEventBroadcaster` when `Dashboard:ShowTagValues` is false (the default) — event metadata (tag reference, quality, status, timestamps) still renders, but the value fields are blanked, so no value leaks through this seam. The per-session ACL that would scope a Viewer to specific sessions is still outstanding for this seam and the in-process one alike (SEC-25 / remediation roadmap item 12); the value redaction is the near-term hardening that closes the value-leak seam independently of that ACL. |
| `EventsHub` | `/hubs/events` | `DashboardEventBroadcaster` invoked by each session's internal dashboard-mirror subscriber on its `SessionEventDistributor` (registered when the session becomes Ready) | `MxEvent` | Clients call `SubscribeSession(sessionId)` to join `session:{id}`, which also registers them in `EventsHubViewerRegistry` — the mirror is gated on that registry, which counts hub and in-process viewers alike (see "Mirror gating" below). The dashboard is a first-class distributor subscriber, so it receives the session's events whether or not a gRPC client is streaming. It sees RAW session events — not the per-gRPC-subscriber `AfterWorkerSequence` filtering that `EventStreamService` applies at its own boundary — because the dashboard is a separate LDAP-authenticated monitoring view meant to show the session's full event activity. Tag values are stripped from the mirrored `MxEvent` copy by `DashboardEventBroadcaster` when `Dashboard:ShowTagValues` is false (the default) — event metadata (tag reference, quality, status, timestamps) still renders, but the value fields are blanked, so no value leaks through this seam. `SubscribeSession` is gated by `IDashboardSessionAcl` (SEC-25 / TST-15): a denied caller gets a `HubException`, is not joined to the group, and is not registered as a viewer, so the mirror stays off for a session nobody is legitimately watching. The same ACL gates the in-process seam the session-details page uses, so neither path is the weaker one. Value redaction remains an independent layer — it bounds what a *permitted* subscriber sees. |
### Default cadences
@@ -696,9 +696,26 @@ The in-process page feeds carry no authentication of their own, and need none:
`MapRazorComponents<App>()` applies `RequireAuthorization(ViewerPolicy)` to the
component endpoints, so a page can only run inside a circuit whose principal is
already an authorized Viewer. The hub-token flow below therefore covers only the
remote hub surface. Neither seam scopes a Viewer to particular sessions — SEC-25
(the per-session ACL) is outstanding for both, and the mirror's value redaction
remains the near-term mitigation, unchanged by the move in-process.
remote hub surface.
Neither policy scopes a Viewer to particular sessions — that is
`IDashboardSessionAcl`'s job (SEC-25 / TST-15), consulted by both subscribe seams:
`EventsHub.SubscribeSession` for remote hub clients and the session-details page's
in-process subscribe, which renders an inline denial instead of subscribing. The
decision is: authenticated Administrator → allow (checked before the session is
looked up, so an Administrator naming a session that just closed is still allowed);
unknown session id → deny; untagged session → `Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility`
(`AdminOnly` by default); otherwise allow iff the session's tags intersect the
caller's granted tags, ordinal-ignore-case. A session's tags are inherited from its
owning API key's `--dashboard-tags` constraint and are immutable for the session's
life, so a subscribe-time decision cannot go stale while the subscription lives and
no per-event re-check is needed. A Viewer's grant comes from
`Dashboard:GroupToTag` applied to their LDAP groups, stamped as
`zb:dashboardtag` claims at cookie login and re-resolved (not copied) at hub-token
mint, so the token's 5-minute lifetime bounds how long a revoked grant survives. A
principal carrying no tag claims — anonymous localhost included — is an
empty-grant Viewer. The mirror's value redaction is an independent layer: it bounds
what a permitted subscriber sees, not who may subscribe.
Two environmental bypasses still apply, both scoped to **read-only** access:
`MxGateway:Authentication:Mode = Disabled` and `MxGateway:Dashboard:AllowAnonymousLocalhost`
@@ -781,9 +798,12 @@ carry no server-side revocation state (no jti denylist). A token captured before
logout remains valid until it expires, and a role change or key revocation does
not take effect on an already-issued token until then. The 5-minute lifetime is
the deliberate mitigation: it bounds that exposure window without the cost of a
revocation store. Server-side revocation is deferred until per-session hub ACLs
land (see the per-session-ACL note), at which point tokens gain session/role
binding and a denylist becomes worthwhile.
revocation store. It now bounds a stale *tag* grant the same way: the token carries
the tags resolved from the caller's LDAP groups at mint time, so removing a
`GroupToTag` entry takes effect for token-authenticated hub connections within one
lifetime. That is where the per-session ACL's revocation need landed — a jti
denylist stays deferred, since the short lifetime already bounds every grant the
token carries.
## Configuration
+8
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,14 @@ public void TransitionTo(SessionState nextState)
`Closed` is terminal, `Faulted` only allows a transition to `Closed`, and `Closing` only allows a transition to `Closed` or `Faulted`. This guards against late callbacks (worker exit, heartbeat timeout) re-animating a session that is already tearing down or torn down — once `CloseAsync` has set `Closing` under `_syncRoot`, no `TransitionTo(Ready)` from another thread can walk the session back to `Ready`. Both close-related writes (`Closing` and `Closed`) go through `_syncRoot` exactly like every other state write; `_closeLock` only serializes concurrent close attempts.
#### Session tags and dashboard event visibility
`GatewaySession.Tags` is an immutable, ordinal-ignore-case set of dashboard visibility tags, stamped once at construction from the `ownerDashboardTags` argument and never mutated for the session's life. The values come from the owning API key's `ApiKeyConstraints.DashboardTags` (set with `apikey --dashboard-tags`), which `MxAccessGatewayService` reads off the authenticated caller and passes to the tagged `OpenSessionAsync` overload. They are never read from the client's wire request, so a client cannot label its own session with another tenant's tag. A session whose owner key declared no tags — and every session opened through the tagless `OpenSessionAsync` overload, which unit-test fakes inherit by default — is untagged.
Tags gate **visibility only**: which sessions' event metadata a dashboard user may observe. They are not a data-access constraint, so they neither widen nor narrow what the owning key can read or write, and they play no part in the gRPC event stream, whose attach check is owner-key identity (see [Reconnect and replay](#reconnect-and-replay)).
`IDashboardSessionAcl.CanViewSession` is the single decision both dashboard subscribe seams consult — `EventsHub.SubscribeSession` for remote hub clients and the session-details page's in-process subscribe. An authenticated Administrator is allowed first, before the session is even looked up; otherwise an unknown session id is denied, an untagged session follows `MxGateway:Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility` (`AdminOnly` by default), and a tagged session is allowed only when its tags intersect the caller's granted tags. A Viewer's grant comes from `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag` applied to their LDAP groups; a principal carrying no tag claims — anonymous localhost included — is an empty-grant Viewer and sees no tagged session. Because `Tags` is immutable, the decision taken at subscribe time cannot go stale while the subscription lives, so there is no per-event re-check. See `docs/GatewayDashboardDesign.md`.
### SessionManager (ISessionManager)
`SessionManager` is the orchestrator. It exposes `OpenSessionAsync`, `TryGetSession`, `InvokeAsync`, `CloseSessionAsync`, `KillWorkerAsync`, `CloseExpiredLeasesAsync`, and `ShutdownAsync`. It composes `ISessionRegistry`, `ISessionWorkerClientFactory`, `GatewayMetrics`, and `GatewayOptions`.
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
# Dashboard EventsHub per-session ACL (TST-15 / SEC-25 · session-resilience epic Phase 4)
Status: **Design** — approved-to-implement pending the schema-touch call in §9.
Status: **Implemented** — branch `feat/deferred-closeout`, 2026-08-17, commits
`693a78d` + `7ec0b35`. As-built notes in §12; the sections above are the design as
approved, kept for the rationale they record.
Findings: TST-15 (`Medium`, P2), SEC-25 (`Low`, P2). Epic tasks: 16–19 of
`docs/plans/2026-06-15-session-resilience.md`.
Depends on: TST-02 (owner-scoped gRPC attach, shipped P0), SEC-25 near-term
@@ -295,3 +297,74 @@ to defer heavy revocation.
- **Staleness bound.** A revoked tag grant takes effect within one token lifetime
(≤5 min) for token-auth connections and immediately for a fresh cookie login.
```
## 12. As-built notes (enforcement landed 2026-08)
### 12.1 §4's "no second seam" no longer held — the ACL gates two
This design was written against a dashboard whose only route to a session's event
feed was the SignalR hub, which is why §4 concludes "gating at join is sufficient —
there is no second seam to guard". The 2026-08 in-process feed refactor invalidated
that premise: server-rendered pages stopped opening a loopback SignalR connection to
`/hubs/events` and now read the mirror directly through
`IDashboardSessionEventSubscriber.Subscribe(sessionId)` (`DashboardEventBroadcaster`
implements both the publish and subscribe interfaces). `SessionDetailsPage` is that
second consumer, and it never touches `SubscribeSession`, so a hub-only gate would
have left the page as an ungated path to the same events.
The shipped enforcement therefore puts the *same* `IDashboardSessionAcl` decision in
front of both subscribe calls:
- `EventsHub.SubscribeSession` — denies with `HubException("Not authorized for this
session.")` before the group join **and** before the `EventsHubViewerRegistry`
registration, so a denied caller neither receives events nor turns the mirror on.
- `SessionDetailsPage` — resolves the circuit principal via
`AuthenticationStateProvider` and checks the ACL *before* `Subscribe(SessionId)`.
A denial creates no subscription, starts no pump, and registers no viewer; the
events panel renders "Not authorized for this session's events." in place of its
empty state. The gate wraps only whether the subscription is created — the page's
generation/`ReferenceEquals` guards, `MarkDisconnectedAsync`, and the
`DisposeAsync`/`DetachEventsAsync` coupling are untouched.
Both seams remain subscribe-time-only. Session tags are immutable for the session's
life (§3), so a joined group or a live in-process subscription cannot go stale, and
no per-event check is needed on either path.
### 12.2 Where the grant is stamped
`zb:dashboardtag` claims are added at both principal-construction sites:
`DashboardAuthenticator.CreatePrincipal` (cookie login, so a circuit carries its
grant without a token round-trip) and `HubTokenService.Issue` (hub bearer). Both
resolve the grant from the caller's `mxgateway:ldap_group` claims through
`DashboardGroupTagMapping` + `Dashboard:GroupToTag` rather than copying tag claims
already on the principal — re-resolving at mint is what makes the token's 5-minute
lifetime an actual staleness bound on a changed grant, as §4 claims. Tags are
stamped for Administrators too; they are simply moot, because the ACL's admin bypass
is checked first.
### 12.3 Deviations worth knowing
- `CanViewSession` takes a **nullable** `ClaimsPrincipal`. `HubCallerContext.User` is
nullable, and null denies — the fail-closed reading.
- The admin bypass additionally requires `Identity.IsAuthenticated`, matching
`DashboardSessionAdminService.CanManage`. A role claim on an unauthenticated
identity does not bypass.
- Tag *values* are never logged at either seam; only the identifiers and the
allow/deny outcome are observable.
- **The page gate needed a re-entrancy guard.** Making `AttachEvents` async (it now
awaits the authentication state) introduced a suspension point the synchronous
version did not have, and with it a window: on a rapid A → B navigation the
suspended A continuation resumes, re-reads the live `SessionId` — now B's — and
attaches B a second time, overwriting the fields that hold B's first subscription.
That subscription is then unreachable: never disposed, its `EventsHubViewerRegistry`
entry never released (so the mirror keeps cloning events for it), its pump never
cancelled. Not an ACL bypass — the newer attach had already cleared the same session
— but a resource leak the ACL work created. `OnParametersSetAsync` now claims a
monotonic `_attachGeneration` synchronously before its first await, and
`AttachEventsAsync` re-checks it after the await and before any field write or
`Subscribe`; a stale attach returns without attaching (it owns nothing, and tearing
down would destroy the newer attach's subscription). `DetachEventsAsync` needs no
guard: it captures and nulls the live fields synchronously before it awaits.
- The admin-bypass-before-lookup ordering means an Administrator naming a session id
the registry does not have is **allowed**, not denied. Deliberate, and pinned by a
test so a "look the session up first" refactor cannot flip it silently.
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
{
"planPath": "docs/plans/2026-08-17-deferred-closeout.md",
"tasks": [
{ "id": 1, "subject": "Task 1: Remove dead ISessionManager.ReadEventsAsync chain", "status": "pending" },
{ "id": 2, "subject": "Task 2: Frame-writer lock-parking — unpark awaited control-frame completion", "status": "pending" },
{ "id": 3, "subject": "Task 3: windev live-alarm probes — GUID identity, ALARM_RECORDS/@COUNT", "status": "pending" },
{ "id": 4, "subject": "Task 4: SEC-25 groundwork — DashboardTags on key, Tags on session", "status": "pending", "blockedBy": [1] },
{ "id": 5, "subject": "Task 5: SEC-25 config — GroupToTag, UntaggedSessionVisibility, validator, mapper", "status": "pending" },
{ "id": 6, "subject": "Task 6: SEC-25 enforcement — ACL, token/cookie tag claims, both seams gated", "status": "pending", "blockedBy": [4, 5] },
{ "id": 7, "subject": "Task 7: SEC-25 closure — live-LDAP tests, docs sweep, design-doc status", "status": "pending", "blockedBy": [6] },
{ "id": 8, "subject": "Task 8: Alarm-truncation degraded-status signal — proto + worker + gateway + dashboard", "status": "pending", "blockedBy": [3] },
{ "id": 9, "subject": "Task 9: Client regeneration + rebuild for new alarm fields", "status": "pending", "blockedBy": [8] },
{ "id": 10, "subject": "Task 10: Phase gate — full gateway suite on macOS", "status": "pending", "blockedBy": [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] },
{ "id": 1, "subject": "Task 1: Remove dead ISessionManager.ReadEventsAsync chain", "status": "completed" },
{ "id": 2, "subject": "Task 2: Frame-writer lock-parking — unpark awaited control-frame completion", "status": "completed" },
{ "id": 3, "subject": "Task 3: windev live-alarm probes — GUID identity, ALARM_RECORDS/@COUNT", "status": "completed" },
{ "id": 4, "subject": "Task 4: SEC-25 groundwork — DashboardTags on key, Tags on session", "status": "completed", "blockedBy": [1] },
{ "id": 5, "subject": "Task 5: SEC-25 config — GroupToTag, UntaggedSessionVisibility, validator, mapper", "status": "completed" },
{ "id": 6, "subject": "Task 6: SEC-25 enforcement — ACL, token/cookie tag claims, both seams gated", "status": "completed", "blockedBy": [4, 5] },
{ "id": 7, "subject": "Task 7: SEC-25 closure — live-LDAP tests, docs sweep, design-doc status", "status": "completed", "blockedBy": [6] },
{ "id": 8, "subject": "Task 8: Alarm-truncation degraded-status signal — proto + worker + gateway + dashboard", "status": "completed", "blockedBy": [3] },
{ "id": 9, "subject": "Task 9: Client regeneration + rebuild for new alarm fields", "status": "completed", "blockedBy": [8] },
{ "id": 10, "subject": "Task 10: Phase gate — full gateway suite on macOS", "status": "completed", "blockedBy": [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] },
{ "id": 11, "subject": "Task 11: windev gate — full Windows verification", "status": "pending", "blockedBy": [2, 10] },
{ "id": 12, "subject": "Task 12: Wrap-up — closure notes, umbrella check, final review", "status": "pending", "blockedBy": [11] }
],
+33 -1
View File
@@ -240,6 +240,24 @@ monitoring (forced)") when subtag mode is the configured `Fallback:Mode=ForceSub
as a fault. Metrics: `mxgateway.alarms.provider_mode` gauge (1 = alarmmgr,
2 = subtag) and `mxgateway.alarms.provider_switches` counter.
**Truncated-snapshot visibility:** `GetXmlCurrentAlarms2` caps its reply at
`MxGateway:Alarms:MaxAlarmsPerFetch` and offers no confirmed "more available"
flag, so a reply holding exactly the cap is treated as truncated. On such a
fetch `WnWrapAlarmConsumer` merges rather than replaces its retained snapshot,
which suppresses the absence-implies-Clear inference and keeps a capped poll
from broadcasting Clears for alarms it simply had no room to mention. That
suppression is reported structurally rather than only in a rate-limited worker
warning: the `QueryActiveAlarms` reply payload carries `snapshot_truncated`,
every `ActiveAlarmSnapshot` in it carries `from_truncated_snapshot`, and the
dashboard Alarms tab shows a warning banner while the flag is set. The flag
means "this active set may be incomplete", not "this record is unreliable" —
it is independent of the subtag-fallback `degraded` field above. It is not
latched: the first fetch that comes back under the cap is complete, restores
absence authority, and clears it. Detection remains the record-count heuristic;
the reply's `ALARM_RECORDS/@COUNT` attribute would make the test exact only if
it reported the total active count rather than the records in the reply, which
a live probe could not discriminate (see `docs/AlarmProbeFindings.md`).
Forced modes are available via `MxGateway:Alarms:Fallback:Mode`:
`ForceAlarmManager` disables failover; `ForceSubtag` forces the standby
on from startup; `Auto` (default) enables failover and failback. Watch-list
@@ -259,12 +277,26 @@ and no `MxGateway:Dashboard:CookieName` override is set; otherwise it is named
it is dropped for HTTP-dev or custom-name deployments). `/logout` clears it.
Login and logout
posts validate antiforgery tokens. SignalR hub connections accept either the
cookie or a 30-minute data-protected bearer minted at `/hubs/token`.
cookie or a 5-minute data-protected bearer minted at `/hubs/token`.
`MxGateway:Dashboard:AllowAnonymousLocalhost` permits loopback to bypass the
cookie requirement; remote requests always require an authenticated principal
with at least the Viewer role. Setting `MxGateway:Dashboard:Enabled` to
`false` leaves the dashboard and hub routes unmapped.
A dashboard role alone does not decide *which* sessions a user may watch:
`IDashboardSessionAcl` gates both event-subscribe seams — `EventsHub.SubscribeSession`
for remote hub clients and the session-details page's in-process subscribe — so
neither is the weaker path. An authenticated Administrator is allowed
unconditionally; every other caller may observe a session only when the session's
tags intersect the tags their LDAP groups grant through
`MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag`. A session's tags are inherited from its owning
API key's `--dashboard-tags` constraint, never from the client's request, so a
client cannot label its own session with another tenant's tag. Untagged sessions
follow `MxGateway:Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility`, which defaults to
`AdminOnly`; a principal with no tag claims — anonymous localhost included — is an
empty-grant Viewer and sees no tagged session. Tags gate visibility only and are
never a data-access grant.
### Worker Process
Runtime:
+23
View File
@@ -92,6 +92,29 @@ See [Provisioning the GwAdmin group](#provisioning-the-gwadmin-group) below for
> `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole` — same operations are authorized. (This
> dashboard role is distinct from the lowercase gRPC `admin` *API-key scope*.)
### Dashboard visibility tags in the live tests
`DashboardLdapLiveTests` covers the per-session dashboard event ACL (SEC-25) against this
directory. **No GLAuth change was needed, and none was made** — the tag layer is entirely
config-side, so the fixture simply names groups that already exist:
| Fixture `MxGateway:Dashboard` setting | Value |
| --- | --- |
| `GroupToRole` | `GwAdmin` → `Administrator`, `GwReader` → `Viewer` |
| `GroupToTag` | `GwReader` → `team-a` |
| `UntaggedSessionVisibility` | `AdminOnly` (the shipped default, stated explicitly because the assertions read it) |
`team-a` and `team-b` are operator-chosen labels that exist only in the test's configuration
and on its in-memory sessions; nothing in the directory carries them. `gw-viewer` therefore
logs in as a Viewer granted `team-a` and is admitted to a `team-a`-tagged session but refused a
`team-b`-tagged one. `multi-role` is a member of **both** `GwAdmin` and `GwReader`, so this map
grants it `team-a` as well — its `team-a` allow would hold even without the Administrator
bypass, which is why the bypass is asserted on the `team-b` and untagged sessions instead.
What only a live bind proves here is that the group names `ILdapAuthService` returns from this
directory (short RDN values, not DNs) are the ones `GroupToTag` keys match; a fabricated
principal cannot show that.
## Two bind patterns
### 1. Direct bind (simplest)
@@ -285,248 +285,249 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
"ASgJEhcKD214YWNjZXNzX3Byb2dpZBgDIAEoCRIWCg5teGFjY2Vzc19jbHNp",
"ZBgEIAEoCSJAChBEcmFpbkV2ZW50c1JlcGx5EiwKBmV2ZW50cxgBIAMoCzIc",
"Lm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuTXhFdmVudCI1ChxBY2tub3dsZWRnZUFs",
"YXJtUmVwbHlQYXlsb2FkEhUKDW5hdGl2ZV9zdGF0dXMYASABKAUiXAodUXVl",
"YXJtUmVwbHlQYXlsb2FkEhUKDW5hdGl2ZV9zdGF0dXMYASABKAUieAodUXVl",
"cnlBY3RpdmVBbGFybXNSZXBseVBheWxvYWQSOwoJc25hcHNob3RzGAEgAygL",
"MigubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5BY3RpdmVBbGFybVNuYXBzaG90Io8I",
"CgdNeEV2ZW50EjIKBmZhbWlseRgBIAEoDjIiLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXku",
"djEuTXhFdmVudEZhbWlseRISCgpzZXNzaW9uX2lkGAIgASgJEhUKDXNlcnZl",
"cl9oYW5kbGUYAyABKAUSEwoLaXRlbV9oYW5kbGUYBCABKAUSKwoFdmFsdWUY",
"BSABKAsyHC5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14VmFsdWUSDwoHcXVhbGl0",
"eRgGIAEoBRI0ChBzb3VyY2VfdGltZXN0YW1wGAcgASgLMhouZ29vZ2xlLnBy",
"b3RvYnVmLlRpbWVzdGFtcBI0CghzdGF0dXNlcxgIIAMoCzIiLm14YWNjZXNz",
"X2dhdGV3YXkudjEuTXhTdGF0dXNQcm94eRIXCg93b3JrZXJfc2VxdWVuY2UY",
"CSABKAQSNAoQd29ya2VyX3RpbWVzdGFtcBgKIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90",
"b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXASPQoZZ2F0ZXdheV9yZWNlaXZlX3RpbWVzdGFtcBgL",
"IAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXASFAoHaHJlc3VsdBgM",
"IAEoBUgBiAEBEhIKCnJhd19zdGF0dXMYDSABKAkSNwoKcmVwbGF5X2dhcBgO",
"IAEoCzIeLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuUmVwbGF5R2FwSAKIAQESQAoO",
"b25fZGF0YV9jaGFuZ2UYFCABKAsyJi5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk9u",
"RGF0YUNoYW5nZUV2ZW50SAASRgoRb25fd3JpdGVfY29tcGxldGUYFSABKAsy",
"KS5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk9uV3JpdGVDb21wbGV0ZUV2ZW50SAAS",
"SQoSb3BlcmF0aW9uX2NvbXBsZXRlGBYgASgLMisubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdh",
"eS52MS5PcGVyYXRpb25Db21wbGV0ZUV2ZW50SAASUQoXb25fYnVmZmVyZWRf",
"ZGF0YV9jaGFuZ2UYFyABKAsyLi5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk9uQnVm",
"ZmVyZWREYXRhQ2hhbmdlRXZlbnRIABJKChNvbl9hbGFybV90cmFuc2l0aW9u",
"GBggASgLMisubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5PbkFsYXJtVHJhbnNpdGlv",
"bkV2ZW50SAASXgoeb25fYWxhcm1fcHJvdmlkZXJfbW9kZV9jaGFuZ2VkGBkg",
"ASgLMjQubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5PbkFsYXJtUHJvdmlkZXJNb2Rl",
"Q2hhbmdlZEV2ZW50SABCBgoEYm9keUIKCghfaHJlc3VsdEINCgtfcmVwbGF5",
"X2dhcCJQCglSZXBsYXlHYXASIAoYcmVxdWVzdGVkX2FmdGVyX3NlcXVlbmNl",
"GAEgASgEEiEKGW9sZGVzdF9hdmFpbGFibGVfc2VxdWVuY2UYAiABKAQiEwoR",
"T25EYXRhQ2hhbmdlRXZlbnQiFgoUT25Xcml0ZUNvbXBsZXRlRXZlbnQiGAoW",
"T3BlcmF0aW9uQ29tcGxldGVFdmVudCLUAQoZT25CdWZmZXJlZERhdGFDaGFu",
"Z2VFdmVudBIyCglkYXRhX3R5cGUYASABKA4yHy5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5",
"LnYxLk14RGF0YVR5cGUSNAoOcXVhbGl0eV92YWx1ZXMYAiABKAsyHC5teGFj",
"Y2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14QXJyYXkSNgoQdGltZXN0YW1wX3ZhbHVlcxgD",
"IAEoCzIcLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuTXhBcnJheRIVCg1yYXdfZGF0",
"YV90eXBlGAQgASgFItAEChZPbkFsYXJtVHJhbnNpdGlvbkV2ZW50EhwKFGFs",
"YXJtX2Z1bGxfcmVmZXJlbmNlGAEgASgJEh8KF3NvdXJjZV9vYmplY3RfcmVm",
"ZXJlbmNlGAIgASgJEhcKD2FsYXJtX3R5cGVfbmFtZRgDIAEoCRJBCg90cmFu",
"c2l0aW9uX2tpbmQYBCABKA4yKC5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLkFsYXJt",
"VHJhbnNpdGlvbktpbmQSEAoIc2V2ZXJpdHkYBSABKAUSPAoYb3JpZ2luYWxf",
"cmFpc2VfdGltZXN0YW1wGAYgASgLMhouZ29vZ2xlLnByb3RvYnVmLlRpbWVz",
"dGFtcBI4ChR0cmFuc2l0aW9uX3RpbWVzdGFtcBgHIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5w",
"cm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXASFQoNb3BlcmF0b3JfdXNlchgIIAEoCRIYChBv",
"cGVyYXRvcl9jb21tZW50GAkgASgJEhAKCGNhdGVnb3J5GAogASgJEhMKC2Rl",
"c2NyaXB0aW9uGAsgASgJEjMKDWN1cnJlbnRfdmFsdWUYDCABKAsyHC5teGFj",
"Y2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14VmFsdWUSMQoLbGltaXRfdmFsdWUYDSABKAsy",
"HC5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14VmFsdWUSEAoIZGVncmFkZWQYDiAB",
"KAgSPwoPc291cmNlX3Byb3ZpZGVyGA8gASgOMiYubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdh",
"eS52MS5BbGFybVByb3ZpZGVyTW9kZSKgAQofT25BbGFybVByb3ZpZGVyTW9k",
"ZUNoYW5nZWRFdmVudBI0CgRtb2RlGAEgASgOMiYubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdh",
"eS52MS5BbGFybVByb3ZpZGVyTW9kZRIOCgZyZWFzb24YAiABKAkSDwoHaHJl",
"c3VsdBgDIAEoBRImCgJhdBgEIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1l",
"c3RhbXAi0AQKE0FjdGl2ZUFsYXJtU25hcHNob3QSHAoUYWxhcm1fZnVsbF9y",
"ZWZlcmVuY2UYASABKAkSHwoXc291cmNlX29iamVjdF9yZWZlcmVuY2UYAiAB",
"KAkSFwoPYWxhcm1fdHlwZV9uYW1lGAMgASgJEhAKCHNldmVyaXR5GAQgASgF",
"EjwKGG9yaWdpbmFsX3JhaXNlX3RpbWVzdGFtcBgFIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5w",
"cm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXASPwoNY3VycmVudF9zdGF0ZRgGIAEoDjIoLm14",
"YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuQWxhcm1Db25kaXRpb25TdGF0ZRIQCghjYXRl",
"Z29yeRgHIAEoCRITCgtkZXNjcmlwdGlvbhgIIAEoCRI9ChlsYXN0X3RyYW5z",
"aXRpb25fdGltZXN0YW1wGAkgASgLMhouZ29vZ2xlLnByb3RvYnVmLlRpbWVz",
"dGFtcBIVCg1vcGVyYXRvcl91c2VyGAogASgJEhgKEG9wZXJhdG9yX2NvbW1l",
"bnQYCyABKAkSMwoNY3VycmVudF92YWx1ZRgMIAEoCzIcLm14YWNjZXNzX2dh",
"dGV3YXkudjEuTXhWYWx1ZRIxCgtsaW1pdF92YWx1ZRgNIAEoCzIcLm14YWNj",
"ZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuTXhWYWx1ZRIQCghkZWdyYWRlZBgOIAEoCBI/Cg9z",
"b3VyY2VfcHJvdmlkZXIYDyABKA4yJi5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLkFs",
"YXJtUHJvdmlkZXJNb2RlIpABChdBY2tub3dsZWRnZUFsYXJtUmVxdWVzdBId",
"ChVjbGllbnRfY29ycmVsYXRpb25faWQYAiABKAkSHAoUYWxhcm1fZnVsbF9y",
"ZWZlcmVuY2UYAyABKAkSDwoHY29tbWVudBgEIAEoCRIVCg1vcGVyYXRvcl91",
"c2VyGAUgASgJSgQIARACUgpzZXNzaW9uX2lkIvEBChVBY2tub3dsZWRnZUFs",
"YXJtUmVwbHkSFgoOY29ycmVsYXRpb25faWQYAiABKAkSPAoPcHJvdG9jb2xf",
"c3RhdHVzGAMgASgLMiMubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5Qcm90b2NvbFN0",
"YXR1cxIUCgdocmVzdWx0GAQgASgFSACIAQESMgoGc3RhdHVzGAUgASgLMiIu",
"bXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5NeFN0YXR1c1Byb3h5EhoKEmRpYWdub3N0",
"aWNfbWVzc2FnZRgGIAEoCUIKCghfaHJlc3VsdEoECAEQAlIKc2Vzc2lvbl9p",
"ZCJRChNTdHJlYW1BbGFybXNSZXF1ZXN0Eh0KFWNsaWVudF9jb3JyZWxhdGlv",
"bl9pZBgBIAEoCRIbChNhbGFybV9maWx0ZXJfcHJlZml4GAIgASgJIoQCChBB",
"bGFybUZlZWRNZXNzYWdlEkAKDGFjdGl2ZV9hbGFybRgBIAEoCzIoLm14YWNj",
"ZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuQWN0aXZlQWxhcm1TbmFwc2hvdEgAEhsKEXNuYXBz",
"aG90X2NvbXBsZXRlGAIgASgISAASQQoKdHJhbnNpdGlvbhgDIAEoCzIrLm14",
"YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuT25BbGFybVRyYW5zaXRpb25FdmVudEgAEkMK",
"D3Byb3ZpZGVyX3N0YXR1cxgEIAEoCzIoLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEu",
"QWxhcm1Qcm92aWRlclN0YXR1c0gAQgkKB3BheWxvYWQimAEKE0FsYXJtUHJv",
"dmlkZXJTdGF0dXMSNAoEbW9kZRgBIAEoDjImLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXku",
"djEuQWxhcm1Qcm92aWRlck1vZGUSEAoIZGVncmFkZWQYAiABKAgSDgoGcmVh",
"c29uGAMgASgJEikKBXNpbmNlGAQgASgLMhouZ29vZ2xlLnByb3RvYnVmLlRp",
"bWVzdGFtcCLrAQoNTXhTdGF0dXNQcm94eRIPCgdzdWNjZXNzGAEgASgFEjcK",
"CGNhdGVnb3J5GAIgASgOMiUubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5NeFN0YXR1",
"c0NhdGVnb3J5EjgKC2RldGVjdGVkX2J5GAMgASgOMiMubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0",
"ZXdheS52MS5NeFN0YXR1c1NvdXJjZRIOCgZkZXRhaWwYBCABKAUSFAoMcmF3",
"X2NhdGVnb3J5GAUgASgFEhcKD3Jhd19kZXRlY3RlZF9ieRgGIAEoBRIXCg9k",
"aWFnbm9zdGljX3RleHQYByABKAki6QMKB014VmFsdWUSMgoJZGF0YV90eXBl",
"GAEgASgOMh8ubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5NeERhdGFUeXBlEhQKDHZh",
"cmlhbnRfdHlwZRgCIAEoCRIPCgdpc19udWxsGAMgASgIEhYKDnJhd19kaWFn",
"bm9zdGljGAQgASgJEhUKDXJhd19kYXRhX3R5cGUYBSABKAUSFAoKYm9vbF92",
"YWx1ZRgKIAEoCEgAEhUKC2ludDMyX3ZhbHVlGAsgASgFSAASFQoLaW50NjRf",
"dmFsdWUYDCABKANIABIVCgtmbG9hdF92YWx1ZRgNIAEoAkgAEhYKDGRvdWJs",
"ZV92YWx1ZRgOIAEoAUgAEhYKDHN0cmluZ192YWx1ZRgPIAEoCUgAEjUKD3Rp",
"bWVzdGFtcF92YWx1ZRgQIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3Rh",
"bXBIABIzCgthcnJheV92YWx1ZRgRIAEoCzIcLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXku",
"djEuTXhBcnJheUgAEhMKCXJhd192YWx1ZRgSIAEoDEgAEkAKEnNwYXJzZV9h",
"cnJheV92YWx1ZRgTIAEoCzIiLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuTXhTcGFy",
"c2VBcnJheUgAQgYKBGtpbmQi/gQKB014QXJyYXkSOgoRZWxlbWVudF9kYXRh",
"X3R5cGUYASABKA4yHy5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14RGF0YVR5cGUS",
"FAoMdmFyaWFudF90eXBlGAIgASgJEhIKCmRpbWVuc2lvbnMYAyADKA0SFgoO",
"cmF3X2RpYWdub3N0aWMYBCABKAkSHQoVcmF3X2VsZW1lbnRfZGF0YV90eXBl",
"GAUgASgFEjUKC2Jvb2xfdmFsdWVzGAogASgLMh4ubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdh",
"eS52MS5Cb29sQXJyYXlIABI3CgxpbnQzMl92YWx1ZXMYCyABKAsyHy5teGFj",
"Y2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLkludDMyQXJyYXlIABI3CgxpbnQ2NF92YWx1ZXMY",
"DCABKAsyHy5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLkludDY0QXJyYXlIABI3Cgxm",
"bG9hdF92YWx1ZXMYDSABKAsyHy5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLkZsb2F0",
"QXJyYXlIABI5Cg1kb3VibGVfdmFsdWVzGA4gASgLMiAubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0",
"ZXdheS52MS5Eb3VibGVBcnJheUgAEjkKDXN0cmluZ192YWx1ZXMYDyABKAsy",
"IC5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLlN0cmluZ0FycmF5SAASPwoQdGltZXN0",
"YW1wX3ZhbHVlcxgQIAEoCzIjLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuVGltZXN0",
"YW1wQXJyYXlIABIzCgpyYXdfdmFsdWVzGBEgASgLMh0ubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0",
"ZXdheS52MS5SYXdBcnJheUgAQggKBnZhbHVlcyKZAQoNTXhTcGFyc2VBcnJh",
"eRI6ChFlbGVtZW50X2RhdGFfdHlwZRgBIAEoDjIfLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3",
"YXkudjEuTXhEYXRhVHlwZRIUCgx0b3RhbF9sZW5ndGgYAiABKA0SNgoIZWxl",
"bWVudHMYAyADKAsyJC5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14U3BhcnNlRWxl",
"bWVudCJNCg9NeFNwYXJzZUVsZW1lbnQSDQoFaW5kZXgYASABKA0SKwoFdmFs",
"dWUYAiABKAsyHC5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14VmFsdWUiGwoJQm9v",
"bEFycmF5Eg4KBnZhbHVlcxgBIAMoCCIcCgpJbnQzMkFycmF5Eg4KBnZhbHVl",
"cxgBIAMoBSIcCgpJbnQ2NEFycmF5Eg4KBnZhbHVlcxgBIAMoAyIcCgpGbG9h",
"dEFycmF5Eg4KBnZhbHVlcxgBIAMoAiIdCgtEb3VibGVBcnJheRIOCgZ2YWx1",
"ZXMYASADKAEiHQoLU3RyaW5nQXJyYXkSDgoGdmFsdWVzGAEgAygJIjwKDlRp",
"bWVzdGFtcEFycmF5EioKBnZhbHVlcxgBIAMoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1",
"Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXAiGgoIUmF3QXJyYXkSDgoGdmFsdWVzGAEgAygMIlgKDlBy",
"b3RvY29sU3RhdHVzEjUKBGNvZGUYASABKA4yJy5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5",
"LnYxLlByb3RvY29sU3RhdHVzQ29kZRIPCgdtZXNzYWdlGAIgASgJKp8LCg1N",
"eENvbW1hbmRLaW5kEh8KG01YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9VTlNQRUNJRklFRBAA",
"EhwKGE1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9SRUdJU1RFUhABEh4KGk1YX0NPTU1BTkRf",
"S0lORF9VTlJFR0lTVEVSEAISHAoYTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX0FERF9JVEVN",
"EAMSHQoZTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX0FERF9JVEVNMhAEEh8KG01YX0NPTU1B",
"TkRfS0lORF9SRU1PVkVfSVRFTRAFEhoKFk1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9BRFZJ",
"U0UQBhIdChlNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfVU5fQURWSVNFEAcSJgoiTVhfQ09N",
"TUFORF9LSU5EX0FEVklTRV9TVVBFUlZJU09SWRAIEiUKIU1YX0NPTU1BTkRf",
"S0lORF9BRERfQlVGRkVSRURfSVRFTRAJEjAKLE1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9T",
"RVRfQlVGRkVSRURfVVBEQVRFX0lOVEVSVkFMEAoSGwoXTVhfQ09NTUFORF9L",
"SU5EX1NVU1BFTkQQCxIcChhNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfQUNUSVZBVEUQDBIZ",
"ChVNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfV1JJVEUQDRIaChZNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRf",
"V1JJVEUyEA4SIQodTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX1dSSVRFX1NFQ1VSRUQQDxIi",
"Ch5NWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfV1JJVEVfU0VDVVJFRDIQEBIlCiFNWF9DT01N",
"QU5EX0tJTkRfQVVUSEVOVElDQVRFX1VTRVIQERIoCiRNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJ",
"TkRfQVJDSEVTVFJBX1VTRVJfVE9fSUQQEhIhCh1NWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRf",
"QUREX0lURU1fQlVMSxATEiQKIE1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9BRFZJU0VfSVRF",
"TV9CVUxLEBQSJAogTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX1JFTU9WRV9JVEVNX0JVTEsQ",
"FRInCiNNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfVU5fQURWSVNFX0lURU1fQlVMSxAWEiIK",
"Hk1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9TVUJTQ1JJQkVfQlVMSxAXEiQKIE1YX0NPTU1B",
"TkRfS0lORF9VTlNVQlNDUklCRV9CVUxLEBgSJAogTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5E",
"X1NVQlNDUklCRV9BTEFSTVMQGRImCiJNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfVU5TVUJT",
"Q1JJQkVfQUxBUk1TEBoSJQohTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX0FDS05PV0xFREdF",
"X0FMQVJNEBsSJwojTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX1FVRVJZX0FDVElWRV9BTEFS",
"TVMQHBItCilNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfQUNLTk9XTEVER0VfQUxBUk1fQllf",
"TkFNRRAdEh4KGk1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9XUklURV9CVUxLEB4SHwobTVhf",
"Q09NTUFORF9LSU5EX1dSSVRFMl9CVUxLEB8SJgoiTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5E",
"X1dSSVRFX1NFQ1VSRURfQlVMSxAgEicKI01YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9XUklU",
"RV9TRUNVUkVEMl9CVUxLECESHQoZTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX1JFQURfQlVM",
"SxAiEhgKFE1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9QSU5HEGQSJQohTVhfQ09NTUFORF9L",
"SU5EX0dFVF9TRVNTSU9OX1NUQVRFEGUSIwofTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX0dF",
"VF9XT1JLRVJfSU5GTxBmEiAKHE1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9EUkFJTl9FVkVO",
"VFMQZxIjCh9NWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfU0hVVERPV05fV09SS0VSEGgqegoR",
"QWxhcm1Qcm92aWRlck1vZGUSIwofQUxBUk1fUFJPVklERVJfTU9ERV9VTlNQ",
"RUNJRklFRBAAEiAKHEFMQVJNX1BST1ZJREVSX01PREVfQUxBUk1NR1IQARIe",
"ChpBTEFSTV9QUk9WSURFUl9NT0RFX1NVQlRBRxACKq0CCg1NeEV2ZW50RmFt",
"aWx5Eh8KG01YX0VWRU5UX0ZBTUlMWV9VTlNQRUNJRklFRBAAEiIKHk1YX0VW",
"RU5UX0ZBTUlMWV9PTl9EQVRBX0NIQU5HRRABEiUKIU1YX0VWRU5UX0ZBTUlM",
"WV9PTl9XUklURV9DT01QTEVURRACEiYKIk1YX0VWRU5UX0ZBTUlMWV9PUEVS",
"QVRJT05fQ09NUExFVEUQAxIrCidNWF9FVkVOVF9GQU1JTFlfT05fQlVGRkVS",
"RURfREFUQV9DSEFOR0UQBBInCiNNWF9FVkVOVF9GQU1JTFlfT05fQUxBUk1f",
"VFJBTlNJVElPThAFEjIKLk1YX0VWRU5UX0ZBTUlMWV9PTl9BTEFSTV9QUk9W",
"SURFUl9NT0RFX0NIQU5HRUQQBirKAQoTQWxhcm1UcmFuc2l0aW9uS2luZBIl",
"CiFBTEFSTV9UUkFOU0lUSU9OX0tJTkRfVU5TUEVDSUZJRUQQABIfChtBTEFS",
"TV9UUkFOU0lUSU9OX0tJTkRfUkFJU0UQARIlCiFBTEFSTV9UUkFOU0lUSU9O",
"X0tJTkRfQUNLTk9XTEVER0UQAhIfChtBTEFSTV9UUkFOU0lUSU9OX0tJTkRf",
"Q0xFQVIQAxIjCh9BTEFSTV9UUkFOU0lUSU9OX0tJTkRfUkVUUklHR0VSEAQq",
"qgEKE0FsYXJtQ29uZGl0aW9uU3RhdGUSJQohQUxBUk1fQ09ORElUSU9OX1NU",
"QVRFX1VOU1BFQ0lGSUVEEAASIAocQUxBUk1fQ09ORElUSU9OX1NUQVRFX0FD",
"VElWRRABEiYKIkFMQVJNX0NPTkRJVElPTl9TVEFURV9BQ1RJVkVfQUNLRUQQ",
"AhIiCh5BTEFSTV9DT05ESVRJT05fU1RBVEVfSU5BQ1RJVkUQAyqlAwoQTXhT",
"dGF0dXNDYXRlZ29yeRIiCh5NWF9TVEFUVVNfQ0FURUdPUllfVU5TUEVDSUZJ",
"RUQQABIeChpNWF9TVEFUVVNfQ0FURUdPUllfVU5LTk9XThABEhkKFU1YX1NU",
"QVRVU19DQVRFR09SWV9PSxACEh4KGk1YX1NUQVRVU19DQVRFR09SWV9QRU5E",
"SU5HEAMSHgoaTVhfU1RBVFVTX0NBVEVHT1JZX1dBUk5JTkcQBBIqCiZNWF9T",
"VEFUVVNfQ0FURUdPUllfQ09NTVVOSUNBVElPTl9FUlJPUhAFEioKJk1YX1NU",
"QVRVU19DQVRFR09SWV9DT05GSUdVUkFUSU9OX0VSUk9SEAYSKAokTVhfU1RB",
"VFVTX0NBVEVHT1JZX09QRVJBVElPTkFMX0VSUk9SEAcSJQohTVhfU1RBVFVT",
"X0NBVEVHT1JZX1NFQ1VSSVRZX0VSUk9SEAgSJQohTVhfU1RBVFVTX0NBVEVH",
"T1JZX1NPRlRXQVJFX0VSUk9SEAkSIgoeTVhfU1RBVFVTX0NBVEVHT1JZX09U",
"SEVSX0VSUk9SEAoqygIKDk14U3RhdHVzU291cmNlEiAKHE1YX1NUQVRVU19T",
"T1VSQ0VfVU5TUEVDSUZJRUQQABIcChhNWF9TVEFUVVNfU09VUkNFX1VOS05P",
"V04QARIjCh9NWF9TVEFUVVNfU09VUkNFX1JFUVVFU1RJTkdfTE1YEAISIwof",
"TVhfU1RBVFVTX1NPVVJDRV9SRVNQT05ESU5HX0xNWBADEiMKH01YX1NUQVRV",
"U19TT1VSQ0VfUkVRVUVTVElOR19OTVgQBBIjCh9NWF9TVEFUVVNfU09VUkNF",
"X1JFU1BPTkRJTkdfTk1YEAUSMQotTVhfU1RBVFVTX1NPVVJDRV9SRVFVRVNU",
"SU5HX0FVVE9NQVRJT05fT0JKRUNUEAYSMQotTVhfU1RBVFVTX1NPVVJDRV9S",
"RVNQT05ESU5HX0FVVE9NQVRJT05fT0JKRUNUEAcq3QQKCk14RGF0YVR5cGUS",
"HAoYTVhfREFUQV9UWVBFX1VOU1BFQ0lGSUVEEAASGAoUTVhfREFUQV9UWVBF",
"X1VOS05PV04QARIYChRNWF9EQVRBX1RZUEVfTk9fREFUQRACEhgKFE1YX0RB",
"VEFfVFlQRV9CT09MRUFOEAMSGAoUTVhfREFUQV9UWVBFX0lOVEVHRVIQBBIW",
"ChJNWF9EQVRBX1RZUEVfRkxPQVQQBRIXChNNWF9EQVRBX1RZUEVfRE9VQkxF",
"EAYSFwoTTVhfREFUQV9UWVBFX1NUUklORxAHEhUKEU1YX0RBVEFfVFlQRV9U",
"SU1FEAgSHQoZTVhfREFUQV9UWVBFX0VMQVBTRURfVElNRRAJEh8KG01YX0RB",
"VEFfVFlQRV9SRUZFUkVOQ0VfVFlQRRAKEhwKGE1YX0RBVEFfVFlQRV9TVEFU",
"VVNfVFlQRRALEhUKEU1YX0RBVEFfVFlQRV9FTlVNEAwSLQopTVhfREFUQV9U",
"WVBFX1NFQ1VSSVRZX0NMQVNTSUZJQ0FUSU9OX0VOVU0QDRIiCh5NWF9EQVRB",
"X1RZUEVfREFUQV9RVUFMSVRZX1RZUEUQDhIfChtNWF9EQVRBX1RZUEVfUVVB",
"TElGSUVEX0VOVU0QDxIhCh1NWF9EQVRBX1RZUEVfUVVBTElGSUVEX1NUUlVD",
"VBAQEikKJU1YX0RBVEFfVFlQRV9JTlRFUk5BVElPTkFMSVpFRF9TVFJJTkcQ",
"ERIbChdNWF9EQVRBX1RZUEVfQklHX1NUUklORxASEhQKEE1YX0RBVEFfVFlQ",
"RV9FTkQQEyqjAwoSUHJvdG9jb2xTdGF0dXNDb2RlEiQKIFBST1RPQ09MX1NU",
"QVRVU19DT0RFX1VOU1BFQ0lGSUVEEAASGwoXUFJPVE9DT0xfU1RBVFVTX0NP",
"REVfT0sQARIoCiRQUk9UT0NPTF9TVEFUVVNfQ09ERV9JTlZBTElEX1JFUVVF",
"U1QQAhIqCiZQUk9UT0NPTF9TVEFUVVNfQ09ERV9TRVNTSU9OX05PVF9GT1VO",
"RBADEioKJlBST1RPQ09MX1NUQVRVU19DT0RFX1NFU1NJT05fTk9UX1JFQURZ",
"EAQSKwonUFJPVE9DT0xfU1RBVFVTX0NPREVfV09SS0VSX1VOQVZBSUxBQkxF",
"EAUSIAocUFJPVE9DT0xfU1RBVFVTX0NPREVfVElNRU9VVBAGEiEKHVBST1RP",
"Q09MX1NUQVRVU19DT0RFX0NBTkNFTEVEEAcSKwonUFJPVE9DT0xfU1RBVFVT",
"X0NPREVfUFJPVE9DT0xfVklPTEFUSU9OEAgSKQolUFJPVE9DT0xfU1RBVFVT",
"X0NPREVfTVhBQ0NFU1NfRkFJTFVSRRAJKr8CCgxTZXNzaW9uU3RhdGUSHQoZ",
"U0VTU0lPTl9TVEFURV9VTlNQRUNJRklFRBAAEhoKFlNFU1NJT05fU1RBVEVf",
"Q1JFQVRJTkcQARIhCh1TRVNTSU9OX1NUQVRFX1NUQVJUSU5HX1dPUktFUhAC",
"EiIKHlNFU1NJT05fU1RBVEVfV0FJVElOR19GT1JfUElQRRADEh0KGVNFU1NJ",
"T05fU1RBVEVfSEFORFNIQUtJTkcQBBIlCiFTRVNTSU9OX1NUQVRFX0lOSVRJ",
"QUxJWklOR19XT1JLRVIQBRIXChNTRVNTSU9OX1NUQVRFX1JFQURZEAYSGQoV",
"U0VTU0lPTl9TVEFURV9DTE9TSU5HEAcSGAoUU0VTU0lPTl9TVEFURV9DTE9T",
"RUQQCBIZChVTRVNTSU9OX1NUQVRFX0ZBVUxURUQQCTLDBQoPTXhBY2Nlc3NH",
"YXRld2F5El0KC09wZW5TZXNzaW9uEicubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5P",
"cGVuU2Vzc2lvblJlcXVlc3QaJS5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk9wZW5T",
"ZXNzaW9uUmVwbHkSYAoMQ2xvc2VTZXNzaW9uEigubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdh",
"eS52MS5DbG9zZVNlc3Npb25SZXF1ZXN0GiYubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52",
"MS5DbG9zZVNlc3Npb25SZXBseRJUCgZJbnZva2USJS5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRl",
"d2F5LnYxLk14Q29tbWFuZFJlcXVlc3QaIy5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYx",
"Lk14Q29tbWFuZFJlcGx5ElgKDFN0cmVhbUV2ZW50cxIoLm14YWNjZXNzX2dh",
"dGV3YXkudjEuU3RyZWFtRXZlbnRzUmVxdWVzdBocLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3",
"YXkudjEuTXhFdmVudDABEmwKEEFja25vd2xlZGdlQWxhcm0SLC5teGFjY2Vz",
"c19nYXRld2F5LnYxLkFja25vd2xlZGdlQWxhcm1SZXF1ZXN0GioubXhhY2Nl",
"c3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5BY2tub3dsZWRnZUFsYXJtUmVwbHkSYQoMU3RyZWFt",
"QWxhcm1zEigubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5TdHJlYW1BbGFybXNSZXF1",
"ZXN0GiUubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5BbGFybUZlZWRNZXNzYWdlMAES",
"bgoRUXVlcnlBY3RpdmVBbGFybXMSLS5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLlF1",
"ZXJ5QWN0aXZlQWxhcm1zUmVxdWVzdBooLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEu",
"QWN0aXZlQWxhcm1TbmFwc2hvdDABQiaqAiNaQi5NT00uV1cuTXhHYXRld2F5",
"LkNvbnRyYWN0cy5Qcm90b2IGcHJvdG8z"));
"MigubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5BY3RpdmVBbGFybVNuYXBzaG90EhoK",
"EnNuYXBzaG90X3RydW5jYXRlZBgCIAEoCCKPCAoHTXhFdmVudBIyCgZmYW1p",
"bHkYASABKA4yIi5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14RXZlbnRGYW1pbHkS",
"EgoKc2Vzc2lvbl9pZBgCIAEoCRIVCg1zZXJ2ZXJfaGFuZGxlGAMgASgFEhMK",
"C2l0ZW1faGFuZGxlGAQgASgFEisKBXZhbHVlGAUgASgLMhwubXhhY2Nlc3Nf",
"Z2F0ZXdheS52MS5NeFZhbHVlEg8KB3F1YWxpdHkYBiABKAUSNAoQc291cmNl",
"X3RpbWVzdGFtcBgHIAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXAS",
"NAoIc3RhdHVzZXMYCCADKAsyIi5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14U3Rh",
"dHVzUHJveHkSFwoPd29ya2VyX3NlcXVlbmNlGAkgASgEEjQKEHdvcmtlcl90",
"aW1lc3RhbXAYCiABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wEj0K",
"GWdhdGV3YXlfcmVjZWl2ZV90aW1lc3RhbXAYCyABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJv",
"dG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wEhQKB2hyZXN1bHQYDCABKAVIAYgBARISCgpyYXdf",
"c3RhdHVzGA0gASgJEjcKCnJlcGxheV9nYXAYDiABKAsyHi5teGFjY2Vzc19n",
"YXRld2F5LnYxLlJlcGxheUdhcEgCiAEBEkAKDm9uX2RhdGFfY2hhbmdlGBQg",
"ASgLMiYubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5PbkRhdGFDaGFuZ2VFdmVudEgA",
"EkYKEW9uX3dyaXRlX2NvbXBsZXRlGBUgASgLMikubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdh",
"eS52MS5PbldyaXRlQ29tcGxldGVFdmVudEgAEkkKEm9wZXJhdGlvbl9jb21w",
"bGV0ZRgWIAEoCzIrLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuT3BlcmF0aW9uQ29t",
"cGxldGVFdmVudEgAElEKF29uX2J1ZmZlcmVkX2RhdGFfY2hhbmdlGBcgASgL",
"Mi4ubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5PbkJ1ZmZlcmVkRGF0YUNoYW5nZUV2",
"ZW50SAASSgoTb25fYWxhcm1fdHJhbnNpdGlvbhgYIAEoCzIrLm14YWNjZXNz",
"X2dhdGV3YXkudjEuT25BbGFybVRyYW5zaXRpb25FdmVudEgAEl4KHm9uX2Fs",
"YXJtX3Byb3ZpZGVyX21vZGVfY2hhbmdlZBgZIAEoCzI0Lm14YWNjZXNzX2dh",
"dGV3YXkudjEuT25BbGFybVByb3ZpZGVyTW9kZUNoYW5nZWRFdmVudEgAQgYK",
"BGJvZHlCCgoIX2hyZXN1bHRCDQoLX3JlcGxheV9nYXAiUAoJUmVwbGF5R2Fw",
"EiAKGHJlcXVlc3RlZF9hZnRlcl9zZXF1ZW5jZRgBIAEoBBIhChlvbGRlc3Rf",
"YXZhaWxhYmxlX3NlcXVlbmNlGAIgASgEIhMKEU9uRGF0YUNoYW5nZUV2ZW50",
"IhYKFE9uV3JpdGVDb21wbGV0ZUV2ZW50IhgKFk9wZXJhdGlvbkNvbXBsZXRl",
"RXZlbnQi1AEKGU9uQnVmZmVyZWREYXRhQ2hhbmdlRXZlbnQSMgoJZGF0YV90",
"eXBlGAEgASgOMh8ubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5NeERhdGFUeXBlEjQK",
"DnF1YWxpdHlfdmFsdWVzGAIgASgLMhwubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5N",
"eEFycmF5EjYKEHRpbWVzdGFtcF92YWx1ZXMYAyABKAsyHC5teGFjY2Vzc19n",
"YXRld2F5LnYxLk14QXJyYXkSFQoNcmF3X2RhdGFfdHlwZRgEIAEoBSLQBAoW",
"T25BbGFybVRyYW5zaXRpb25FdmVudBIcChRhbGFybV9mdWxsX3JlZmVyZW5j",
"ZRgBIAEoCRIfChdzb3VyY2Vfb2JqZWN0X3JlZmVyZW5jZRgCIAEoCRIXCg9h",
"bGFybV90eXBlX25hbWUYAyABKAkSQQoPdHJhbnNpdGlvbl9raW5kGAQgASgO",
"MigubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5BbGFybVRyYW5zaXRpb25LaW5kEhAK",
"CHNldmVyaXR5GAUgASgFEjwKGG9yaWdpbmFsX3JhaXNlX3RpbWVzdGFtcBgG",
"IAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXASOAoUdHJhbnNpdGlv",
"bl90aW1lc3RhbXAYByABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1w",
"EhUKDW9wZXJhdG9yX3VzZXIYCCABKAkSGAoQb3BlcmF0b3JfY29tbWVudBgJ",
"IAEoCRIQCghjYXRlZ29yeRgKIAEoCRITCgtkZXNjcmlwdGlvbhgLIAEoCRIz",
"Cg1jdXJyZW50X3ZhbHVlGAwgASgLMhwubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5N",
"eFZhbHVlEjEKC2xpbWl0X3ZhbHVlGA0gASgLMhwubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdh",
"eS52MS5NeFZhbHVlEhAKCGRlZ3JhZGVkGA4gASgIEj8KD3NvdXJjZV9wcm92",
"aWRlchgPIAEoDjImLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuQWxhcm1Qcm92aWRl",
"ck1vZGUioAEKH09uQWxhcm1Qcm92aWRlck1vZGVDaGFuZ2VkRXZlbnQSNAoE",
"bW9kZRgBIAEoDjImLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuQWxhcm1Qcm92aWRl",
"ck1vZGUSDgoGcmVhc29uGAIgASgJEg8KB2hyZXN1bHQYAyABKAUSJgoCYXQY",
"BCABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wIvEEChNBY3RpdmVB",
"bGFybVNuYXBzaG90EhwKFGFsYXJtX2Z1bGxfcmVmZXJlbmNlGAEgASgJEh8K",
"F3NvdXJjZV9vYmplY3RfcmVmZXJlbmNlGAIgASgJEhcKD2FsYXJtX3R5cGVf",
"bmFtZRgDIAEoCRIQCghzZXZlcml0eRgEIAEoBRI8ChhvcmlnaW5hbF9yYWlz",
"ZV90aW1lc3RhbXAYBSABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1w",
"Ej8KDWN1cnJlbnRfc3RhdGUYBiABKA4yKC5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYx",
"LkFsYXJtQ29uZGl0aW9uU3RhdGUSEAoIY2F0ZWdvcnkYByABKAkSEwoLZGVz",
"Y3JpcHRpb24YCCABKAkSPQoZbGFzdF90cmFuc2l0aW9uX3RpbWVzdGFtcBgJ",
"IAEoCzIaLmdvb2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXASFQoNb3BlcmF0b3Jf",
"dXNlchgKIAEoCRIYChBvcGVyYXRvcl9jb21tZW50GAsgASgJEjMKDWN1cnJl",
"bnRfdmFsdWUYDCABKAsyHC5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14VmFsdWUS",
"MQoLbGltaXRfdmFsdWUYDSABKAsyHC5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14",
"VmFsdWUSEAoIZGVncmFkZWQYDiABKAgSPwoPc291cmNlX3Byb3ZpZGVyGA8g",
"ASgOMiYubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5BbGFybVByb3ZpZGVyTW9kZRIf",
"Chdmcm9tX3RydW5jYXRlZF9zbmFwc2hvdBgQIAEoCCKQAQoXQWNrbm93bGVk",
"Z2VBbGFybVJlcXVlc3QSHQoVY2xpZW50X2NvcnJlbGF0aW9uX2lkGAIgASgJ",
"EhwKFGFsYXJtX2Z1bGxfcmVmZXJlbmNlGAMgASgJEg8KB2NvbW1lbnQYBCAB",
"KAkSFQoNb3BlcmF0b3JfdXNlchgFIAEoCUoECAEQAlIKc2Vzc2lvbl9pZCLx",
"AQoVQWNrbm93bGVkZ2VBbGFybVJlcGx5EhYKDmNvcnJlbGF0aW9uX2lkGAIg",
"ASgJEjwKD3Byb3RvY29sX3N0YXR1cxgDIAEoCzIjLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3",
"YXkudjEuUHJvdG9jb2xTdGF0dXMSFAoHaHJlc3VsdBgEIAEoBUgAiAEBEjIK",
"BnN0YXR1cxgFIAEoCzIiLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuTXhTdGF0dXNQ",
"cm94eRIaChJkaWFnbm9zdGljX21lc3NhZ2UYBiABKAlCCgoIX2hyZXN1bHRK",
"BAgBEAJSCnNlc3Npb25faWQiUQoTU3RyZWFtQWxhcm1zUmVxdWVzdBIdChVj",
"bGllbnRfY29ycmVsYXRpb25faWQYASABKAkSGwoTYWxhcm1fZmlsdGVyX3By",
"ZWZpeBgCIAEoCSKEAgoQQWxhcm1GZWVkTWVzc2FnZRJACgxhY3RpdmVfYWxh",
"cm0YASABKAsyKC5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLkFjdGl2ZUFsYXJtU25h",
"cHNob3RIABIbChFzbmFwc2hvdF9jb21wbGV0ZRgCIAEoCEgAEkEKCnRyYW5z",
"aXRpb24YAyABKAsyKy5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk9uQWxhcm1UcmFu",
"c2l0aW9uRXZlbnRIABJDCg9wcm92aWRlcl9zdGF0dXMYBCABKAsyKC5teGFj",
"Y2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLkFsYXJtUHJvdmlkZXJTdGF0dXNIAEIJCgdwYXls",
"b2FkIpgBChNBbGFybVByb3ZpZGVyU3RhdHVzEjQKBG1vZGUYASABKA4yJi5t",
"eGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLkFsYXJtUHJvdmlkZXJNb2RlEhAKCGRlZ3Jh",
"ZGVkGAIgASgIEg4KBnJlYXNvbhgDIAEoCRIpCgVzaW5jZRgEIAEoCzIaLmdv",
"b2dsZS5wcm90b2J1Zi5UaW1lc3RhbXAi6wEKDU14U3RhdHVzUHJveHkSDwoH",
"c3VjY2VzcxgBIAEoBRI3CghjYXRlZ29yeRgCIAEoDjIlLm14YWNjZXNzX2dh",
"dGV3YXkudjEuTXhTdGF0dXNDYXRlZ29yeRI4CgtkZXRlY3RlZF9ieRgDIAEo",
"DjIjLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuTXhTdGF0dXNTb3VyY2USDgoGZGV0",
"YWlsGAQgASgFEhQKDHJhd19jYXRlZ29yeRgFIAEoBRIXCg9yYXdfZGV0ZWN0",
"ZWRfYnkYBiABKAUSFwoPZGlhZ25vc3RpY190ZXh0GAcgASgJIukDCgdNeFZh",
"bHVlEjIKCWRhdGFfdHlwZRgBIAEoDjIfLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEu",
"TXhEYXRhVHlwZRIUCgx2YXJpYW50X3R5cGUYAiABKAkSDwoHaXNfbnVsbBgD",
"IAEoCBIWCg5yYXdfZGlhZ25vc3RpYxgEIAEoCRIVCg1yYXdfZGF0YV90eXBl",
"GAUgASgFEhQKCmJvb2xfdmFsdWUYCiABKAhIABIVCgtpbnQzMl92YWx1ZRgL",
"IAEoBUgAEhUKC2ludDY0X3ZhbHVlGAwgASgDSAASFQoLZmxvYXRfdmFsdWUY",
"DSABKAJIABIWCgxkb3VibGVfdmFsdWUYDiABKAFIABIWCgxzdHJpbmdfdmFs",
"dWUYDyABKAlIABI1Cg90aW1lc3RhbXBfdmFsdWUYECABKAsyGi5nb29nbGUu",
"cHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wSAASMwoLYXJyYXlfdmFsdWUYESABKAsyHC5t",
"eGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14QXJyYXlIABITCglyYXdfdmFsdWUYEiAB",
"KAxIABJAChJzcGFyc2VfYXJyYXlfdmFsdWUYEyABKAsyIi5teGFjY2Vzc19n",
"YXRld2F5LnYxLk14U3BhcnNlQXJyYXlIAEIGCgRraW5kIv4ECgdNeEFycmF5",
"EjoKEWVsZW1lbnRfZGF0YV90eXBlGAEgASgOMh8ubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdh",
"eS52MS5NeERhdGFUeXBlEhQKDHZhcmlhbnRfdHlwZRgCIAEoCRISCgpkaW1l",
"bnNpb25zGAMgAygNEhYKDnJhd19kaWFnbm9zdGljGAQgASgJEh0KFXJhd19l",
"bGVtZW50X2RhdGFfdHlwZRgFIAEoBRI1Cgtib29sX3ZhbHVlcxgKIAEoCzIe",
"Lm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuQm9vbEFycmF5SAASNwoMaW50MzJfdmFs",
"dWVzGAsgASgLMh8ubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5JbnQzMkFycmF5SAAS",
"NwoMaW50NjRfdmFsdWVzGAwgASgLMh8ubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5J",
"bnQ2NEFycmF5SAASNwoMZmxvYXRfdmFsdWVzGA0gASgLMh8ubXhhY2Nlc3Nf",
"Z2F0ZXdheS52MS5GbG9hdEFycmF5SAASOQoNZG91YmxlX3ZhbHVlcxgOIAEo",
"CzIgLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuRG91YmxlQXJyYXlIABI5Cg1zdHJp",
"bmdfdmFsdWVzGA8gASgLMiAubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5TdHJpbmdB",
"cnJheUgAEj8KEHRpbWVzdGFtcF92YWx1ZXMYECABKAsyIy5teGFjY2Vzc19n",
"YXRld2F5LnYxLlRpbWVzdGFtcEFycmF5SAASMwoKcmF3X3ZhbHVlcxgRIAEo",
"CzIdLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuUmF3QXJyYXlIAEIICgZ2YWx1ZXMi",
"mQEKDU14U3BhcnNlQXJyYXkSOgoRZWxlbWVudF9kYXRhX3R5cGUYASABKA4y",
"Hy5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14RGF0YVR5cGUSFAoMdG90YWxfbGVu",
"Z3RoGAIgASgNEjYKCGVsZW1lbnRzGAMgAygLMiQubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdh",
"eS52MS5NeFNwYXJzZUVsZW1lbnQiTQoPTXhTcGFyc2VFbGVtZW50Eg0KBWlu",
"ZGV4GAEgASgNEisKBXZhbHVlGAIgASgLMhwubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52",
"MS5NeFZhbHVlIhsKCUJvb2xBcnJheRIOCgZ2YWx1ZXMYASADKAgiHAoKSW50",
"MzJBcnJheRIOCgZ2YWx1ZXMYASADKAUiHAoKSW50NjRBcnJheRIOCgZ2YWx1",
"ZXMYASADKAMiHAoKRmxvYXRBcnJheRIOCgZ2YWx1ZXMYASADKAIiHQoLRG91",
"YmxlQXJyYXkSDgoGdmFsdWVzGAEgAygBIh0KC1N0cmluZ0FycmF5Eg4KBnZh",
"bHVlcxgBIAMoCSI8Cg5UaW1lc3RhbXBBcnJheRIqCgZ2YWx1ZXMYASADKAsy",
"Gi5nb29nbGUucHJvdG9idWYuVGltZXN0YW1wIhoKCFJhd0FycmF5Eg4KBnZh",
"bHVlcxgBIAMoDCJYCg5Qcm90b2NvbFN0YXR1cxI1CgRjb2RlGAEgASgOMicu",
"bXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5Qcm90b2NvbFN0YXR1c0NvZGUSDwoHbWVz",
"c2FnZRgCIAEoCSqfCwoNTXhDb21tYW5kS2luZBIfChtNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJ",
"TkRfVU5TUEVDSUZJRUQQABIcChhNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfUkVHSVNURVIQ",
"ARIeChpNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfVU5SRUdJU1RFUhACEhwKGE1YX0NPTU1B",
"TkRfS0lORF9BRERfSVRFTRADEh0KGU1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9BRERfSVRF",
"TTIQBBIfChtNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfUkVNT1ZFX0lURU0QBRIaChZNWF9D",
"T01NQU5EX0tJTkRfQURWSVNFEAYSHQoZTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX1VOX0FE",
"VklTRRAHEiYKIk1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9BRFZJU0VfU1VQRVJWSVNPUlkQ",
"CBIlCiFNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfQUREX0JVRkZFUkVEX0lURU0QCRIwCixN",
"WF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfU0VUX0JVRkZFUkVEX1VQREFURV9JTlRFUlZBTBAK",
"EhsKF01YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9TVVNQRU5EEAsSHAoYTVhfQ09NTUFORF9L",
"SU5EX0FDVElWQVRFEAwSGQoVTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX1dSSVRFEA0SGgoW",
"TVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX1dSSVRFMhAOEiEKHU1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9X",
"UklURV9TRUNVUkVEEA8SIgoeTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX1dSSVRFX1NFQ1VS",
"RUQyEBASJQohTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX0FVVEhFTlRJQ0FURV9VU0VSEBES",
"KAokTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX0FSQ0hFU1RSQV9VU0VSX1RPX0lEEBISIQod",
"TVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX0FERF9JVEVNX0JVTEsQExIkCiBNWF9DT01NQU5E",
"X0tJTkRfQURWSVNFX0lURU1fQlVMSxAUEiQKIE1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9S",
"RU1PVkVfSVRFTV9CVUxLEBUSJwojTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX1VOX0FEVklT",
"RV9JVEVNX0JVTEsQFhIiCh5NWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfU1VCU0NSSUJFX0JV",
"TEsQFxIkCiBNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfVU5TVUJTQ1JJQkVfQlVMSxAYEiQK",
"IE1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9TVUJTQ1JJQkVfQUxBUk1TEBkSJgoiTVhfQ09N",
"TUFORF9LSU5EX1VOU1VCU0NSSUJFX0FMQVJNUxAaEiUKIU1YX0NPTU1BTkRf",
"S0lORF9BQ0tOT1dMRURHRV9BTEFSTRAbEicKI01YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9R",
"VUVSWV9BQ1RJVkVfQUxBUk1TEBwSLQopTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX0FDS05P",
"V0xFREdFX0FMQVJNX0JZX05BTUUQHRIeChpNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfV1JJ",
"VEVfQlVMSxAeEh8KG01YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9XUklURTJfQlVMSxAfEiYK",
"Ik1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9XUklURV9TRUNVUkVEX0JVTEsQIBInCiNNWF9D",
"T01NQU5EX0tJTkRfV1JJVEVfU0VDVVJFRDJfQlVMSxAhEh0KGU1YX0NPTU1B",
"TkRfS0lORF9SRUFEX0JVTEsQIhIYChRNWF9DT01NQU5EX0tJTkRfUElORxBk",
"EiUKIU1YX0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9HRVRfU0VTU0lPTl9TVEFURRBlEiMKH01Y",
"X0NPTU1BTkRfS0lORF9HRVRfV09SS0VSX0lORk8QZhIgChxNWF9DT01NQU5E",
"X0tJTkRfRFJBSU5fRVZFTlRTEGcSIwofTVhfQ09NTUFORF9LSU5EX1NIVVRE",
"T1dOX1dPUktFUhBoKnoKEUFsYXJtUHJvdmlkZXJNb2RlEiMKH0FMQVJNX1BS",
"T1ZJREVSX01PREVfVU5TUEVDSUZJRUQQABIgChxBTEFSTV9QUk9WSURFUl9N",
"T0RFX0FMQVJNTUdSEAESHgoaQUxBUk1fUFJPVklERVJfTU9ERV9TVUJUQUcQ",
"AiqtAgoNTXhFdmVudEZhbWlseRIfChtNWF9FVkVOVF9GQU1JTFlfVU5TUEVD",
"SUZJRUQQABIiCh5NWF9FVkVOVF9GQU1JTFlfT05fREFUQV9DSEFOR0UQARIl",
"CiFNWF9FVkVOVF9GQU1JTFlfT05fV1JJVEVfQ09NUExFVEUQAhImCiJNWF9F",
"VkVOVF9GQU1JTFlfT1BFUkFUSU9OX0NPTVBMRVRFEAMSKwonTVhfRVZFTlRf",
"RkFNSUxZX09OX0JVRkZFUkVEX0RBVEFfQ0hBTkdFEAQSJwojTVhfRVZFTlRf",
"RkFNSUxZX09OX0FMQVJNX1RSQU5TSVRJT04QBRIyCi5NWF9FVkVOVF9GQU1J",
"TFlfT05fQUxBUk1fUFJPVklERVJfTU9ERV9DSEFOR0VEEAYqygEKE0FsYXJt",
"VHJhbnNpdGlvbktpbmQSJQohQUxBUk1fVFJBTlNJVElPTl9LSU5EX1VOU1BF",
"Q0lGSUVEEAASHwobQUxBUk1fVFJBTlNJVElPTl9LSU5EX1JBSVNFEAESJQoh",
"QUxBUk1fVFJBTlNJVElPTl9LSU5EX0FDS05PV0xFREdFEAISHwobQUxBUk1f",
"VFJBTlNJVElPTl9LSU5EX0NMRUFSEAMSIwofQUxBUk1fVFJBTlNJVElPTl9L",
"SU5EX1JFVFJJR0dFUhAEKqoBChNBbGFybUNvbmRpdGlvblN0YXRlEiUKIUFM",
"QVJNX0NPTkRJVElPTl9TVEFURV9VTlNQRUNJRklFRBAAEiAKHEFMQVJNX0NP",
"TkRJVElPTl9TVEFURV9BQ1RJVkUQARImCiJBTEFSTV9DT05ESVRJT05fU1RB",
"VEVfQUNUSVZFX0FDS0VEEAISIgoeQUxBUk1fQ09ORElUSU9OX1NUQVRFX0lO",
"QUNUSVZFEAMqpQMKEE14U3RhdHVzQ2F0ZWdvcnkSIgoeTVhfU1RBVFVTX0NB",
"VEVHT1JZX1VOU1BFQ0lGSUVEEAASHgoaTVhfU1RBVFVTX0NBVEVHT1JZX1VO",
"S05PV04QARIZChVNWF9TVEFUVVNfQ0FURUdPUllfT0sQAhIeChpNWF9TVEFU",
"VVNfQ0FURUdPUllfUEVORElORxADEh4KGk1YX1NUQVRVU19DQVRFR09SWV9X",
"QVJOSU5HEAQSKgomTVhfU1RBVFVTX0NBVEVHT1JZX0NPTU1VTklDQVRJT05f",
"RVJST1IQBRIqCiZNWF9TVEFUVVNfQ0FURUdPUllfQ09ORklHVVJBVElPTl9F",
"UlJPUhAGEigKJE1YX1NUQVRVU19DQVRFR09SWV9PUEVSQVRJT05BTF9FUlJP",
"UhAHEiUKIU1YX1NUQVRVU19DQVRFR09SWV9TRUNVUklUWV9FUlJPUhAIEiUK",
"IU1YX1NUQVRVU19DQVRFR09SWV9TT0ZUV0FSRV9FUlJPUhAJEiIKHk1YX1NU",
"QVRVU19DQVRFR09SWV9PVEhFUl9FUlJPUhAKKsoCCg5NeFN0YXR1c1NvdXJj",
"ZRIgChxNWF9TVEFUVVNfU09VUkNFX1VOU1BFQ0lGSUVEEAASHAoYTVhfU1RB",
"VFVTX1NPVVJDRV9VTktOT1dOEAESIwofTVhfU1RBVFVTX1NPVVJDRV9SRVFV",
"RVNUSU5HX0xNWBACEiMKH01YX1NUQVRVU19TT1VSQ0VfUkVTUE9ORElOR19M",
"TVgQAxIjCh9NWF9TVEFUVVNfU09VUkNFX1JFUVVFU1RJTkdfTk1YEAQSIwof",
"TVhfU1RBVFVTX1NPVVJDRV9SRVNQT05ESU5HX05NWBAFEjEKLU1YX1NUQVRV",
"U19TT1VSQ0VfUkVRVUVTVElOR19BVVRPTUFUSU9OX09CSkVDVBAGEjEKLU1Y",
"X1NUQVRVU19TT1VSQ0VfUkVTUE9ORElOR19BVVRPTUFUSU9OX09CSkVDVBAH",
"Kt0ECgpNeERhdGFUeXBlEhwKGE1YX0RBVEFfVFlQRV9VTlNQRUNJRklFRBAA",
"EhgKFE1YX0RBVEFfVFlQRV9VTktOT1dOEAESGAoUTVhfREFUQV9UWVBFX05P",
"X0RBVEEQAhIYChRNWF9EQVRBX1RZUEVfQk9PTEVBThADEhgKFE1YX0RBVEFf",
"VFlQRV9JTlRFR0VSEAQSFgoSTVhfREFUQV9UWVBFX0ZMT0FUEAUSFwoTTVhf",
"REFUQV9UWVBFX0RPVUJMRRAGEhcKE01YX0RBVEFfVFlQRV9TVFJJTkcQBxIV",
"ChFNWF9EQVRBX1RZUEVfVElNRRAIEh0KGU1YX0RBVEFfVFlQRV9FTEFQU0VE",
"X1RJTUUQCRIfChtNWF9EQVRBX1RZUEVfUkVGRVJFTkNFX1RZUEUQChIcChhN",
"WF9EQVRBX1RZUEVfU1RBVFVTX1RZUEUQCxIVChFNWF9EQVRBX1RZUEVfRU5V",
"TRAMEi0KKU1YX0RBVEFfVFlQRV9TRUNVUklUWV9DTEFTU0lGSUNBVElPTl9F",
"TlVNEA0SIgoeTVhfREFUQV9UWVBFX0RBVEFfUVVBTElUWV9UWVBFEA4SHwob",
"TVhfREFUQV9UWVBFX1FVQUxJRklFRF9FTlVNEA8SIQodTVhfREFUQV9UWVBF",
"X1FVQUxJRklFRF9TVFJVQ1QQEBIpCiVNWF9EQVRBX1RZUEVfSU5URVJOQVRJ",
"T05BTElaRURfU1RSSU5HEBESGwoXTVhfREFUQV9UWVBFX0JJR19TVFJJTkcQ",
"EhIUChBNWF9EQVRBX1RZUEVfRU5EEBMqowMKElByb3RvY29sU3RhdHVzQ29k",
"ZRIkCiBQUk9UT0NPTF9TVEFUVVNfQ09ERV9VTlNQRUNJRklFRBAAEhsKF1BS",
"T1RPQ09MX1NUQVRVU19DT0RFX09LEAESKAokUFJPVE9DT0xfU1RBVFVTX0NP",
"REVfSU5WQUxJRF9SRVFVRVNUEAISKgomUFJPVE9DT0xfU1RBVFVTX0NPREVf",
"U0VTU0lPTl9OT1RfRk9VTkQQAxIqCiZQUk9UT0NPTF9TVEFUVVNfQ09ERV9T",
"RVNTSU9OX05PVF9SRUFEWRAEEisKJ1BST1RPQ09MX1NUQVRVU19DT0RFX1dP",
"UktFUl9VTkFWQUlMQUJMRRAFEiAKHFBST1RPQ09MX1NUQVRVU19DT0RFX1RJ",
"TUVPVVQQBhIhCh1QUk9UT0NPTF9TVEFUVVNfQ09ERV9DQU5DRUxFRBAHEisK",
"J1BST1RPQ09MX1NUQVRVU19DT0RFX1BST1RPQ09MX1ZJT0xBVElPThAIEikK",
"JVBST1RPQ09MX1NUQVRVU19DT0RFX01YQUNDRVNTX0ZBSUxVUkUQCSq/AgoM",
"U2Vzc2lvblN0YXRlEh0KGVNFU1NJT05fU1RBVEVfVU5TUEVDSUZJRUQQABIa",
"ChZTRVNTSU9OX1NUQVRFX0NSRUFUSU5HEAESIQodU0VTU0lPTl9TVEFURV9T",
"VEFSVElOR19XT1JLRVIQAhIiCh5TRVNTSU9OX1NUQVRFX1dBSVRJTkdfRk9S",
"X1BJUEUQAxIdChlTRVNTSU9OX1NUQVRFX0hBTkRTSEFLSU5HEAQSJQohU0VT",
"U0lPTl9TVEFURV9JTklUSUFMSVpJTkdfV09SS0VSEAUSFwoTU0VTU0lPTl9T",
"VEFURV9SRUFEWRAGEhkKFVNFU1NJT05fU1RBVEVfQ0xPU0lORxAHEhgKFFNF",
"U1NJT05fU1RBVEVfQ0xPU0VEEAgSGQoVU0VTU0lPTl9TVEFURV9GQVVMVEVE",
"EAkywwUKD014QWNjZXNzR2F0ZXdheRJdCgtPcGVuU2Vzc2lvbhInLm14YWNj",
"ZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuT3BlblNlc3Npb25SZXF1ZXN0GiUubXhhY2Nlc3Nf",
"Z2F0ZXdheS52MS5PcGVuU2Vzc2lvblJlcGx5EmAKDENsb3NlU2Vzc2lvbhIo",
"Lm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuQ2xvc2VTZXNzaW9uUmVxdWVzdBomLm14",
"YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuQ2xvc2VTZXNzaW9uUmVwbHkSVAoGSW52b2tl",
"EiUubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5NeENvbW1hbmRSZXF1ZXN0GiMubXhh",
"Y2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5NeENvbW1hbmRSZXBseRJYCgxTdHJlYW1FdmVu",
"dHMSKC5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLlN0cmVhbUV2ZW50c1JlcXVlc3Qa",
"HC5teGFjY2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLk14RXZlbnQwARJsChBBY2tub3dsZWRn",
"ZUFsYXJtEiwubXhhY2Nlc3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5BY2tub3dsZWRnZUFsYXJt",
"UmVxdWVzdBoqLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuQWNrbm93bGVkZ2VBbGFy",
"bVJlcGx5EmEKDFN0cmVhbUFsYXJtcxIoLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEu",
"U3RyZWFtQWxhcm1zUmVxdWVzdBolLm14YWNjZXNzX2dhdGV3YXkudjEuQWxh",
"cm1GZWVkTWVzc2FnZTABEm4KEVF1ZXJ5QWN0aXZlQWxhcm1zEi0ubXhhY2Nl",
"c3NfZ2F0ZXdheS52MS5RdWVyeUFjdGl2ZUFsYXJtc1JlcXVlc3QaKC5teGFj",
"Y2Vzc19nYXRld2F5LnYxLkFjdGl2ZUFsYXJtU25hcHNob3QwAUImqgIjWkIu",
"TU9NLldXLk14R2F0ZXdheS5Db250cmFjdHMuUHJvdG9iBnByb3RvMw=="));
descriptor = pbr::FileDescriptor.FromGeneratedCode(descriptorData,
new pbr::FileDescriptor[] { global::Google.Protobuf.WellKnownTypes.DurationReflection.Descriptor, global::Google.Protobuf.WellKnownTypes.TimestampReflection.Descriptor, },
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(new[] {typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.MxCommandKind), typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AlarmProviderMode), typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.MxEventFamily), typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AlarmTransitionKind), typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AlarmConditionState), typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.MxStatusCategory), typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.MxStatusSource), typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.MxDataType), typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.ProtocolStatusCode), typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.SessionState), }, null, new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo[] {
@@ -602,7 +603,7 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.WorkerInfoReply), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.WorkerInfoReply.Parser, new[]{ "WorkerProcessId", "WorkerVersion", "MxaccessProgid", "MxaccessClsid" }, null, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.DrainEventsReply), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.DrainEventsReply.Parser, new[]{ "Events" }, null, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AcknowledgeAlarmReplyPayload), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AcknowledgeAlarmReplyPayload.Parser, new[]{ "NativeStatus" }, null, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload.Parser, new[]{ "Snapshots" }, null, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload.Parser, new[]{ "Snapshots", "SnapshotTruncated" }, null, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.MxEvent), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.MxEvent.Parser, new[]{ "Family", "SessionId", "ServerHandle", "ItemHandle", "Value", "Quality", "SourceTimestamp", "Statuses", "WorkerSequence", "WorkerTimestamp", "GatewayReceiveTimestamp", "Hresult", "RawStatus", "ReplayGap", "OnDataChange", "OnWriteComplete", "OperationComplete", "OnBufferedDataChange", "OnAlarmTransition", "OnAlarmProviderModeChanged" }, new[]{ "Body", "Hresult", "ReplayGap" }, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.ReplayGap), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.ReplayGap.Parser, new[]{ "RequestedAfterSequence", "OldestAvailableSequence" }, null, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.OnDataChangeEvent), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.OnDataChangeEvent.Parser, null, null, null, null, null),
@@ -611,7 +612,7 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.OnBufferedDataChangeEvent), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.OnBufferedDataChangeEvent.Parser, new[]{ "DataType", "QualityValues", "TimestampValues", "RawDataType" }, null, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.OnAlarmTransitionEvent), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.OnAlarmTransitionEvent.Parser, new[]{ "AlarmFullReference", "SourceObjectReference", "AlarmTypeName", "TransitionKind", "Severity", "OriginalRaiseTimestamp", "TransitionTimestamp", "OperatorUser", "OperatorComment", "Category", "Description", "CurrentValue", "LimitValue", "Degraded", "SourceProvider" }, null, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.OnAlarmProviderModeChangedEvent), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.OnAlarmProviderModeChangedEvent.Parser, new[]{ "Mode", "Reason", "Hresult", "At" }, null, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.ActiveAlarmSnapshot), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.ActiveAlarmSnapshot.Parser, new[]{ "AlarmFullReference", "SourceObjectReference", "AlarmTypeName", "Severity", "OriginalRaiseTimestamp", "CurrentState", "Category", "Description", "LastTransitionTimestamp", "OperatorUser", "OperatorComment", "CurrentValue", "LimitValue", "Degraded", "SourceProvider" }, null, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.ActiveAlarmSnapshot), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.ActiveAlarmSnapshot.Parser, new[]{ "AlarmFullReference", "SourceObjectReference", "AlarmTypeName", "Severity", "OriginalRaiseTimestamp", "CurrentState", "Category", "Description", "LastTransitionTimestamp", "OperatorUser", "OperatorComment", "CurrentValue", "LimitValue", "Degraded", "SourceProvider", "FromTruncatedSnapshot" }, null, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AcknowledgeAlarmRequest), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AcknowledgeAlarmRequest.Parser, new[]{ "ClientCorrelationId", "AlarmFullReference", "Comment", "OperatorUser" }, null, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AcknowledgeAlarmReply), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AcknowledgeAlarmReply.Parser, new[]{ "CorrelationId", "ProtocolStatus", "Hresult", "Status", "DiagnosticMessage" }, new[]{ "Hresult" }, null, null, null),
new pbr::GeneratedClrTypeInfo(typeof(global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.StreamAlarmsRequest), global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.StreamAlarmsRequest.Parser, new[]{ "ClientCorrelationId", "AlarmFilterPrefix" }, null, null, null, null),
@@ -23224,6 +23225,7 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
[global::System.CodeDom.Compiler.GeneratedCode("protoc", null)]
public QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload(QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload other) : this() {
snapshots_ = other.snapshots_.Clone();
snapshotTruncated_ = other.snapshotTruncated_;
_unknownFields = pb::UnknownFieldSet.Clone(other._unknownFields);
}
@@ -23244,6 +23246,26 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
get { return snapshots_; }
}
/// <summary>Field number for the "snapshot_truncated" field.</summary>
public const int SnapshotTruncatedFieldNumber = 2;
private bool snapshotTruncated_;
/// <summary>
/// True when the provider fetch backing this reply came back holding the
/// per-fetch cap (MxGateway:Alarms:MaxAlarmsPerFetch). The reply may then omit
/// active alarms, and the worker suspends its absence-implies-Clear inference
/// for that poll — so a reference missing from `snapshots` is not evidence the
/// alarm cleared. Carried on the payload as well as per-record because a
/// truncated fetch that filters down to zero records still has to say so.
/// </summary>
[global::System.Diagnostics.DebuggerNonUserCodeAttribute]
[global::System.CodeDom.Compiler.GeneratedCode("protoc", null)]
public bool SnapshotTruncated {
get { return snapshotTruncated_; }
set {
snapshotTruncated_ = value;
}
}
[global::System.Diagnostics.DebuggerNonUserCodeAttribute]
[global::System.CodeDom.Compiler.GeneratedCode("protoc", null)]
public override bool Equals(object other) {
@@ -23260,6 +23282,7 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
return true;
}
if(!snapshots_.Equals(other.snapshots_)) return false;
if (SnapshotTruncated != other.SnapshotTruncated) return false;
return Equals(_unknownFields, other._unknownFields);
}
@@ -23268,6 +23291,7 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
public override int GetHashCode() {
int hash = 1;
hash ^= snapshots_.GetHashCode();
if (SnapshotTruncated != false) hash ^= SnapshotTruncated.GetHashCode();
if (_unknownFields != null) {
hash ^= _unknownFields.GetHashCode();
}
@@ -23287,6 +23311,10 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
output.WriteRawMessage(this);
#else
snapshots_.WriteTo(output, _repeated_snapshots_codec);
if (SnapshotTruncated != false) {
output.WriteRawTag(16);
output.WriteBool(SnapshotTruncated);
}
if (_unknownFields != null) {
_unknownFields.WriteTo(output);
}
@@ -23298,6 +23326,10 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
[global::System.CodeDom.Compiler.GeneratedCode("protoc", null)]
void pb::IBufferMessage.InternalWriteTo(ref pb::WriteContext output) {
snapshots_.WriteTo(ref output, _repeated_snapshots_codec);
if (SnapshotTruncated != false) {
output.WriteRawTag(16);
output.WriteBool(SnapshotTruncated);
}
if (_unknownFields != null) {
_unknownFields.WriteTo(ref output);
}
@@ -23309,6 +23341,9 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
public int CalculateSize() {
int size = 0;
size += snapshots_.CalculateSize(_repeated_snapshots_codec);
if (SnapshotTruncated != false) {
size += 1 + 1;
}
if (_unknownFields != null) {
size += _unknownFields.CalculateSize();
}
@@ -23322,6 +23357,9 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
return;
}
snapshots_.Add(other.snapshots_);
if (other.SnapshotTruncated != false) {
SnapshotTruncated = other.SnapshotTruncated;
}
_unknownFields = pb::UnknownFieldSet.MergeFrom(_unknownFields, other._unknownFields);
}
@@ -23345,6 +23383,10 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
snapshots_.AddEntriesFrom(input, _repeated_snapshots_codec);
break;
}
case 16: {
SnapshotTruncated = input.ReadBool();
break;
}
}
}
#endif
@@ -23368,6 +23410,10 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
snapshots_.AddEntriesFrom(ref input, _repeated_snapshots_codec);
break;
}
case 16: {
SnapshotTruncated = input.ReadBool();
break;
}
}
}
}
@@ -26732,6 +26778,7 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
limitValue_ = other.limitValue_ != null ? other.limitValue_.Clone() : null;
degraded_ = other.degraded_;
sourceProvider_ = other.sourceProvider_;
fromTruncatedSnapshot_ = other.fromTruncatedSnapshot_;
_unknownFields = pb::UnknownFieldSet.Clone(other._unknownFields);
}
@@ -26944,6 +26991,29 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
}
}
/// <summary>Field number for the "from_truncated_snapshot" field.</summary>
public const int FromTruncatedSnapshotFieldNumber = 16;
private bool fromTruncatedSnapshot_;
/// <summary>
/// True when the provider fetch that produced this snapshot hit the per-fetch
/// cap: the snapshot set may omit active alarms, and the worker suspended its
/// absence-implies-Clear inference for that poll. Says nothing about THIS
/// record's fidelity — the record is as accurate as any other; it flags that
/// the set it belongs to is possibly incomplete. QueryActiveAlarms returns a
/// bare `stream ActiveAlarmSnapshot` with no envelope message, so a per-record
/// boolean is the only additive way to carry set-level degraded status on that
/// RPC. Distinct from `degraded`, which is about the subtag fallback provider.
/// Additive (proto3): clients that ignore it deserialize the stream unchanged.
/// </summary>
[global::System.Diagnostics.DebuggerNonUserCodeAttribute]
[global::System.CodeDom.Compiler.GeneratedCode("protoc", null)]
public bool FromTruncatedSnapshot {
get { return fromTruncatedSnapshot_; }
set {
fromTruncatedSnapshot_ = value;
}
}
[global::System.Diagnostics.DebuggerNonUserCodeAttribute]
[global::System.CodeDom.Compiler.GeneratedCode("protoc", null)]
public override bool Equals(object other) {
@@ -26974,6 +27044,7 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
if (!object.Equals(LimitValue, other.LimitValue)) return false;
if (Degraded != other.Degraded) return false;
if (SourceProvider != other.SourceProvider) return false;
if (FromTruncatedSnapshot != other.FromTruncatedSnapshot) return false;
return Equals(_unknownFields, other._unknownFields);
}
@@ -26996,6 +27067,7 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
if (limitValue_ != null) hash ^= LimitValue.GetHashCode();
if (Degraded != false) hash ^= Degraded.GetHashCode();
if (SourceProvider != global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AlarmProviderMode.Unspecified) hash ^= SourceProvider.GetHashCode();
if (FromTruncatedSnapshot != false) hash ^= FromTruncatedSnapshot.GetHashCode();
if (_unknownFields != null) {
hash ^= _unknownFields.GetHashCode();
}
@@ -27074,6 +27146,10 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
output.WriteRawTag(120);
output.WriteEnum((int) SourceProvider);
}
if (FromTruncatedSnapshot != false) {
output.WriteRawTag(128, 1);
output.WriteBool(FromTruncatedSnapshot);
}
if (_unknownFields != null) {
_unknownFields.WriteTo(output);
}
@@ -27144,6 +27220,10 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
output.WriteRawTag(120);
output.WriteEnum((int) SourceProvider);
}
if (FromTruncatedSnapshot != false) {
output.WriteRawTag(128, 1);
output.WriteBool(FromTruncatedSnapshot);
}
if (_unknownFields != null) {
_unknownFields.WriteTo(ref output);
}
@@ -27199,6 +27279,9 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
if (SourceProvider != global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AlarmProviderMode.Unspecified) {
size += 1 + pb::CodedOutputStream.ComputeEnumSize((int) SourceProvider);
}
if (FromTruncatedSnapshot != false) {
size += 2 + 1;
}
if (_unknownFields != null) {
size += _unknownFields.CalculateSize();
}
@@ -27268,6 +27351,9 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
if (other.SourceProvider != global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AlarmProviderMode.Unspecified) {
SourceProvider = other.SourceProvider;
}
if (other.FromTruncatedSnapshot != false) {
FromTruncatedSnapshot = other.FromTruncatedSnapshot;
}
_unknownFields = pb::UnknownFieldSet.MergeFrom(_unknownFields, other._unknownFields);
}
@@ -27359,6 +27445,10 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
SourceProvider = (global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AlarmProviderMode) input.ReadEnum();
break;
}
case 128: {
FromTruncatedSnapshot = input.ReadBool();
break;
}
}
}
#endif
@@ -27450,6 +27540,10 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto {
SourceProvider = (global::ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto.AlarmProviderMode) input.ReadEnum();
break;
}
case 128: {
FromTruncatedSnapshot = input.ReadBool();
break;
}
}
}
}
@@ -726,6 +726,13 @@ message AcknowledgeAlarmReplyPayload {
// stream.
message QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload {
repeated ActiveAlarmSnapshot snapshots = 1;
// True when the provider fetch backing this reply came back holding the
// per-fetch cap (MxGateway:Alarms:MaxAlarmsPerFetch). The reply may then omit
// active alarms, and the worker suspends its absence-implies-Clear inference
// for that poll — so a reference missing from `snapshots` is not evidence the
// alarm cleared. Carried on the payload as well as per-record because a
// truncated fetch that filters down to zero records still has to say so.
bool snapshot_truncated = 2;
}
message MxEvent {
@@ -932,6 +939,16 @@ message ActiveAlarmSnapshot {
// OnAlarmTransitionEvent.source_provider; always ALARMMGR or SUBTAG on the
// wire (never UNSPECIFIED).
AlarmProviderMode source_provider = 15;
// True when the provider fetch that produced this snapshot hit the per-fetch
// cap: the snapshot set may omit active alarms, and the worker suspended its
// absence-implies-Clear inference for that poll. Says nothing about THIS
// record's fidelity — the record is as accurate as any other; it flags that
// the set it belongs to is possibly incomplete. QueryActiveAlarms returns a
// bare `stream ActiveAlarmSnapshot` with no envelope message, so a per-record
// boolean is the only additive way to carry set-level degraded status on that
// RPC. Distinct from `degraded`, which is about the subtag fallback provider.
// Additive (proto3): clients that ignore it deserialize the stream unchanged.
bool from_truncated_snapshot = 16;
}
enum AlarmConditionState {
@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
using System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis;
using System.Security.Claims;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions.Ldap;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Ldap;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Configuration;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Sessions;
using LibraryLdapOptions = ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions.Ldap.LdapOptions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.IntegrationTests;
@@ -23,6 +26,18 @@ public sealed class DashboardLdapLiveTests
/// </summary>
private const string SharedDirectoryPassword = "password";
/// <summary>
/// Dashboard visibility tags (SEC-25) used by the ACL scenarios below. They are operator-chosen
/// labels that exist only in this fixture's configuration and in the fake sessions' owner-tag
/// list — nothing in the shared directory carries them.
/// </summary>
private const string TeamATag = "team-a";
private const string TeamBTag = "team-b";
private const string TeamASessionId = "session-team-a";
private const string TeamBSessionId = "session-team-b";
private const string UntaggedSessionId = "session-untagged";
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that <c>admin</c> — a shared-directory user whose <c>othergroups</c> include
/// GwAdmin (gid 5610) — authenticates successfully and is granted the Admin dashboard role.
@@ -152,27 +167,162 @@ public sealed class DashboardLdapLiveTests
Assert.Null(result.Principal);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies the SEC-25 tag grant end-to-end from a real LDAP bind: <c>gw-viewer</c>'s only
/// group (GwReader) is mapped to the <c>team-a</c> visibility tag by <c>Dashboard:GroupToTag</c>,
/// and the principal that bind produces is admitted by <see cref="IDashboardSessionAcl"/> for a
/// <c>team-a</c>-tagged session but refused for a <c>team-b</c>-tagged one.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The mapping under test is entirely config-side: no GLAuth entry, group, or membership was
/// added for it — the shared directory's existing GwReader group is simply named as a key in
/// this fixture's <c>GroupToTag</c> map. What only a live bind can prove is that the group
/// names <c>ILdapAuthService</c> actually returns from the shared directory (short RDN values,
/// not DNs) are the ones <c>GroupToTag</c> keys match, which a fabricated principal cannot show.
/// The denial half is the load-bearing assertion: before the ACL, every Viewer saw every session.
/// </remarks>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[LiveLdapFact]
public async Task AuthenticateAsync_ViewerWithGroupToTagGrant_SeesOnlyItsOwnTaggedSession()
{
DashboardAuthenticator authenticator = CreateAuthenticator(LibraryOptions(), TaggedDashboardOptions());
DashboardAuthenticationResult result = await authenticator.AuthenticateAsync(
"gw-viewer",
SharedDirectoryPassword,
CancellationToken.None);
Assert.True(result.Succeeded);
Assert.NotNull(result.Principal);
Assert.True(result.Principal.IsInRole(DashboardRoles.Viewer));
Assert.False(result.Principal.IsInRole(DashboardRoles.Admin));
Assert.Contains(result.Principal.Claims, claim =>
claim.Type == DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.DashboardTagClaimType
&& claim.Value == TeamATag);
IDashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(result.Principal, TeamASessionId));
Assert.False(acl.CanViewSession(result.Principal, TeamBSessionId));
// Untagged sessions stay Admin-only under the shipped default, so the Viewer's grant does
// not silently widen to sessions whose owning key declared no tags.
Assert.False(acl.CanViewSession(result.Principal, UntaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that <c>multi-role</c> — an Administrator in the shared directory — reaches every
/// session regardless of tags.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The bypass is proved by the two sessions the account's own grant does <em>not</em> cover.
/// <c>multi-role</c> is a member of GwReader as well as GwAdmin, so this fixture's
/// <c>GroupToTag</c> map grants it <c>team-a</c> — the <c>team-a</c> allow would therefore hold
/// even with the bypass removed and proves nothing on its own. <c>team-b</c> (a tag it does not
/// hold) and the untagged session (Admin-only under the shipped default) are the assertions
/// that fail if the Administrator branch is ever dropped.
/// </remarks>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[LiveLdapFact]
public async Task AuthenticateAsync_Administrator_BypassesTagCheckForEverySession()
{
DashboardAuthenticator authenticator = CreateAuthenticator(LibraryOptions(), TaggedDashboardOptions());
DashboardAuthenticationResult result = await authenticator.AuthenticateAsync(
"multi-role",
SharedDirectoryPassword,
CancellationToken.None);
Assert.True(result.Succeeded);
Assert.NotNull(result.Principal);
Assert.True(result.Principal.IsInRole(DashboardRoles.Admin));
IDashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(result.Principal, TeamASessionId));
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(result.Principal, TeamBSessionId));
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(result.Principal, UntaggedSessionId));
}
private static DashboardAuthenticator CreateAuthenticator() => CreateAuthenticator(LibraryOptions());
private static DashboardAuthenticator CreateAuthenticator(LibraryLdapOptions ldapOptions)
private static DashboardAuthenticator CreateAuthenticator(LibraryLdapOptions ldapOptions) =>
CreateAuthenticator(ldapOptions, AdminOnlyDashboardOptions());
private static DashboardAuthenticator CreateAuthenticator(
LibraryLdapOptions ldapOptions,
DashboardOptions dashboardOptions)
{
GatewayOptions gatewayOptions = new()
{
Dashboard = new DashboardOptions
{
GroupToRole = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
{
["GwAdmin"] = DashboardRoles.Admin,
},
},
};
GatewayOptions gatewayOptions = new() { Dashboard = dashboardOptions };
return new DashboardAuthenticator(
new LdapAuthService(ldapOptions),
new DashboardGroupRoleMapper(Options.Create(gatewayOptions)),
Options.Create(gatewayOptions),
NullLogger<DashboardAuthenticator>.Instance);
}
/// <summary>
/// The historical fixture map: GwAdmin is the only mapped group, so GwReader members are denied
/// login outright. Kept for the tests that assert that denial.
/// </summary>
private static DashboardOptions AdminOnlyDashboardOptions() => new()
{
GroupToRole = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
{
["GwAdmin"] = DashboardRoles.Admin,
},
};
/// <summary>
/// The SEC-25 fixture map: GwReader is admitted as a Viewer and granted <c>team-a</c>. Both keys
/// name groups that already exist in the shared directory — the tag layer is config-only.
/// </summary>
private static DashboardOptions TaggedDashboardOptions() => new()
{
GroupToRole = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
{
["GwAdmin"] = DashboardRoles.Admin,
["GwReader"] = DashboardRoles.Viewer,
},
GroupToTag = new Dictionary<string, string[]>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
{
["GwReader"] = [TeamATag],
},
};
private static DashboardSessionAcl CreateAcl() => new(
new FixedSessionManager(
[
CreateSession(TeamASessionId, [TeamATag]),
CreateSession(TeamBSessionId, [TeamBTag]),
CreateSession(UntaggedSessionId, tags: null),
]),
Options.Create(new GatewayOptions
{
// Explicit rather than defaulted: the untagged assertions above read this value.
Dashboard = new DashboardOptions
{
UntaggedSessionVisibility = UntaggedSessionVisibility.AdminOnly,
},
}));
private static GatewaySession CreateSession(string sessionId, string[]? tags) => new(
sessionId: sessionId,
backendName: "backend",
pipeName: $"pipe-{sessionId}",
nonce: "nonce",
clientIdentity: "client",
ownerKeyId: "key-1",
clientSessionName: "client-session",
clientCorrelationId: "correlation",
commandTimeout: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5),
startupTimeout: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5),
shutdownTimeout: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5),
leaseDuration: TimeSpan.FromMinutes(30),
openedAt: DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
ownerDashboardTags: tags);
/// <summary>
/// Builds the shared library <see cref="LibraryLdapOptions"/> by binding the real
/// <c>MxGateway:Ldap</c> configuration section the same way production does in
@@ -227,4 +377,53 @@ public sealed class DashboardLdapLiveTests
return options;
}
/// <summary>
/// Registry double serving a fixed set of sessions. The ACL only ever calls
/// <see cref="TryGetSession"/>; the remaining members exist to satisfy the interface and are
/// never reached by these tests.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="sessions">The sessions this registry resolves.</param>
private sealed class FixedSessionManager(IReadOnlyList<GatewaySession> sessions) : ISessionManager
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<GatewaySession> OpenSessionAsync(
SessionOpenRequest request,
string? clientIdentity,
string? ownerKeyId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) => throw new NotSupportedException();
/// <inheritdoc />
public bool TryGetSession(string sessionId, [MaybeNullWhen(false)] out GatewaySession session)
{
session = sessions.FirstOrDefault(candidate => candidate.SessionId == sessionId);
return session is not null;
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<WorkerCommandReply> InvokeAsync(
string sessionId,
WorkerCommand command,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) => throw new NotSupportedException();
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<SessionCloseResult> CloseSessionAsync(
string sessionId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) => throw new NotSupportedException();
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<SessionCloseResult> KillWorkerAsync(
string sessionId,
string reason,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) => throw new NotSupportedException();
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<int> CloseExpiredLeasesAsync(
DateTimeOffset now,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.FromResult(0);
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.CompletedTask;
}
}
@@ -57,6 +57,13 @@ public sealed class GatewayAlarmMonitor : BackgroundService, IGatewayAlarmServic
private string _providerReason = string.Empty;
private DateTimeOffset _providerSince = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
// Whether the worker's most recent reconcile fetch was capped, guarded by _sync.
// Written only by ApplyReconcile (and cleared with the cache), so it describes the last full
// reconcile — not necessarily the current _alarms contents, which live transitions keep moving
// via ApplyTransition between passes. Read it as "as of the last reconcile, the worker's fetch
// was capped", which is the right granularity for a completeness caveat.
private bool _snapshotTruncated;
private volatile GatewayAlarmMonitorState _state = GatewayAlarmMonitorState.Disabled;
private volatile string? _lastError;
private GatewaySession? _session;
@@ -110,6 +117,12 @@ public sealed class GatewayAlarmMonitor : BackgroundService, IGatewayAlarmServic
}
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public bool SnapshotTruncated
{
get { lock (_sync) { return _snapshotTruncated; } }
}
/// <inheritdoc />
protected override async Task ExecuteAsync(CancellationToken stoppingToken)
{
@@ -416,7 +429,7 @@ public sealed class GatewayAlarmMonitor : BackgroundService, IGatewayAlarmServic
QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload? payload = reply.Reply.QueryActiveAlarms;
if (payload is not null)
{
ApplyReconcile(payload.Snapshots);
ApplyReconcile(payload.Snapshots, payload.SnapshotTruncated);
}
}
@@ -610,7 +623,13 @@ public sealed class GatewayAlarmMonitor : BackgroundService, IGatewayAlarmServic
// suppressed. The dedup fires only on a positive marker match, so the contract stays
// at-least-once: consumers must still treat alarm state idempotently — apply a transition as
// "set the alarm to this state", never as an increment or a toggle.
private void ApplyReconcile(IEnumerable<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> snapshots)
//
// Truncation (`snapshotTruncated`) needs no special handling here, and that is worth saying
// because the obvious worry — a capped fetch reading as a wave of Clears — is answered one
// level down. The worker merges rather than replaces its retained snapshot on a capped fetch,
// so the set arriving here still carries the alarms the capped reply had no room to mention.
// The flag is therefore only recorded, for the operator-facing completeness caveat.
private void ApplyReconcile(IEnumerable<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> snapshots, bool snapshotTruncated)
{
Dictionary<string, ActiveAlarmSnapshot> next = new(StringComparer.Ordinal);
foreach (ActiveAlarmSnapshot snapshot in snapshots)
@@ -669,6 +688,7 @@ public sealed class GatewayAlarmMonitor : BackgroundService, IGatewayAlarmServic
_alarms[incoming.Key] = incoming.Value;
}
_snapshotTruncated = snapshotTruncated;
_currentAlarmsProjection = null;
}
}
@@ -716,6 +736,10 @@ public sealed class GatewayAlarmMonitor : BackgroundService, IGatewayAlarmServic
lock (_sync)
{
_alarms.Clear();
// The truncation verdict describes the cache generation being discarded, so it goes
// with it. Carrying it across a monitor restart would caveat an empty set as "may be
// incomplete" on evidence from a session that no longer exists.
_snapshotTruncated = false;
_currentAlarmsProjection = null;
}
}
@@ -38,6 +38,16 @@ public interface IGatewayAlarmService
/// <summary>A point-in-time copy of the current active-alarm set.</summary>
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> CurrentAlarms { get; }
/// <summary>
/// True when the worker's most recent reconcile fetch hit the provider's
/// per-fetch cap, so <see cref="CurrentAlarms"/> may be missing active
/// alarms. The monitor is otherwise healthy — this is not a fault, it is
/// a completeness caveat, which is why it is separate from
/// <see cref="State"/> and <see cref="LastError"/>. Cleared by the first
/// reconcile whose fetch comes back under the cap.
/// </summary>
bool SnapshotTruncated { get; }
/// <summary>
/// Attaches to the central alarm feed. The returned stream yields one
/// <see cref="AlarmFeedMessage"/> per currently-active alarm, then a
@@ -34,6 +34,17 @@
<div class="alert alert-danger">Alarm query failed: @_queryError</div>
}
@* Warning, not danger: the rows below are all real and the monitor is healthy — only the
completeness of the set is in doubt, so this must not read as "alarms are broken". *@
@if (_snapshotTruncated)
{
<div class="alert alert-warning">
Alarm snapshot may be incomplete — the provider returned a capped fetch, so alarms beyond
the cap are not listed. Alarms already known stay listed rather than clearing. Raise
<code>MxGateway:Alarms:MaxAlarmsPerFetch</code> or narrow the subscription if this persists.
</div>
}
<section class="metric-grid compact">
<MetricCard Label="Active (unacked)" Value="@_unackedCount.ToString("N0")" />
<MetricCard Label="Acknowledged" Value="@_ackedCount.ToString("N0")" />
@@ -156,6 +167,7 @@
@code {
private readonly List<DashboardActiveAlarm> _alarms = [];
private string? _queryError;
private bool _snapshotTruncated;
private int? _workerPid;
private DateTimeOffset? _lastRefresh;
private int _unackedCount;
@@ -386,6 +398,7 @@
{
DashboardAlarmQueryResult result = await LiveData.QueryAlarmsAsync(_cts.Token);
_queryError = result.Error;
_snapshotTruncated = result.SnapshotTruncated;
_workerPid = result.WorkerProcessId;
_lastRefresh = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
_alarms.Clear();
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
@inject AuthenticationStateProvider AuthenticationStateProvider
@inject IDashboardSessionAdminService SessionAdminService
@inject IDashboardSessionEventSubscriber EventSubscriber
@inject IDashboardSessionAcl SessionAcl
<PageTitle>Dashboard Session</PageTitle>
@@ -114,7 +115,11 @@ else
<span>@(_eventsConnected ? "live" : "offline")</span>
</span>
</div>
@if (_recentEvents.Count == 0)
@if (!_eventsAuthorized)
{
<div class="empty-state">Not authorized for this session's events.</div>
}
else if (_recentEvents.Count == 0)
{
<div class="empty-state">
Waiting for events. The dashboard subscribes to this session's events directly, so
@@ -175,7 +180,21 @@ else
private CancellationTokenSource? _eventPumpCancellation;
private Task? _eventPumpTask;
private bool _eventsConnected;
// Renders the denial message in place of the events panel's empty state. Starts true so the
// panel reads as "waiting" until the gate has actually been evaluated for a session id;
// AttachEventsAsync is the only writer, and it writes on the renderer's dispatcher.
private bool _eventsAuthorized = true;
private string? _subscribedSessionId;
// Identifies the attach currently entitled to publish subscription state. Bumped
// synchronously by OnParametersSetAsync before it awaits anything, so a suspended
// AttachEventsAsync continuation can tell that a newer parameter set overtook it — the
// same dispatcher-owned identity idea as the ReferenceEquals guards in PumpEventsAsync
// and MarkDisconnectedAsync, one level up. Without it, the await on the authentication
// state opens a window in which a rapid A -> B navigation lets the stale continuation
// re-read the live SessionId and attach B a second time, orphaning B's first
// subscription (never disposed, its viewer registration never released, its pump never
// cancelled) behind the fields it overwrites.
private int _attachGeneration;
private readonly LinkedList<MxEvent> _recentEvents = new();
private bool CanManage { get; set; }
@@ -199,11 +218,17 @@ else
{
if (!string.Equals(_subscribedSessionId, SessionId, StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
// Claimed before the first await, so every attach that follows carries a token
// that a later parameter set can invalidate. DetachEventsAsync needs no such
// guard: it captures and nulls the live fields synchronously before it awaits,
// so a resumed detach only unwinds what it already took ownership of.
int generation = ++_attachGeneration;
// Deliberately no ConfigureAwait(false): the resumption must stay on the
// renderer's dispatcher so the new subscription is published to
// _eventSubscription from the same thread the pump's guard reads it on.
await DetachEventsAsync();
AttachEvents();
await AttachEventsAsync(generation);
}
}
@@ -288,19 +313,47 @@ else
// IDashboardEventBroadcaster, and the subscription registers with
// EventsHubViewerRegistry, so the "nobody is watching" gate keeps working for
// both audiences.
// ACL posture is unchanged from the hub path: any dashboard Viewer may watch
// any session (SEC-25 tracks the per-session ACL for both seams).
private void AttachEvents()
// ACL posture matches the hub path exactly: IDashboardSessionAcl gates this seam with the
// same decision EventsHub.SubscribeSession applies (SEC-25 / TST-15). The gate wraps only
// whether a subscription is created at all — the generation guards, the pump, and the detach
// coupling below it are untouched, so a denied page holds no subscription to leak and never
// registers a viewer, which keeps the broadcaster's mirror off for that session.
private async Task AttachEventsAsync(int generation)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(SessionId))
{
return;
}
// Deliberately no ConfigureAwait(false): the decision and everything it publishes must
// land back on the renderer's dispatcher, which is where the fields below are owned.
AuthenticationState authenticationState = await AuthenticationStateProvider.GetAuthenticationStateAsync();
// Checked before ANY field write and before Subscribe, because both are the damage: a
// newer parameter set may have run start-to-finish while this continuation was parked,
// and SessionId now reads as ITS session. Attaching here would not bypass the ACL (the
// newer attach already cleared the same session), but it would strand the live
// subscription — overwritten in place, so nothing ever disposes it or releases its
// viewer registration, and the mirror stays on for a session nobody is watching. A
// stale attach owns nothing, so it returns rather than detaching: tearing down here
// would destroy the newer attach's subscription.
if (generation != _attachGeneration)
{
return;
}
_subscribedSessionId = SessionId;
_eventsAuthorized = SessionAcl.CanViewSession(authenticationState.User, SessionId);
if (!_eventsAuthorized)
{
// No subscription, no pump, no viewer registration — the panel renders the denial.
return;
}
_eventSubscription = EventSubscriber.Subscribe(SessionId);
_eventPumpCancellation = new CancellationTokenSource();
_eventsConnected = true;
_subscribedSessionId = SessionId;
// Deliberately not awaited: the pump runs for as long as the page watches this
// session and is cancelled and drained by DetachEventsAsync.
@@ -57,7 +57,14 @@ public sealed record DashboardActiveAlarm(
/// <param name="Alarms">The active alarms, or an empty list on error.</param>
/// <param name="Error">A diagnostic message when the query failed; otherwise null.</param>
/// <param name="WorkerProcessId">The worker process id backing the dashboard session, when available.</param>
/// <param name="SnapshotTruncated">
/// True when the provider fetch behind <paramref name="Alarms"/> hit its per-fetch cap, so the
/// list may be missing active alarms. Distinct from <paramref name="Error"/>: the query
/// succeeded and every row shown is real — only the set's completeness is in doubt, which the
/// page states as a caveat rather than a failure.
/// </param>
public sealed record DashboardAlarmQueryResult(
IReadOnlyList<DashboardActiveAlarm> Alarms,
string? Error,
int? WorkerProcessId);
int? WorkerProcessId,
bool SnapshotTruncated = false);
@@ -36,6 +36,16 @@ public static class DashboardAuthenticationDefaults
public const string LdapGroupClaimType = "mxgateway:ldap_group";
public const string KeyPrefixClaimType = "mxgateway:key_prefix";
/// <summary>
/// Claim carrying one dashboard event-visibility tag the caller is granted (SEC-25). Stamped
/// at cookie login by <see cref="DashboardAuthenticator"/> and at hub-token mint by
/// <see cref="HubTokenService"/>, both resolving the caller's LDAP groups through
/// <c>MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag</c>; read by <see cref="IDashboardSessionAcl"/>. A
/// principal carrying none of these claims is an empty-grant Viewer, which is the fail-closed
/// default. Visibility only — it never grants data access.
/// </summary>
public const string DashboardTagClaimType = "zb:dashboardtag";
/// <summary>
/// Dashboard auth cookie name used when the cookie is not guaranteed to be Secure
/// (<c>RequireHttpsCookie=false</c> → <see cref="Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Cookies.CookieSecurePolicy.SameAsRequest"/>)
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
using System.Security.Claims;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions.Ldap;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Abstractions.Roles;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.AspNetCore;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Configuration;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard;
@@ -17,10 +19,15 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard;
/// </summary>
/// <param name="ldapAuthService">Shared LDAP bind-then-search provider.</param>
/// <param name="roleMapper">Maps LDAP groups to dashboard roles.</param>
/// <param name="options">
/// Gateway options supplying <c>MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag</c>, the map that turns the user's
/// LDAP groups into the dashboard visibility tags stamped on the cookie principal (SEC-25).
/// </param>
/// <param name="logger">Logger for diagnostic, credential-free login outcomes.</param>
public sealed class DashboardAuthenticator(
ILdapAuthService ldapAuthService,
IGroupRoleMapper<string> roleMapper,
IOptions<GatewayOptions> options,
ILogger<DashboardAuthenticator> logger) : IDashboardAuthenticator
{
private const string GenericFailureMessage = "The username or password is invalid, or the user is not authorized.";
@@ -70,7 +77,8 @@ public sealed class DashboardAuthenticator(
ldapResult.Username,
ldapResult.DisplayName,
ldapResult.Groups,
roles));
roles,
options.Value.Dashboard.GroupToTag));
}
/// <summary>
@@ -97,12 +105,23 @@ public sealed class DashboardAuthenticator(
/// is role-based), so the shape change is non-breaking for dashboard consumers.
/// </param>
/// <param name="roles">The dashboard roles resolved from <paramref name="groups"/>.</param>
/// <param name="groupToTag">
/// The configured <c>Dashboard:GroupToTag</c> map. The tags it grants are stamped as
/// <see cref="DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.DashboardTagClaimType"/> claims so a
/// cookie-authenticated circuit carries its grant without a hub-token round-trip — the
/// session-details page's in-process subscribe seam reads exactly these claims.
/// </param>
private static ClaimsPrincipal CreatePrincipal(
string username,
string displayName,
IEnumerable<string> groups,
IEnumerable<string> roles)
IEnumerable<string> roles,
IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string[]> groupToTag)
{
// Materialized because the groups are read twice below (group claims and tag mapping) and
// the source is only guaranteed to be enumerable.
string[] groupNames = groups as string[] ?? [.. groups];
List<Claim> claims =
[
// Keep NameIdentifier so any existing read-site that uses it continues to work.
@@ -120,9 +139,14 @@ public sealed class DashboardAuthenticator(
// Groups are short RDN names from ILdapAuthService (see param doc above), so
// this claim value is the short group name, not the original DN.
// LdapGroupClaimType is MxGateway-specific ("mxgateway:ldap_group") — no ZbClaimType for groups.
claims.AddRange(groups.Select(group => new Claim(
claims.AddRange(groupNames.Select(group => new Claim(
DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.LdapGroupClaimType,
group)));
// Dashboard event-visibility tags (SEC-25). Visibility only — never a data-access grant —
// and never logged: only the decision, never the tag values, reaches diagnostics.
claims.AddRange(DashboardGroupTagMapping
.MapGroupsToTags(groupNames, groupToTag)
.Select(tag => new Claim(DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.DashboardTagClaimType, tag)));
ClaimsIdentity claimsIdentity = new(
claims,
@@ -127,7 +127,11 @@ public sealed class DashboardLiveDataService : IDashboardLiveDataService, IAsync
? null
: _alarmService.LastError ?? $"Alarm monitor is {_alarmService.State}.";
return Task.FromResult(new DashboardAlarmQueryResult(alarms, error, _alarmService.WorkerProcessId));
return Task.FromResult(new DashboardAlarmQueryResult(
alarms,
error,
_alarmService.WorkerProcessId,
_alarmService.SnapshotTruncated));
}
// Promotes every already-advised tag in this read to the front of the recency
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ public static class DashboardServiceCollectionExtensions
services.AddSingleton<DashboardApiKeyAuthorization>();
services.AddSingleton<IDashboardApiKeyManagementService, DashboardApiKeyManagementService>();
services.AddSingleton<IDashboardSessionAdminService, DashboardSessionAdminService>();
// Singleton and stateless: it reads the session registry and options per call, and is
// consulted from both subscribe seams (the EventsHub join and the session-details page's
// in-process subscription).
services.AddSingleton<IDashboardSessionAcl, DashboardSessionAcl>();
// Singleton, and the only consumer scope left is HubTokenAuthenticationHandler plus
// the /hubs/token endpoint: server-rendered pages read the in-process feeds, so
// nothing in this process builds a hub connection or needs a token for one.
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
using System.Security.Claims;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Configuration;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Sessions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard;
/// <summary>
/// Tag-intersection implementation of <see cref="IDashboardSessionAcl"/>. Fails closed on
/// every branch: an unknown session, an empty tag grant, and an untagged session under the
/// default <see cref="UntaggedSessionVisibility.AdminOnly"/> all deny.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// Decision order (first match wins):
/// </para>
/// <list type="number">
/// <item><description>Authenticated caller in <see cref="DashboardRoles.Admin"/> → allow. Admin
/// already reaches every destructive surface, so event-metadata visibility is strictly weaker.</description></item>
/// <item><description>Session not present in <see cref="ISessionManager"/> → deny. No subscription
/// is created for a phantom id.</description></item>
/// <item><description>Session carries no tags → allow only when
/// <c>MxGateway:Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility</c> is
/// <see cref="UntaggedSessionVisibility.AllViewers"/>.</description></item>
/// <item><description>Otherwise allow iff the session's tags intersect the caller's granted tags
/// (ordinal-ignore-case).</description></item>
/// </list>
/// <para>
/// Granted tags are read from the caller's <see cref="DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.DashboardTagClaimType"/>
/// claims, stamped at login (<see cref="DashboardAuthenticator"/>) or at hub-token mint
/// (<see cref="HubTokenService"/>). A principal with no such claims — anonymous localhost included —
/// is an empty-grant Viewer.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// This sits on the <em>subscribe</em> path, not the per-event path, and must stay cheap enough to
/// keep it there: the only per-call work is the claim scan plus a session-registry lookup, with no
/// intermediate collection built. A per-event re-check is deliberately not needed — a joined SignalR
/// group and an in-process subscription are both per-session, and <see cref="GatewaySession.Tags"/>
/// is immutable for the session's life, so the decision taken at subscribe time cannot go stale
/// while the subscription lives.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
/// <param name="sessionManager">Registry the session id is resolved against.</param>
/// <param name="options">Gateway options supplying <c>Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility</c>.</param>
public sealed class DashboardSessionAcl(
ISessionManager sessionManager,
IOptions<GatewayOptions> options) : IDashboardSessionAcl
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public bool CanViewSession(ClaimsPrincipal? principal, string sessionId)
{
if (principal is null || string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(sessionId))
{
return false;
}
if (principal.Identity?.IsAuthenticated == true && principal.IsInRole(DashboardRoles.Admin))
{
return true;
}
if (!sessionManager.TryGetSession(sessionId, out GatewaySession? session))
{
return false;
}
if (session.Tags.Count == 0)
{
return options.Value.Dashboard.UntaggedSessionVisibility == UntaggedSessionVisibility.AllViewers;
}
// Session.Tags is an ordinal-ignore-case set, so the containment test carries the
// comparison; scanning the claims (rather than materializing the grant) keeps this
// allocation-free beyond the claim enumerator.
foreach (Claim tagClaim in principal.FindAll(DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.DashboardTagClaimType))
{
if (session.Tags.Contains(tagClaim.Value))
{
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
}
@@ -2,14 +2,16 @@ using System.Security.Claims;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text.Json;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Configuration;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard;
/// <summary>
/// Mints and validates short-lived bearer tokens for SignalR hub connections.
/// The token is a data-protected JSON payload containing the user's name and
/// role claims. Validity is enforced by the data-protection time-limited
/// protector; no separate signing keys are configured.
/// The token is a data-protected JSON payload containing the user's name, role
/// claims, and granted dashboard visibility tags. Validity is enforced by the
/// data-protection time-limited protector; no separate signing keys are configured.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// This service is registered as a singleton in
@@ -27,29 +29,42 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard;
/// </remarks>
public sealed class HubTokenService
{
private const string ProtectorPurpose = "ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Dashboard.HubToken.v1";
// Internal rather than private so a test can protect a hand-built payload through the same
// purpose and assert how Validate reads a payload shape this class no longer mints (a token
// predating the Tags field). Copying the literal into the test instead would let the two
// drift and silently turn that test into an assertion about an unrelated protector.
internal const string ProtectorPurpose = "ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Dashboard.HubToken.v1";
// Hub bearer tokens are single-purpose, data-protection-encrypted, and NOT server-side
// revocable. A short lifetime bounds the exposure window of a token captured from a proxy
// or log after logout (the cookie is cleared on logout, but outstanding tokens are not), and
// bounds how long a stale role set survives a role change. Five minutes is transparent to
// clients that re-fetch from /hubs/token on every (re)connect, which is what a remote hub
// consumer is expected to do; see docs/GatewayDashboardDesign.md. Heavier jti-denylist
// revocation is deliberately deferred until per-session hub ACLs land, when tokens gain
// session binding.
// bounds how long a stale role set survives a role change. It now bounds a stale *tag* grant
// the same way (SEC-25): the token carries the tags resolved from the caller's LDAP groups at
// mint time, so revoking a GroupToTag entry takes effect for token-authenticated hub
// connections within one lifetime — the natural place the deferred "tokens gain session
// binding" note landed. Five minutes is transparent to clients that re-fetch from /hubs/token
// on every (re)connect, which is what a remote hub consumer is expected to do; see
// docs/GatewayDashboardDesign.md. Heavier jti-denylist revocation stays deferred.
internal static readonly TimeSpan TokenLifetime = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
private readonly ITimeLimitedDataProtector _protector;
private readonly IOptions<GatewayOptions> _options;
/// <summary>Initializes a new instance of the HubTokenService with a data protection provider.</summary>
/// <param name="dataProtection">The data protection provider for token encryption.</param>
public HubTokenService(IDataProtectionProvider dataProtection)
/// <param name="options">
/// Gateway options supplying <c>MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag</c>, the map used to resolve the
/// caller's granted visibility tags at mint time.
/// </param>
public HubTokenService(IDataProtectionProvider dataProtection, IOptions<GatewayOptions> options)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(dataProtection);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(options);
_protector = dataProtection.CreateProtector(ProtectorPurpose).ToTimeLimitedDataProtector();
_options = options;
}
/// <summary>Issues a bearer token carrying the user's identity and roles.</summary>
/// <summary>Issues a bearer token carrying the user's identity, roles, and granted tags.</summary>
/// <param name="user">The claims principal representing the user.</param>
/// <returns>The data-protected bearer token string.</returns>
public string Issue(ClaimsPrincipal user) => Issue(user, TokenLifetime);
@@ -65,10 +80,20 @@ public sealed class HubTokenService
internal string Issue(ClaimsPrincipal user, TimeSpan lifetime)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(user);
// Resolved from the caller's LDAP-group claims rather than copied from any tag claims the
// principal already carries: re-resolving is what makes the 5-minute lifetime an actual
// staleness bound on the grant. Tags are stamped for every caller — an Administrator
// bypasses the ACL, so theirs are simply moot rather than a special case here.
IReadOnlySet<string> grantedTags = DashboardGroupTagMapping.MapGroupsToTags(
user.FindAll(DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.LdapGroupClaimType).Select(c => c.Value),
_options.Value.Dashboard.GroupToTag);
HubTokenPayload payload = new(
user.Identity?.Name,
user.FindFirstValue(ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier),
[.. user.FindAll(ClaimTypes.Role).Select(c => c.Value)]);
[.. user.FindAll(ClaimTypes.Role).Select(c => c.Value)],
[.. grantedTags]);
return _protector.Protect(JsonSerializer.Serialize(payload), lifetime);
}
@@ -107,6 +132,12 @@ public sealed class HubTokenService
}
claims.AddRange((payload.Roles ?? []).Select(r => new Claim(ClaimTypes.Role, r)));
// Rehydrated alongside the roles so the reconstructed principal is what
// IDashboardSessionAcl reads on the hub path — a token minted before the tag field
// existed (or by a caller with no grant) simply yields an empty grant, which denies.
claims.AddRange((payload.Tags ?? []).Select(t => new Claim(
DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.DashboardTagClaimType,
t)));
ClaimsIdentity identity = new(
claims,
@@ -121,5 +152,5 @@ public sealed class HubTokenService
}
}
private sealed record HubTokenPayload(string? Name, string? NameIdentifier, string[]? Roles);
private sealed record HubTokenPayload(string? Name, string? NameIdentifier, string[]? Roles, string[]? Tags);
}
@@ -15,8 +15,11 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard.Hubs;
/// registry to skip all mirror work for sessions nobody is watching.
/// </remarks>
/// <param name="viewerRegistry">Registry tracking which sessions have live subscribers.</param>
/// <param name="sessionAcl">Per-session visibility gate consulted before any group join.</param>
[Authorize(Policy = DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.HubClientsPolicy)]
public sealed class EventsHub(EventsHubViewerRegistry viewerRegistry) : Hub
public sealed class EventsHub(
EventsHubViewerRegistry viewerRegistry,
IDashboardSessionAcl sessionAcl) : Hub
{
/// <summary>Method name used to push individual <c>MxEvent</c> values to clients.</summary>
public const string EventMessage = "MxEvent";
@@ -33,27 +36,26 @@ public sealed class EventsHub(EventsHubViewerRegistry viewerRegistry) : Hub
/// client.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// In v1 the hub-level <see cref="AuthorizeAttribute"/>
/// (<c>HubClientsPolicy</c>) only checks that the caller carries one of
/// the dashboard roles (Admin or Viewer); both roles may subscribe to
/// any session id they choose. This is acceptable today because (a) the
/// dashboard's per-session views show non-secret session metadata that
/// any authenticated dashboard user can already see, and (b) tag values
/// are stripped from the mirrored events by
/// <see cref="DashboardEventBroadcaster"/> when
/// <c>MxGateway:Dashboard:ShowTagValues</c> is false (the default), so the
/// most sensitive payload cannot leak through this seam regardless of the
/// still-missing ACL. The per-session ACL that gates the gRPC
/// <c>StreamEvents</c> RPC is intentionally not yet mirrored here.
/// TODO(per-session-acl): tracked as remediation roadmap item 12
/// (SEC-25). Once a role/scope is introduced that scopes a Viewer to a
/// specific session or tenant, add a session-access check at this seam —
/// either inline (consult the per-user allowed-session set on
/// <c>Context.User</c> claims / <c>Context.Items</c>) or via a dedicated
/// authorization policy applied to the hub method itself.
/// The hub-level <see cref="AuthorizeAttribute"/> (<c>HubClientsPolicy</c>)
/// only checks that the caller carries one of the dashboard roles, which by
/// itself would let any Viewer subscribe to any session id they name. The
/// per-session decision is <see cref="IDashboardSessionAcl"/>'s
/// (SEC-25 / TST-15). The admin bypass is evaluated first, so an
/// Administrator joins any session id they name; every check below it
/// applies to non-Admin callers only. For those: a Viewer sees a session
/// only when its tags intersect their granted tags, an untagged session
/// follows <c>Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility</c>, and a session id the
/// registry does not have is denied outright — the phantom-id denial is
/// therefore a non-Admin rule, not a universal one.
/// A denied caller is not joined to the group and is
/// not registered with <see cref="EventsHubViewerRegistry"/>, so the mirror
/// stays off for a session nobody is legitimately watching. The same ACL
/// gates the in-process seam used by the session-details page, so neither
/// path is the weaker one.
/// </remarks>
/// <param name="sessionId">Session id to subscribe the caller to.</param>
/// <returns>A task representing the subscription operation.</returns>
/// <exception cref="HubException">The caller may not observe this session.</exception>
public Task SubscribeSession(string sessionId)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(sessionId))
@@ -61,6 +63,13 @@ public sealed class EventsHub(EventsHubViewerRegistry viewerRegistry) : Hub
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
if (!sessionAcl.CanViewSession(Context.User, sessionId))
{
// Surfaced rather than swallowed so a client can tell "denied" from "no events yet".
// The message names neither the session's tags nor the caller's grant.
throw new HubException("Not authorized for this session.");
}
// Register before joining the group: the reverse order would leave a window
// in which this connection is a group member but the broadcaster's gate still
// reports the session unwatched, silently dropping events it should receive.
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
using System.Security.Claims;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard;
/// <summary>
/// Decides whether a dashboard principal may observe one session's mirrored
/// event stream (SEC-25 / TST-15). Consulted at every subscribe seam: the
/// SignalR <c>EventsHub.SubscribeSession</c> join and the in-process
/// <c>IDashboardSessionEventSubscriber.Subscribe</c> used by the
/// session-details page.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The dashboard authenticates LDAP users while sessions are owned by API keys —
/// two disjoint identity domains — so the bridge is the session <em>tag</em>: a
/// session inherits its owning key's tags, and a dashboard group grants tags via
/// <c>MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag</c>. See
/// <c>docs/plans/2026-07-10-dashboard-session-acl-tst15.md</c>.
/// </remarks>
public interface IDashboardSessionAcl
{
/// <summary>
/// Returns whether <paramref name="principal"/> may observe the events of the
/// session identified by <paramref name="sessionId"/>.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="principal">
/// The dashboard caller. <see langword="null"/>, unauthenticated, or claim-less
/// principals (including the anonymous-localhost path) are treated as Viewers
/// holding an empty tag grant.
/// </param>
/// <param name="sessionId">Session id the caller wants to observe.</param>
/// <returns><see langword="true"/> when the caller may observe the session; otherwise <see langword="false"/>.</returns>
bool CanViewSession(ClaimsPrincipal? principal, string sessionId);
}
@@ -32,11 +32,17 @@ public sealed class MxAccessGatewayService(
try
{
requestValidator.ValidateOpenSession(request);
// The session's owner id and its dashboard-visibility tags both come from the resolved
// API key identity, never from the request: the key is the tenant principal, so a
// client cannot label its own session with another tenant's tag (SEC-25).
ApiKeyIdentity? owner = identityAccessor.Current;
GatewaySession session = await sessionManager
.OpenSessionAsync(
SessionOpenRequest.FromContract(request),
ResolveClientIdentity(),
identityAccessor.Current?.KeyId,
owner?.KeyId,
owner?.EffectiveConstraints.DashboardTags,
context.CancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
@@ -143,8 +143,13 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyAdminCliRunner(ApiKeyAdminCommands commands)
string expiry = key.ExpiresUtc is { } expires
? expires.ToUniversalTime().ToString("u", System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture)
: "-";
// Dashboard tags are operator-facing labels, not key material, so they are safe to
// print alongside the scopes; "-" keeps the column aligned for an untagged key.
string dashboardTags = key.Constraints.DashboardTags.Count > 0
? string.Join(',', key.Constraints.DashboardTags)
: "-";
await output.WriteLineAsync(
$"{key.KeyId}\t{key.DisplayName}\t{status}\t{expiry}\t{string.Join(',', key.Scopes)}")
$"{key.KeyId}\t{key.DisplayName}\t{status}\t{expiry}\t{string.Join(',', key.Scopes)}\t{dashboardTags}")
.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
}
@@ -233,7 +233,45 @@ public static class ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParser
MaxWriteClassification: ParseNullableInt(GetOption(options, "max-write-classification")),
BrowseSubtrees: GetOptions(options, "browse-subtree"),
ReadAlarmOnly: HasFlag(options, "read-alarm-only"),
ReadHistorizedOnly: HasFlag(options, "read-historized-only"));
ReadHistorizedOnly: HasFlag(options, "read-historized-only"))
{
DashboardTags = ParseDashboardTags(options),
};
}
// --dashboard-tags takes a comma-separated list ("team-a,team-b"); repeating the flag unions
// its values. Segments are trimmed and de-duplicated ordinal-ignore-case, matching how the
// enforcement site compares them. An empty segment is rejected rather than dropped: a stray
// comma otherwise silently persists a grant the operator did not mean to write.
private static IReadOnlyList<string> ParseDashboardTags(Dictionary<string, List<string?>> options)
{
if (!options.TryGetValue("dashboard-tags", out List<string?>? values))
{
return Array.Empty<string>();
}
List<string> tags = [];
HashSet<string> seen = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
foreach (string? raw in values)
{
foreach (string segment in (raw ?? string.Empty).Split(','))
{
string tag = segment.Trim();
if (tag.Length == 0)
{
throw new FormatException(
"--dashboard-tags must be a comma-separated list of non-empty tags.");
}
if (seen.Add(tag))
{
tags.Add(tag);
}
}
}
return tags.Count == 0 ? Array.Empty<string>() : tags;
}
// Parses the optional --expires value into an absolute UTC expiry. Accepts a relative
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ public static class ApiKeyConstraintSerializer
/// <summary>Deserializes API key constraints from JSON, or returns empty constraints if JSON is null or whitespace.</summary>
/// <param name="json">The JSON string to deserialize.</param>
/// <returns>The deserialized constraints, or <see cref="ApiKeyConstraints.Empty"/> when <paramref name="json"/> is null/whitespace.</returns>
/// <remarks>
/// Members absent from the JSON take their default: rows persisted before
/// <see cref="ApiKeyConstraints.DashboardTags"/> existed carry no <c>dashboard_tags</c>
/// member and deserialize to an untagged key, unchanged in every other respect.
/// </remarks>
public static ApiKeyConstraints Deserialize(string? json)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(json))
@@ -10,6 +10,38 @@ public sealed record ApiKeyConstraints(
bool ReadAlarmOnly,
bool ReadHistorizedOnly)
{
private readonly IReadOnlyList<string> _dashboardTags = Array.Empty<string>();
/// <summary>
/// Gets the dashboard event-visibility tags granted to this key (SEC-25).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// This is <em>dashboard event-visibility only</em>. It is <strong>never</strong> a
/// data-access constraint: no read, write, browse, or subscribe path consults it, and
/// adding a tag neither widens nor narrows what the key may read or write. Sessions
/// opened by the key inherit these tags (<c>GatewaySession.Tags</c>), and a dashboard
/// Viewer may observe a session's mirrored event metadata only when their granted tags
/// intersect the session's. It rides in the same serialized constraints blob purely to
/// avoid an auth-store schema migration — see
/// <c>docs/plans/2026-07-10-dashboard-session-acl-tst15.md</c> §3.1.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Tag values are stored exactly as supplied; comparisons are ordinal-ignore-case at the
/// enforcement site, so <c>Team-A</c> and <c>team-a</c> name the same tag. An empty list
/// means untagged.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public IReadOnlyList<string> DashboardTags
{
get => _dashboardTags;
// Defensive copy: the tag set is a security-relevant grant, so the record must not alias a
// caller-owned list that could be mutated after construction. A null or empty value (an old
// persisted row has no dashboard_tags member at all) normalizes to untagged.
init => _dashboardTags = value is { Count: > 0 } ? [.. value] : Array.Empty<string>();
}
/// <summary>Gets an empty constraints instance with no restrictions.</summary>
public static ApiKeyConstraints Empty { get; } = new(
ReadSubtrees: Array.Empty<string>(),
@@ -22,6 +54,11 @@ public sealed record ApiKeyConstraints(
ReadHistorizedOnly: false);
/// <summary>Gets a value indicating whether the constraints are empty (no restrictions).</summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <see cref="DashboardTags"/> counts here even though it restricts nothing: an empty
/// instance is not persisted at all (<c>ApiKeyConstraintSerializer.Serialize</c> returns
/// null), so a key whose only per-key policy is a dashboard tag must still round-trip.
/// </remarks>
public bool IsEmpty =>
ReadSubtrees.Count == 0
&& WriteSubtrees.Count == 0
@@ -30,7 +67,8 @@ public sealed record ApiKeyConstraints(
&& MaxWriteClassification is null
&& BrowseSubtrees.Count == 0
&& !ReadAlarmOnly
&& !ReadHistorizedOnly;
&& !ReadHistorizedOnly
&& DashboardTags.Count == 0;
/// <summary>Gets a value indicating whether any read constraints are defined.</summary>
public bool HasReadConstraints =>
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
using System.Collections.Frozen;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Runtime.CompilerServices;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
@@ -12,6 +13,10 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Sessions;
public sealed class GatewaySession
{
// Shared untagged sentinel: most sessions carry no dashboard tags. Frozen so the exposed set
// cannot be mutated by a cast — the tag set is a visibility grant, not a scratch collection.
private static readonly IReadOnlySet<string> EmptyTags = FrozenSet<string>.Empty;
private readonly object _syncRoot = new();
private readonly SemaphoreSlim _closeLock = new(1, 1);
private readonly SessionEventStreaming _eventStreaming;
@@ -149,6 +154,12 @@ public sealed class GatewaySession
/// <see cref="MarkFaulted"/> using <paramref name="eventStreaming"/>'s clock so the timer
/// is unit-testable.
/// </param>
/// <param name="ownerDashboardTags">
/// Dashboard event-visibility tags inherited from the owning API key (SEC-25). Copied into
/// the immutable <see cref="Tags"/> set; <see langword="null"/> or empty means untagged.
/// The tags come from the owner key, never from the client's wire request, so a client
/// cannot label its own session with another tenant's tag.
/// </param>
public GatewaySession(
string sessionId,
string backendName,
@@ -167,7 +178,8 @@ public sealed class GatewaySession
TimeSpan detachGrace = default,
TimeSpan workerReadyWaitTimeout = default,
ArrayAddressNormalizer? addressNormalizer = null,
TimeSpan faultedGrace = default)
TimeSpan faultedGrace = default,
IReadOnlyList<string>? ownerDashboardTags = null)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(sessionId))
{
@@ -195,6 +207,9 @@ public sealed class GatewaySession
Nonce = nonce;
ClientIdentity = clientIdentity;
OwnerKeyId = ownerKeyId;
Tags = ownerDashboardTags is { Count: > 0 }
? ownerDashboardTags.ToFrozenSet(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
: EmptyTags;
ClientSessionName = clientSessionName;
ClientCorrelationId = clientCorrelationId;
CommandTimeout = commandTimeout;
@@ -241,6 +256,19 @@ public sealed class GatewaySession
/// </summary>
public string? OwnerKeyId { get; }
/// <summary>
/// Gets the dashboard event-visibility tags this session inherited from its owning API key
/// (SEC-25). An empty set means untagged.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Immutable for the session's life — assigned once at construction from the owner key's
/// <c>ApiKeyConstraints.DashboardTags</c> — so a dashboard subscription decided at join time
/// never has to be re-evaluated. The set compares ordinal-ignore-case. These tags gate
/// nothing on the gRPC data path; they exist only so the dashboard can scope which sessions'
/// mirrored event metadata a Viewer may observe.
/// </remarks>
public IReadOnlySet<string> Tags { get; }
/// <summary>
/// Gets the client-supplied session name.
/// </summary>
@@ -17,6 +17,33 @@ public interface ISessionManager
string? ownerKeyId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken);
/// <summary>
/// Opens a new gateway session, stamping the owning API key's dashboard event-visibility
/// tags onto it (SEC-25).
/// </summary>
/// <param name="request">Request payload.</param>
/// <param name="clientIdentity">Client identity string.</param>
/// <param name="ownerKeyId">API key identifier of the caller creating the session.</param>
/// <param name="ownerDashboardTags">
/// The owner key's <c>ApiKeyConstraints.DashboardTags</c>. Null or empty opens an untagged
/// session. Never sourced from the client's wire request — see
/// <c>docs/plans/2026-07-10-dashboard-session-acl-tst15.md</c> §3.1.
/// </param>
/// <param name="cancellationToken">Token to cancel the asynchronous operation.</param>
/// <returns>The newly opened session.</returns>
/// <remarks>
/// The default implementation forwards to the tagless overload, so an implementation that
/// does not model tags (unit-test fakes) opens an <em>untagged</em> session. That is the
/// fail-closed direction: untagged sessions are the least dashboard-visible ones.
/// </remarks>
Task<GatewaySession> OpenSessionAsync(
SessionOpenRequest request,
string? clientIdentity,
string? ownerKeyId,
IReadOnlyList<string>? ownerDashboardTags,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
=> OpenSessionAsync(request, clientIdentity, ownerKeyId, cancellationToken);
/// <summary>Attempts to retrieve a session by ID.</summary>
/// <param name="sessionId">Identifier of the session.</param>
/// <param name="session">The retrieved session, if found.</param>
@@ -87,11 +87,20 @@ public sealed class SessionManager : ISessionManager
_sessionSlots = new SemaphoreSlim(_options.Sessions.MaxSessions, _options.Sessions.MaxSessions);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<GatewaySession> OpenSessionAsync(
SessionOpenRequest request,
string? clientIdentity,
string? ownerKeyId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
=> OpenSessionAsync(request, clientIdentity, ownerKeyId, ownerDashboardTags: null, cancellationToken);
/// <inheritdoc />
public async Task<GatewaySession> OpenSessionAsync(
SessionOpenRequest request,
string? clientIdentity,
string? ownerKeyId,
IReadOnlyList<string>? ownerDashboardTags,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(request);
@@ -101,7 +110,7 @@ public sealed class SessionManager : ISessionManager
bool sessionOpenedRecorded = false;
try
{
session = CreateSession(request, clientIdentity, ownerKeyId);
session = CreateSession(request, clientIdentity, ownerKeyId, ownerDashboardTags);
if (!_registry.TryAdd(session))
{
throw new SessionManagerException(
@@ -494,7 +503,8 @@ public sealed class SessionManager : ISessionManager
private GatewaySession CreateSession(
SessionOpenRequest request,
string? clientIdentity,
string? ownerKeyId)
string? ownerKeyId,
IReadOnlyList<string>? ownerDashboardTags)
{
string sessionUid = Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N");
string sessionId = $"session-{sessionUid}";
@@ -541,7 +551,8 @@ public sealed class SessionManager : ISessionManager
TimeSpan.FromSeconds(Math.Max(0, _options.Sessions.DetachGraceSeconds)),
TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(Math.Max(0, _options.Sessions.WorkerReadyWaitTimeoutMs)),
_addressNormalizer,
TimeSpan.FromSeconds(Math.Max(0, _options.Sessions.FaultedGraceSeconds)));
TimeSpan.FromSeconds(Math.Max(0, _options.Sessions.FaultedGraceSeconds)),
ownerDashboardTags);
}
private static string CreateClientCorrelationId(
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
using System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis;
using System.Runtime.CompilerServices;
using System.Threading.Channels;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Alarms;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Configuration;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Grpc;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Metrics;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Security.Authorization;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Sessions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.TestSupport;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.Alarms;
/// <summary>
/// Carries the worker's truncated-fetch verdict across the gateway: worker
/// reply payload → <see cref="GatewayAlarmMonitor"/> → the public
/// <c>QueryActiveAlarms</c> stream.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The truncation guard itself (the worker merging rather than replacing
/// a capped snapshot) is already covered in the worker suite. What was
/// missing is that the guard is <em>silent</em>: a capped fetch suppresses
/// absence-implies-Clear inference and says so only in a rate-limited
/// stderr warning, so a consumer of the alarm surface could not tell a
/// complete active set from a capped one. These tests pin the structural
/// signal that replaces the guesswork.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// The load-bearing assertion is the <em>false</em> one
/// (<see cref="QueryActiveAlarms_WithCompleteWorkerReply_LeavesFlagUnset"/>).
/// "Truncated reply sets the flag" would also pass against a field
/// hard-wired to true; only the complete-reply case proves the flag is
/// actually derived from the worker's verdict.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class AlarmTruncationSignalTests
{
private static readonly TimeSpan WaitTimeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(15);
/// <summary>
/// A capped worker reply sets the monitor's completeness caveat and
/// stamps every cached snapshot, so both the dashboard (which reads the
/// service flag) and the RPC (which reads the records) can surface it.
/// </summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task Reconcile_WithTruncatedWorkerReply_SurfacesTheFlagOnMonitorAndSnapshots()
{
using GatewayMetrics metrics = new();
StubSessionManager sessions = new()
{
SnapshotTruncated = true,
Snapshots = [NewSnapshot("Galaxy!Area.Tank01.Level.HiHi", fromTruncatedSnapshot: true)],
};
using GatewayAlarmMonitor monitor = CreateMonitor(sessions, metrics);
using CancellationTokenSource cts = new();
await monitor.StartAsync(cts.Token);
await sessions.WaitForReconcileAsync(WaitTimeout);
await WaitUntilAsync(() => monitor.CurrentAlarms.Count == 1, WaitTimeout);
Assert.True(monitor.SnapshotTruncated);
ActiveAlarmSnapshot cached = Assert.Single(monitor.CurrentAlarms);
Assert.True(cached.FromTruncatedSnapshot);
// Truncation is about the completeness of the SET, not the fidelity of
// the record — the subtag-fallback flag must stay independent of it.
Assert.False(cached.Degraded);
await cts.CancelAsync();
await monitor.StopAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
/// <summary>
/// The public <c>QueryActiveAlarms</c> stream carries the per-record flag
/// through untouched. That RPC returns a bare
/// <c>stream ActiveAlarmSnapshot</c> with no envelope message, so the
/// per-record boolean is the only place set-level degraded status can
/// ride — if the service ever starts re-projecting records instead of
/// forwarding them, this is what catches the dropped field.
/// </summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task QueryActiveAlarms_WithTruncatedSnapshot_StreamsTheFlagToTheClient()
{
FakeGatewayAlarmService alarms = new()
{
SnapshotTruncated = true,
CurrentAlarms = [NewSnapshot("Galaxy!Area.Tank01.Level.HiHi", fromTruncatedSnapshot: true)],
};
MxAccessGatewayService service = CreateService(alarms);
RecordingServerStreamWriter<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> sink = new();
await service.QueryActiveAlarms(
new QueryActiveAlarmsRequest(),
sink,
new TestServerCallContext());
ActiveAlarmSnapshot streamed = Assert.Single(sink.Messages);
Assert.True(streamed.FromTruncatedSnapshot);
Assert.Equal("Galaxy!Area.Tank01.Level.HiHi", streamed.AlarmFullReference);
}
/// <summary>
/// The control. A complete worker reply must leave both the monitor flag
/// and the streamed records unset — otherwise every snapshot would read
/// as possibly-incomplete and the signal would carry no information.
/// </summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task QueryActiveAlarms_WithCompleteWorkerReply_LeavesFlagUnset()
{
using GatewayMetrics metrics = new();
StubSessionManager sessions = new()
{
SnapshotTruncated = false,
Snapshots = [NewSnapshot("Galaxy!Area.Tank01.Level.HiHi", fromTruncatedSnapshot: false)],
};
using GatewayAlarmMonitor monitor = CreateMonitor(sessions, metrics);
using CancellationTokenSource cts = new();
await monitor.StartAsync(cts.Token);
await sessions.WaitForReconcileAsync(WaitTimeout);
await WaitUntilAsync(() => monitor.CurrentAlarms.Count == 1, WaitTimeout);
Assert.False(monitor.SnapshotTruncated);
MxAccessGatewayService service = CreateService(new FakeGatewayAlarmService
{
SnapshotTruncated = monitor.SnapshotTruncated,
CurrentAlarms = monitor.CurrentAlarms,
});
RecordingServerStreamWriter<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> sink = new();
await service.QueryActiveAlarms(
new QueryActiveAlarmsRequest(),
sink,
new TestServerCallContext());
Assert.False(Assert.Single(sink.Messages).FromTruncatedSnapshot);
await cts.CancelAsync();
await monitor.StopAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
private static ActiveAlarmSnapshot NewSnapshot(string reference, bool fromTruncatedSnapshot)
{
return new ActiveAlarmSnapshot
{
AlarmFullReference = reference,
SourceObjectReference = "Tank01.Level",
AlarmTypeName = "HiHi",
Category = "Area",
Severity = 500,
CurrentState = AlarmConditionState.Active,
SourceProvider = AlarmProviderMode.Alarmmgr,
FromTruncatedSnapshot = fromTruncatedSnapshot,
};
}
private static GatewayAlarmMonitor CreateMonitor(StubSessionManager sessions, GatewayMetrics metrics)
{
AlarmsOptions options = new()
{
Enabled = true,
SubscriptionExpression = @"\\NODE\Galaxy!Area",
};
return new GatewayAlarmMonitor(
sessions,
new StubWatchListResolver(),
metrics,
Microsoft.Extensions.Options.Options.Create(new GatewayOptions { Alarms = options }),
NullLogger<GatewayAlarmMonitor>.Instance);
}
private static MxAccessGatewayService CreateService(FakeGatewayAlarmService alarms)
{
StubSessionManager sessions = new();
return new MxAccessGatewayService(
sessions,
new GatewayRequestIdentityAccessor(),
new AllowAllConstraintEnforcer(),
new MxAccessGrpcRequestValidator(),
new MxAccessGrpcMapper(),
new StubEventStreamService(),
new GatewayMetrics(),
NullLogger<MxAccessGatewayService>.Instance,
alarms);
}
private static async Task WaitUntilAsync(Func<bool> condition, TimeSpan timeout)
{
DateTime deadline = DateTime.UtcNow + timeout;
while (DateTime.UtcNow < deadline)
{
if (condition())
{
return;
}
await Task.Delay(25);
}
throw new TimeoutException("Condition was not met in time.");
}
/// <summary><see cref="IAlarmWatchListResolver"/> that resolves an empty watch-list.</summary>
private sealed class StubWatchListResolver : IAlarmWatchListResolver
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<IReadOnlyList<AlarmSubtagTarget>> ResolveAsync(
AlarmsOptions options,
CancellationToken cancellationToken = default) =>
Task.FromResult<IReadOnlyList<AlarmSubtagTarget>>([]);
}
/// <summary>
/// Minimal <see cref="ISessionManager"/> that answers the monitor's
/// QueryActiveAlarms with a scripted reply payload — the seam this suite
/// drives the truncation verdict through.
/// </summary>
private sealed class StubSessionManager : ISessionManager
{
private readonly Channel<WorkerEvent> _events = Channel.CreateUnbounded<WorkerEvent>();
private readonly TaskCompletionSource _reconciled =
new(TaskCreationOptions.RunContinuationsAsynchronously);
/// <summary>Gets or sets the truncation verdict the scripted reply carries.</summary>
public bool SnapshotTruncated { get; init; }
/// <summary>Gets or sets the snapshots the scripted reply carries.</summary>
public IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> Snapshots { get; init; } = [];
/// <summary>Completes once the monitor has issued its first QueryActiveAlarms.</summary>
/// <param name="timeout">The maximum time to wait.</param>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
public Task WaitForReconcileAsync(TimeSpan timeout) => _reconciled.Task.WaitAsync(timeout);
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<GatewaySession> OpenSessionAsync(
SessionOpenRequest request,
string? clientIdentity,
string? ownerKeyId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
GatewaySession session = new(
Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"),
"Galaxy",
"pipe-test",
"nonce-test",
clientIdentity,
null,
null,
TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30),
TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30),
TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30),
DateTimeOffset.UtcNow);
session.AttachWorkerClient(new ChannelWorkerClient(session.SessionId, _events.Reader));
session.MarkReady();
return Task.FromResult(session);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<WorkerCommandReply> InvokeAsync(
string sessionId,
WorkerCommand command,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
MxCommandReply reply = new()
{
ProtocolStatus = new ProtocolStatus { Code = ProtocolStatusCode.Ok },
};
if (command.Command?.Kind == MxCommandKind.QueryActiveAlarms)
{
QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload payload = new() { SnapshotTruncated = SnapshotTruncated };
payload.Snapshots.AddRange(Snapshots.Select(snapshot => snapshot.Clone()));
reply.QueryActiveAlarms = payload;
_reconciled.TrySetResult();
}
return Task.FromResult(new WorkerCommandReply { Reply = reply });
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public bool TryGetSession(string sessionId, [MaybeNullWhen(false)] out GatewaySession session)
{
session = null;
return false;
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<SessionCloseResult> CloseSessionAsync(string sessionId, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
_events.Writer.TryComplete();
return Task.FromResult(new SessionCloseResult(sessionId, SessionState.Closed, AlreadyClosed: false));
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<SessionCloseResult> KillWorkerAsync(string sessionId, string reason, CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult(new SessionCloseResult(sessionId, SessionState.Closed, AlreadyClosed: false));
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<int> CloseExpiredLeasesAsync(DateTimeOffset now, CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult(0);
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.CompletedTask;
}
/// <summary>
/// <see cref="IEventStreamService"/> stub — QueryActiveAlarms never
/// touches the event path, but the service constructor requires one.
/// </summary>
private sealed class StubEventStreamService : IEventStreamService
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public async IAsyncEnumerable<MxEvent> StreamEventsAsync(
StreamEventsRequest request,
string? callerKeyId,
[EnumeratorCancellation] CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
await Task.CompletedTask.ConfigureAwait(false);
yield break;
}
}
}
@@ -161,6 +161,33 @@ public sealed class GatewayOptionsTests
Assert.Null(new DashboardOptions().AutoLoginUser);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that <c>Dashboard:GroupToTag</c> keeps its ordinal-ignore-case group lookup after
/// configuration binding, and that <c>UntaggedSessionVisibility</c> binds from its string form.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The property initializer seeds the dictionary with <see cref="StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase"/>,
/// but only the binder decides whether that instance is populated in place or replaced by a
/// default-comparer one. Asserting the comparer on a hand-constructed <see cref="DashboardOptions"/>
/// would prove nothing about the configured path; a mis-cased LDAP group name from the directory
/// would then silently grant no tags, and the SEC-25 ACL would deny with no diagnostic.
/// </remarks>
[Fact]
public void DashboardOptions_GroupToTag_BindsCaseInsensitively()
{
GatewayOptions options = BindOptions(new Dictionary<string, string?>
{
["MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag:GwReader:0"] = "team-a",
["MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag:GwReader:1"] = "team-b",
["MxGateway:Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility"] = "AllViewers",
["MxGateway:Ldap:ServiceAccountPassword"] = "test-bind-password",
});
Assert.True(options.Dashboard.GroupToTag.TryGetValue("gwREADER", out string[]? tags));
Assert.Equal(["team-a", "team-b"], tags);
Assert.Equal(UntaggedSessionVisibility.AllViewers, options.Dashboard.UntaggedSessionVisibility);
}
private static GatewayOptions BindOptions(IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string?> configurationValues)
{
using ServiceProvider services = BuildServices(configurationValues);
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.Web.HtmlRendering;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Alarms;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Configuration;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard.Components.Pages;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.TestSupport;
using HtmlRenderer = Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.Web.HtmlRenderer;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.Dashboard;
/// <summary>
/// Renders <see cref="AlarmsPage"/> and asserts the truncated-snapshot
/// caveat banner appears exactly when the alarm query reports a capped
/// provider fetch.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The absence assertion is the load-bearing one: a banner that renders
/// unconditionally would satisfy the positive case while telling every
/// operator, on every normal day, that the alarm list might be missing
/// alarms. A caveat that is always on is a caveat nobody reads.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Static rendering via the framework's <see cref="HtmlRenderer"/>, as in
/// <c>SecretsNavRenderTests</c> — the assertion is about markup the server
/// emits, so no component-testing dependency is warranted. The page's
/// poll loop runs its first pass inline during <c>OnInitialized</c>
/// (the stub query completes synchronously), so the rendered markup
/// already reflects the query result.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class AlarmsPageTruncationBannerTests
{
private const string BannerMarker = "Alarm snapshot may be incomplete";
/// <summary>A capped provider fetch puts the completeness caveat on the page.</summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task AlarmsPage_WhenSnapshotTruncated_RendersTheCaveatBanner()
{
string html = await RenderAsync(snapshotTruncated: true);
Assert.Contains(BannerMarker, html, StringComparison.Ordinal);
}
/// <summary>
/// The proof the banner is gated. A complete fetch must render no caveat
/// at all, while the page itself still renders — the alarm-table heading
/// is the control that keeps this from passing over a blank page.
/// </summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task AlarmsPage_WhenSnapshotComplete_OmitsTheCaveatBanner()
{
string html = await RenderAsync(snapshotTruncated: false);
Assert.DoesNotContain(BannerMarker, html, StringComparison.Ordinal);
Assert.Contains("Active Alarms", html, StringComparison.Ordinal);
}
private static async Task<string> RenderAsync(bool snapshotTruncated)
{
ServiceCollection services = new();
services.AddLogging();
services.AddSingleton<IDashboardLiveDataService>(
new StubLiveDataService(snapshotTruncated));
services.AddSingleton<IGatewayAlarmService>(
new FakeGatewayAlarmService { SnapshotTruncated = snapshotTruncated });
services.AddSingleton<IOptions<GatewayOptions>>(
Options.Create(new GatewayOptions { Alarms = new AlarmsOptions { Enabled = true } }));
await using ServiceProvider provider = services.BuildServiceProvider();
await using HtmlRenderer renderer = new(
provider,
provider.GetRequiredService<ILoggerFactory>());
return await renderer.Dispatcher.InvokeAsync(async () =>
{
HtmlRootComponent output = await renderer.RenderComponentAsync<AlarmsPage>();
return output.ToHtmlString();
});
}
// Answers the page's 3-second poll synchronously, so the first pass completes
// inline inside OnInitialized and the rendered markup reflects it.
private sealed class StubLiveDataService(bool snapshotTruncated) : IDashboardLiveDataService
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<DashboardLiveReadResult> ReadAsync(
IReadOnlyCollection<string> tagAddresses,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult(DashboardLiveReadResult.Empty);
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<DashboardAlarmQueryResult> QueryAlarmsAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult(new DashboardAlarmQueryResult(
Alarms: [],
Error: null,
WorkerProcessId: null,
SnapshotTruncated: snapshotTruncated));
}
}
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ public sealed class DashboardAuthenticatorTests
return new DashboardAuthenticator(
ldapAuthService,
roleMapper,
Options.Create(options),
NullLogger<DashboardAuthenticator>.Instance);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
using System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis;
using System.Security.Claims;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Configuration;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Sessions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.Gateway.Dashboard;
/// <summary>
/// Covers <see cref="DashboardSessionAcl"/>, the single decision both dashboard subscribe seams
/// consult (SEC-25 / TST-15).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Every branch is asserted in its denying direction as well as its allowing one, because the
/// pre-ACL behaviour was "allow everything": an assertion that a permitted caller is permitted
/// cannot distinguish a working gate from no gate at all.
/// </remarks>
public sealed class DashboardSessionAclTests
{
private const string TaggedSessionId = "session-tagged";
private const string UntaggedSessionId = "session-untagged";
/// <summary>An Administrator bypasses the tag check entirely, including for a tag they hold none of.</summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_Administrator_BypassesTagCheck()
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Admin]), TaggedSessionId));
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Admin]), UntaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// The admin bypass is what keeps <c>Dashboard:DisableLogin</c> auto-login (which stamps both
/// roles and no tags) working exactly as before this change.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_AutoLoginStyleBothRolesNoTags_Allowed()
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(
Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Admin, DashboardRoles.Viewer]),
TaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// The decision table's order is load-bearing at exactly one corner: an Administrator naming
/// a session id the registry does not have is ALLOWED, because the admin bypass is checked
/// before the lookup. Pinned deliberately — reordering the two checks (a plausible "look the
/// session up first, it reads better" refactor) would flip this to a denial and quietly change
/// what an Administrator's hub join does for a session that closed a moment ago.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_AdministratorAndUnknownSession_Allowed()
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Admin]), "session-does-not-exist"));
}
/// <summary>
/// An unknown session id is denied for a non-Admin even when they hold every configured tag:
/// no subscription is created for a session the registry does not have. The Administrator
/// counterpart above is the deliberate exception.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_UnknownSession_Denied()
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.False(acl.CanViewSession(
Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Viewer], tags: ["team-a", "team-b"]),
"session-does-not-exist"));
}
/// <summary>A blank session id is denied without consulting anything.</summary>
[Theory]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData(" ")]
public void CanViewSession_BlankSessionId_Denied(string sessionId)
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.False(acl.CanViewSession(Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Admin]), sessionId));
}
/// <summary>A null principal denies — the fail-closed reading of an unauthenticated hub context.</summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_NullPrincipal_Denied()
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.False(acl.CanViewSession(null, UntaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// Untagged sessions follow <c>Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility</c>: hidden from Viewers
/// under the shipped <see cref="UntaggedSessionVisibility.AdminOnly"/> default, visible under
/// the opt-in <see cref="UntaggedSessionVisibility.AllViewers"/>.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="visibility">The configured untagged-session visibility.</param>
/// <param name="expected">Whether a tagless Viewer may observe the untagged session.</param>
[Theory]
[InlineData(UntaggedSessionVisibility.AdminOnly, false)]
[InlineData(UntaggedSessionVisibility.AllViewers, true)]
public void CanViewSession_UntaggedSession_FollowsConfiguredVisibility(
UntaggedSessionVisibility visibility,
bool expected)
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl(visibility);
Assert.Equal(
expected,
acl.CanViewSession(Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Viewer]), UntaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// A Viewer whose grant intersects the session's tags is allowed; the comparison is
/// ordinal-ignore-case, matching the session's tag set and the config map.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="grantedTag">The single tag the Viewer holds.</param>
[Theory]
[InlineData("team-a")]
[InlineData("TEAM-A")]
public void CanViewSession_ViewerGrantIntersectsSessionTags_Allowed(string grantedTag)
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(
Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Viewer], tags: [grantedTag]),
TaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>A Viewer holding only another tenant's tag is denied — the load-bearing negative.</summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_ViewerGrantDisjointFromSessionTags_Denied()
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.False(acl.CanViewSession(
Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Viewer], tags: ["team-b"]),
TaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// A principal carrying no tag claims — the anonymous-localhost / empty-grant Viewer of
/// SEC-02 — sees a tagged session never, and an untagged one only when the operator opted
/// into <see cref="UntaggedSessionVisibility.AllViewers"/>.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_NoTagClaims_IsEmptyGrantViewer()
{
ClaimsPrincipal anonymous = new(new ClaimsIdentity());
Assert.False(CreateAcl().CanViewSession(anonymous, TaggedSessionId));
Assert.False(CreateAcl(UntaggedSessionVisibility.AdminOnly).CanViewSession(anonymous, UntaggedSessionId));
Assert.True(CreateAcl(UntaggedSessionVisibility.AllViewers).CanViewSession(anonymous, UntaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// An unauthenticated principal that nonetheless carries an Administrator role claim does not
/// get the bypass: the bypass requires a real authenticated identity, as elsewhere in the
/// dashboard (<c>DashboardSessionAdminService.CanManage</c>).
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_UnauthenticatedAdminRoleClaim_DoesNotBypass()
{
// No authentication type => IsAuthenticated is false.
ClaimsPrincipal principal = new(new ClaimsIdentity(
[new Claim(ClaimTypes.Role, DashboardRoles.Admin)],
authenticationType: null,
nameType: ClaimTypes.Name,
roleType: ClaimTypes.Role));
Assert.False(CreateAcl().CanViewSession(principal, TaggedSessionId));
}
private static DashboardSessionAcl CreateAcl(
UntaggedSessionVisibility visibility = UntaggedSessionVisibility.AdminOnly)
{
GatewayOptions options = new()
{
Dashboard = new DashboardOptions { UntaggedSessionVisibility = visibility },
};
return new DashboardSessionAcl(
new TwoSessionManager(
CreateSession(TaggedSessionId, ["team-a"]),
CreateSession(UntaggedSessionId, tags: null)),
Options.Create(options));
}
private static ClaimsPrincipal Principal(string[] roles, string[]? tags = null)
{
List<Claim> claims = [new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "viewer-user")];
claims.AddRange(roles.Select(role => new Claim(ClaimTypes.Role, role)));
claims.AddRange((tags ?? []).Select(tag => new Claim(
DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.DashboardTagClaimType,
tag)));
return new ClaimsPrincipal(new ClaimsIdentity(
claims,
authenticationType: "test",
nameType: ClaimTypes.Name,
roleType: ClaimTypes.Role));
}
private static GatewaySession CreateSession(string sessionId, string[]? tags)
{
return new GatewaySession(
sessionId: sessionId,
backendName: "backend",
pipeName: $"pipe-{sessionId}",
nonce: "nonce",
clientIdentity: "client",
ownerKeyId: "key-1",
clientSessionName: "client-session",
clientCorrelationId: "correlation",
commandTimeout: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5),
startupTimeout: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5),
shutdownTimeout: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5),
leaseDuration: TimeSpan.FromMinutes(30),
openedAt: DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
ownerDashboardTags: tags);
}
/// <summary>Registry double serving exactly the two sessions the ACL cases need.</summary>
private sealed class TwoSessionManager(GatewaySession tagged, GatewaySession untagged) : ISessionManager
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<GatewaySession> OpenSessionAsync(
SessionOpenRequest request,
string? clientIdentity,
string? ownerKeyId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.FromResult(tagged);
/// <inheritdoc />
public bool TryGetSession(string sessionId, [MaybeNullWhen(false)] out GatewaySession session)
{
session = sessionId switch
{
TaggedSessionId => tagged,
UntaggedSessionId => untagged,
_ => null,
};
return session is not null;
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<WorkerCommandReply> InvokeAsync(
string sessionId,
WorkerCommand command,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.FromResult(new WorkerCommandReply());
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<SessionCloseResult> CloseSessionAsync(
string sessionId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult(new SessionCloseResult(sessionId, SessionState.Closed, AlreadyClosed: false));
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<SessionCloseResult> KillWorkerAsync(
string sessionId,
string reason,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult(new SessionCloseResult(sessionId, SessionState.Closed, AlreadyClosed: false));
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<int> CloseExpiredLeasesAsync(
DateTimeOffset now,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.FromResult(0);
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.CompletedTask;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
using System.Security.Claims;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.Features;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.SignalR;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard.Hubs;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.Gateway.Dashboard;
/// <summary>
/// Covers the ACL gate on <see cref="EventsHub.SubscribeSession"/> (SEC-25 / TST-15).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The denial assertions are the load-bearing ones — before the gate existed every caller was
/// joined, so "an allowed caller is joined" is indistinguishable from no gate. They assert the
/// absence of BOTH effects of a join: the SignalR group membership and the viewer registration
/// that turns the broadcaster's mirror on for the session. Leaving either behind would keep the
/// event clone running for a caller who may not observe it.
/// </remarks>
public sealed class EventsHubTests
{
private const string SessionId = "session-1";
private const string ConnectionId = "connection-1";
private static readonly ClaimsPrincipal TestPrincipal = new(new ClaimsIdentity(
[new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "viewer-user")],
authenticationType: "test"));
/// <summary>An allowed caller joins the group and registers as a viewer.</summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task SubscribeSession_WhenAclAllows_JoinsGroupAndRegistersViewer()
{
EventsHubViewerRegistry registry = new();
RecordingGroupManager groups = new();
EventsHub hub = CreateHub(registry, groups, allow: true);
await hub.SubscribeSession(SessionId);
Assert.Equal([(ConnectionId, EventsHub.GroupName(SessionId))], groups.Added);
Assert.True(registry.HasViewers(SessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// A denied caller gets a <see cref="HubException"/>, is not joined, and is not registered.
/// </summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task SubscribeSession_WhenAclDenies_ThrowsAndDoesNotJoin()
{
EventsHubViewerRegistry registry = new();
RecordingGroupManager groups = new();
EventsHub hub = CreateHub(registry, groups, allow: false);
HubException error = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<HubException>(() => hub.SubscribeSession(SessionId));
Assert.Equal("Not authorized for this session.", error.Message);
Assert.Empty(groups.Added);
Assert.False(registry.HasViewers(SessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// A blank session id is still a no-op rather than a denial, so a client that sends one is not
/// told it lacks authorization for a session it never named.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="sessionId">The blank session id supplied by the caller.</param>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Theory]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData(" ")]
public async Task SubscribeSession_BlankSessionId_IsNoOp(string sessionId)
{
EventsHubViewerRegistry registry = new();
RecordingGroupManager groups = new();
EventsHub hub = CreateHub(registry, groups, allow: false);
await hub.SubscribeSession(sessionId);
Assert.Empty(groups.Added);
}
/// <summary>The ACL is asked about the session the caller named, with the caller's own principal.</summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task SubscribeSession_AsksAclAboutTheRequestedSession()
{
StubSessionAcl acl = new(allow: true);
EventsHub hub = new(new EventsHubViewerRegistry(), acl)
{
Groups = new RecordingGroupManager(),
Context = new StubHubCallerContext(ConnectionId, TestPrincipal),
};
await hub.SubscribeSession(SessionId);
Assert.Equal(SessionId, acl.LastSessionId);
Assert.Same(TestPrincipal, acl.LastPrincipal);
}
private static EventsHub CreateHub(
EventsHubViewerRegistry registry,
RecordingGroupManager groups,
bool allow)
{
return new EventsHub(registry, new StubSessionAcl(allow))
{
Groups = groups,
Context = new StubHubCallerContext(ConnectionId, TestPrincipal),
};
}
private sealed class StubSessionAcl(bool allow) : IDashboardSessionAcl
{
/// <summary>Gets the principal passed to the most recent call.</summary>
public ClaimsPrincipal? LastPrincipal { get; private set; }
/// <summary>Gets the session id passed to the most recent call.</summary>
public string? LastSessionId { get; private set; }
/// <inheritdoc />
public bool CanViewSession(ClaimsPrincipal? principal, string sessionId)
{
LastPrincipal = principal;
LastSessionId = sessionId;
return allow;
}
}
private sealed class RecordingGroupManager : IGroupManager
{
/// <summary>Gets the (connection id, group name) pairs added, in order.</summary>
public List<(string ConnectionId, string GroupName)> Added { get; } = [];
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task AddToGroupAsync(string connectionId, string groupName, CancellationToken cancellationToken = default)
{
Added.Add((connectionId, groupName));
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task RemoveFromGroupAsync(
string connectionId,
string groupName,
CancellationToken cancellationToken = default) => Task.CompletedTask;
}
private sealed class StubHubCallerContext(string connectionId, ClaimsPrincipal user) : HubCallerContext
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public override string ConnectionId { get; } = connectionId;
/// <inheritdoc />
public override string? UserIdentifier => User?.Identity?.Name;
/// <inheritdoc />
public override ClaimsPrincipal? User { get; } = user;
/// <inheritdoc />
public override IDictionary<object, object?> Items { get; } = new Dictionary<object, object?>();
/// <inheritdoc />
public override IFeatureCollection Features { get; } = new FeatureCollection();
/// <inheritdoc />
public override CancellationToken ConnectionAborted => CancellationToken.None;
/// <inheritdoc />
public override void Abort()
{
// Nothing to abort in a unit-constructed context.
}
}
}
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
using System.Security.Claims;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Configuration;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.Gateway.Dashboard;
@@ -19,7 +21,7 @@ public sealed class HubTokenServiceTests
[Fact]
public void Validate_TokenWithNullNameAndNullNameIdentifier_ReturnsNull()
{
HubTokenService service = new(new EphemeralDataProtectionProvider());
HubTokenService service = CreateService();
// Issue from a principal with NO Name claim and NO NameIdentifier
// claim. The Issue method's payload will then carry
@@ -43,7 +45,7 @@ public sealed class HubTokenServiceTests
[Fact]
public void Validate_TokenWithName_ReturnsAuthenticatedPrincipal()
{
HubTokenService service = new(new EphemeralDataProtectionProvider());
HubTokenService service = CreateService();
ClaimsIdentity identity = new(
[
@@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ public sealed class HubTokenServiceTests
[Fact]
public void Validate_TokenWithOnlyNameIdentifier_ReturnsPrincipal()
{
HubTokenService service = new(new EphemeralDataProtectionProvider());
HubTokenService service = CreateService();
ClaimsIdentity identity = new(
[
@@ -93,7 +95,7 @@ public sealed class HubTokenServiceTests
[Fact]
public void Validate_NullToken_ReturnsNull()
{
HubTokenService service = new(new EphemeralDataProtectionProvider());
HubTokenService service = CreateService();
Assert.Null(service.Validate(null));
}
@@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ public sealed class HubTokenServiceTests
[Fact]
public void Validate_EmptyToken_ReturnsNull()
{
HubTokenService service = new(new EphemeralDataProtectionProvider());
HubTokenService service = CreateService();
Assert.Null(service.Validate(string.Empty));
}
@@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ public sealed class HubTokenServiceTests
[Fact]
public void Validate_GarbageToken_ReturnsNull()
{
HubTokenService service = new(new EphemeralDataProtectionProvider());
HubTokenService service = CreateService();
Assert.Null(service.Validate("this-is-not-a-protected-payload"));
}
@@ -123,7 +125,7 @@ public sealed class HubTokenServiceTests
[Fact]
public void IssueThenValidate_FreshToken_RoundTripsIdentityAndRoles()
{
HubTokenService service = new(new EphemeralDataProtectionProvider());
HubTokenService service = CreateService();
ClaimsIdentity identity = new(
[
new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "bob"),
@@ -163,7 +165,7 @@ public sealed class HubTokenServiceTests
[Fact]
public void Validate_ExpiredToken_ReturnsNull()
{
HubTokenService service = new(new EphemeralDataProtectionProvider());
HubTokenService service = CreateService();
ClaimsIdentity identity = new(
[new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "carol")],
authenticationType: "test");
@@ -174,4 +176,119 @@ public sealed class HubTokenServiceTests
Assert.Null(service.Validate(expiredToken));
}
/// <summary>
/// The dashboard visibility grant (SEC-25) survives the mint/validate round-trip: tags are
/// resolved from the caller's LDAP-group claims through <c>Dashboard:GroupToTag</c> at
/// <see cref="HubTokenService.Issue(ClaimsPrincipal)"/> and rehydrated as
/// <see cref="DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.DashboardTagClaimType"/> claims on the principal
/// <see cref="HubTokenService.Validate"/> reconstructs — which is the principal
/// <c>IDashboardSessionAcl</c> reads on the hub path.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void IssueThenValidate_ResolvesAndRoundTripsGrantedTags()
{
HubTokenService service = CreateService(new Dictionary<string, string[]>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
{
["GwViewer"] = ["team-a"],
["TeamBViewers"] = ["team-b"],
});
ClaimsIdentity identity = new(
[
new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "dana"),
new Claim(ClaimTypes.Role, DashboardRoles.Viewer),
new Claim(DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.LdapGroupClaimType, "GwViewer"),
new Claim(DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.LdapGroupClaimType, "TeamBViewers"),
],
authenticationType: "test",
nameType: ClaimTypes.Name,
roleType: ClaimTypes.Role);
ClaimsPrincipal? result = service.Validate(service.Issue(new ClaimsPrincipal(identity)));
Assert.NotNull(result);
Assert.Equal(
["team-a", "team-b"],
result.FindAll(DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.DashboardTagClaimType)
.Select(c => c.Value)
.Order(StringComparer.Ordinal));
}
/// <summary>
/// A caller whose groups map to nothing mints a token with no tags, and validating it yields a
/// principal carrying no tag claims — the empty grant the ACL denies tagged sessions on. This
/// is also the shape of every token minted before the tag field existed (the payload field
/// deserializes to null), so the fail-closed direction is covered for both.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void IssueThenValidate_WithNoMatchingGroups_ProducesEmptyGrant()
{
HubTokenService service = CreateService(new Dictionary<string, string[]>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
{
["SomeOtherGroup"] = ["team-a"],
});
ClaimsIdentity identity = new(
[
new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "erin"),
new Claim(ClaimTypes.Role, DashboardRoles.Viewer),
new Claim(DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.LdapGroupClaimType, "GwViewer"),
],
authenticationType: "test",
nameType: ClaimTypes.Name,
roleType: ClaimTypes.Role);
ClaimsPrincipal? result = service.Validate(service.Issue(new ClaimsPrincipal(identity)));
Assert.NotNull(result);
Assert.Empty(result.FindAll(DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.DashboardTagClaimType));
}
/// <summary>
/// A token minted before the payload carried tags at all still validates, and yields an empty
/// grant rather than throwing or rejecting. Distinct from the empty-grant test above, which
/// exercises a <c>Tags</c> key that is present and empty: this one protects a hand-built
/// payload with the key genuinely ABSENT, which is the shape every in-flight token has across
/// the deploy that introduces the field. Deserialization leaves the field null, and the
/// null-coalesce in <c>Validate</c> is the only thing standing between that and a crash on
/// the hub's authentication path.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void Validate_TokenMintedBeforeTagsFieldExisted_YieldsEmptyGrant()
{
EphemeralDataProtectionProvider dataProtection = new();
HubTokenService service = CreateService(dataProtection: dataProtection);
// The pre-field payload shape, verbatim: no "Tags" key anywhere.
const string LegacyPayload = """{"Name":"frank","NameIdentifier":"frank-id","Roles":["Viewer"]}""";
string legacyToken = dataProtection
.CreateProtector(HubTokenService.ProtectorPurpose)
.ToTimeLimitedDataProtector()
.Protect(LegacyPayload, HubTokenService.TokenLifetime);
ClaimsPrincipal? result = service.Validate(legacyToken);
Assert.NotNull(result);
Assert.Equal("frank", result.Identity?.Name);
Assert.True(result.IsInRole(DashboardRoles.Viewer));
Assert.Empty(result.FindAll(DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.DashboardTagClaimType));
}
private static HubTokenService CreateService(
Dictionary<string, string[]>? groupToTag = null,
IDataProtectionProvider? dataProtection = null)
{
GatewayOptions options = new()
{
Dashboard = new DashboardOptions
{
GroupToTag = groupToTag ?? new Dictionary<string, string[]>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase),
},
};
return new HubTokenService(
dataProtection ?? new EphemeralDataProtectionProvider(),
Options.Create(options));
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
using System.Runtime.CompilerServices;
using System.Security.Claims;
using System.Threading.Channels;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.Authorization;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.RenderTree;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.Web;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.Web.HtmlRendering;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard.Components.Pages;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard.Hubs;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.Gateway.Dashboard;
/// <summary>
/// Covers the ACL gate on the session-details page's in-process subscribe seam (SEC-25 / TST-15).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The 2026-08 in-process feed refactor gave the dashboard a second way to subscribe to a
/// session's events — <see cref="IDashboardSessionEventSubscriber"/>, used by this page — so
/// gating the hub join alone would leave the page as an ungated path to the same feed. The
/// denial assertion here is the one that proves the second seam is closed: it asserts that
/// <see cref="IDashboardSessionEventSubscriber.Subscribe"/> is never called, not merely that the
/// panel renders differently.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Rendered through the framework's static <see cref="HtmlRenderer"/>, the same idiom
/// <c>SecretsNavRenderTests</c> uses — no component-testing package, because the assertions are
/// about the emitted markup and the calls the lifecycle makes, not about interactivity.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class SessionDetailsPageEventAclTests
{
private const string SessionId = "session-1";
// Matched without the trailing possessive so the assertion does not depend on how the
// renderer escapes the apostrophe.
private const string DeniedMessage = "Not authorized for this session";
private const string WaitingMarker = "Waiting for events.";
/// <summary>A denied caller gets the message and no subscription is opened.</summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task Page_WhenAclDenies_RendersMessageAndDoesNotSubscribe()
{
RecordingEventSubscriber subscriber = new();
string html = await RenderAsync(subscriber, allow: false);
Assert.Contains(DeniedMessage, html, StringComparison.Ordinal);
Assert.DoesNotContain(WaitingMarker, html, StringComparison.Ordinal);
Assert.Empty(subscriber.SubscribedSessionIds);
}
/// <summary>
/// The control for the denial above: an allowed caller subscribes and sees the ordinary
/// waiting state. Without this, a page that failed to render its events panel at all would
/// satisfy the "no subscription" assertion and the suite would report a working gate over a
/// broken panel.
/// </summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task Page_WhenAclAllows_SubscribesAndRendersWaitingState()
{
RecordingEventSubscriber subscriber = new();
string html = await RenderAsync(subscriber, allow: true);
Assert.Equal([SessionId], subscriber.SubscribedSessionIds);
Assert.Contains(WaitingMarker, html, StringComparison.Ordinal);
Assert.DoesNotContain(DeniedMessage, html, StringComparison.Ordinal);
}
/// <summary>
/// The re-entrancy guard on <c>AttachEventsAsync</c>: a rapid A -> B navigation must leave
/// exactly one live subscription, not two.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// Gating the ACL made attach asynchronous — it awaits the authentication state — and that
/// await is a suspension point the synchronous version did not have. The interleaving this
/// test forces is the one that window admits: A's attach parks on the auth state, B's whole
/// parameter set runs to completion behind it, and only then does A resume. A now reads
/// <c>SessionId</c> as B's and, ungurarded, subscribes to B a SECOND time — overwriting the
/// fields holding B's first subscription, which is then unreachable: never disposed, its
/// <c>EventsHubViewerRegistry</c> entry never released (so the mirror keeps cloning events
/// for it), its pump never cancelled.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// The assertion is deliberately about subscription COUNT and disposal rather than about the
/// ACL: the guard is a resource-lifecycle fix, and the second attach was never an
/// authorization bypass — B had already been cleared by the newer attach.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// This case needs a renderer that can re-set parameters on the SAME component instance, which
/// the static <see cref="HtmlRenderer"/> used by the tests above cannot do — it renders a root
/// component once and exposes no parameter-update seam. Hence the minimal
/// <see cref="ParameterDrivingRenderer"/> below, which is the smallest thing that can express
/// a second <c>SetParametersAsync</c> while the first is still suspended.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task Page_WhenNavigationOvertakesASuspendedAttach_LeavesOneSubscription()
{
RecordingEventSubscriber subscriber = new();
// Call 1 is OnInitializedAsync's CanManage lookup; call 2 is the first session's attach,
// which is the one that must be caught mid-flight.
GatedAuthenticationStateProvider auth = new(gateOnCall: 2);
ServiceCollection services = BuildServices(subscriber, allow: true, authenticationStateProvider: auth);
await using ServiceProvider provider = services.BuildServiceProvider();
await using ParameterDrivingRenderer renderer = new(provider, provider.GetRequiredService<ILoggerFactory>());
SessionDetailsPage page = await renderer.MountAsync<SessionDetailsPage>();
// Not awaited: it parks inside the first attach, which is the whole point.
Task first = renderer.SetParametersAsync(page, "session-a");
await auth.Entered.WaitAsync(TestTimeout);
// The overtaking navigation completes end to end while the first attach is suspended.
await renderer.SetParametersAsync(page, "session-b").WaitAsync(TestTimeout);
auth.Release();
await first.WaitAsync(TestTimeout);
Assert.Empty(renderer.Exceptions);
// Without the generation guard this is ["session-b", "session-b"] and the first of the two
// is stranded — the exact leak the guard exists to prevent.
Assert.Equal(["session-b"], subscriber.SubscribedSessionIds);
Assert.Empty(subscriber.UndisposedAfterReplacement);
}
private static readonly TimeSpan TestTimeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30);
private static ServiceCollection BuildServices(
RecordingEventSubscriber subscriber,
bool allow,
AuthenticationStateProvider? authenticationStateProvider = null)
{
ServiceCollection services = new();
services.AddLogging();
services.AddSingleton<IDashboardSnapshotService>(new StubSnapshotService());
services.AddSingleton<IDashboardSnapshotFeed>(new IdleSnapshotFeed());
services.AddSingleton<IDashboardSessionAdminService>(new NonManagingSessionAdminService());
services.AddSingleton<IDashboardSessionEventSubscriber>(subscriber);
services.AddSingleton<IDashboardSessionAcl>(new StubSessionAcl(allow));
services.AddSingleton<AuthenticationStateProvider>(
authenticationStateProvider ?? new StubAuthenticationStateProvider());
return services;
}
private static async Task<string> RenderAsync(RecordingEventSubscriber subscriber, bool allow)
{
await using ServiceProvider provider = BuildServices(subscriber, allow).BuildServiceProvider();
await using HtmlRenderer renderer = new(provider, provider.GetRequiredService<ILoggerFactory>());
return await renderer.Dispatcher.InvokeAsync(async () =>
{
HtmlRootComponent output = await renderer.RenderComponentAsync<SessionDetailsPage>(
ParameterView.FromDictionary(new Dictionary<string, object?>
{
[nameof(SessionDetailsPage.SessionId)] = SessionId,
}));
return output.ToHtmlString();
});
}
private sealed class StubSessionAcl(bool allow) : IDashboardSessionAcl
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public bool CanViewSession(ClaimsPrincipal? principal, string sessionId) => allow;
}
private sealed class RecordingEventSubscriber : IDashboardSessionEventSubscriber
{
private readonly List<IdleSubscription> _handedOut = [];
/// <summary>Gets the session ids <see cref="Subscribe"/> was called with, in order.</summary>
public List<string> SubscribedSessionIds { get; } = [];
/// <summary>
/// Gets the subscriptions that were superseded by a later one and never disposed — the
/// signature of a stranded subscription, whose viewer registration is never released. The
/// most recent subscription is excluded because the page legitimately still holds it.
/// </summary>
public IReadOnlyList<IdleSubscription> UndisposedAfterReplacement =>
[.. _handedOut.SkipLast(1).Where(subscription => !subscription.IsDisposed)];
/// <inheritdoc />
public IDashboardEventSubscription Subscribe(string sessionId)
{
SubscribedSessionIds.Add(sessionId);
IdleSubscription subscription = new();
_handedOut.Add(subscription);
return subscription;
}
// A subscription whose channel never yields and never completes, so the page's pump parks
// exactly as it would against a quiet session.
internal sealed class IdleSubscription : IDashboardEventSubscription
{
private readonly Channel<MxEvent> _channel = Channel.CreateUnbounded<MxEvent>();
/// <summary>Gets a value indicating whether the page released this subscription.</summary>
public bool IsDisposed { get; private set; }
/// <inheritdoc />
public ChannelReader<MxEvent> Reader => _channel.Reader;
/// <inheritdoc />
public void Dispose()
{
IsDisposed = true;
_channel.Writer.TryComplete();
}
}
}
// Gates one nominated call so a test can suspend an attach exactly where the ACL check made it
// asynchronous, and let a second parameter set overtake it.
private sealed class GatedAuthenticationStateProvider(int gateOnCall) : AuthenticationStateProvider
{
private readonly TaskCompletionSource _entered = new(TaskCreationOptions.RunContinuationsAsynchronously);
private readonly TaskCompletionSource _release = new(TaskCreationOptions.RunContinuationsAsynchronously);
private int _calls;
/// <summary>Completes once the gated call has been entered and is parked.</summary>
public Task Entered => _entered.Task;
/// <summary>Lets the parked call finish.</summary>
public void Release() => _release.TrySetResult();
/// <inheritdoc />
public override async Task<AuthenticationState> GetAuthenticationStateAsync()
{
if (Interlocked.Increment(ref _calls) == gateOnCall)
{
_entered.TrySetResult();
await _release.Task.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
return new AuthenticationState(new ClaimsPrincipal(new ClaimsIdentity(
[new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "viewer-user"), new Claim(ClaimTypes.Role, DashboardRoles.Viewer)],
authenticationType: "test",
nameType: ClaimTypes.Name,
roleType: ClaimTypes.Role)));
}
}
// The smallest renderer that can drive a SECOND parameter set into an already-mounted
// component instance. HtmlRenderer renders a root component once and offers no such seam, so
// the interleaving under test is inexpressible with it; everything here is plumbing around
// Renderer's protected mount/parameter surface, with no behaviour of its own.
//
// BL0006 warns that Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.RenderTree is not for use outside the
// Blazor framework because those types may change between releases. Suppressed here and only
// here: this is test-only scaffolding (the same thing component-testing packages do), it never
// ships, and the cost of the warning coming true is a compile break in one test file on an SDK
// bump — not a production defect. Production code must keep honouring BL0006.
#pragma warning disable BL0006
private sealed class ParameterDrivingRenderer(IServiceProvider services, ILoggerFactory loggerFactory)
: Renderer(services, loggerFactory)
{
/// <summary>Gets exceptions the renderer surfaced, so a test never passes over a swallowed fault.</summary>
public List<Exception> Exceptions { get; } = [];
/// <inheritdoc />
public override Dispatcher Dispatcher { get; } = Dispatcher.CreateDefault();
/// <summary>Instantiates the component with DI-injected properties and attaches it as a root.</summary>
/// <typeparam name="TComponent">Component type to mount.</typeparam>
/// <returns>The mounted component instance.</returns>
public Task<TComponent> MountAsync<TComponent>()
where TComponent : IComponent
{
return Dispatcher.InvokeAsync(() =>
{
TComponent component = (TComponent)InstantiateComponent(typeof(TComponent));
AssignRootComponentId(component);
return component;
});
}
/// <summary>Sets the session-id parameter on an already-mounted page.</summary>
/// <param name="component">The mounted page.</param>
/// <param name="sessionId">Session id to render.</param>
/// <returns>The task the component's parameter-set lifecycle returns.</returns>
public Task SetParametersAsync(IComponent component, string sessionId)
{
return Dispatcher.InvokeAsync(() => component.SetParametersAsync(
ParameterView.FromDictionary(new Dictionary<string, object?>
{
[nameof(SessionDetailsPage.SessionId)] = sessionId,
})));
}
/// <inheritdoc />
protected override void HandleException(Exception exception) => Exceptions.Add(exception);
/// <inheritdoc />
protected override Task UpdateDisplayAsync(in RenderBatch renderBatch) => Task.CompletedTask;
}
#pragma warning restore BL0006
private sealed class StubSnapshotService : IDashboardSnapshotService
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public DashboardSnapshot GetSnapshot() => new(
GeneratedAt: DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
GatewayStartedAt: DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
GatewayUptime: TimeSpan.Zero,
GatewayStatus: "Healthy",
GatewayVersion: "test",
Sessions:
[
new DashboardSessionSummary(
SessionId: SessionId,
BackendName: "backend",
State: SessionState.Ready,
ClientIdentity: "client",
ClientSessionName: "client-session",
ClientCorrelationId: "correlation",
OpenedAt: DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
LastClientActivityAt: DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
LeaseExpiresAt: null,
WorkerProcessId: null,
WorkerState: null,
LastWorkerHeartbeatAt: null,
EventsReceived: 0,
LastFault: null),
],
Workers: [],
Metrics: [],
Faults: [],
ApiKeys: [],
Configuration: null!,
Galaxy: null!);
/// <inheritdoc />
public IAsyncEnumerable<DashboardSnapshot> WatchSnapshotsAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
new IdleSnapshotFeed().WatchAsync(cancellationToken);
}
// Parks until the page is disposed, so the base page's watch loop neither spins nor pushes a
// second snapshot mid-assertion.
private sealed class IdleSnapshotFeed : IDashboardSnapshotFeed
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public async IAsyncEnumerable<DashboardSnapshot> WatchAsync(
[EnumeratorCancellation] CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
await Task.Delay(Timeout.Infinite, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
yield break;
}
}
private sealed class NonManagingSessionAdminService : IDashboardSessionAdminService
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public bool CanManage(ClaimsPrincipal user) => false;
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<DashboardSessionAdminResult> CloseSessionAsync(
ClaimsPrincipal user,
string sessionId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult(DashboardSessionAdminResult.Fail("not supported"));
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<DashboardSessionAdminResult> KillWorkerAsync(
ClaimsPrincipal user,
string sessionId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult(DashboardSessionAdminResult.Fail("not supported"));
}
private sealed class StubAuthenticationStateProvider : AuthenticationStateProvider
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public override Task<AuthenticationState> GetAuthenticationStateAsync() =>
Task.FromResult(new AuthenticationState(new ClaimsPrincipal(new ClaimsIdentity(
[new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "viewer-user"), new Claim(ClaimTypes.Role, DashboardRoles.Viewer)],
authenticationType: "test",
nameType: ClaimTypes.Name,
roleType: ClaimTypes.Role))));
}
}
@@ -50,6 +50,45 @@ public sealed class MxAccessGatewayServiceTests
Assert.Equal("operator-session", sessionManager.LastOpenRequest?.ClientSessionName);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies OpenSession forwards the calling key's dashboard-visibility tags, so the
/// session's tags are derived from the owning API key rather than the wire request (SEC-25).
/// </summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task OpenSession_WithTaggedKey_ForwardsOwnerDashboardTags()
{
GatewayRequestIdentityAccessor identityAccessor = new();
FakeSessionManager sessionManager = new();
MxAccessGatewayService service = CreateService(sessionManager, identityAccessor);
ApiKeyIdentity identity = CreateIdentity() with
{
Constraints = ApiKeyConstraints.Empty with { DashboardTags = ["team-a"] },
};
using IDisposable identityScope = identityAccessor.Push(identity);
await service.OpenSession(new OpenSessionRequest(), new TestServerCallContext());
Assert.Equal(["team-a"], sessionManager.LastOwnerDashboardTags);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies an unauthenticated OpenSession (no resolved key identity) opens an untagged
/// session — the fail-closed state for dashboard event visibility.
/// </summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task OpenSession_WithoutIdentity_ForwardsNoDashboardTags()
{
FakeSessionManager sessionManager = new();
MxAccessGatewayService service = CreateService(sessionManager, new GatewayRequestIdentityAccessor());
await service.OpenSession(new OpenSessionRequest(), new TestServerCallContext());
Assert.Null(sessionManager.LastOwnerDashboardTags);
Assert.Null(sessionManager.LastOwnerKeyId);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that Invoke maps a genuinely missing session to NotFound via the
/// service's own <c>ResolveSession</c> lookup. No <c>InvokeException</c> is
@@ -517,6 +556,9 @@ public sealed class MxAccessGatewayServiceTests
/// <summary>The last owner key id passed to OpenSessionAsync.</summary>
public string? LastOwnerKeyId { get; private set; }
/// <summary>The last owner dashboard tags passed to OpenSessionAsync.</summary>
public IReadOnlyList<string>? LastOwnerDashboardTags { get; private set; }
/// <summary>The last session ID the event stream service was asked to stream.</summary>
public string? LastReadEventsSessionId { get; private set; }
@@ -564,6 +606,19 @@ public sealed class MxAccessGatewayServiceTests
return Task.FromResult(OpenSessionResult ?? CreateSession("session-1", processId: 1234));
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<GatewaySession> OpenSessionAsync(
SessionOpenRequest request,
string? clientIdentity,
string? ownerKeyId,
IReadOnlyList<string>? ownerDashboardTags,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
LastOwnerDashboardTags = ownerDashboardTags;
return OpenSessionAsync(request, clientIdentity, ownerKeyId, cancellationToken);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public bool TryGetSession(
string sessionId,
@@ -109,6 +109,55 @@ public sealed class SessionManagerTests
Assert.Null(session.OwnerKeyId);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies a session inherits the owning API key's dashboard-visibility tags (SEC-25),
/// compared ordinal-ignore-case so a differently cased grant still matches.
/// </summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task OpenSessionAsync_WithOwnerDashboardTags_CopiesTagsOntoSession()
{
SessionManager manager = CreateManager(new FakeSessionWorkerClientFactory(new FakeWorkerClient()));
GatewaySession session = await manager.OpenSessionAsync(
CreateOpenRequest(),
clientIdentity: "MyKey Display",
ownerKeyId: "key-abc123",
ownerDashboardTags: ["team-a", "team-b"],
CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Equal(["team-a", "team-b"], session.Tags.OrderBy(tag => tag, StringComparer.Ordinal));
Assert.Contains("TEAM-A", session.Tags);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies a session opened by a key with no dashboard tags is untagged, which is the
/// fail-closed state for dashboard event visibility.
/// </summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
public async Task OpenSessionAsync_WithoutOwnerDashboardTags_LeavesSessionUntagged()
{
SessionManager manager = CreateManager(new FakeSessionWorkerClientFactory(new FakeWorkerClient()));
GatewaySession session = await manager.OpenSessionAsync(
CreateOpenRequest(),
clientIdentity: "MyKey Display",
ownerKeyId: "key-abc123",
ownerDashboardTags: null,
CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Empty(session.Tags);
GatewaySession tagless = await manager.OpenSessionAsync(
CreateOpenRequest(),
"client-1",
ownerKeyId: null,
CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Empty(tagless.Tags);
}
/// <summary>Verifies that opening a session sets the initial lease expiry from the configured default lease.</summary>
/// <returns>A task that represents the asynchronous operation.</returns>
[Fact]
@@ -196,6 +196,64 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParserTests
Assert.True(constraints.ReadHistorizedOnly);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies --dashboard-tags parses a comma-separated list, trimming segments and unioning
/// repeated occurrences of the flag without duplicating a tag that differs only by case.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void Parse_CreateKeyCommand_WithDashboardTags_ParsesTrimmedTagList()
{
ApiKeyAdminParseResult result = ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParser.Parse(
[
"apikey",
"create-key",
"--key-id",
"operator01",
"--display-name",
"Operator",
"--dashboard-tags",
" team-a , team-b ",
"--dashboard-tags",
"TEAM-A,team-c"
]);
Assert.True(result.IsApiKeyCommand);
Assert.Null(result.Error);
Assert.NotNull(result.Command);
Assert.Equal(["team-a", "team-b", "team-c"], result.Command.Constraints.DashboardTags);
}
/// <summary>Verifies a create-key command without --dashboard-tags leaves the key untagged.</summary>
[Fact]
public void Parse_CreateKeyCommand_WithoutDashboardTags_LeavesKeyUntagged()
{
ApiKeyAdminParseResult result = ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParser.Parse(
["apikey", "create-key", "--key-id", "operator01", "--display-name", "Operator"]);
Assert.NotNull(result.Command);
Assert.Empty(result.Command.Constraints.DashboardTags);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies an empty tag segment is rejected rather than dropped: a stray comma must not
/// silently persist a grant the operator did not write.
/// </summary>
[Theory]
[InlineData("team-a,,team-b")]
[InlineData("team-a, ")]
[InlineData("")]
public void Parse_CreateKeyCommand_WithEmptyDashboardTag_Fails(string tags)
{
ApiKeyAdminParseResult result = ApiKeyAdminCommandLineParser.Parse(
["apikey", "create-key", "--key-id", "operator01", "--display-name", "Operator",
$"--dashboard-tags={tags}"]);
Assert.True(result.IsApiKeyCommand);
Assert.Null(result.Command);
Assert.NotNull(result.Error);
Assert.Contains("--dashboard-tags", result.Error, StringComparison.Ordinal);
}
/// <summary>Verifies that create-key command without display name returns error.</summary>
[Fact]
public void Parse_CreateKeyWithoutDisplayName_ReturnsError()
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Security.Authentication;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.Security.Authentication;
public sealed class ApiKeyConstraintSerializerTests
{
/// <summary>Verifies that dashboard tags survive a serialize/deserialize round trip.</summary>
[Fact]
public void RoundTrip_WithDashboardTags_PreservesTags()
{
ApiKeyConstraints constraints = ApiKeyConstraints.Empty with
{
ReadSubtrees = ["Area1/*"],
DashboardTags = ["team-a", "team-b"],
};
string? json = ApiKeyConstraintSerializer.Serialize(constraints);
Assert.NotNull(json);
Assert.Contains("dashboard_tags", json, StringComparison.Ordinal);
ApiKeyConstraints restored = ApiKeyConstraintSerializer.Deserialize(json);
Assert.Equal(["team-a", "team-b"], restored.DashboardTags);
Assert.Equal(["Area1/*"], restored.ReadSubtrees);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies a key whose only per-key policy is a dashboard tag is still persisted: the
/// serializer drops empty constraints entirely, so the tag must count as non-empty.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void Serialize_WithOnlyDashboardTags_IsNotTreatedAsEmpty()
{
ApiKeyConstraints constraints = ApiKeyConstraints.Empty with { DashboardTags = ["team-a"] };
Assert.False(constraints.IsEmpty);
Assert.NotNull(ApiKeyConstraintSerializer.Serialize(constraints));
}
/// <summary>Verifies that dashboard tags never register as read or write (data-access) constraints.</summary>
[Fact]
public void DashboardTags_AreNotDataAccessConstraints()
{
ApiKeyConstraints constraints = ApiKeyConstraints.Empty with { DashboardTags = ["team-a"] };
Assert.False(constraints.HasReadConstraints);
Assert.False(constraints.HasWriteConstraints);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies a row persisted before the dashboard-tag field existed still deserializes, with
/// every pre-existing constraint intact and an untagged (empty, never null) tag list.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void Deserialize_LegacyJsonWithoutDashboardTags_YieldsUntaggedConstraints()
{
const string LegacyJson = """
{
"read_subtrees": ["Area1/*"],
"write_subtrees": [],
"read_tag_globs": [],
"write_tag_globs": ["Pump_*"],
"max_write_classification": 2,
"browse_subtrees": ["Area1/*"],
"read_alarm_only": true,
"read_historized_only": false
}
""";
ApiKeyConstraints constraints = ApiKeyConstraintSerializer.Deserialize(LegacyJson);
Assert.Empty(constraints.DashboardTags);
Assert.Equal(["Area1/*"], constraints.ReadSubtrees);
Assert.Equal(["Pump_*"], constraints.WriteTagGlobs);
Assert.Equal(2, constraints.MaxWriteClassification);
Assert.Equal(["Area1/*"], constraints.BrowseSubtrees);
Assert.True(constraints.ReadAlarmOnly);
Assert.False(constraints.ReadHistorizedOnly);
}
/// <summary>Verifies an explicit JSON null for the tag list normalizes to untagged rather than null.</summary>
[Fact]
public void Deserialize_ExplicitNullDashboardTags_YieldsEmptyList()
{
const string Json = """
{
"read_subtrees": [],
"write_subtrees": [],
"read_tag_globs": [],
"write_tag_globs": [],
"max_write_classification": null,
"browse_subtrees": [],
"read_alarm_only": false,
"read_historized_only": false,
"dashboard_tags": null
}
""";
Assert.Empty(ApiKeyConstraintSerializer.Deserialize(Json).DashboardTags);
}
/// <summary>Verifies null or whitespace constraint JSON deserializes to the untagged empty instance.</summary>
[Fact]
public void Deserialize_NullJson_YieldsEmptyConstraints()
{
Assert.Same(ApiKeyConstraints.Empty, ApiKeyConstraintSerializer.Deserialize(null));
Assert.Empty(ApiKeyConstraints.Empty.DashboardTags);
}
}
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ public sealed class FakeGatewayAlarmService : IGatewayAlarmService
/// <inheritdoc />
public IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> CurrentAlarms { get; set; } = [];
/// <inheritdoc />
public bool SnapshotTruncated { get; set; }
/// <inheritdoc />
public async IAsyncEnumerable<AlarmFeedMessage> StreamAsync(
string? alarmFilterPrefix,
@@ -262,6 +262,72 @@ public sealed class AlarmCommandExecutorTests
Assert.Equal("Galaxy!A", handler.LastFilterPrefix);
}
/// <summary>
/// The reply payload's <c>SnapshotTruncated</c> comes from the handler's
/// verdict. This is the last hop before the IPC frame; if the executor
/// dropped it, a filtered query returning no records would carry no
/// completeness caveat at all.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="handlerReportsTruncated">The verdict the fake handler reports.</param>
[Theory]
[InlineData(true)]
[InlineData(false)]
public void QueryActiveAlarms_StampsSnapshotTruncatedFromHandler(bool handlerReportsTruncated)
{
FakeAlarmHandler handler = new FakeAlarmHandler
{
SnapshotTruncated = handlerReportsTruncated,
QueryResult = new[]
{
new ActiveAlarmSnapshot { AlarmFullReference = "Galaxy!A.T1" },
},
};
MxAccessCommandExecutor executor = NewExecutor(handler);
StaCommand command = new StaCommand(
SessionId, CorrelationId,
new MxCommand
{
Kind = MxCommandKind.QueryActiveAlarms,
QueryActiveAlarmsCommand = new QueryActiveAlarmsCommand(),
});
MxCommandReply reply = executor.Execute(command);
Assert.Equal(ProtocolStatusCode.Ok, reply.ProtocolStatus.Code);
Assert.NotNull(reply.QueryActiveAlarms);
Assert.Equal(handlerReportsTruncated, reply.QueryActiveAlarms.SnapshotTruncated);
}
/// <summary>
/// A truncated fetch whose records all filtered out still reports the
/// caveat on the payload — the case the per-record flag cannot cover.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void QueryActiveAlarms_WithTruncatedFetchAndNoRecords_StillReportsTruncation()
{
FakeAlarmHandler handler = new FakeAlarmHandler
{
SnapshotTruncated = true,
QueryResult = Array.Empty<ActiveAlarmSnapshot>(),
};
MxAccessCommandExecutor executor = NewExecutor(handler);
StaCommand command = new StaCommand(
SessionId, CorrelationId,
new MxCommand
{
Kind = MxCommandKind.QueryActiveAlarms,
QueryActiveAlarmsCommand = new QueryActiveAlarmsCommand(),
});
MxCommandReply reply = executor.Execute(command);
Assert.Equal(ProtocolStatusCode.Ok, reply.ProtocolStatus.Code);
Assert.Empty(reply.QueryActiveAlarms.Snapshots);
Assert.True(reply.QueryActiveAlarms.SnapshotTruncated);
}
/// <summary>Verifies that unsubscribe routes to handler.</summary>
[Fact]
public void UnsubscribeAlarms_WithHandler_RoutesToHandler()
@@ -371,6 +437,9 @@ public sealed class AlarmCommandExecutorTests
/// <summary>Gets the last alarm filter prefix.</summary>
public string? LastFilterPrefix { get; private set; }
/// <summary>Gets or sets the truncation verdict this handler reports with its query result.</summary>
public bool SnapshotTruncated { get; set; }
/// <inheritdoc />
public void Subscribe(SubscribeAlarmsCommand command, string sessionId)
{
@@ -413,9 +482,12 @@ public sealed class AlarmCommandExecutorTests
public (string Name, string Provider, string Group)? LastAckByNameTuple { get; private set; }
/// <inheritdoc />
public IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> QueryActive(string? alarmFilterPrefix)
public IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> QueryActive(
string? alarmFilterPrefix,
out bool snapshotTruncated)
{
LastFilterPrefix = alarmFilterPrefix;
snapshotTruncated = SnapshotTruncated;
return QueryResult;
}
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ public sealed class AlarmCommandHandlerTests
() => consumer);
handler.Subscribe(new SubscribeAlarmsCommand { SubscriptionExpression = @"\\HOST\Galaxy!A" }, "s1");
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> snapshots = handler.QueryActive(null);
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> snapshots = handler.QueryActive(null, out _);
Assert.Single(snapshots);
Assert.Equal("Galaxy!TestArea.Tag1", snapshots[0].AlarmFullReference);
@@ -175,12 +175,66 @@ public sealed class AlarmCommandHandlerTests
() => consumer);
handler.Subscribe(new SubscribeAlarmsCommand { SubscriptionExpression = @"\\HOST\Galaxy!A" }, "s1");
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> filtered = handler.QueryActive("Galaxy!AreaA");
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> filtered = handler.QueryActive("Galaxy!AreaA", out _);
Assert.Single(filtered);
Assert.Equal("Galaxy!AreaA.Tag1", filtered[0].AlarmFullReference);
}
/// <summary>
/// The consumer's truncation verdict reaches the caller through the
/// handler and its dispatcher. This is the middle hop of the flag's
/// journey to the QueryActiveAlarms reply payload; without it the reply
/// builder would have nothing to stamp.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="consumerReportsTruncated">The verdict the fake consumer reports.</param>
[Theory]
[InlineData(true)]
[InlineData(false)]
public void QueryActive_ReportsConsumerTruncationVerdict(bool consumerReportsTruncated)
{
FakeConsumer consumer = new FakeConsumer
{
SnapshotTruncated = consumerReportsTruncated,
SnapshotResult = new[] { NewRecord("Galaxy", "AreaA", "Tag1") },
};
AlarmCommandHandler handler = new AlarmCommandHandler(
new MxAccessEventQueue(),
() => consumer);
handler.Subscribe(new SubscribeAlarmsCommand { SubscriptionExpression = @"\\HOST\Galaxy!A" }, "s1");
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> snapshots = handler.QueryActive(null, out bool snapshotTruncated);
Assert.Equal(consumerReportsTruncated, snapshotTruncated);
Assert.Equal(consumerReportsTruncated, Assert.Single(snapshots).FromTruncatedSnapshot);
}
/// <summary>
/// A prefix filter that removes every record must not remove the verdict
/// with them. This is exactly why the flag rides out separately as well as
/// on each record: a scoped query over a truncated fetch can legitimately
/// return nothing and still owe the caller the completeness caveat.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void QueryActive_WhenPrefixFiltersOutEveryRecord_StillReportsTruncation()
{
FakeConsumer consumer = new FakeConsumer
{
SnapshotTruncated = true,
SnapshotResult = new[] { NewRecord("Galaxy", "AreaB", "Tag2") },
};
AlarmCommandHandler handler = new AlarmCommandHandler(
new MxAccessEventQueue(),
() => consumer);
handler.Subscribe(new SubscribeAlarmsCommand { SubscriptionExpression = @"\\HOST\Galaxy!A" }, "s1");
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> filtered =
handler.QueryActive("Galaxy!AreaA", out bool snapshotTruncated);
Assert.Empty(filtered);
Assert.True(snapshotTruncated);
}
/// <summary>Verifies that dispose unsubscribes and disposes consumer when subscribed.</summary>
[Fact]
public void Dispose_WhenSubscribed_UnsubscribesAndDisposesConsumer()
@@ -227,7 +281,7 @@ public sealed class AlarmCommandHandlerTests
handler.AcknowledgeByName("a", "p", "g", "c", "u", "n", "d", "F");
Assert.Equal(3, guardInvocations);
_ = handler.QueryActive(null);
_ = handler.QueryActive(null, out _);
Assert.Equal(4, guardInvocations);
handler.PollOnce();
@@ -268,7 +322,7 @@ public sealed class AlarmCommandHandlerTests
() => handler.Acknowledge(Guid.Empty, "", "", "", "", ""));
Assert.Throws<InvalidOperationException>(
() => handler.AcknowledgeByName("", "", "", "", "", "", "", ""));
Assert.Throws<InvalidOperationException>(() => handler.QueryActive(null));
Assert.Throws<InvalidOperationException>(() => handler.QueryActive(null, out _));
Assert.Throws<InvalidOperationException>(() => handler.PollOnce());
Assert.Throws<InvalidOperationException>(() => handler.Unsubscribe());
}
@@ -470,8 +524,15 @@ public sealed class AlarmCommandHandlerTests
/// <summary>Gets the last acknowledge-by-name parameters.</summary>
public (string Name, string Provider, string Group)? LastAckByNameTuple { get; private set; }
/// <summary>Gets or sets the truncation verdict this consumer reports with its snapshot.</summary>
public bool SnapshotTruncated { get; set; }
/// <inheritdoc />
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms() => SnapshotResult;
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated)
{
truncated = SnapshotTruncated;
return SnapshotResult;
}
/// <summary>Gets the number of times polled.</summary>
public int PollCount { get; private set; }
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ public sealed class AlarmDispatcherTests
new MxAccessAlarmEventSink(new MxAccessEventQueue(), new MxAccessEventMapper()),
SessionId);
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> snapshots = dispatcher.SnapshotActiveAlarms();
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> snapshots = dispatcher.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out _);
Assert.Equal(2, snapshots.Count);
Assert.Equal("Galaxy!TestArea.Tag1", snapshots[0].AlarmFullReference);
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ public sealed class AlarmDispatcherTests
new MxAccessAlarmEventSink(new MxAccessEventQueue(), new MxAccessEventMapper()),
SessionId);
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> snapshots = dispatcher.SnapshotActiveAlarms();
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> snapshots = dispatcher.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out _);
Assert.Equal(2, snapshots.Count);
Assert.True(snapshots[0].Degraded);
@@ -333,6 +333,82 @@ public sealed class AlarmDispatcherTests
Assert.Equal(AlarmProviderMode.Alarmmgr, snapshots[1].SourceProvider);
}
/// <summary>
/// A truncated consumer snapshot stamps every mapped record with
/// <c>FromTruncatedSnapshot</c> and reports the verdict out of the same
/// call. Every record carries it because the public QueryActiveAlarms RPC
/// streams bare snapshots with no envelope to hold set-level status, so
/// a client that reads only one record must still learn the set may be
/// incomplete.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void SnapshotActiveAlarms_WhenConsumerReportsTruncated_StampsEveryRecord()
{
FakeAlarmConsumer consumer = new FakeAlarmConsumer
{
SnapshotTruncated = true,
SnapshotResult = new[]
{
NewSnapshotRecord("Tag1", degraded: false),
NewSnapshotRecord("Tag2", degraded: true),
},
};
using AlarmDispatcher dispatcher = new AlarmDispatcher(
consumer,
new MxAccessAlarmEventSink(new MxAccessEventQueue(), new MxAccessEventMapper()),
SessionId);
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> snapshots = dispatcher.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated);
Assert.True(truncated);
Assert.Equal(2, snapshots.Count);
Assert.All(snapshots, snapshot => Assert.True(snapshot.FromTruncatedSnapshot));
// Truncation is about the SET; the per-record provider fidelity flag is
// independent and must not be dragged along with it.
Assert.False(snapshots[0].Degraded);
Assert.True(snapshots[1].Degraded);
}
/// <summary>
/// The control. A complete consumer snapshot must leave every record's
/// <c>FromTruncatedSnapshot</c> unset — without this, a field hard-wired
/// to true would satisfy the test above and every snapshot would read as
/// possibly-incomplete.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void SnapshotActiveAlarms_WhenConsumerReportsComplete_LeavesRecordsUnstamped()
{
FakeAlarmConsumer consumer = new FakeAlarmConsumer
{
SnapshotTruncated = false,
SnapshotResult = new[] { NewSnapshotRecord("Tag1", degraded: false) },
};
using AlarmDispatcher dispatcher = new AlarmDispatcher(
consumer,
new MxAccessAlarmEventSink(new MxAccessEventQueue(), new MxAccessEventMapper()),
SessionId);
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> snapshots = dispatcher.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated);
Assert.False(truncated);
Assert.False(Assert.Single(snapshots).FromTruncatedSnapshot);
}
private static MxAlarmSnapshotRecord NewSnapshotRecord(string tagName, bool degraded)
{
return new MxAlarmSnapshotRecord
{
AlarmGuid = Guid.NewGuid(),
ProviderName = "Galaxy",
Group = "TestArea",
TagName = tagName,
Type = "DSC",
Priority = 500,
State = MxAlarmStateKind.UnackAlm,
Degraded = degraded,
};
}
/// <summary>Verifies that dispose unsubscribes the handler and disposes the consumer.</summary>
[Fact]
public void Dispose_WhenSubscribed_UnsubscribesHandlerAndDisposesConsumer()
@@ -432,9 +508,13 @@ public sealed class AlarmDispatcherTests
/// <summary>Gets the last acknowledge-by-name tuple (alarm name, provider, group).</summary>
public (string Name, string Provider, string Group)? LastAckByNameTuple { get; private set; }
/// <summary>Gets or sets the truncation verdict this consumer reports with its snapshot.</summary>
public bool SnapshotTruncated { get; set; }
/// <inheritdoc />
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms()
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated)
{
truncated = SnapshotTruncated;
return SnapshotResult;
}
@@ -78,7 +78,14 @@ public sealed class FailoverAlarmConsumerTests
public int AcknowledgeByName(string n, string p, string gr, string c, string a, string b, string d, string e) => 11;
/// <inheritdoc />
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms() => Array.Empty<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord>();
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated)
{
truncated = SnapshotTruncated;
return Array.Empty<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord>();
}
/// <summary>Gets or sets the truncation verdict this child reports, so delegation is observable.</summary>
public bool SnapshotTruncated { get; set; }
/// <inheritdoc />
public void Dispose() { }
@@ -121,7 +128,7 @@ public sealed class FailoverAlarmConsumerTests
public int AcknowledgeByName(string n, string p, string gr, string c, string a, string b, string d, string e) => 22;
/// <inheritdoc />
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms()
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated)
{
SnapshotCalls++;
if (ThrowOnSnapshot)
@@ -129,9 +136,13 @@ public sealed class FailoverAlarmConsumerTests
throw new InvalidOperationException("priming snapshot failed");
}
truncated = SnapshotTruncated;
return Array.Empty<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord>();
}
/// <summary>Gets or sets the truncation verdict this child reports, so delegation is observable.</summary>
public bool SnapshotTruncated { get; set; }
/// <inheritdoc />
public void Dispose() { }
@@ -668,8 +668,13 @@ public sealed class MxAccessStaSessionTests
=> 0;
/// <inheritdoc />
public IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> QueryActive(string? alarmFilterPrefix)
=> Array.Empty<ActiveAlarmSnapshot>();
public IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> QueryActive(
string? alarmFilterPrefix,
out bool snapshotTruncated)
{
snapshotTruncated = false;
return Array.Empty<ActiveAlarmSnapshot>();
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public void PollOnce()
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ public sealed class SubtagAlarmConsumerTests
source.Raise(ActiveSubtag, true, new DateTime(2026, 6, 13, 10, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc));
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> snapshot = consumer.SnapshotActiveAlarms();
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> snapshot = consumer.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out _);
Assert.Single(snapshot);
Assert.True(snapshot[0].Degraded);
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ public sealed class SubtagAlarmConsumerTests
source.Raise(ActiveSubtag, true, new DateTime(2026, 6, 13, 10, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc));
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> snapshot = consumer.SnapshotActiveAlarms();
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> snapshot = consumer.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out _);
Assert.NotNull(emitted);
Assert.Single(snapshot);
@@ -688,6 +688,107 @@ public sealed class WnWrapAlarmConsumerXmlTests
Assert.Equal(MxAlarmStateKind.UnackAlm, record.State);
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Degraded-status signal. The truncation guard above keeps a capped fetch
// from broadcasting phantom Clears, but it does so silently: the retained
// snapshot simply stops shrinking. The truncation verdict SnapshotActiveAlarms
// hands back alongside the records is what makes that suppression visible to
// the QueryActiveAlarms reply and, through it, the dashboard banner — so its
// set/reset behaviour is the contract, not detail.
//
// These assert through SnapshotActiveAlarms(out ...) rather than any internal
// field, because the pairing IS the contract: records and verdict must come
// out of one call, produced under one lock acquisition.
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// <summary>
/// A capped fetch sets the truncation verdict handed out with the
/// snapshot. Without this the signal never leaves the consumer and the
/// reply builder stamps a complete-looking snapshot over a capped one.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void SnapshotActiveAlarms_AfterTruncatedFetch_ReportsTruncated()
{
const int Cap = 8;
using WnWrapAlarmConsumer consumer = new WnWrapAlarmConsumer(Cap);
consumer.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncatedBeforeAnyFetch);
Assert.False(truncatedBeforeAnyFetch);
Dictionary<Guid, MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> next =
WnWrapAlarmConsumer.ParseSnapshotXml(BuildAlarmXml(Cap), out int fetchedRecordCount);
Assert.True(WnWrapAlarmConsumer.IsTruncatedFetch(fetchedRecordCount, Cap));
consumer.FoldFetch(next, truncated: true, out int retainedCount);
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> snapshot =
consumer.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated);
Assert.True(truncated);
Assert.Equal(Cap, retainedCount);
// The verdict describes THIS set — assert they arrive together, not just
// that the boolean flipped somewhere.
Assert.Equal(Cap, snapshot.Count);
}
/// <summary>
/// THE reset test. A sub-cap fetch is complete, so it restores absence
/// authority and must clear the verdict. Latching it instead would leave
/// the operator banner asserting "snapshot may be incomplete" forever
/// after a single burst above the cap, which trains operators to ignore
/// it — the opposite of what the signal is for.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void SnapshotActiveAlarms_AfterSubCapFetchFollowingTruncation_ReportsComplete()
{
const int Cap = 8;
using WnWrapAlarmConsumer consumer = new WnWrapAlarmConsumer(Cap);
Dictionary<Guid, MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> capped =
WnWrapAlarmConsumer.ParseSnapshotXml(BuildAlarmXml(Cap), out _);
consumer.FoldFetch(capped, truncated: true, out _);
consumer.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncatedAfterCappedFetch);
Assert.True(truncatedAfterCappedFetch);
Dictionary<Guid, MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> complete =
WnWrapAlarmConsumer.ParseSnapshotXml(BuildAlarmXml(Cap - 1), out int fetchedRecordCount);
Assert.False(WnWrapAlarmConsumer.IsTruncatedFetch(fetchedRecordCount, Cap));
consumer.FoldFetch(complete, truncated: false, out int retainedCount);
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> snapshot =
consumer.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated);
Assert.False(truncated);
// The complete fetch also replaced the snapshot wholesale, which is what
// makes it authoritative about absence — pinned here so a future change
// cannot clear the verdict while keeping the merge semantics.
Assert.Equal(Cap - 1, retainedCount);
Assert.Equal(Cap - 1, snapshot.Count);
}
/// <summary>
/// Consecutive capped fetches keep the verdict set. It is per-fetch state,
/// not an edge-triggered one-shot: an operator arriving mid-burst must
/// still see the caveat.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void SnapshotActiveAlarms_WithConsecutiveTruncatedFetches_KeepsReportingTruncated()
{
const int Cap = 8;
using WnWrapAlarmConsumer consumer = new WnWrapAlarmConsumer(Cap);
for (int pass = 0; pass < 3; pass++)
{
Dictionary<Guid, MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> capped =
WnWrapAlarmConsumer.ParseSnapshotXml(BuildAlarmXml(Cap), out _);
consumer.FoldFetch(capped, truncated: true, out _);
consumer.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated);
Assert.True(truncated);
}
}
private static MxAlarmSnapshotRecord NewRecord(Guid guid, MxAlarmStateKind state)
{
return new MxAlarmSnapshotRecord
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ public sealed class AlarmSubtagLiveSmokeTests
raiseEvent.Record.AlarmGuid, raiseEvent.Record.Degraded, raiseEvent.Record.State));
// 2. Snapshot active alarms and confirm the raised alarm is present.
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> snapshot = consumer.SnapshotActiveAlarms();
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> snapshot = consumer.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out _);
Log(string.Format("SnapshotActiveAlarms count={0}", snapshot.Count));
foreach (MxAlarmSnapshotRecord s in snapshot)
{
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ public sealed class AlarmsLiveSmokeTests
Assert.Contains("Galaxy", raiseBody.AlarmFullReference);
// 2. Snapshot the active set + verify the captured alarm is there.
var snapshot = dispatcher.SnapshotActiveAlarms();
var snapshot = dispatcher.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out _);
Log($"SnapshotActiveAlarms count={snapshot.Count}");
foreach (var s in snapshot)
{
@@ -172,6 +172,12 @@ public sealed class WorkerFrameWriter
// caller still observes cancellation while the frame reaches the wire (documented
// above). Rethrow from the wait rather than from the completion, so a claimed frame's
// canceller is not held behind the very write it is abandoning.
//
// The wait ending without the lock IS cancellation in every reachable case — nothing
// disposes _writeLock — so the tombstone's TrySetCanceled is honest. A hypothetical
// faulted wait would take this same path and label the frame cancelled instead of
// faulted; that is internal state only, since the await below rethrows the fault itself
// to the caller.
TombstoneIfUnclaimed(frame, cancellationToken);
await lockWait.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
@@ -343,8 +349,23 @@ public sealed class WorkerFrameWriter
/// <param name="frame">Frame whose completion may fault without an awaiter.</param>
private static void ObserveAbandonedFault(PendingFrame frame)
{
_ = frame.Completion.Task.ContinueWith(
task => _ = task.Exception,
ObserveFault(frame.Completion.Task);
}
/// <summary>
/// Attaches the NEXT-04 fault-observing continuation to a task this writer starts and then
/// discards. Every such task must carry one: with no awaiter, a fault would otherwise reach
/// nobody and resurface as <see cref="TaskScheduler.UnobservedTaskException"/> at finalization
/// — a detached, unattributable failure long after the code that caused it. The continuation
/// runs only on the faulted path and only touches <see cref="Task.Exception"/>, so it can
/// never fault itself; it runs inline because an already-faulted task would otherwise pay a
/// scheduling hop to do nothing.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="task">Discarded task whose fault would otherwise go unobserved.</param>
private static void ObserveFault(Task task)
{
_ = task.ContinueWith(
faulted => _ = faulted.Exception,
CancellationToken.None,
TaskContinuationOptions.OnlyOnFaulted | TaskContinuationOptions.ExecuteSynchronously,
TaskScheduler.Default);
@@ -367,11 +388,14 @@ public sealed class WorkerFrameWriter
/// <param name="lockWait">Outstanding write-lock acquisition the caller has walked away from.</param>
private void DetachLockWait(Task lockWait)
{
_ = lockWait.ContinueWith(
// The continuation task is discarded, so it takes the NEXT-04 fault observer: nothing awaits
// it, and a throw out of OnDetachedLockWaitSettled would otherwise be an unobserved-task
// exception raised at finalization rather than an attributable failure here.
ObserveFault(lockWait.ContinueWith(
OnDetachedLockWaitSettled,
CancellationToken.None,
TaskContinuationOptions.None,
TaskScheduler.Default);
TaskScheduler.Default));
}
/// <summary>
@@ -394,7 +418,11 @@ public sealed class WorkerFrameWriter
return;
}
_ = DrainDetachedAsync();
// Discarded, so it takes the NEXT-04 fault observer too. DrainDetachedAsync swallows the drain
// itself, but its release sits in a finally outside that catch: a Release that ever throws (a
// SemaphoreFullException from some future double-release regression, say) must fail somewhere
// attributable rather than at finalization.
ObserveFault(DrainDetachedAsync());
}
/// <summary>
@@ -325,11 +325,15 @@ public sealed class AlarmCommandHandler : IAlarmCommandHandler
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> QueryActive(string? alarmFilterPrefix)
public IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> QueryActive(
string? alarmFilterPrefix,
out bool snapshotTruncated)
{
threadAffinityCheck?.Invoke();
AlarmDispatcher? d = GetDispatcherOrThrow();
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> all = d.SnapshotActiveAlarms();
// The verdict rides out of the same call that produced the records, so
// filtering below cannot separate it from the set it describes.
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> all = d.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out snapshotTruncated);
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(alarmFilterPrefix)) return all;
List<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> filtered = new List<ActiveAlarmSnapshot>(all.Count);
foreach (ActiveAlarmSnapshot snap in all)
@@ -154,16 +154,29 @@ public sealed class AlarmDispatcher : IDisposable
/// <see cref="ActiveAlarmSnapshot"/> protos for the
/// <c>QueryActiveAlarms</c> RPC's ConditionRefresh stream.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="truncated">
/// Receives whether the fetch behind the snapshot hit the per-fetch cap,
/// so the returned set may omit active alarms. Forwarded from the single
/// atomic consumer read, and stamped onto every returned record as
/// <c>ActiveAlarmSnapshot.FromTruncatedSnapshot</c>. Also returned
/// separately because a snapshot of zero records still has to report it.
/// </param>
/// <returns>The currently active alarm snapshots.</returns>
public IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> SnapshotActiveAlarms()
public IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated)
{
if (disposed) throw new ObjectDisposedException(nameof(AlarmDispatcher));
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> records = consumer.SnapshotActiveAlarms();
// One consumer call yields the records and the verdict together, under a
// single acquisition of the consumer's snapshot lock. Reading them
// separately would let a poll interleave and pair a stale not-truncated
// verdict with a capped snapshot — a set that reads complete while
// missing actives. The atomicity is structural here, not a consequence of
// the STA happening to serialize the two calls.
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> records = consumer.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out truncated);
if (records.Count == 0) return Array.Empty<ActiveAlarmSnapshot>();
List<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> snapshots = new List<ActiveAlarmSnapshot>(records.Count);
foreach (MxAlarmSnapshotRecord record in records)
{
snapshots.Add(MapToSnapshot(record));
snapshots.Add(MapToSnapshot(record, truncated));
}
return snapshots;
}
@@ -196,7 +209,7 @@ public sealed class AlarmDispatcher : IDisposable
degraded: record.Degraded);
}
private static ActiveAlarmSnapshot MapToSnapshot(MxAlarmSnapshotRecord record)
private static ActiveAlarmSnapshot MapToSnapshot(MxAlarmSnapshotRecord record, bool truncated)
{
ActiveAlarmSnapshot snapshot = new ActiveAlarmSnapshot
{
@@ -212,6 +225,12 @@ public sealed class AlarmDispatcher : IDisposable
Description = string.Empty,
Degraded = record.Degraded,
SourceProvider = record.Degraded ? AlarmProviderMode.Subtag : AlarmProviderMode.Alarmmgr,
// Set-level status, stamped identically on every record of the
// snapshot: QueryActiveAlarms streams bare ActiveAlarmSnapshot
// messages with no envelope to hang it off. Independent of
// Degraded above — that is about this record's provider, this is
// about whether the set it belongs to is complete.
FromTruncatedSnapshot = truncated,
};
if (record.TransitionTimestampUtc != DateTime.MinValue)
{
@@ -260,10 +260,16 @@ public sealed class FailoverAlarmConsumer : IMxAccessAlarmConsumer
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms()
/// <remarks>
/// Both values come from ONE call to the active child, so the snapshot
/// and its verdict cannot end up describing different children across a
/// failover. A failover to the subtag standby therefore reports
/// not-truncated — correctly, since that child performs no capped fetch.
/// </remarks>
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated)
{
if (disposed) throw new ObjectDisposedException(nameof(FailoverAlarmConsumer));
return ActiveChild.SnapshotActiveAlarms();
return ActiveChild.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out truncated);
}
private IMxAccessAlarmConsumer ActiveChild => active == Active.Primary ? primary : standby;
@@ -340,7 +346,7 @@ public sealed class FailoverAlarmConsumer : IMxAccessAlarmConsumer
{
try
{
_ = standby.SnapshotActiveAlarms();
_ = standby.SnapshotActiveAlarms(out _);
}
catch (Exception ex) when (ex is not OutOfMemoryException)
{
@@ -71,8 +71,17 @@ public interface IAlarmCommandHandler : IDisposable
/// prefix matched against <c>AlarmFullReference</c>.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="alarmFilterPrefix">Optional prefix to filter alarms by.</param>
/// <param name="snapshotTruncated">
/// Receives whether the fetch behind the snapshot hit the per-fetch cap,
/// so the set may omit active alarms. Carried out alongside the records
/// rather than read from a separate property, both so the pair comes from
/// one atomic consumer read and because it is the only carrier left once
/// <paramref name="alarmFilterPrefix"/> (or an empty galaxy) filters the
/// records down to none. <see langword="false"/> when there is no active
/// subscription: no fetch has happened, so nothing is capped.
/// </param>
/// <returns>The currently active alarms matching the filter.</returns>
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> QueryActive(string? alarmFilterPrefix);
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> QueryActive(string? alarmFilterPrefix, out bool snapshotTruncated);
/// <summary>
/// Drives a single poll of the underlying alarm consumer on the
@@ -97,12 +97,43 @@ public interface IMxAccessAlarmConsumer : IDisposable
/// <summary>
/// Returns the consumer's most recently parsed snapshot of currently
/// active alarms. Used by the gateway's QueryActiveAlarms (PR A.7)
/// active alarms, together with whether the fetch that produced it hit
/// the per-fetch cap. Used by the gateway's QueryActiveAlarms (PR A.7)
/// ConditionRefresh path — operator clients call this after reconnect
/// to seed local Part 9 state.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The verdict is an <c>out</c> parameter rather than a separate
/// property on purpose, and the reason is a correctness one.
/// Implementations must produce both values from a single acquisition
/// of whatever lock guards the retained snapshot, mirroring the write
/// side (<c>WnWrapAlarmConsumer.FoldFetch</c> updates snapshot and
/// verdict together). Two separate reads could straddle a poll that
/// flips not-truncated → truncated and pair a stale
/// <see langword="false"/> with a capped snapshot — a snapshot that
/// reads as complete while missing actives, which is exactly the
/// false all-clear this signal exists to prevent. Making the pair
/// inseparable in the signature removes the possibility rather than
/// relying on callers, or on the STA serializing them.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// While <paramref name="truncated"/> is <see langword="true"/> the
/// returned snapshot is authoritative about presence only: the
/// provider may hold actives it had no room to report, and the
/// consumer has suspended the absence-implies-Clear inference. Not
/// latched — the first sub-cap fetch clears it, because that fetch is
/// complete and its snapshot is again authoritative about absence.
/// Consumers with no per-fetch cap (the subtag fallback, which is
/// advise-driven) always report <see langword="false"/>.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
/// <param name="truncated">
/// Receives whether the fetch behind the returned snapshot hit the
/// per-fetch cap.
/// </param>
/// <returns>The most recently parsed snapshot of currently active alarms.</returns>
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms();
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated);
/// <summary>
/// Drives a single synchronous poll of the underlying alarm source.
@@ -974,9 +974,15 @@ public sealed class MxAccessCommandExecutor : IStaCommandExecutor
try
{
IReadOnlyList<ActiveAlarmSnapshot> snapshots = alarmCommandHandler.QueryActive(
command.Command.QueryActiveAlarmsCommand.AlarmFilterPrefix);
command.Command.QueryActiveAlarmsCommand.AlarmFilterPrefix,
out bool snapshotTruncated);
QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload payload = new QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload();
payload.Snapshots.AddRange(snapshots);
// Set-level degraded status: the snapshot may omit actives because
// the provider fetch hit its cap. The records carry the same flag,
// but a prefix filter can leave none, so the payload states it too.
// Same value the records were stamped with — one read, not a second.
payload.SnapshotTruncated = snapshotTruncated;
MxCommandReply reply = CreateOkReply(command);
reply.QueryActiveAlarms = payload;
return reply;
@@ -152,8 +152,16 @@ public sealed class SubtagAlarmConsumer : IMxAccessAlarmConsumer
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms()
/// <remarks>
/// <paramref name="truncated"/> is always <see langword="false"/>: subtag
/// mode is advise-driven over a fixed watch list, so there is no bulk
/// fetch and no per-fetch cap to hit. Subtag snapshots are lower-fidelity
/// in other ways, which <c>MxAlarmSnapshotRecord.Degraded</c> already
/// reports; truncation is not one of them.
/// </remarks>
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated)
{
truncated = false;
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> records = stateMachine.SnapshotActive();
foreach (MxAlarmSnapshotRecord record in records)
{
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ public sealed class WnWrapAlarmConsumer : IMxAccessAlarmConsumer
private long lastTruncationWarningMilliseconds = -TruncationWarningIntervalMilliseconds;
private long truncatedFetchCount;
private bool lastSnapshotTruncated;
private wwAlarmConsumerClass? client;
private wwAlarmConsumerClass? ackClient;
private bool subscribed;
@@ -125,6 +126,23 @@ public sealed class WnWrapAlarmConsumer : IMxAccessAlarmConsumer
: DefaultMaxAlarmsPerFetch;
}
/// <summary>
/// COM-free construction, for exercising the retained-snapshot state
/// machine (<see cref="FoldFetch"/> / <see cref="SnapshotActiveAlarms"/>)
/// on a machine without AVEVA
/// installed. <see cref="Subscribe"/> throws and <see cref="PollOnce"/>
/// no-ops on an instance built this way — both need the wnwrap coclass,
/// which cannot be instantiated on the macOS/Linux test matrix. Internal
/// rather than public so it cannot be reached from production wiring.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="maxAlarmsPerFetch">Maximum alarms per fetch call.</param>
internal WnWrapAlarmConsumer(int maxAlarmsPerFetch)
{
this.maxAlarmsPerFetch = maxAlarmsPerFetch > 0
? maxAlarmsPerFetch
: DefaultMaxAlarmsPerFetch;
}
/// <summary>
/// Resolves the per-fetch cap from the launcher-provided environment
/// variable. A missing, unparseable, or out-of-range value falls back
@@ -354,8 +372,11 @@ public sealed class WnWrapAlarmConsumer : IMxAccessAlarmConsumer
/// <see cref="PollOnce"/>. Erring toward "still active" keeps the feed
/// at-least-once: a stale entry is repaired by the next sub-cap poll,
/// whereas a dropped one is broadcast as a Clear that never happened.
/// The snapshot and <paramref name="truncated"/> are produced under one
/// <c>syncRoot</c> acquisition, the same one <see cref="FoldFetch"/>
/// writes them both under, so no poll can interleave between them.
/// </remarks>
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms()
public IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> SnapshotActiveAlarms(out bool truncated)
{
if (disposed) throw new ObjectDisposedException(nameof(WnWrapAlarmConsumer));
lock (syncRoot)
@@ -369,6 +390,7 @@ public sealed class WnWrapAlarmConsumer : IMxAccessAlarmConsumer
active.Add(record);
}
}
truncated = lastSnapshotTruncated;
return active;
}
}
@@ -402,21 +424,19 @@ public sealed class WnWrapAlarmConsumer : IMxAccessAlarmConsumer
Dictionary<Guid, MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> next = ParseSnapshotXml(xml, out int fetchedRecordCount);
// TRUNCATION CLIFF. GetXmlCurrentAlarms2 caps its reply at maxAlmCnt
// and gives no "there is more" flag, so a reply holding exactly the
// cap is indistinguishable from a galaxy that happens to have exactly
// that many active alarms. Treat the ambiguous case as truncated: the
// false-positive cost is a snapshot that stays stale for one poll, the
// false-negative cost is every alarm past the cap reading as cleared.
// and gives no *verified* "there is more" flag, so a reply holding
// exactly the cap is indistinguishable from a galaxy that happens to
// have exactly that many active alarms. Treat the ambiguous case as
// truncated: the false-positive cost is a snapshot that stays stale for
// one poll, the false-negative cost is every alarm past the cap reading
// as cleared. (The reply's ALARM_RECORDS/@COUNT attribute is a
// candidate exact signal, but only if it reports the total rather than
// the records in the reply — untested on a live rig, see
// docs/AlarmProbeFindings.md.)
bool truncated = IsTruncatedFetch(fetchedRecordCount, maxAlarmsPerFetch);
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmTransitionEvent> transitions;
int retainedCount;
lock (syncRoot)
{
transitions = ComputeTransitions(latestSnapshot, next);
ApplySnapshotUpdate(latestSnapshot, next, truncated);
retainedCount = latestSnapshot.Count;
}
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmTransitionEvent> transitions =
FoldFetch(next, truncated, out int retainedCount);
if (truncated)
{
@@ -432,15 +452,51 @@ public sealed class WnWrapAlarmConsumer : IMxAccessAlarmConsumer
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Folds one fetch into the retained state under a single lock: the
/// transition diff, the snapshot merge/replace, and the truncation
/// verdict move together. This is the write half of the pairing
/// <see cref="SnapshotActiveAlarms"/> reads; splitting either half would
/// let a reader see a capped snapshot alongside the previous poll's
/// "complete" verdict — precisely the false all-clear the signal exists
/// to prevent.
/// The verdict is replaced, never latched: a sub-cap fetch is complete
/// and restores absence authority, so leaving the flag set would strand
/// the operator banner on after a single burst.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="next">The snapshot just parsed from the fetch.</param>
/// <param name="truncated">Whether the fetch hit the per-fetch cap.</param>
/// <param name="retainedCount">Size of the retained snapshot after the fold.</param>
/// <returns>The transitions the fetch implies.</returns>
internal IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmTransitionEvent> FoldFetch(
Dictionary<Guid, MxAlarmSnapshotRecord> next,
bool truncated,
out int retainedCount)
{
lock (syncRoot)
{
IReadOnlyList<MxAlarmTransitionEvent> transitions =
ComputeTransitions(latestSnapshot, next);
ApplySnapshotUpdate(latestSnapshot, next, truncated);
lastSnapshotTruncated = truncated;
retainedCount = latestSnapshot.Count;
return transitions;
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Decides whether a fetch that came back holding
/// <paramref name="fetchedRecordCount"/> records hit the cap.
/// <c>GetXmlCurrentAlarms2</c> caps its reply at <c>maxAlmCnt</c> and
/// offers no "more available" flag, so a reply at exactly the cap is
/// indistinguishable from a galaxy that happens to hold exactly that
/// many active alarms; both are treated as truncated. Exposed as
/// <c>internal static</c> so the rule is unit-testable without the
/// wnwrapConsumer COM object.
/// offers no confirmed "more available" flag, so a reply at exactly the
/// cap is indistinguishable from a galaxy that happens to hold exactly
/// that many active alarms; both are treated as truncated. The reply
/// root carries an <c>ALARM_RECORDS/@COUNT</c> attribute that would make
/// the test exact if it reported the total active count rather than the
/// records in this reply; a live probe could not discriminate the two
/// (see <c>docs/AlarmProbeFindings.md</c>), so the count is deliberately
/// not trusted here. Exposed as <c>internal static</c> so the rule is
/// unit-testable without the wnwrapConsumer COM object.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="fetchedRecordCount">ALARM records the reply carried.</param>
/// <param name="maxAlarmsPerFetch">The cap that was passed to the fetch.</param>
@@ -599,6 +655,17 @@ public sealed class WnWrapAlarmConsumer : IMxAccessAlarmConsumer
/// stays correct for the alarms it does carry — first sightings
/// and state changes are computed from presence alone.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Every rule above assumes the GUID identifies the alarm
/// <em>instance</em> rather than the state it is in: a re-minted
/// GUID would read as the old alarm vanishing and a new one
/// appearing, i.e. a spurious Clear plus a spurious Raise. Live
/// capture confirms stability across the active→returned leg only
/// (<c>docs/AlarmClientDiscovery.md</c>); the acknowledge leg and
/// re-raise-after-clear are assumed, not observed, because the dev
/// rig's alarm attributes reject unauthenticated writes — see
/// <c>docs/AlarmProbeFindings.md</c>.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
/// <param name="previous">The snapshot from the previous poll (or empty on first call).</param>
/// <param name="next">The snapshot just parsed from <c>GetXmlCurrentAlarms2</c>.</param>