The themed Blazor <LoginCard> page (Components/Pages/Login.razor, @page "/login")
registers a Razor Components endpoint that matches ALL HTTP methods. The credential
form POSTed to /login, where MapPost("/login") also matched — so every POST /login
threw Microsoft.AspNetCore.Routing.Matching.AmbiguousMatchException (HTTP 500),
breaking dashboard login for every user. It was latent because the dashboard was only
ever reached via the AllowAnonymousLocalhost bypass on the host box.
Move the credential POST to a distinct /auth/login route (mirroring ScadaBridge, which
never collided because it posts to /auth/login). GET /login stays the Blazor page; the
cookie LoginPath stays /login. Adds a registration assertion pinning DashboardLoginPost
to /auth/login as the regression guard.
Files: Login.razor (LoginCard Action), DashboardEndpointRouteBuilderExtensions (MapPost
route), GatewayApplicationTests (route assertion).
The dashboard auth cookie name was hardcoded to the constant
DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.CookieName (MxGatewayDashboard). Browser
cookies are scoped by host+path but NOT by port, so two gateway instances
sharing a hostname would clobber each other's dashboard session under the
shared name.
Add DashboardOptions.CookieName (MxGateway:Dashboard:CookieName); null/blank
keeps the canonical default. Applied in the existing dashboard cookie
PostConfigure (runs after the inline AddCookie default, so it wins). Behaviour
is unchanged when unset. Adds a Tests case for the override.
Introduce IAuditActorAccessor seam + HttpAuditActorAccessor impl (reads ZbClaimTypes.Username
from IHttpContextAccessor; falls back to Identity.Name / ZbClaimTypes.Name; null when
unauthenticated). Register in DI via DashboardServiceCollectionExtensions.
Wire DashboardApiKeyManagementService: WriteDashboardAuditAsync now accepts the ClaimsPrincipal
user already in scope at each call site; ResolveOperatorActor extracts ZbClaimTypes.Username
(preferred) or Identity.Name. All four dashboard-* events now emit Actor = LDAP operator
username and Target = managed keyId, fixing the semantic gap where both fields held the keyId.
ConstraintEnforcer (gRPC / API-key actor) and CanonicalForwardingApiKeyAuditStore (CLI /
"system"/"cli" fallback) are unchanged.
Tests: DashboardApiKeyManagementServiceTests updated — CreateAuthorizedUser adds ZbClaimTypes.Username
("alice"), all dashboard-* audit assertions updated to Actor = "alice" / Target = "operator01";
new CreateAsync_AuthorizedUser_CanonicalAuditEventHasOperatorAsActorAndKeyIdAsTarget verifies the
canonical AuditEvent directly. New HttpAuditActorAccessorTests (4 cases: username claim, Identity.Name
fallback, unauthenticated → null, no context → null). ConstraintEnforcer tests still assert API-key/anonymous actor.
Standardize the dashboard role VALUE on the canonical six: Admin→Administrator
(Viewer unchanged). Pure value rename via DashboardRoles.Admin constant +
appsettings GroupToRole; the GatewayOptionsValidator allowed-set/message track
the constant so they now require 'Administrator' or 'Viewer'. Enforcement is
unchanged — Administrator authorizes exactly what Admin did.
Dashboard roles are derived at login from LDAP groups via GroupToRole and are
never persisted to the SQLite auth store, so no DB migration/seed change.
UNTOUCHED: the separate gRPC API-key scope GatewayScopes.Admin = "admin"
(lowercase) and every "admin" scope literal — a distinct data-plane system.
- DashboardAuthenticator.CreatePrincipal: emit ZbClaimTypes.Username ("zb:username") with
the login username, ZbClaimTypes.DisplayName ("zb:displayname") with the display name,
ZbClaimTypes.Name (== ClaimTypes.Name) for Identity.Name resolution, ZbClaimTypes.Role
(== ClaimTypes.Role) for IsInRole/[Authorize]. Keep ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier for back-compat
read-sites; keep mxgateway:ldap_group unchanged (MxGateway-specific, no ZbClaimType for groups).
ClaimsIdentity built with nameType=ZbClaimTypes.Name, roleType=ZbClaimTypes.Role.
- DashboardServiceCollectionExtensions.AddGatewayDashboard: route cookie hardening through
ZbCookieDefaults.Apply(requireHttps:true, idleTimeout:8h); set cookie name/path/redirects
after Apply; PostConfigure still overrides SecurePolicy per RequireHttpsCookie setting.
- DashboardAuthenticatorTests: add AuthenticateAsync_Success_EmitsCanonicalZbClaims asserting
zb:username, zb:displayname, ZbClaimTypes.Role per role, Identity.Name, and ldap_group preserved.
Defect 1: ValidateLdap used AddIfNotPositive for Port, accepting any value
> 0 including 70000. Replaced with builder.Port() from the shared
ZB.MOM.WW.Configuration library, which enforces the 1-65535 TCP range and
emits "MxGateway:Ldap:Port must be between 1 and 65535 (was {value})".
Defect 2: AddIfInvalidPath only caught ArgumentException, NotSupportedException,
and PathTooLongException from Path.GetFullPath. On macOS/Linux a path containing
an embedded null throws IOException, which escaped the catch block and caused
Validate() to throw instead of returning a failure. Added catch (IOException).
Tests: added Validate_Fails_WhenLdapPortIsZero, Validate_Fails_WhenLdapPortExceedsMaximum,
and Validate_Succeeds_WhenLdapEnabledWithValidPort to cover the new range boundary.
Wrap the WriteAllBytes/Move/HardenPermissions sequence in a try/catch so
that any failure best-effort deletes the hardened .tmp file (which may
already hold PFX/private-key bytes) before rethrowing. Add a test that
induces a persist failure by pointing SelfSignedCertPath inside a
regular file and asserts no .tmp is left on disk.
Drop KeyEncipherment from the self-signed cert's key-usage extension — it
is semantically wrong for ECDSA (RSA key-transport only); DigitalSignature
alone is correct for TLS 1.3 / ECDHE server certs. CertificateRequest is
unchanged (not IDisposable in .NET 10). Test now also asserts MachineName,
127.0.0.1 and IPv6 loopback are present in the SAN extension.
Adds missing <summary>/<param> XML docs across 99 server, worker, and test
files so CommentChecker reports zero issues (TreatWarningsAsErrors needs the
analyzer clean). Bundles in WIP dashboard work: NavSection extraction,
MainLayout/site.css/js styling alignment, and DashboardOptions/Auth tweaks.
Browsers that navigate directly to /logout via the address bar issued a GET
against a POST-only route and got 405 Method Not Allowed. Logout is
self-destructive, so the GET path can skip antiforgery; the existing POST
form (used by the layout's Sign out button) is unchanged and still
antiforgery-protected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tests-027 GatewayMetrics exposes its internal Meter; the
StreamEvents_WhenEventIsWritten_RecordsSendDuration listener
now filters by ReferenceEquals(instrument.Meter, metrics.Meter)
instead of Meter.Name, so parallel tests with their own
GatewayMetrics no longer cross-contaminate the families list.
Tests-028 FakeWorkerClient.Kill now captures LastKillReason;
SessionManager.KillWorkerAsync tests pin the reason
propagation end-to-end and cover the blank/null guard. The
DashboardSessionAdminService kill test pins the literal
dashboard-admin-kill reason.
Tests-029 Added CloseSessionAsync_BlankSessionId_ReturnsFailure to mirror
the existing KillWorkerAsync blank-id coverage.
Tests-030 DeleteAsync_WhenStoreRefuses_ReportsFriendlyError renamed and
extended to assert the dashboard-delete-key audit row with
Details = not-found-or-active. Added
DeleteAsync_BlankKeyId_ReturnsFailure.
Tests-031 DashboardSnapshotPublisher reconnect test now measures the
gap from the first throw inside the fake (firstThrowAt) to
secondSubscribeAt, isolating Task.Delay from StartAsync /
scheduling overhead.
All resolved at 2026-05-24; 512/512 gateway tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Server-044 KillWorkerAsync catch path now calls _metrics.SessionRemoved
so the open-session gauge does not leak when KillWorker throws.
Server-045 KillWorkerAsync routes through a new
GatewaySession.KillWorkerWithCloseGateAsync that takes the
per-session close lock, so concurrent kills count SessionsClosed
exactly once.
Server-046 CloseSessionCoreAsync's SessionCloseStartedException branch and
ShutdownAsync's kill fallback both increment SessionsClosed (not
just the gauge), so the counter and gauge stay consistent.
Server-047 ApiKeysPage.ConfirmPendingAsync holds PendingAction across the
awaited action and clears it in finally, matching the sessions
pages.
Server-048 Closed: the 044/045 regression tests cover the previously-
untested kill paths.
Server-049 IDashboardSessionAdminService + DashboardSessionAdminService
now carry XML docs that pin the Admin gate, missing-session
return-Fail semantics, and the dashboard-admin-kill reason.
Server-050 CloseSessionAsync and KillWorkerAsync catch unexpected
exceptions after the SessionManagerException catches and return
a friendly Fail; OperationCanceledException tied to the caller
token still propagates.
All resolved at 2026-05-24; 503/503 gateway tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add IApiKeyAdminStore.DeleteAsync that only deletes already-revoked
rows (active keys must be revoked first so the revoke event lands in
the audit log before the row disappears) and a matching admin-gated
DashboardApiKeyManagementService.DeleteAsync. ApiKeysPage now shows
Delete on revoked rows in place of the old "No actions" stub, and
Rotate/Revoke/Delete all route through ConfirmDialog so each
destructive action requires an explicit confirmation step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Joseph Doherty