docs: strip task-tracking IDs from code comments and fill missing XML docs

Tracking IDs are review bookkeeping that rots in shipped source; the rationale they tagged is kept. Comment-only change (CommentChecker 458 -> 16 false positives).

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests/Security/Authorization/ApiKeyFailureLimiterTests.cs

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.TestSupport;
 namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.Security.Authorization;
 
 /// <summary>
-/// Unit tests for the two-layer API-key failure limiter (SEC-31 / SEC-32): composite
+/// Unit tests for the two-layer API-key failure limiter: composite
 /// <c>(transport peer, key id)</c> partitions, the cross-peer per-key-id aggregate, probe
 /// admission, the per-peer key-id partition cap, and the eviction preference order.
 /// </summary>
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyFailureLimiterTests
 
     /// <summary>
     /// The composite partition binds a throttle to the failing address: the same key id presented
-    /// from a different transport peer is unaffected. This is the structural half of the SEC-31 fix.
+    /// from a different transport peer is unaffected. This is the structural half of the per-address throttle.
     /// </summary>
     [Fact]
     public void CompositePartition_ThrottleDoesNotFollowKeyIdToAnotherPeer()
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyFailureLimiterTests
     }
 
     /// <summary>
-    ///     SEC-38: a valid key id still feeds and consults its cross-peer aggregate when each
+    ///     A valid key id still feeds and consults its cross-peer aggregate when each
     ///     attacking peer has exhausted its 32 dedicated key-id partitions and therefore records
     ///     the peer layer through the fallback bucket.
     /// </summary>
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyFailureLimiterTests
     }
 
     /// <summary>
-    ///     SEC-39: a request with no effective key id does not own the peer's shared fallback
+    ///     A request with no effective key id does not own the peer's shared fallback
     ///     partition. Resetting after such a request must leave other fallback failures tracked.
     /// </summary>
     [Fact]
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyFailureLimiterTests
     }
 
     /// <summary>
-    /// SEC-32: a spray of unique junk partitions (junk tokens resolve to the sender's fallback
+    /// A spray of unique junk partitions (junk tokens resolve to the sender's fallback
     /// partition, one per address) must not evict a partition that is currently throttled — the
     /// LRU cap bounds memory, it must not be a reset button for the block.
     /// </summary>
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyFailureLimiterTests
     }
 
     /// <summary>
-    /// SEC-32: one address may mint at most <see cref="ApiKeyFailureLimiter.MaxKeyIdPartitionsPerPeer"/>
+    /// One address may mint at most <see cref="ApiKeyFailureLimiter.MaxKeyIdPartitionsPerPeer"/>
     /// key-id partitions; the overflow collapses into that address's fallback partition, which then
     /// throttles the address wholesale instead of letting the spray mint unbounded state.
     /// </summary>
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyFailureLimiterTests
     }
 
     /// <summary>
-    /// SEC-32 eviction preference: with the map at capacity a new failure evicts an entry whose
+    /// Eviction preference: with the map at capacity a new failure evicts an entry whose
     /// window has fully expired rather than an entry that is still counting.
     /// </summary>
     [Fact]