docs(dashboard): GroupToRole/GroupToTag keys are short names — full-DN keys never match the pre-stripped groups

Follow-up to the Server-040 comment restoration (d3ac527). The restored
comment in DashboardGroupRoleMapping records that the shared
ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Ldap provider hands the mapper groups already stripped to
short RDN names, so a full-DN GroupToRole *key* can never match. Three
doc sites still told operators the opposite, and the tag mapper carried
the same consequence with no comment at all.

- docs/GatewayConfiguration.md: GroupToRole and GroupToTag rows both said
  keys may be 'short CN or full DN — leading-RDN match'. Corrected to
  short group names only, with the reason (pre-stripped groups) and a
  note that the mapper's full-string-then-RDN fallback only matters to
  non-library callers of the IGroupRoleMapper<string> seam.
- docs/GatewayDashboardDesign.md: the login-flow bullet said the user's
  memberOf '(or short CN)' is matched against GroupToRole; it now
  describes what actually happens — groups arrive short and are matched
  against short-name keys.
- DashboardGroupTagMapping: short comment at the lookup pointing at the
  DashboardGroupRoleMapping comment, since it reuses ExtractFirstRdnValue
  and inherits the same full-DN-key-unsupported consequence.

Both doc rows are pre-existing on main — they predate this branch and
were not introduced by the Server-040 work; only their incorrectness was
surfaced by it. Comment/doc-only; no logic changes.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-08-18 07:23:59 -04:00
parent 6b5c737b04
commit db7b1db947
3 changed files with 13 additions and 4 deletions
+2 -2
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@@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ events (a "gap") and must re-snapshot; whatever is still retained is replayed.
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:RecentFaultLimit` | `100` | Maximum number of fault summaries projected into each dashboard snapshot. | | `MxGateway:Dashboard:RecentFaultLimit` | `100` | Maximum number of fault summaries projected into each dashboard snapshot. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:RecentSessionLimit` | `200` | Maximum number of session summaries projected into each dashboard snapshot. | | `MxGateway:Dashboard:RecentSessionLimit` | `200` | Maximum number of session summaries projected into each dashboard snapshot. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:ShowTagValues` | `false` | Controls whether tag values reach the dashboard at all. `false` (the default) suppresses them on all three seams that carry one: (1) the **events hub mirror**`DashboardEventBroadcaster` blanks `MxEvent.value` plus the alarm body's `current_value`/`limit_value` from a deep-cloned copy before it reaches any hub subscriber (see `docs/GatewayDashboardDesign.md`'s `EventsHub` row); (2) the **alarms hub**`AlarmsHubPublisher` clears `current_value`/`limit_value` from a deep-cloned copy of each `AlarmFeedMessage`, on both value-bearing payload arms (`transition` and `active_alarm`), before broadcasting to `/hubs/alarms`; (3) the **`/browse` live-value panel** — `DashboardLiveDataService` substitutes the literal `[redacted]` for the value text of each **successfully read** tag; a failed read keeps its `-` placeholder (there was no value to suppress, and the row's error is left untouched, so the two cannot contradict each other). Both hub redactions clone: the source `MxEvent` is shared with the gRPC event stream and the replay ring, and the source `AlarmFeedMessage` fans out to gRPC `StreamAlarms` subscribers, so neither is mutated in place and **no gRPC client is affected by this flag** — it is a dashboard-display control only. Everything that is not the value survives on every seam: tag reference, alarm reference/severity/state/operator, data type, quality, status, and timestamps still render, so the dashboard stays diagnostic without disclosing process values. This is one of two independent layers: `IDashboardSessionAcl` decides *which* sessions a caller may subscribe to at all (see `GroupToTag` / `UntaggedSessionVisibility` below), while this flag decides what a permitted subscriber sees. Setting it `true` exposes tag values to everyone the ACL admits — every Administrator, plus each Viewer holding a matching tag — and, because the alarms hub is session-less, exposes alarm values to every dashboard client that can reach `/hubs/alarms`. | | `MxGateway:Dashboard:ShowTagValues` | `false` | Controls whether tag values reach the dashboard at all. `false` (the default) suppresses them on all three seams that carry one: (1) the **events hub mirror**`DashboardEventBroadcaster` blanks `MxEvent.value` plus the alarm body's `current_value`/`limit_value` from a deep-cloned copy before it reaches any hub subscriber (see `docs/GatewayDashboardDesign.md`'s `EventsHub` row); (2) the **alarms hub**`AlarmsHubPublisher` clears `current_value`/`limit_value` from a deep-cloned copy of each `AlarmFeedMessage`, on both value-bearing payload arms (`transition` and `active_alarm`), before broadcasting to `/hubs/alarms`; (3) the **`/browse` live-value panel** — `DashboardLiveDataService` substitutes the literal `[redacted]` for the value text of each **successfully read** tag; a failed read keeps its `-` placeholder (there was no value to suppress, and the row's error is left untouched, so the two cannot contradict each other). Both hub redactions clone: the source `MxEvent` is shared with the gRPC event stream and the replay ring, and the source `AlarmFeedMessage` fans out to gRPC `StreamAlarms` subscribers, so neither is mutated in place and **no gRPC client is affected by this flag** — it is a dashboard-display control only. Everything that is not the value survives on every seam: tag reference, alarm reference/severity/state/operator, data type, quality, status, and timestamps still render, so the dashboard stays diagnostic without disclosing process values. This is one of two independent layers: `IDashboardSessionAcl` decides *which* sessions a caller may subscribe to at all (see `GroupToTag` / `UntaggedSessionVisibility` below), while this flag decides what a permitted subscriber sees. Setting it `true` exposes tag values to everyone the ACL admits — every Administrator, plus each Viewer holding a matching tag — and, because the alarms hub is session-less, exposes alarm values to every dashboard client that can reach `/hubs/alarms`. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole` | _(empty)_ | LDAP group → dashboard role mapping. Keys are LDAP group names (short CN or full DN — leading-RDN match). Values must be `Administrator` (read/write, API-key CRUD) or `Viewer` (read-only) — matched ordinally by the startup validator, so the spelling is exact and `Admin` is rejected. A user whose LDAP groups don't intersect this map cannot sign in; with no mapping at all, only the loopback bypass admits anyone. | | `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole` | _(empty)_ | LDAP group → dashboard role mapping. Keys must be **short** LDAP group names — the CN / first-RDN value, e.g. `GwAdmin`, not `ou=GwAdmin,ou=groups,dc=zb,dc=local` — matched case-insensitively. The shared `ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Ldap` provider delivers a user's groups already stripped to short names, so a full-DN key can never match and the group silently maps to nothing. (The mapper does try the full literal string before falling back to the leading-RDN value, but on the live login path both branches see the same short name; the fallback only matters to non-library callers of the `IGroupRoleMapper<string>` seam.) Values must be `Administrator` (read/write, API-key CRUD) or `Viewer` (read-only) — matched ordinally by the startup validator, so the spelling is exact and `Admin` is rejected. A user whose LDAP groups don't intersect this map cannot sign in; with no mapping at all, only the loopback bypass admits anyone. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag` | _(empty)_ | LDAP group → dashboard visibility tags. Keys follow the same convention as `GroupToRole` (short CN or full DN — leading-RDN match, case-insensitive); values are tag lists. A dashboard user's granted tag set is the union over the groups they belong to; an unmapped group contributes nothing. **Visibility only:** tags scope which sessions' event streams a Viewer may observe on the dashboard — they never grant or deny data access, which stays with the API key's scopes and constraints. Independent of `GroupToRole`: a group may appear in either map, both, or neither. Empty (the default) means Viewers hold no tags, so under the default `UntaggedSessionVisibility` they observe no session's events. | | `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToTag` | _(empty)_ | LDAP group → dashboard visibility tags. Keys follow the same convention as `GroupToRole` short LDAP group names (CN / first-RDN value), matched case-insensitively; a full-DN key never matches the pre-stripped groups the LDAP provider returns. Values are tag lists. A dashboard user's granted tag set is the union over the groups they belong to; an unmapped group contributes nothing. **Visibility only:** tags scope which sessions' event streams a Viewer may observe on the dashboard — they never grant or deny data access, which stays with the API key's scopes and constraints. Independent of `GroupToRole`: a group may appear in either map, both, or neither. Empty (the default) means Viewers hold no tags, so under the default `UntaggedSessionVisibility` they observe no session's events. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility` | `AdminOnly` | Who may observe a session that carries no tags (its owning API key declared none). `AdminOnly` (default, fail-closed) restricts untagged sessions to dashboard Administrators. `AllViewers` shows them to every Viewer — opt-in for a single-tenant deployment that wants the pre-tag behaviour. Administrators always see every session regardless of tags. | | `MxGateway:Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility` | `AdminOnly` | Who may observe a session that carries no tags (its owning API key declared none). `AdminOnly` (default, fail-closed) restricts untagged sessions to dashboard Administrators. `AllViewers` shows them to every Viewer — opt-in for a single-tenant deployment that wants the pre-tag behaviour. Administrators always see every session regardless of tags. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:DisableLogin` | `false` | Dev/test only. When `true`, replaces the cookie authentication handler with `DashboardAutoLoginAuthenticationHandler`, which auto-authenticates every dashboard request — including requests from remote browsers, not just loopback — as `AutoLoginUser` holding both `Administrator` and `Viewer` roles. No login form, LDAP bind, or cookie is involved. A loud one-time startup warning is logged. Differs from `AllowAnonymousLocalhost`: `DisableLogin` mints a real authenticated principal (so role-gated write affordances appear), whereas `AllowAnonymousLocalhost` satisfies the authorization requirement on loopback only without minting a principal (write affordances stay hidden). Never enable in production. **Production hard-stop (SEC-04):** when the host runs in the `Production` environment and `DisableLogin` is `true`, startup validation fails and the process aborts — the flag is only accepted outside Production, where the one-time startup warning still fires. | | `MxGateway:Dashboard:DisableLogin` | `false` | Dev/test only. When `true`, replaces the cookie authentication handler with `DashboardAutoLoginAuthenticationHandler`, which auto-authenticates every dashboard request — including requests from remote browsers, not just loopback — as `AutoLoginUser` holding both `Administrator` and `Viewer` roles. No login form, LDAP bind, or cookie is involved. A loud one-time startup warning is logged. Differs from `AllowAnonymousLocalhost`: `DisableLogin` mints a real authenticated principal (so role-gated write affordances appear), whereas `AllowAnonymousLocalhost` satisfies the authorization requirement on loopback only without minting a principal (write affordances stay hidden). Never enable in production. **Production hard-stop (SEC-04):** when the host runs in the `Production` environment and `DisableLogin` is `true`, startup validation fails and the process aborts — the flag is only accepted outside Production, where the one-time startup warning still fires. |
| `MxGateway:Dashboard:AutoLoginUser` | `(null)` | Username stamped on the synthetic principal when `DisableLogin` is `true`. Default `(null)` — a null or blank value falls back to `multi-role`. Has no effect when `DisableLogin` is `false`. | | `MxGateway:Dashboard:AutoLoginUser` | `(null)` | Username stamped on the synthetic principal when `DisableLogin` is `true`. Default `(null)` — a null or blank value falls back to `multi-role`. Has no effect when `DisableLogin` is `false`. |
+4 -2
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@@ -690,8 +690,10 @@ Implemented behavior:
- a static `/login` HTML form posts username/password to the gateway; - a static `/login` HTML form posts username/password to the gateway;
- `DashboardAuthenticator` binds against `MxGateway:Ldap` (service-account bind, - `DashboardAuthenticator` binds against `MxGateway:Ldap` (service-account bind,
user search, candidate bind) using `Novell.Directory.Ldap.NETStandard`; user search, candidate bind) using `Novell.Directory.Ldap.NETStandard`;
- the user's `memberOf` (or short CN) is matched against - the user's groups arrive from the LDAP provider already stripped to short
`MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole`; the resolved role(s) are emitted as names (the CN / first-RDN value of each `memberOf` entry) and are matched
against the short-name keys of `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole` — a full-DN
key there never matches; the resolved role(s) are emitted as
`ClaimTypes.Role` claims, alongside the per-group `mxgateway:ldap_group` `ClaimTypes.Role` claims, alongside the per-group `mxgateway:ldap_group`
claims; claims;
- a successful login signs in the `MxGateway.Dashboard` cookie scheme - a successful login signs in the `MxGateway.Dashboard` cookie scheme
@@ -35,6 +35,13 @@ internal static class DashboardGroupTagMapping
{ {
string normalizedGroup = group.Trim(); string normalizedGroup = group.Trim();
// Same lookup semantics as DashboardGroupRoleMapping.MapGroupsToRoles —
// full literal group string first, leading-RDN value as the fallback, over
// an OrdinalIgnoreCase map. See the comment there for the consequence that
// applies verbatim here: the shared ZB.MOM.WW.Auth.Ldap provider delivers
// groups already stripped to short RDN names, so a full-DN GroupToTag *key*
// is UNSUPPORTED — it can never equal the short name that arrives. Keep
// GroupToTag keys as short group names.
if (!groupToTag.TryGetValue(normalizedGroup, out string[]? granted) if (!groupToTag.TryGetValue(normalizedGroup, out string[]? granted)
&& !groupToTag.TryGetValue( && !groupToTag.TryGetValue(
DashboardGroupRoleMapping.ExtractFirstRdnValue(normalizedGroup), DashboardGroupRoleMapping.ExtractFirstRdnValue(normalizedGroup),