fix(logging): fail-closed bearer redaction; hoist per-request logger creation

docs/Diagnostics.md

@@ -84,42 +84,32 @@ The names match the MXAccess command list in `gateway.md` exactly. `Write` and `
 
 ### API key redaction
 
-`RedactApiKey` is built around the `mxgw_` API key format issued by the gateway. It preserves the bearer scheme and the key id segment so that operators can correlate a log entry to a specific principal, but always strips the secret tail:
+`RedactClientIdentity` is the single redaction path for identity-bearing values; `RedactApiKey` is a
+name-preserving alias for it. Redaction **fails closed**: the only value that survives with any of its
+content is a gateway-issued `mxgw_<key-id>_<secret>` key, whose key id is kept so operators can
+correlate a log entry to a specific principal.
 
-```csharp
+| Input | Output | Why |
-public static string? RedactApiKey(string? authorizationHeader)
+|-------|--------|-----|
-{
+| `Bearer mxgw_operator01_super-secret` | `Bearer mxgw_operator01_[redacted]` | Recognized gateway key; key id identifies the principal |
-    if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(authorizationHeader))
+| `Bearer eyJhbGciOi…` (any foreign token) | `Bearer [redacted]` | Structure is unknown, so the whole credential goes |
-    {
+| `Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz` | `Basic [redacted]` | Same, for any recognized scheme |
-        return authorizationHeader;
+| `Bearer mxgw_operator01` (no secret separator) | `Bearer mxgw_[redacted]` | No trustworthy key-id boundary |
-    }
+| `Bearer` (scheme only), `anonymous`, `some junk` | `[redacted]` | No scheme/credential split that can be trusted |
+| `null`, `""`, whitespace | unchanged | Nothing to redact |
 
-    const string bearerPrefix = "Bearer ";
+A scheme word survives only when it is one of the recognized authorization schemes (`Bearer`,
-    if (!authorizationHeader.StartsWith(bearerPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
+`Basic`, `Digest`, `Negotiate`, `NTLM`, `ApiKey`, `Token`). An unrecognized leading word is as likely
-    {
+to be credential material as it is to be a scheme, so it is dropped along with the rest. The key id is
-        return RedactedValue;
+also dropped when it runs longer than 64 characters, which no issued key id does — a long run before
-    }
+the first `_` is secret material, not an identifier.
 
-    string token = authorizationHeader[bearerPrefix.Length..].Trim();
+The parse is span-based (no regex, no `Split` allocation): the value is split once at the first space,
+and the key id is read up to the first `_` of the remainder.
 
-    if (!token.StartsWith("mxgw_", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
+The consequence for callers is that a non-key identity (for example a Windows account name) reaching
-    {
+`RedactClientIdentity` is now replaced rather than passed through. `DashboardRedactor` routes only
-        return $"{bearerPrefix}{RedactedValue}";
+values containing the `mxgw_` marker here, so dashboard display names are unaffected.
-    }
-
-    string[] tokenParts = token.Split('_', 3, StringSplitOptions.RemoveEmptyEntries);
-    if (tokenParts.Length < 2)
-    {
-        return $"{bearerPrefix}mxgw_{RedactedValue}";
-    }
-
-    return $"{bearerPrefix}mxgw_{tokenParts[1]}_{RedactedValue}";
-}
-```
-
-The split uses `count: 3` because the secret portion may itself contain underscores; only the first two segments (`mxgw` and the key id) are kept verbatim. Authorization headers that are not bearer tokens are reduced to `[redacted]` rather than passed through, since the gateway cannot reason about their structure.
-
-`RedactClientIdentity` is the entry point used by `GatewayLogScope` and `DashboardRedactor`. It only invokes `RedactApiKey` when the input contains the `mxgw_` marker, leaving non-key identities (for example, Windows account names) untouched.
 
 ### Command value redaction
 
@@ -160,12 +150,12 @@ public static IApplicationBuilder UseGatewayRequestLoggingScope(this IApplicatio
 {
     ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(app);
 
+    ILogger logger = app.ApplicationServices
+        .GetRequiredService<ILoggerFactory>()
+        .CreateLogger("MxGateway.Request");
+
     return app.Use(async (context, next) =>
     {
-        ILogger logger = context.RequestServices
-            .GetRequiredService<ILoggerFactory>()
-            .CreateLogger("ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Request");
-
         using IDisposable? scope = logger.BeginGatewayScope(new GatewayLogScope(
             SessionId: ReadHeader(context, SessionIdHeaderName),
             WorkerProcessId: ReadInt32Header(context, WorkerProcessIdHeaderName),
@@ -190,7 +180,7 @@ The scope is keyed off four custom headers and the standard `authorization` head
 
 The numeric headers use `int.TryParse` and `ulong.TryParse`; missing or unparseable values become `null` and are dropped by `GatewayLogScope.ToDictionary`. This keeps the middleware tolerant of clients that do not yet emit every header, which matters because the earliest call in a session (`OpenSession`) has no `SessionId` to send.
 
-The logger category is `ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Request`, which lets operators filter the request scope events independently from per-component categories.
+The logger category is `MxGateway.Request`, which lets operators filter the request scope events independently from per-component categories. The logger is resolved once at registration rather than per request: the category is fixed, so a per-request `IServiceProvider` resolve and `ILoggerFactory.CreateLogger` (which takes the factory lock) bought nothing. Scope construction itself stays unconditional — gating it on `ILogger.IsEnabled` would drop scope state for providers and scope consumers registered after startup.
 
 ### Pipeline ordering
 

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server/Diagnostics/GatewayLogRedactor.cs

@@ -15,6 +15,28 @@ public static class GatewayLogRedactor
         "WriteSecured2"
     };
 
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Authorization schemes whose name may survive redaction. Anything outside this list is
+    /// dropped whole: an unrecognized leading word is as likely to be credential material as it
+    /// is to be a scheme, so it is not worth the leak.
+    /// </summary>
+    private static readonly string[] KnownAuthorizationSchemes =
+    [
+        "Bearer",
+        "Basic",
+        "Digest",
+        "Negotiate",
+        "NTLM",
+        "ApiKey",
+        "Token",
+    ];
+
+    /// <summary>Prefix identifying a gateway-issued API key.</summary>
+    private const string GatewayKeyPrefix = "mxgw_";
+
+    /// <summary>Upper bound on a key id kept in the clear; a longer run is treated as secret material.</summary>
+    private const int MaxKeyIdLength = 64;
+
     /// <summary>
     /// Determines whether a command method bears credentials.
     /// </summary>
@@ -27,44 +49,24 @@ public static class GatewayLogRedactor
     }
 
     /// <summary>
-    /// Redacts the API key secret portion of a Bearer authorization header.
+    /// Redacts the credential portion of an authorization header value.
     /// </summary>
     /// <param name="authorizationHeader">The authorization header value to redact.</param>
-    /// <returns>The header with the secret portion redacted, or the original value when it is null, blank, or not a Bearer header.</returns>
+    /// <returns>The header with the credential redacted, or the original value when it is null or blank.</returns>
     public static string? RedactApiKey(string? authorizationHeader)
     {
-        if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(authorizationHeader))
+        return RedactClientIdentity(authorizationHeader);
-        {
-            return authorizationHeader;
-        }
-
-        const string bearerPrefix = "Bearer ";
-        if (!authorizationHeader.StartsWith(bearerPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
-        {
-            return RedactedValue;
-        }
-
-        string token = authorizationHeader[bearerPrefix.Length..].Trim();
-
-        if (!token.StartsWith("mxgw_", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
-        {
-            return $"{bearerPrefix}{RedactedValue}";
-        }
-
-        string[] tokenParts = token.Split('_', 3, StringSplitOptions.RemoveEmptyEntries);
-        if (tokenParts.Length < 2)
-        {
-            return $"{bearerPrefix}mxgw_{RedactedValue}";
-        }
-
-        return $"{bearerPrefix}mxgw_{tokenParts[1]}_{RedactedValue}";
     }
 
     /// <summary>
-    /// Redacts the client identity if it contains an API key.
+    /// Redacts the credential carried by a client identity. Redaction fails closed: only a
+    /// gateway-issued API key keeps its <c>mxgw_&lt;key-id&gt;_</c> shape (so operators can tell keys
+    /// apart in logs), and only a recognized scheme keeps its name. Every other value — a foreign
+    /// bearer token, a scheme-less string, junk — is replaced whole, because nothing that reaches
+    /// this method is known to be safe to log.
     /// </summary>
     /// <param name="clientIdentity">The client identity string to redact.</param>
-    /// <returns>The redacted client identity, or the original value when it contains no API key.</returns>
+    /// <returns>The redacted client identity, or the original value when it is null or blank.</returns>
     public static string? RedactClientIdentity(string? clientIdentity)
     {
         if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(clientIdentity))
@@ -72,9 +74,61 @@ public static class GatewayLogRedactor
             return clientIdentity;
         }
 
-        return clientIdentity.Contains("mxgw_", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
+        ReadOnlySpan<char> value = clientIdentity.AsSpan().Trim();
-            ? RedactApiKey(clientIdentity)
+        int separatorIndex = value.IndexOf(' ');
-            : clientIdentity;
+
+        if (separatorIndex < 0)
+        {
+            // A single token carries no scheme, so the token itself is the credential.
+            return RedactedValue;
+        }
+
+        ReadOnlySpan<char> scheme = value[..separatorIndex];
+        ReadOnlySpan<char> credential = value[(separatorIndex + 1)..].Trim();
+
+        if (credential.IsEmpty || !IsKnownAuthorizationScheme(scheme))
+        {
+            return RedactedValue;
+        }
+
+        return credential.StartsWith(GatewayKeyPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
+            ? $"{scheme} {GatewayKeyPrefix}{RedactKeyId(credential)}"
+            : $"{scheme} {RedactedValue}";
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Renders the trailing portion of a gateway API key: the key id when the key is well formed,
+    /// otherwise nothing but the placeholder.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <param name="credential">The credential, known to start with the gateway key prefix.</param>
+    /// <returns>The <c>&lt;key-id&gt;_[redacted]</c> tail, or just the placeholder.</returns>
+    private static string RedactKeyId(ReadOnlySpan<char> credential)
+    {
+        ReadOnlySpan<char> remainder = credential[GatewayKeyPrefix.Length..];
+        int secretIndex = remainder.IndexOf('_');
+
+        // No separator means no secret boundary to trust, so the whole remainder is treated as secret.
+        return secretIndex is <= 0 or > MaxKeyIdLength
+            ? RedactedValue
+            : $"{remainder[..secretIndex]}_{RedactedValue}";
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Determines whether a leading word is a recognized authorization scheme.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <param name="scheme">The candidate scheme word.</param>
+    /// <returns><see langword="true"/> when the word may survive redaction; otherwise <see langword="false"/>.</returns>
+    private static bool IsKnownAuthorizationScheme(ReadOnlySpan<char> scheme)
+    {
+        foreach (string knownScheme in KnownAuthorizationSchemes)
+        {
+            if (scheme.Equals(knownScheme, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
+            {
+                return true;
+            }
+        }
+
+        return false;
     }
 
     /// <summary>

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server/Diagnostics/GatewayRequestLoggingMiddlewareExtensions.cs

@@ -24,12 +24,16 @@ public static class GatewayRequestLoggingMiddlewareExtensions
     {
         ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(app);
 
-        return app.Use(async (context, next) =>
+        // Resolved once at registration: the logger is keyed by category, not by request, so the
-        {
+        // per-request DI resolve and logger-factory lock bought nothing.
-            ILogger logger = context.RequestServices
+        ILogger logger = app.ApplicationServices
             .GetRequiredService<ILoggerFactory>()
             .CreateLogger("MxGateway.Request");
 
+        return app.Use(async (context, next) =>
+        {
+            // Scope construction is deliberately unconditional: gating it on IsEnabled would drop
+            // scope state for providers (and scope consumers) registered after startup.
             using IDisposable? scope = logger.BeginGatewayScope(new GatewayLogScope(
                 SessionId: ReadHeader(context, SessionIdHeaderName),
                 WorkerProcessId: ReadInt32Header(context, WorkerProcessIdHeaderName),

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests/Diagnostics/GatewayLogRedactorTests.cs

@@ -24,6 +24,67 @@ public sealed class GatewayLogRedactorTests
         Assert.DoesNotContain("super_secret_value", redacted);
     }
 
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Verifies that a bearer credential the gateway does not issue is redacted too. A client that
+    /// pastes a JWT (or any other token) into the authorization header must not have it logged.
+    /// </summary>
+    [Fact]
+    public void RedactClientIdentity_RedactsNonGatewayBearerCredential()
+    {
+        const string token = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0.c2lnbmF0dXJl";
+
+        string? redacted = GatewayLogRedactor.RedactClientIdentity($"Bearer {token}");
+
+        Assert.Equal("Bearer [redacted]", redacted);
+        Assert.DoesNotContain(token, redacted, StringComparison.Ordinal);
+        Assert.DoesNotContain("eyJ", redacted, StringComparison.Ordinal);
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>Verifies that a gateway API key keeps its key-id shape so an operator can still tell keys apart.</summary>
+    [Fact]
+    public void RedactClientIdentity_PreservesGatewayKeyIdShape()
+    {
+        string? redacted = GatewayLogRedactor.RedactClientIdentity("Bearer mxgw_operator01_super-secret");
+
+        Assert.Equal("Bearer mxgw_operator01_[redacted]", redacted);
+        Assert.DoesNotContain("super-secret", redacted, StringComparison.Ordinal);
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Verifies that anything not recognized as a gateway API key fails closed: the scheme word
+    /// survives only when it looks like an auth scheme, and the credential never does.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <param name="clientIdentity">The raw client identity value.</param>
+    /// <param name="expected">The expected redacted value.</param>
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData("Bearer", "[redacted]")]
+    [InlineData("Bearer   ", "[redacted]")]
+    [InlineData("Basic dXNlcjpwYXNzd29yZA==", "Basic [redacted]")]
+    [InlineData("Negotiate YIIJvwYGKwYBBQUCoIIJ", "Negotiate [redacted]")]
+    [InlineData("mxgw_operator01_super-secret", "[redacted]")]
+    [InlineData("mxgw_operator01_super-secret trailing", "[redacted]")]
+    [InlineData("Bearer mxgw_operator01", "Bearer mxgw_[redacted]")]
+    [InlineData("Bearer mxgw_", "Bearer mxgw_[redacted]")]
+    [InlineData("Bearer mxgw__super-secret", "Bearer mxgw_[redacted]")]
+    [InlineData("bearer mxgw_operator01_super-secret", "bearer mxgw_operator01_[redacted]")]
+    [InlineData("anonymous", "[redacted]")]
+    [InlineData("some random junk", "[redacted]")]
+    public void RedactClientIdentity_FailsClosedForUnrecognizedCredentials(string clientIdentity, string expected)
+    {
+        Assert.Equal(expected, GatewayLogRedactor.RedactClientIdentity(clientIdentity));
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>Verifies that a blank client identity is passed through — there is nothing to redact.</summary>
+    /// <param name="clientIdentity">The raw client identity value.</param>
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData(null)]
+    [InlineData("")]
+    [InlineData("   ")]
+    public void RedactClientIdentity_PassesThroughBlankValues(string? clientIdentity)
+    {
+        Assert.Equal(clientIdentity, GatewayLogRedactor.RedactClientIdentity(clientIdentity));
+    }
+
     /// <summary>Verifies that IsCredentialBearingCommand identifies credential-bearing MXAccess commands.</summary>
     /// <param name="commandMethod">Name of the MXAccess command method.</param>
     [Theory]