fix(dashboard): close AttachEventsAsync re-entrancy window; pin ACL decision-table corners (SEC-25 review)
Follow-up to the per-session event ACL. Part of that change rode into 693a78d
via a concurrent agent's pathspec-less commit; this commit carries the review
fixes and uses pathspecs on the commit itself so it cannot recur in either
direction.
Gating the page's subscribe seam made AttachEvents asynchronous — it awaits the
authentication state — and that await is a suspension point the synchronous
version did not have. On a rapid A -> B navigation the suspended A continuation
resumes after B's parameter set has run to completion, re-reads the live
SessionId (now B's), and attaches B a SECOND time. The ACL is not bypassed —
the newer attach already cleared that same session — but the fields holding B's
first subscription are overwritten in place, so nothing ever disposes it: its
EventsHubViewerRegistry entry is never released, which keeps the mirror cloning
events for a session the page is no longer watching through that handle, and
its pump is never cancelled. A resource leak the ACL work introduced.
OnParametersSetAsync now claims a monotonic _attachGeneration synchronously,
before its first await, and AttachEventsAsync re-checks it after the await and
before any field write or Subscribe call. A stale attach returns rather than
detaching: it owns nothing, and tearing down there would destroy the newer
attach's subscription. DetachEventsAsync needs no such guard — it captures and
nulls the live fields synchronously before it awaits, so a resumed detach only
unwinds what it already took ownership of. Same dispatcher-owned identity idea
as the existing ReferenceEquals guards in PumpEventsAsync and
MarkDisconnectedAsync, one level up.
The interleaving is not expressible with the static HtmlRenderer idiom the other
page tests use: it renders a root component once and exposes no parameter-update
seam. The new test therefore adds a minimal Renderer subclass whose only job is
to mount a component and drive a second SetParametersAsync into it while the
first is parked on a gated AuthenticationStateProvider. That subclass is the
lone reason for a narrowly scoped BL0006 suppression, justified in place: it is
test-only scaffolding that never ships, and the cost of the warning coming true
is a compile break in one test file on an SDK bump. Confirmed non-vacuous by
mutation — with the generation check disabled the test goes red on the doubled
subscription and the two passing ACL tests stay green.
Two decision-table corners are now pinned rather than implied. Admin x
nonexistent session id resolves to ALLOW, because the admin bypass is evaluated
before the registry lookup; a plausible "look the session up first, it reads
better" refactor would flip it, so a test documents the ordering. EventsHub's
remarks said "an unknown session id is denied" without qualification, which read
as universal; they now state that the bypass is checked first and every rule
below it is a non-Admin rule.
HubTokenServiceTests gains the truly-absent-field case: a hand-built payload
JSON with no Tags key at all, protected through the same purpose, which is the
shape every in-flight token has across the deploy that introduces the field. The
existing test covered present-but-empty, which does not exercise the null
coalesce that stands between a legacy token and a crash on the hub auth path.
ProtectorPurpose became internal so the test cannot drift from the real purpose
string.
Tag-count cardinality cap considered and recorded as a deliberate non-goal.
Build 0 warnings / 0 errors; 48 filtered (ACL/hub/token/page) and 257 dashboard
tests pass.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -47,8 +47,24 @@ public sealed class DashboardSessionAclTests
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// An unknown session id is denied even for a caller holding every configured tag: no
|
||||
/// subscription is created for a session the registry does not have.
|
||||
/// The decision table's order is load-bearing at exactly one corner: an Administrator naming
|
||||
/// a session id the registry does not have is ALLOWED, because the admin bypass is checked
|
||||
/// before the lookup. Pinned deliberately — reordering the two checks (a plausible "look the
|
||||
/// session up first, it reads better" refactor) would flip this to a denial and quietly change
|
||||
/// what an Administrator's hub join does for a session that closed a moment ago.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public void CanViewSession_AdministratorAndUnknownSession_Allowed()
|
||||
{
|
||||
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
|
||||
|
||||
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Admin]), "session-does-not-exist"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// An unknown session id is denied for a non-Admin even when they hold every configured tag:
|
||||
/// no subscription is created for a session the registry does not have. The Administrator
|
||||
/// counterpart above is the deliberate exception.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public void CanViewSession_UnknownSession_Denied()
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user