fix(dashboard): conditionally restore __Host- cookie prefix (SEC-03)
Restore the __Host- browser guarantees for the default secure deployment without breaking plaintext/dev: - DashboardServiceCollectionExtensions PostConfigure now resolves the cookie name as: explicit MxGateway:Dashboard:CookieName override wins; else __Host-MxGatewayDashboard when SecurePolicy==Always (RequireHttpsCookie true); else the plain MxGatewayDashboard default. Guard: never apply the __Host- prefix without Secure (browsers silently drop it). - DashboardAuthenticationDefaults: add SecureCookieName const; keep the plain CookieName as the non-secure fallback. - Docs corrected to the actual conditional contract (five stale claims): gateway.md, GatewayProcessDesign.md, ImplementationPlanGateway.md, GatewayDashboardDesign.md, CLAUDE.md; GatewayConfiguration.md phrasing tightened. - Test: DashboardCookieOptionsTests asserts the name flips with RequireHttpsCookie and that an explicit override wins. Server build clean (0 warnings); Dashboard tests 149/149. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMXXvNuPekkkrTEyPNxEkW
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@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ Gateway gRPC clients authenticate with an API key in metadata: `authorization: B
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Session event streaming is **owner-scoped**: the API key that opened a session is recorded on the session, and every `StreamEvents` attach/reattach is rejected with `PermissionDenied` unless the caller's key id matches the owner. Possessing the `event` scope and knowing a session id is not sufficient — this closes the reconnect/fan-out trust boundary (detach-grace and replay retention are on by default) so an `event`-scoped key cannot attach to another key's retained session.
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Dashboard auth is LDAP-backed (separate from the gRPC API-key model). `/login` binds against `MxGateway:Ldap` and maps the user's LDAP groups to `Admin` or `Viewer` via `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole`, then issues an HTTP-only secure `__Host-MxGatewayDashboard` cookie. SignalR hubs at `/hubs/{snapshot,alarms,events}` accept either the cookie or a 5-minute bearer minted at `/hubs/token`. `Dashboard:AllowAnonymousLocalhost` (default `true`) grants **read-only** loopback access — it satisfies the Viewer requirement but never the Admin-only requirement, so anonymous localhost can view the dashboard but not reach API-key CRUD or session Close/Kill (`Authentication:Mode=Disabled` is scoped the same way). `Dashboard:DisableLogin` (default `false`) auto-authenticates every dashboard request — including remote browsers — as `Dashboard:AutoLoginUser` (default `multi-role`) with both Admin and Viewer roles; dev/test only, never enable in production.
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Dashboard auth is LDAP-backed (separate from the gRPC API-key model). `/login` binds against `MxGateway:Ldap` and maps the user's LDAP groups to `Admin` or `Viewer` via `MxGateway:Dashboard:GroupToRole`, then issues an HTTP-only secure cookie named `__Host-MxGatewayDashboard` when `Dashboard:RequireHttpsCookie` is true (default) and no `Dashboard:CookieName` override is set, else the plain `MxGatewayDashboard` (the `__Host-` prefix requires a Secure cookie). SignalR hubs at `/hubs/{snapshot,alarms,events}` accept either the cookie or a 5-minute bearer minted at `/hubs/token`. `Dashboard:AllowAnonymousLocalhost` (default `true`) grants **read-only** loopback access — it satisfies the Viewer requirement but never the Admin-only requirement, so anonymous localhost can view the dashboard but not reach API-key CRUD or session Close/Kill (`Authentication:Mode=Disabled` is scoped the same way). `Dashboard:DisableLogin` (default `false`) auto-authenticates every dashboard request — including remote browsers — as `Dashboard:AutoLoginUser` (default `multi-role`) with both Admin and Viewer roles; dev/test only, never enable in production.
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## Process / Platform Notes
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