fix(sessions): drop the deny-NETWORK pipe ACE (#187)
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NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK marks a network logon, not a remote caller. On windev
a gateway run from an SSH session carries it in its own token, so the deny
entry locked the gateway's same-machine workers out (UnauthorizedAccess on
connect; 15 fake-worker tests failed). The ACL now holds exactly one entry:
FullControl for the gateway's user.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-11-06 15:52:46 -05:00
parent 34a7453ac3
commit 777fef9cad
3 changed files with 21 additions and 22 deletions
@@ -10,8 +10,13 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Sessions;
/// credential-bearing commands (secured writes, <c>AuthenticateUser</c>, alarm-ack passwords), so
/// its unguessable name is not enough: only the account the gateway runs as — which is also the
/// account the worker is launched as, because the launcher sets no alternate credentials — may
/// open it, and never over the network.
/// open it.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// There is deliberately no deny entry for <c>NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK</c>. That SID marks a network
/// <em>logon</em>, not a remote caller: a gateway started from an SSH or WinRM session carries it in
/// its own token, so a deny entry locked its own same-machine workers out (found on windev, #187).
/// </remarks>
internal static class WorkerPipeSecurity
{
/// <summary>Gets the options every worker pipe is created with on non-Windows hosts.</summary>
@@ -34,8 +39,8 @@ internal static class WorkerPipeSecurity
}
/// <summary>
/// Creates a pipe ACL that grants full control to <paramref name="user"/> only, denies network
/// logons, and does not inherit any other entries.
/// Creates a pipe ACL that grants full control to <paramref name="user"/> only and does not
/// inherit any other entries.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="user">The account the gateway and its workers run as.</param>
/// <returns>The pipe security descriptor.</returns>
@@ -51,12 +56,6 @@ internal static class WorkerPipeSecurity
security.SetOwner(user);
security.AddAccessRule(new PipeAccessRule(user, PipeAccessRights.FullControl, AccessControlType.Allow));
// A network logon of the same account still carries the user SID; the deny ACE keeps the
// pipe local-only regardless.
security.AddAccessRule(new PipeAccessRule(
new SecurityIdentifier(WellKnownSidType.NetworkSid, domainSid: null),
PipeAccessRights.FullControl,
AccessControlType.Deny));
return security;
}
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.Gateway.Sessions;
public sealed class WorkerPipeSecurityTests
{
/// <summary>Verifies the factory grants only the given user and denies network logons.</summary>
/// <summary>Verifies the factory grants only the given user.</summary>
[WindowsFact]
[SupportedOSPlatform("windows")]
public void Create_GrantsOnlyTheUserAndDeniesNetwork()
public void Create_GrantsOnlyTheUser()
{
SecurityIdentifier user = new("S-1-5-21-1000-2000-3000-1001");
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ public sealed class WorkerPipeSecurityTests
Assert.True(security.AreAccessRulesProtected);
Assert.Equal(user, security.GetOwner(typeof(SecurityIdentifier)));
AssertOnlyUserAllowedAndNetworkDenied(security, user);
AssertOnlyUserAllowed(security, user);
}
/// <summary>
@@ -41,12 +41,14 @@ public sealed class WorkerPipeSecurityTests
using NamedPipeServerStream pipe = SessionWorkerClientFactory.CreatePipe(NewPipeName());
PipeSecurity applied = pipe.GetAccessControl();
AssertOnlyUserAllowedAndNetworkDenied(applied, user);
AssertOnlyUserAllowed(applied, user);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies the pipe still accepts a client running as the same user — the worker is launched
/// under the gateway's own account, so the restriction must not break the session handshake.
/// On windev this runs from an SSH (network-logon) session, which is what caught the earlier
/// deny-NETWORK entry.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public async Task CreatePipe_AcceptsClientRunningAsTheSameUser()
@@ -77,24 +79,22 @@ public sealed class WorkerPipeSecurityTests
}
[SupportedOSPlatform("windows")]
private static void AssertOnlyUserAllowedAndNetworkDenied(PipeSecurity security, SecurityIdentifier user)
private static void AssertOnlyUserAllowed(PipeSecurity security, SecurityIdentifier user)
{
SecurityIdentifier everyoneSid = new(WellKnownSidType.WorldSid, null);
SecurityIdentifier anonymousSid = new(WellKnownSidType.AnonymousSid, null);
SecurityIdentifier networkSid = new(WellKnownSidType.NetworkSid, null);
List<PipeAccessRule> rules = security
.GetAccessRules(includeExplicit: true, includeInherited: true, typeof(SecurityIdentifier))
.Cast<PipeAccessRule>()
.ToList();
PipeAccessRule[] allows = rules.Where(r => r.AccessControlType == AccessControlType.Allow).ToArray();
PipeAccessRule allow = Assert.Single(allows);
// Exactly one entry: an allow for the gateway's user. In particular no deny entry — a deny
// for NETWORK locked out same-machine workers when the gateway ran from an SSH logon.
PipeAccessRule allow = Assert.Single(rules);
Assert.Equal(AccessControlType.Allow, allow.AccessControlType);
Assert.Equal(user, allow.IdentityReference);
Assert.Equal(PipeAccessRights.FullControl, allow.PipeAccessRights & PipeAccessRights.FullControl);
PipeAccessRule deny = Assert.Single(rules, r => r.AccessControlType == AccessControlType.Deny);
Assert.Equal(networkSid, deny.IdentityReference);
Assert.DoesNotContain(rules, r => r.IdentityReference == everyoneSid && r.AccessControlType == AccessControlType.Allow);
Assert.DoesNotContain(rules, r => r.IdentityReference == anonymousSid && r.AccessControlType == AccessControlType.Allow);
}