feat(alarms): structural degraded-status signal for truncated alarm snapshots

The truncation-cliff fix made alarm transitions truncation-safe but silent:
when GetXmlCurrentAlarms2 returns exactly maxAlmCnt records the worker
suppresses absence-implies-Clear inference and says so only in a rate-limited
stderr warning. No client and no operator could tell a complete active set
from a capped one.

Two additive proto3 booleans carry the verdict out:

- QueryActiveAlarmsReplyPayload.snapshot_truncated = 2 (worker IPC reply)
- ActiveAlarmSnapshot.from_truncated_snapshot = 16 (per record)

The per-record field is not an aesthetic choice. QueryActiveAlarms returns a
bare `stream ActiveAlarmSnapshot` with no envelope, header, or trailer, so a
per-record boolean is the only carrier that stays wire-compatible; an envelope
message would change every existing client's stream element type. The reply
payload states it too because a prefix filter can leave zero records and a
truncated fetch with nothing to report still has to say so. The flag means
"this set may be incomplete", never "this record is unreliable" — it is
independent of the subtag-fallback `degraded` field.

Detection is deliberately UNCHANGED: IsTruncatedFetch remains
`fetchedRecordCount >= maxAlarmsPerFetch`. The live probe (docs/AlarmProbeFindings.md,
ce5d8ae) could not verify whether ALARM_RECORDS/@COUNT reports the total active
count or only the records in the reply, so @COUNT is not parsed for detection;
switching to it stays blocked on probe evidence. The probe's comment
annotations in WnWrapAlarmConsumer.cs are preserved.

Reset semantics: not latched. WnWrapAlarmConsumer.FoldFetch replaces the
verdict on every poll under the same lock as the snapshot merge, so the first
sub-cap fetch clears it; GatewayAlarmMonitor.ClearCache drops it with the cache
generation it describes. A caveat that never turns off is one operators learn
to ignore.

Flow: WnWrapAlarmConsumer.LastSnapshotTruncated -> AlarmDispatcher (stamps every
record) / IAlarmCommandHandler (payload) -> MxAccessCommandExecutor reply ->
GatewayAlarmMonitor._snapshotTruncated -> IGatewayAlarmService.SnapshotTruncated
-> DashboardAlarmQueryResult -> AlarmsPage warning banner (render-side only; the
poll loop and DisposeAsync drain are untouched). The public QueryActiveAlarms
RPC forwards worker snapshots unmodified, so the per-record flag needed no
mapper change — a test pins that.

Parity: this describes OUR fetch mechanics — additive gateway metadata — not
MXAccess provider behavior. No event is synthesized and no MXAccess-observable
semantics change, so it is not a parity deviation.

Tests: worker LastSnapshotTruncated set/reset/consecutive-burst (windev-run);
gateway end-to-end truncated reply -> monitor -> public stream, with the
complete-reply control as the load-bearing assertion; AlarmsPage banner
present/absent. Docs: gateway.md alarm surface, docs/DesignDecisions.md entry.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-08-17 04:18:34 -04:00
parent b8b7b69ba0
commit 693a78db7d
41 changed files with 2217 additions and 309 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
using System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis;
using System.Security.Claims;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Contracts.Proto;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Configuration;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Dashboard;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Sessions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.Gateway.Dashboard;
/// <summary>
/// Covers <see cref="DashboardSessionAcl"/>, the single decision both dashboard subscribe seams
/// consult (SEC-25 / TST-15).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Every branch is asserted in its denying direction as well as its allowing one, because the
/// pre-ACL behaviour was "allow everything": an assertion that a permitted caller is permitted
/// cannot distinguish a working gate from no gate at all.
/// </remarks>
public sealed class DashboardSessionAclTests
{
private const string TaggedSessionId = "session-tagged";
private const string UntaggedSessionId = "session-untagged";
/// <summary>An Administrator bypasses the tag check entirely, including for a tag they hold none of.</summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_Administrator_BypassesTagCheck()
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Admin]), TaggedSessionId));
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Admin]), UntaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// The admin bypass is what keeps <c>Dashboard:DisableLogin</c> auto-login (which stamps both
/// roles and no tags) working exactly as before this change.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_AutoLoginStyleBothRolesNoTags_Allowed()
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(
Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Admin, DashboardRoles.Viewer]),
TaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// An unknown session id is denied even for a caller holding every configured tag: no
/// subscription is created for a session the registry does not have.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_UnknownSession_Denied()
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.False(acl.CanViewSession(
Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Viewer], tags: ["team-a", "team-b"]),
"session-does-not-exist"));
}
/// <summary>A blank session id is denied without consulting anything.</summary>
[Theory]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData(" ")]
public void CanViewSession_BlankSessionId_Denied(string sessionId)
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.False(acl.CanViewSession(Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Admin]), sessionId));
}
/// <summary>A null principal denies — the fail-closed reading of an unauthenticated hub context.</summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_NullPrincipal_Denied()
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.False(acl.CanViewSession(null, UntaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// Untagged sessions follow <c>Dashboard:UntaggedSessionVisibility</c>: hidden from Viewers
/// under the shipped <see cref="UntaggedSessionVisibility.AdminOnly"/> default, visible under
/// the opt-in <see cref="UntaggedSessionVisibility.AllViewers"/>.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="visibility">The configured untagged-session visibility.</param>
/// <param name="expected">Whether a tagless Viewer may observe the untagged session.</param>
[Theory]
[InlineData(UntaggedSessionVisibility.AdminOnly, false)]
[InlineData(UntaggedSessionVisibility.AllViewers, true)]
public void CanViewSession_UntaggedSession_FollowsConfiguredVisibility(
UntaggedSessionVisibility visibility,
bool expected)
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl(visibility);
Assert.Equal(
expected,
acl.CanViewSession(Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Viewer]), UntaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// A Viewer whose grant intersects the session's tags is allowed; the comparison is
/// ordinal-ignore-case, matching the session's tag set and the config map.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="grantedTag">The single tag the Viewer holds.</param>
[Theory]
[InlineData("team-a")]
[InlineData("TEAM-A")]
public void CanViewSession_ViewerGrantIntersectsSessionTags_Allowed(string grantedTag)
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.True(acl.CanViewSession(
Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Viewer], tags: [grantedTag]),
TaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>A Viewer holding only another tenant's tag is denied — the load-bearing negative.</summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_ViewerGrantDisjointFromSessionTags_Denied()
{
DashboardSessionAcl acl = CreateAcl();
Assert.False(acl.CanViewSession(
Principal(roles: [DashboardRoles.Viewer], tags: ["team-b"]),
TaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// A principal carrying no tag claims — the anonymous-localhost / empty-grant Viewer of
/// SEC-02 — sees a tagged session never, and an untagged one only when the operator opted
/// into <see cref="UntaggedSessionVisibility.AllViewers"/>.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_NoTagClaims_IsEmptyGrantViewer()
{
ClaimsPrincipal anonymous = new(new ClaimsIdentity());
Assert.False(CreateAcl().CanViewSession(anonymous, TaggedSessionId));
Assert.False(CreateAcl(UntaggedSessionVisibility.AdminOnly).CanViewSession(anonymous, UntaggedSessionId));
Assert.True(CreateAcl(UntaggedSessionVisibility.AllViewers).CanViewSession(anonymous, UntaggedSessionId));
}
/// <summary>
/// An unauthenticated principal that nonetheless carries an Administrator role claim does not
/// get the bypass: the bypass requires a real authenticated identity, as elsewhere in the
/// dashboard (<c>DashboardSessionAdminService.CanManage</c>).
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void CanViewSession_UnauthenticatedAdminRoleClaim_DoesNotBypass()
{
// No authentication type => IsAuthenticated is false.
ClaimsPrincipal principal = new(new ClaimsIdentity(
[new Claim(ClaimTypes.Role, DashboardRoles.Admin)],
authenticationType: null,
nameType: ClaimTypes.Name,
roleType: ClaimTypes.Role));
Assert.False(CreateAcl().CanViewSession(principal, TaggedSessionId));
}
private static DashboardSessionAcl CreateAcl(
UntaggedSessionVisibility visibility = UntaggedSessionVisibility.AdminOnly)
{
GatewayOptions options = new()
{
Dashboard = new DashboardOptions { UntaggedSessionVisibility = visibility },
};
return new DashboardSessionAcl(
new TwoSessionManager(
CreateSession(TaggedSessionId, ["team-a"]),
CreateSession(UntaggedSessionId, tags: null)),
Options.Create(options));
}
private static ClaimsPrincipal Principal(string[] roles, string[]? tags = null)
{
List<Claim> claims = [new Claim(ClaimTypes.Name, "viewer-user")];
claims.AddRange(roles.Select(role => new Claim(ClaimTypes.Role, role)));
claims.AddRange((tags ?? []).Select(tag => new Claim(
DashboardAuthenticationDefaults.DashboardTagClaimType,
tag)));
return new ClaimsPrincipal(new ClaimsIdentity(
claims,
authenticationType: "test",
nameType: ClaimTypes.Name,
roleType: ClaimTypes.Role));
}
private static GatewaySession CreateSession(string sessionId, string[]? tags)
{
return new GatewaySession(
sessionId: sessionId,
backendName: "backend",
pipeName: $"pipe-{sessionId}",
nonce: "nonce",
clientIdentity: "client",
ownerKeyId: "key-1",
clientSessionName: "client-session",
clientCorrelationId: "correlation",
commandTimeout: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5),
startupTimeout: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5),
shutdownTimeout: TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5),
leaseDuration: TimeSpan.FromMinutes(30),
openedAt: DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch,
ownerDashboardTags: tags);
}
/// <summary>Registry double serving exactly the two sessions the ACL cases need.</summary>
private sealed class TwoSessionManager(GatewaySession tagged, GatewaySession untagged) : ISessionManager
{
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<GatewaySession> OpenSessionAsync(
SessionOpenRequest request,
string? clientIdentity,
string? ownerKeyId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.FromResult(tagged);
/// <inheritdoc />
public bool TryGetSession(string sessionId, [MaybeNullWhen(false)] out GatewaySession session)
{
session = sessionId switch
{
TaggedSessionId => tagged,
UntaggedSessionId => untagged,
_ => null,
};
return session is not null;
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<WorkerCommandReply> InvokeAsync(
string sessionId,
WorkerCommand command,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.FromResult(new WorkerCommandReply());
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<SessionCloseResult> CloseSessionAsync(
string sessionId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult(new SessionCloseResult(sessionId, SessionState.Closed, AlreadyClosed: false));
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<SessionCloseResult> KillWorkerAsync(
string sessionId,
string reason,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
Task.FromResult(new SessionCloseResult(sessionId, SessionState.Closed, AlreadyClosed: false));
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<int> CloseExpiredLeasesAsync(
DateTimeOffset now,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.FromResult(0);
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.CompletedTask;
}
}