fix(sessions): restrict the worker named pipe to the gateway's account (#187)
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On Windows each worker pipe is created via NamedPipeServerStreamAcl with a
protected DACL granting FullControl only to the gateway process user (the
worker is launched under the same account) and denying NETWORK logons. On
non-Windows hosts (test matrix) the pipe uses PipeOptions.CurrentUserOnly.
Tests assert the factory ACL and the ACL read back from the created pipe
(Windows), and that a same-user client still connects.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-11-06 15:45:50 -05:00
parent 9354d69bf9
commit 34a7453ac3
4 changed files with 200 additions and 3 deletions
+4 -1
View File
@@ -742,7 +742,10 @@ Transport security here applies only to the public gRPC channel. The
gateway↔worker link is a per-session **named pipe**
(`mxgw-{gatewayPid}-{sessionUid}`), not a network socket. It is not
TLS-encrypted and does not need to be: it never leaves the local Windows host and
is secured by the OS pipe ACL. See [Worker Frame Protocol](./WorkerFrameProtocol.md).
is secured by the OS pipe ACL: on Windows the gateway creates each pipe with a
protected DACL that grants only its own account (the account the worker is
launched as) and denies network logons; on the non-Windows test matrix it uses
`PipeOptions.CurrentUserOnly`. See `WorkerPipeSecurity` and [Worker Frame Protocol](./WorkerFrameProtocol.md).
## Related Documentation
@@ -171,15 +171,30 @@ public sealed class SessionWorkerClientFactory : ISessionWorkerClientFactory
/// The buffer sizes are explicit so the pipe is not created with a zero quota; see
/// <see cref="PipeBufferSizeBytes"/>. On Unix hosts (the macOS test matrix, where named pipes
/// are Unix domain sockets) the sizes are advisory — the fix targets Windows production.
/// Access is restricted to the gateway's own account (#187): on Windows by the explicit ACL
/// from <see cref="WorkerPipeSecurity"/>, elsewhere by <see cref="PipeOptions.CurrentUserOnly"/>.
/// </remarks>
private static NamedPipeServerStream CreatePipe(string pipeName)
internal static NamedPipeServerStream CreatePipe(string pipeName)
{
if (OperatingSystem.IsWindows())
{
return NamedPipeServerStreamAcl.Create(
pipeName,
PipeDirection.InOut,
maxNumberOfServerInstances: 1,
PipeTransmissionMode.Byte,
PipeOptions.Asynchronous,
inBufferSize: PipeBufferSizeBytes,
outBufferSize: PipeBufferSizeBytes,
WorkerPipeSecurity.CreateForCurrentUser());
}
return new NamedPipeServerStream(
pipeName,
PipeDirection.InOut,
maxNumberOfServerInstances: 1,
PipeTransmissionMode.Byte,
PipeOptions.Asynchronous,
WorkerPipeSecurity.UnixPipeOptions,
inBufferSize: PipeBufferSizeBytes,
outBufferSize: PipeBufferSizeBytes);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
using System.IO.Pipes;
using System.Runtime.Versioning;
using System.Security.AccessControl;
using System.Security.Principal;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Sessions;
/// <summary>
/// Builds the access control applied to each gateway↔worker named pipe. The pipe carries
/// credential-bearing commands (secured writes, <c>AuthenticateUser</c>, alarm-ack passwords), so
/// its unguessable name is not enough: only the account the gateway runs as — which is also the
/// account the worker is launched as, because the launcher sets no alternate credentials — may
/// open it, and never over the network.
/// </summary>
internal static class WorkerPipeSecurity
{
/// <summary>Gets the options every worker pipe is created with on non-Windows hosts.</summary>
/// <remarks>
/// On Unix the pipe is a Unix domain socket; <see cref="PipeOptions.CurrentUserOnly"/> makes it
/// owner-only and rejects peers running as a different user. Windows uses the explicit ACL from
/// <see cref="Create(SecurityIdentifier)"/> instead.
/// </remarks>
public const PipeOptions UnixPipeOptions = PipeOptions.Asynchronous | PipeOptions.CurrentUserOnly;
/// <summary>Creates the pipe ACL for the account the gateway process runs as.</summary>
/// <returns>The pipe security descriptor.</returns>
[SupportedOSPlatform("windows")]
public static PipeSecurity CreateForCurrentUser()
{
using WindowsIdentity identity = WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent();
SecurityIdentifier user = identity.User
?? throw new InvalidOperationException("The gateway process identity has no user SID.");
return Create(user);
}
/// <summary>
/// Creates a pipe ACL that grants full control to <paramref name="user"/> only, denies network
/// logons, and does not inherit any other entries.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="user">The account the gateway and its workers run as.</param>
/// <returns>The pipe security descriptor.</returns>
[SupportedOSPlatform("windows")]
public static PipeSecurity Create(SecurityIdentifier user)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(user);
PipeSecurity security = new();
// Drop inherited entries so the default pipe DACL (Everyone/Anonymous read) cannot creep back in.
security.SetAccessRuleProtection(isProtected: true, preserveInheritance: false);
security.SetOwner(user);
security.AddAccessRule(new PipeAccessRule(user, PipeAccessRights.FullControl, AccessControlType.Allow));
// A network logon of the same account still carries the user SID; the deny ACE keeps the
// pipe local-only regardless.
security.AddAccessRule(new PipeAccessRule(
new SecurityIdentifier(WellKnownSidType.NetworkSid, domainSid: null),
PipeAccessRights.FullControl,
AccessControlType.Deny));
return security;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
using System.IO.Pipes;
using System.Runtime.Versioning;
using System.Security.AccessControl;
using System.Security.Principal;
using ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server.Sessions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Tests.Gateway.Sessions;
/// <summary>
/// Verifies that the gateway↔worker pipe is restricted to the gateway's own account (#187).
/// The ACL assertions need Windows; the Unix assertion covers the macOS/Linux test matrix.
/// </summary>
public sealed class WorkerPipeSecurityTests
{
/// <summary>Verifies the factory grants only the given user and denies network logons.</summary>
[WindowsFact]
[SupportedOSPlatform("windows")]
public void Create_GrantsOnlyTheUserAndDeniesNetwork()
{
SecurityIdentifier user = new("S-1-5-21-1000-2000-3000-1001");
PipeSecurity security = WorkerPipeSecurity.Create(user);
Assert.True(security.AreAccessRulesProtected);
Assert.Equal(user, security.GetOwner(typeof(SecurityIdentifier)));
AssertOnlyUserAllowedAndNetworkDenied(security, user);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies the pipe the factory actually creates carries the restricted ACL — read back from
/// the kernel object, not from the descriptor handed to it.
/// </summary>
[WindowsFact]
[SupportedOSPlatform("windows")]
public void CreatePipe_OnWindows_AppliesCurrentUserOnlyAcl()
{
using WindowsIdentity identity = WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent();
SecurityIdentifier user = identity.User!;
using NamedPipeServerStream pipe = SessionWorkerClientFactory.CreatePipe(NewPipeName());
PipeSecurity applied = pipe.GetAccessControl();
AssertOnlyUserAllowedAndNetworkDenied(applied, user);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies the pipe still accepts a client running as the same user — the worker is launched
/// under the gateway's own account, so the restriction must not break the session handshake.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public async Task CreatePipe_AcceptsClientRunningAsTheSameUser()
{
string pipeName = NewPipeName();
using NamedPipeServerStream server = SessionWorkerClientFactory.CreatePipe(pipeName);
using NamedPipeClientStream client = new(".", pipeName, PipeDirection.InOut, PipeOptions.Asynchronous);
using CancellationTokenSource timeout = new(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(10));
Task accept = server.WaitForConnectionAsync(timeout.Token);
await client.ConnectAsync(timeout.Token);
await accept;
Assert.True(server.IsConnected);
Assert.True(client.IsConnected);
}
/// <summary>
/// Verifies non-Windows pipes are created current-user-only. On Unix .NET enforces this by
/// checking the connecting peer's credentials at accept time (the socket file mode is not
/// changed), so the observable contract is the option itself.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void UnixPipeOptions_AreAsynchronousAndCurrentUserOnly()
{
Assert.True(WorkerPipeSecurity.UnixPipeOptions.HasFlag(PipeOptions.CurrentUserOnly));
Assert.True(WorkerPipeSecurity.UnixPipeOptions.HasFlag(PipeOptions.Asynchronous));
}
[SupportedOSPlatform("windows")]
private static void AssertOnlyUserAllowedAndNetworkDenied(PipeSecurity security, SecurityIdentifier user)
{
SecurityIdentifier everyoneSid = new(WellKnownSidType.WorldSid, null);
SecurityIdentifier anonymousSid = new(WellKnownSidType.AnonymousSid, null);
SecurityIdentifier networkSid = new(WellKnownSidType.NetworkSid, null);
List<PipeAccessRule> rules = security
.GetAccessRules(includeExplicit: true, includeInherited: true, typeof(SecurityIdentifier))
.Cast<PipeAccessRule>()
.ToList();
PipeAccessRule[] allows = rules.Where(r => r.AccessControlType == AccessControlType.Allow).ToArray();
PipeAccessRule allow = Assert.Single(allows);
Assert.Equal(user, allow.IdentityReference);
Assert.Equal(PipeAccessRights.FullControl, allow.PipeAccessRights & PipeAccessRights.FullControl);
PipeAccessRule deny = Assert.Single(rules, r => r.AccessControlType == AccessControlType.Deny);
Assert.Equal(networkSid, deny.IdentityReference);
Assert.DoesNotContain(rules, r => r.IdentityReference == everyoneSid && r.AccessControlType == AccessControlType.Allow);
Assert.DoesNotContain(rules, r => r.IdentityReference == anonymousSid && r.AccessControlType == AccessControlType.Allow);
}
private static string NewPipeName() => $"mxgw-acl-{Guid.NewGuid():N}";
}
/// <summary>A fact that runs only on Windows.</summary>
public sealed class WindowsFactAttribute : FactAttribute
{
/// <summary>Initializes a new instance of the <see cref="WindowsFactAttribute"/> class.</summary>
public WindowsFactAttribute()
{
if (!OperatingSystem.IsWindows())
{
Skip = "Requires Windows.";
}
}
}