fix(TST-31): reconcile glauth.md with the shared GLAuth directory, fix propagated live-test credential

glauth.md's OPC-perm group table and pre-provisioned-users table described a
directory that no longer exists: all five OPC-perm gids were off by 100
(5501-5505 vs actual 5601-5605), and the user table listed
readonly/writeop/writetune/writeconfig/alarmack accounts that scadaproj's
shared GLAuth (config.toml) never provisioned. The real per-role testers are
opc-readonly/opc-writeop/opc-writetune/opc-writeconfig/opc-alarmack (renamed
to avoid a cn= case-collision with their group), and every dev user's
password is "password" per config.toml's own comment and passsha256 (not
admin123). admin itself is no longer a member of any OPC-perm group in the
shared directory (only GwAdmin + OtOpcUa-Admins) - multi-role is the actual
"covers every gw capability" account now.

The wrong admin123 default had propagated into
MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_WRITE_SECURED_PASSWORD (docs/GatewayTesting.md) and
the WorkerLiveMxAccessSmokeTests.cs literal/comment attributing the rig's
GLAuth-bridged ArchestrA identity - both corrected to password. Also made
the WriteSecured parity test log (never assert) whether AuthenticateUser
succeeded or was rejected: MXAccess parity means a bad credential is a
legitimate failure reply, so it must not fail the test, but a stale rig
credential was silently degrading the nightly live smoke's WriteSecured leg
from an authenticated round-trip to a bare failure-reply-shape check with no
visible signal.

Verified: dotnet build src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.NonWindows.slnx succeeds
(IntegrationTests builds cleanly on macOS, net10.0, no COM/x86 dependency).

Flips Batch B (TST-31) to Done in the cycle-3 remediation tracker.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-08-20 09:19:59 -04:00
parent b75f8b1704
commit 22d5d52c14
4 changed files with 61 additions and 30 deletions
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ This plan is executed as **seven parallel batches**, each by one subagent workin
| Batch | Branch | Findings | Model | Why this model | Status | | Batch | Branch | Findings | Model | Why this model | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---| |---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | `fix/c3-client-versions` | CLI-46 | sonnet | Mechanical five-client bump + README note + one script guard; recipe is fully specified | Not started | | A | `fix/c3-client-versions` | CLI-46 | sonnet | Mechanical five-client bump + README note + one script guard; recipe is fully specified | Not started |
| B | `fix/c3-glauth-doc` | TST-31 | sonnet | Reconcile a table against one TOML source of truth, re-derive one default, change an assert to a log | Not started | | B | `fix/c3-glauth-doc` | TST-31 | sonnet | Reconcile a table against one TOML source of truth, re-derive one default, change an assert to a log | Done |
| C | `fix/c3-tracker-hygiene` | GWC-31 + housekeeping (close GWC-16/IPC-08/IPC-31, refresh TST-06/TST-17, register WRK-31) | sonnet | Cross-file comment/ID sweep needs care about what each ID *means*, but no logic changes | Not started | | C | `fix/c3-tracker-hygiene` | GWC-31 + housekeeping (close GWC-16/IPC-08/IPC-31, refresh TST-06/TST-17, register WRK-31) | sonnet | Cross-file comment/ID sweep needs care about what each ID *means*, but no logic changes | Not started |
| D | `fix/c3-dashboard-acl` | SEC-40, SEC-41, GWC-38 | opus | Authorization semantics, fail-closed decisions, claims re-resolution; each needs a regression test | Not started | | D | `fix/c3-dashboard-acl` | SEC-40, SEC-41, GWC-38 | opus | Authorization semantics, fail-closed decisions, claims re-resolution; each needs a regression test | Not started |
| E | `fix/c3-ipc-boundaries` | IPC-33, IPC-39, IPC-34, IPC-35 | opus | Changes the WorkerClient command lifecycle, the options validator, and the worker drain budget; race-sensitive | Not started | | E | `fix/c3-ipc-boundaries` | IPC-33, IPC-39, IPC-34, IPC-35 | opus | Changes the WorkerClient command lifecycle, the options validator, and the worker drain budget; race-sensitive | Not started |
+1 -1
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@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ Optional live smoke variables:
| `MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_CLIENT_NAME` | `ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.IntegrationTests` | Client name passed to `Register`. | | `MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_CLIENT_NAME` | `ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.IntegrationTests` | Client name passed to `Register`. |
| `MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_EVENT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` | `15` | Maximum wait for the first `OnDataChange` (also used for the `OnWriteComplete` round-trip and the abnormal-exit fault transition). | | `MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_EVENT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` | `15` | Maximum wait for the first `OnDataChange` (also used for the `OnWriteComplete` round-trip and the abnormal-exit fault transition). |
| `MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_WRITE_SECURED_USER` | `admin` | ArchestrA user name passed to `AuthenticateUser` before the `WriteSecured` parity step. | | `MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_WRITE_SECURED_USER` | `admin` | ArchestrA user name passed to `AuthenticateUser` before the `WriteSecured` parity step. |
| `MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_WRITE_SECURED_PASSWORD` | `admin123` | Password paired with the user above. Never logged; the test asserts the value does not appear in the WriteSecured diagnostic message. | | `MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_WRITE_SECURED_PASSWORD` | `password` | Password paired with the user above (matches the shared GLAuth `admin` user's dev password — see `glauth.md`). Never logged; the test asserts the value does not appear in the WriteSecured diagnostic message. |
The test output includes session id, worker process id, command status, The test output includes session id, worker process id, command status,
HRESULT/status diagnostics, event sequence and handles, close status, and worker HRESULT/status diagnostics, event sequence and handles, close status, and worker
+32 -17
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@@ -52,31 +52,46 @@ LmxOpcUa write rights doesn't need a second account for the gw.
| Group | GID | DN | LmxOpcUa meaning | Suggested mxgw mapping | | Group | GID | DN | LmxOpcUa meaning | Suggested mxgw mapping |
|---|---|---|---|---| |---|---|---|---|---|
| ReadOnly | 5501 | `ou=ReadOnly,ou=groups,dc=zb,dc=local` | Browse + read OPC UA nodes | `Browse` + `Subscribe` (read paths only) | | ReadOnly | 5601 | `ou=ReadOnly,ou=groups,dc=zb,dc=local` | Browse + read OPC UA nodes | `Browse` + `Subscribe` (read paths only) |
| WriteOperate | 5502 | `ou=WriteOperate,ou=groups,dc=zb,dc=local` | Write FreeAccess / Operate attrs | `Write` (plain) | | WriteOperate | 5602 | `ou=WriteOperate,ou=groups,dc=zb,dc=local` | Write FreeAccess / Operate attrs | `Write` (plain) |
| WriteTune | 5504 | `ou=WriteTune,ou=groups,dc=zb,dc=local` | Write Tune attrs | `WriteSecured` (Tune only) | | WriteTune | 5603 | `ou=WriteTune,ou=groups,dc=zb,dc=local` | Write Tune attrs | `WriteSecured` (Tune only) |
| WriteConfigure | 5505 | `ou=WriteConfigure,ou=groups,dc=zb,dc=local` | Write Configure attrs | `WriteSecured` (Configure) | | WriteConfigure | 5604 | `ou=WriteConfigure,ou=groups,dc=zb,dc=local` | Write Configure attrs | `WriteSecured` (Configure) |
| AlarmAck | 5503 | `ou=AlarmAck,ou=groups,dc=zb,dc=local` | Acknowledge alarms | gw alarm-ack RPC, when added | | AlarmAck | 5605 | `ou=AlarmAck,ou=groups,dc=zb,dc=local` | Acknowledge alarms | gw alarm-ack RPC, when added |
These are the shared config's OPC-perm (`560x`) family — see
`scadaproj/infra/glauth/README.md`'s directory-layout table, which
partitions groups into non-overlapping gid ranges per sister app
(`SCADA-*` 55xx, OPC-perm 560x, `Gw*` 561x, `OtOpcUa-*` 57xx) so the
three apps coexist in one directory.
**A user can be in multiple groups** — `othergroups = [...]` in the **A user can be in multiple groups** — `othergroups = [...]` in the
config is a list. `admin` is the canonical example (in every role config is a list. `multi-role` is the canonical example (in every
group below). group in the file, not just the ones below).
## Pre-provisioned users ## Pre-provisioned users
Per-role OPC-perm testers are named `opc-*` rather than the bare role name
(`readonly`, `writeop`, …) because a tester username must not
case-collide with a group name — see the naming rule in
`scadaproj/infra/glauth/README.md`.
| Username | Password | UID | Primary group | Other groups | Capabilities | | Username | Password | UID | Primary group | Other groups | Capabilities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---| |---|---|---|---|---|---|
| `readonly` | `readonly123` | 5001 | ReadOnly | — | Browse, read | | `opc-readonly` | `password` | 5101 | ReadOnly | — | Browse, read |
| `writeop` | `writeop123` | 5002 | WriteOperate | — | + plain Write | | `opc-writeop` | `password` | 5102 | WriteOperate | — | + plain Write |
| `writetune` | `writetune123` | 5005 | WriteTune | — | + WriteSecured (Tune) | | `opc-writetune` | `password` | 5103 | WriteTune | — | + WriteSecured (Tune) |
| `writeconfig` | `writeconfig123` | 5006 | WriteConfigure | — | + WriteSecured (Configure) | | `opc-writeconfig` | `password` | 5104 | WriteConfigure | — | + WriteSecured (Configure) |
| `alarmack` | `alarmack123` | 5003 | AlarmAck | — | Alarm acknowledgment | | `opc-alarmack` | `password` | 5105 | AlarmAck | — | Alarm acknowledgment |
| `admin` | `admin123` | 5004 | ReadOnly | WriteOperate, AlarmAck, WriteTune, WriteConfigure | All roles | | `multi-role` | `password` | 5005 | SCADA-Admins | every other group in the file, incl. all five OPC-perm groups + `GwAdmin`/`GwReader` | All roles, all apps (cross-app canonical login) |
| `admin` | `password` | 5001 | SCADA-Admins | `GwAdmin`, `OtOpcUa-Admins` | Dashboard Administrator + ScadaBridge/OtOpcUa admin — **not** a member of any OPC-perm group, so it has no gw-side Write/WriteSecured/AlarmAck capability |
| `serviceaccount` | `<service-account-password>` | 5999 | ReadOnly | — | LDAP search capability (for bind-then-search) | | `serviceaccount` | `<service-account-password>` | 5999 | ReadOnly | — | LDAP search capability (for bind-then-search) |
For mxaccessgw dev, `admin` covers every gw-side capability test; For mxaccessgw dev, `multi-role` covers every gw-side capability test
`readonly` is the right "negative" case for proving Browse-OK / (it is a member of all five OPC-perm groups as well as `GwAdmin`);
Write-denied. `opc-readonly` is the right "negative" case for proving Browse-OK /
Write-denied. `admin` is useful for dashboard-Administrator and
ScadaBridge/OtOpcUa-admin testing but, per the table above, carries no
OPC-perm group membership of its own.
The gateway dashboard uses two gateway-specific groups beyond the LmxOpcUa taxonomy: The gateway dashboard uses two gateway-specific groups beyond the LmxOpcUa taxonomy:
`GwAdmin` (gid 5610 → role `Administrator`) and `GwReader` (gid 5611 → role `Viewer`). `GwAdmin` (gid 5610 → role `Administrator`) and `GwReader` (gid 5611 → role `Viewer`).
@@ -121,7 +136,7 @@ principal cannot show that.
``` ```
DN: cn=admin,dc=zb,dc=local DN: cn=admin,dc=zb,dc=local
Password: admin123 Password: password
``` ```
Construct the DN from the username; bind. Works on GLAuth because Construct the DN from the username; bind. Works on GLAuth because
@@ -514,21 +514,37 @@ public sealed class WorkerLiveMxAccessSmokeTests(ITestOutputHelper output)
// AuthenticateUser resolves an ArchestrA user id for the WriteSecured call. // AuthenticateUser resolves an ArchestrA user id for the WriteSecured call.
// Credentials are env-overridable so the test honors the gateway's "do not // Credentials are env-overridable so the test honors the gateway's "do not
// log secrets" rule and works against either MXAccess's own user store or // log secrets" rule and works against either MXAccess's own user store or
// the LmxOpcUa-baseline GLAuth-bridged ArchestrA identity (admin/admin123). // the LmxOpcUa-baseline GLAuth-bridged ArchestrA identity (admin/password —
// see glauth.md; the shared GLAuth's dev-user password is "password", not
// the old per-box "admin123").
MxCommandReply authReply = await fixture.Service.Invoke( MxCommandReply authReply = await fixture.Service.Invoke(
CreateAuthenticateUserRequest(sessionId, serverHandle, verifyUser, verifyPassword), CreateAuthenticateUserRequest(sessionId, serverHandle, verifyUser, verifyPassword),
new TestServerCallContext()).ConfigureAwait(false); new TestServerCallContext()).ConfigureAwait(false);
recordedOutput.WriteLine(
$"AuthenticateUser status={authReply.ProtocolStatus.Code} hresult={authReply.Hresult} user_id={authReply.AuthenticateUser?.UserId}");
// AuthenticateUser is allowed to fail (the underlying provider may reject // AuthenticateUser is allowed to fail — MXAccess parity means a rejected
// the credential pair); we use the returned user id if non-zero and fall // credential is a legitimate reply, not a bug, so this must never be an
// back to 0 ("operator only" / no verifier) so the parity assertion holds. // Assert. But a silent fall-through to "operator only" (currentUserId 0)
int currentUserId = authReply.ProtocolStatus.Code == ProtocolStatusCode.Ok // quietly demotes the rest of this test from an authenticated round-trip
// to a bare failure-reply-shape check, which a stale rig credential (e.g.
// TST-31) would otherwise hide indefinitely in nightly runs. Log the
// outcome loudly — never the password (verifyUser only) — so that
// degradation is visible in the test output even though it never fails
// the test by itself.
bool authenticateUserSucceeded = authReply.ProtocolStatus.Code == ProtocolStatusCode.Ok
&& authReply.AuthenticateUser is not null && authReply.AuthenticateUser is not null
&& authReply.AuthenticateUser.UserId != 0 && authReply.AuthenticateUser.UserId != 0;
? authReply.AuthenticateUser.UserId recordedOutput.WriteLine(
: 0; authenticateUserSucceeded
? $"AuthenticateUser SUCCEEDED for user={verifyUser} user_id={authReply.AuthenticateUser!.UserId}"
: $"AuthenticateUser FAILED (credential rejected or not recognized by the provider) "
+ $"for user={verifyUser} status={authReply.ProtocolStatus.Code} hresult={authReply.Hresult} "
+ $"diagnostic={authReply.DiagnosticMessage} -- WriteSecured below will run as an "
+ $"unauthenticated (currentUserId=0) failure-reply-shape check only, not an "
+ $"authenticated round-trip. If this is unexpected, verify "
+ $"MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_WRITE_SECURED_USER/_PASSWORD against the rig's ArchestrA "
+ $"identity (see glauth.md).");
int currentUserId = authenticateUserSucceeded ? authReply.AuthenticateUser!.UserId : 0;
MxCommandReply writeSecuredReply = await fixture.Service.Invoke( MxCommandReply writeSecuredReply = await fixture.Service.Invoke(
CreateWriteSecuredRequest( CreateWriteSecuredRequest(
@@ -1429,7 +1445,7 @@ public sealed class WorkerLiveMxAccessSmokeTests(ITestOutputHelper output)
string verifyUser = Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_WRITE_SECURED_USER") string verifyUser = Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_WRITE_SECURED_USER")
?? "admin"; ?? "admin";
string verifyPassword = Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_WRITE_SECURED_PASSWORD") string verifyPassword = Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("MXGATEWAY_LIVE_MXACCESS_WRITE_SECURED_PASSWORD")
?? "admin123"; ?? "password";
return (verifyUser, verifyPassword); return (verifyUser, verifyPassword);
} }