feat(dashboard): gate the side rail's Secrets link on secrets:manage
Family-wide nav sweep: the Secrets management page should be linked from each app's UI, visible to Administrator-role users only. The link already existed in MainLayout's Admin section. The gate did not: the rail rendered every item for every visitor, including a Viewer and the anonymous-localhost read-only identity. Not an access hole — the mounted page carries [Authorize(Policy = "secrets:manage")], so a Viewer clicking through was denied — but a dead link presented as a live one. There was also no existing role-gated nav pattern to follow; the rail's only AuthorizeView was the footer's signed-in/signed-out split. Gated on the POLICY rather than a role literal, so nav visibility cannot drift from what the page enforces. In this host the two are equivalent: GatewayOptionsValidator constrains Dashboard:GroupToRole values to Administrator or Viewer, so the shared library's other manage-granting roles (secrets-manager, secrets-reveal) are unreachable. The policy form stays correct if that ever relaxes, where a role literal would then hide the link from users who can use the page. API Keys is deliberately left ungated. It looks like the same case and is not: ApiKeysPage renders for a Viewer with write affordances hidden, so hiding its link would remove legitimate read access. The secrets page has no read-only mode. The rule is "gate the link when the page denies the role outright", not "gate everything under Admin". Coverage: three tests pin the policy's verdict per principal (Administrator admitted, Viewer refused, unauthenticated refused), and /admin/secrets joins the canonical route list — it is the one nav destination mounted from an RCL rather than declared here, so a routing regression could remove it without touching this repo's pages. The principal helper sets an authentication type deliberately: without one the role assertions would pass vacuously for the wrong reason. Not a rendering test — the suite has no component-testing harness, and adding one to assert a single AuthorizeView would be a large dependency for a small claim. Build 0 warnings / 0 errors; suite 895/895.
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
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@inherits LayoutComponentBase
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@using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Ui
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@* Thin layout: delegates the side-rail chassis (hamburger, brand, responsive
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collapse) to the shared ZB.MOM.WW.Theme <ThemeShell>. The nav is reproduced
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@@ -19,7 +20,20 @@
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</NavRailSection>
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<NavRailSection Title="Admin" Key="admin">
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<NavRailItem Href="/apikeys" Text="API Keys" />
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<NavRailItem Href="/admin/secrets" Text="Secrets" />
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@* Gated on the SAME policy the mounted /admin/secrets page enforces, not on a role
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literal, so nav visibility cannot drift from page access. In this host the two are
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equivalent — GatewayOptionsValidator constrains Dashboard:GroupToRole values to
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Administrator or Viewer, so the shared library's other manage-granting roles
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(secrets-manager, secrets-reveal) are unreachable here — but the policy form stays
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correct if that ever relaxes. Deliberately NOT applied to the API Keys item above:
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that page renders read-only for Viewers, so hiding its link would remove legitimate
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read access, whereas the secrets page denies a Viewer outright and its link would be
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a dead end. *@
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<AuthorizeView Policy="@SecretsAuthorization.ManagePolicy">
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<Authorized>
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<NavRailItem Href="/admin/secrets" Text="Secrets" />
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</Authorized>
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</AuthorizeView>
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<NavRailItem Href="/settings" Text="Settings" />
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</NavRailSection>
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</Nav>
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