fix(archreview): security authz+hub cluster (SEC-07/05/08/11) + validation hardening

SEC-07: add QueryActiveAlarmsRequest -> events:read scope arm; fix two tests that
  constructed StreamAlarmsRequest instead of QueryActiveAlarmsRequest.
SEC-05: shorten hub-token lifetime 30m -> 5m; document that the ?access_token= query
  carriage must never be request-logged.
SEC-08: gateway-side CachingApiKeyVerifier (short TTL, keyed on a hash of the presented
  secret) skips the per-call store read+last_used write; CoalescingMarkApiKeyStore bounds
  last_used writes to <=1/key/min; identity constraints are cached. Invalidation is wired
  at the gateway admin sites (revoke/rotate/delete); short TTL backstops out-of-process CLI.
SEC-11: fixed-window rate limit on POST /auth/login + a per-peer (key-id) failure limiter
  checked before VerifyAsync; new MxGateway:Security options bound + validated.

Also fixes regressions from the SEC-01/04/06 commit (c185f62) that a narrow test filter
missed (all now covered by a full-suite checkpoint):
- Rooting check is cross-platform: accepts Windows C:\/UNC forms on Unix so the shipped
  appsettings path validates on the macOS dev box, still rejecting bare filenames.
- AddGatewayConfiguration TryAdds a non-production IHostEnvironment fallback so the validator
  resolves in minimal test/tooling containers; the real host + apikey CLI register the actual
  environment first (TryAdd no-op there).
- Test assembly defaults ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Development (ModuleInitializer) so full-host
  tests exercise wiring instead of tripping the SEC-04/06 production guards.
- GatewayOptionsTests asserts the SEC-01 CommonApplicationData-derived default (platform-correct).

archreview: SEC-07/05/08/11 (P1). Verified: NonWindows build clean; full gateway suite
747 passed / 42 failed, where all 42 are the pre-existing macOS named-pipe-harness failures
(Unix-socket path limit) and 0 are validation/regression failures.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-07-09 07:31:35 -04:00
parent 970613eebd
commit 17f16ea181
29 changed files with 1521 additions and 18 deletions
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ public sealed class DashboardApiKeyManagementService(
ApiKeyAdminCommands adminCommands,
IApiKeyAdminStore adminStore,
IAuditWriter auditWriter,
IHttpContextAccessor httpContextAccessor) : IDashboardApiKeyManagementService
IHttpContextAccessor httpContextAccessor,
IApiKeyCacheInvalidator? cacheInvalidator = null) : IDashboardApiKeyManagementService
{
private const string UnauthorizedMessage = "Sign in with an authorized LDAP account to manage API keys.";
private const string PepperUnavailableMarker = "pepper unavailable";
@@ -100,6 +101,10 @@ public sealed class DashboardApiKeyManagementService(
.RevokeKeyAsync(normalizedKeyId, RemoteAddress(), cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
// SEC-08: drop any cached verification for this key in THIS gateway process so the revoke
// takes effect immediately rather than after the verification-cache TTL elapses.
cacheInvalidator?.Invalidate(normalizedKeyId);
await WriteDashboardAuditAsync(
user,
normalizedKeyId,
@@ -138,6 +143,10 @@ public sealed class DashboardApiKeyManagementService(
.RotateKeyAsync(normalizedKeyId, RemoteAddress(), cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
// SEC-08: the old secret's cached verification must not outlive the rotate — evict it so
// the superseded secret stops authenticating within this process immediately.
cacheInvalidator?.Invalidate(normalizedKeyId);
bool succeeded = rotated.Token is not null;
await WriteDashboardAuditAsync(
@@ -182,6 +191,10 @@ public sealed class DashboardApiKeyManagementService(
.DeleteAsync(normalizedKeyId, cancellationToken)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
// SEC-08: a deleted key is only reachable after a prior revoke, but evict defensively so no
// cached verification survives the delete.
cacheInvalidator?.Invalidate(normalizedKeyId);
await WriteDashboardAuditAsync(
user,
normalizedKeyId,