fix(archreview): security authz+hub cluster (SEC-07/05/08/11) + validation hardening

SEC-07: add QueryActiveAlarmsRequest -> events:read scope arm; fix two tests that
  constructed StreamAlarmsRequest instead of QueryActiveAlarmsRequest.
SEC-05: shorten hub-token lifetime 30m -> 5m; document that the ?access_token= query
  carriage must never be request-logged.
SEC-08: gateway-side CachingApiKeyVerifier (short TTL, keyed on a hash of the presented
  secret) skips the per-call store read+last_used write; CoalescingMarkApiKeyStore bounds
  last_used writes to <=1/key/min; identity constraints are cached. Invalidation is wired
  at the gateway admin sites (revoke/rotate/delete); short TTL backstops out-of-process CLI.
SEC-11: fixed-window rate limit on POST /auth/login + a per-peer (key-id) failure limiter
  checked before VerifyAsync; new MxGateway:Security options bound + validated.

Also fixes regressions from the SEC-01/04/06 commit (c185f62) that a narrow test filter
missed (all now covered by a full-suite checkpoint):
- Rooting check is cross-platform: accepts Windows C:\/UNC forms on Unix so the shipped
  appsettings path validates on the macOS dev box, still rejecting bare filenames.
- AddGatewayConfiguration TryAdds a non-production IHostEnvironment fallback so the validator
  resolves in minimal test/tooling containers; the real host + apikey CLI register the actual
  environment first (TryAdd no-op there).
- Test assembly defaults ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Development (ModuleInitializer) so full-host
  tests exercise wiring instead of tripping the SEC-04/06 production guards.
- GatewayOptionsTests asserts the SEC-01 CommonApplicationData-derived default (platform-correct).

archreview: SEC-07/05/08/11 (P1). Verified: NonWindows build clean; full gateway suite
747 passed / 42 failed, where all 42 are the pre-existing macOS named-pipe-harness failures
(Unix-socket path limit) and 0 are validation/regression failures.

src/ZB.MOM.WW.MxGateway.Server/Configuration/GatewayOptionsValidator.cs

@@ -48,6 +48,43 @@ public sealed class GatewayOptionsValidator : OptionsValidatorBase<GatewayOption
         ValidateProtocol(options.Protocol, builder);
         ValidateAlarms(options.Alarms, builder);
         ValidateTls(options.Tls, builder);
+        ValidateSecurity(options.Security, builder);
+    }
+
+    private static void ValidateSecurity(SecurityOptions options, ValidationBuilder builder)
+    {
+        // Cache/coalesce windows may be 0 (disables that mechanism); negatives are invalid.
+        AddIfNegative(
+            options.ApiKeyVerificationCacheSeconds,
+            "MxGateway:Security:ApiKeyVerificationCacheSeconds must be greater than or equal to zero (0 disables the verification cache).",
+            builder);
+        AddIfNegative(
+            options.ApiKeyLastUsedCoalesceSeconds,
+            "MxGateway:Security:ApiKeyLastUsedCoalesceSeconds must be greater than or equal to zero (0 forwards every last_used write).",
+            builder);
+
+        // Rate-limit knobs must be positive: a zero permit/window/limit is a misconfiguration that
+        // would either reject every request or divide by zero rather than express an intent.
+        AddIfNotPositive(
+            options.LoginRateLimitPermitLimit,
+            "MxGateway:Security:LoginRateLimitPermitLimit must be greater than zero.",
+            builder);
+        AddIfNotPositive(
+            options.LoginRateLimitWindowSeconds,
+            "MxGateway:Security:LoginRateLimitWindowSeconds must be greater than zero.",
+            builder);
+        AddIfNotPositive(
+            options.ApiKeyFailureLimit,
+            "MxGateway:Security:ApiKeyFailureLimit must be greater than zero.",
+            builder);
+        AddIfNotPositive(
+            options.ApiKeyFailureWindowSeconds,
+            "MxGateway:Security:ApiKeyFailureWindowSeconds must be greater than zero.",
+            builder);
+        AddIfNotPositive(
+            options.ApiKeyFailureTrackedPeers,
+            "MxGateway:Security:ApiKeyFailureTrackedPeers must be greater than zero.",
+            builder);
     }
 
     private static void ValidateAuthentication(AuthenticationOptions options, ValidationBuilder builder)
@@ -456,12 +493,41 @@ public sealed class GatewayOptionsValidator : OptionsValidatorBase<GatewayOption
             return;
         }
 
-        if (!Path.IsPathRooted(value))
+        if (!IsRootedForAnyPlatform(value))
         {
             builder.Add(message);
         }
     }
 
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Determines whether <paramref name="value"/> is an absolute path for <em>any</em> platform,
+    /// not just the host running the validator. This matters on the macOS dev box, where the
+    /// production <c>appsettings.json</c> ships Windows-absolute paths (<c>C:\ProgramData\...</c>)
+    /// that <see cref="Path.IsPathRooted(string)"/> reports as non-rooted on Unix. The intent of the
+    /// rooting check is to reject bare filenames that resolve against the launch working directory,
+    /// so a valid Windows drive-qualified or UNC path must pass regardless of the current OS.
+    /// </summary>
+    private static bool IsRootedForAnyPlatform(string value)
+    {
+        // Rooted on the current OS (Unix "/...", or a Windows drive/UNC path when on Windows).
+        if (Path.IsPathRooted(value))
+        {
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        // Windows drive-qualified path ("C:\..." or "C:/...") checked on a non-Windows host.
+        if (value.Length >= 3
+            && char.IsLetter(value[0])
+            && value[1] == ':'
+            && (value[2] == '\\' || value[2] == '/'))
+        {
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        // Windows UNC path ("\\server\share") checked on a non-Windows host.
+        return value.StartsWith(@"\\", StringComparison.Ordinal);
+    }
+
     private static void AddIfInvalidPath(string? value, string message, ValidationBuilder builder)
     {
         if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(value))