fix(CLI-40): scrub the credential from the redacted error's structured reply, route MXACCESS_FAILURE to MxAccess (Rust), fix Go Subscribe terminal-error drop
Code-review follow-up on the CLI-40/41/44 branch. ISSUE 1 (all five, critical): the message-only scrub still leaked the server-echoed credential through the redacted error's structured reply accessor (.NET Reply/Statuses, Java reply()/protocolStatus(), Go MxAccessError.Reply via errors.As, Rust reply()/into_reply(), Python raw_reply). The redacted error now carries a scrubbed clone of the reply (protocol_status.message, diagnostic_message, statuses[].diagnostic_text), with per-language tests asserting the reply accessor no longer contains the credential. ISSUE 2 (Rust, critical): ensure_command_success routed MXACCESS_FAILURE to Error::Command (unlike the other four clients), bypassing attach_secrets and leaking via derived Debug/Display. MXACCESS_FAILURE now routes to Error::MxAccess, fixing the cross-client inconsistency. ISSUE 3 (Go, important): the CLI-44 terminal send was unconditionally non-blocking, dropping a genuine terminal error under a full buffer on the never-drop SubscribeEvents path. It is now reserved-slot-non-blocking only for the cancel-on-overflow path and blocking for the never-drop path. New shared fixture authenticate-user.echoed-credential-mxaccess-failure.reply.json wired into all five suites. Minors: whitespace-secret guard on .NET/Java redact helpers; Java preserves exception subtype on redaction; redaction-helper unit tests (Go/Java/.NET). Docs (ClientBehaviorFixtures.md, ClientLibrariesDesign.md) updated to make the structured-field claim true.
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@@ -82,15 +82,31 @@ async def test_add_buffered_item_missing_payload_raises_malformed_reply() -> Non
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assert captured.value.raw_reply is reply
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"fixture",
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[
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"command-replies/authenticate-user.echoed-credential.reply.json",
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"command-replies/authenticate-user.echoed-credential-mxaccess-failure.reply.json",
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],
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)
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_authenticate_user_echoed_credential_is_scrubbed() -> None:
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async def test_authenticate_user_echoed_credential_is_scrubbed(fixture: str) -> None:
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credential = "sup3rSecretVerify9f3a2b"
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reply = _load_reply("command-replies/authenticate-user.echoed-credential.reply.json")
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reply = _load_reply(fixture)
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session, _ = await _session_with([reply])
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with pytest.raises(MxAccessError) as captured:
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await session.authenticate_user(12, "operator", credential)
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message = str(captured.value)
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exc = captured.value
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message = str(exc)
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assert credential not in message
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assert "[redacted]" in message
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# The credential must not survive in the structured protobuf context either:
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# a logger dumping raw_reply's fields would otherwise reintroduce the leak.
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assert exc.raw_reply is not None
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assert credential not in exc.raw_reply.protocol_status.message
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assert credential not in exc.raw_reply.diagnostic_message
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for status in exc.raw_reply.statuses:
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assert credential not in status.diagnostic_text
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