//! `NmxSecuredWrite2Message` — secured timestamped-write (`0x38`) message
//! body codec.
//!
//! Direct port of `src/MxNativeCodec/NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs`.
//!
//! ## Naming and the single-token form
//!
//! The .NET method name is `WriteSecured2`. It always carries **two** user
//! identifiers (`currentUserToken` and `verifierUserToken`) plus a timestamp
//! and a client name — there is no separate single-token form on the LMX
//! wire. Single-user secured writes pass `currentUserToken == verifierUserToken`
//! (per `wwtools/mxaccesscli/docs/api-notes.md:60-72` verification noted in
//! `design/40-protocol-invariants.md` after the MAJOR-pass audit).
//!
//! The R6 entry in `design/70-risks-and-open-questions.md:174` confirms this:
//! the production LMX surface accepts `WriteSecured` with two user ids
//! unconditionally, and the captured `0x38` shape always has both token slots.
//!
//! ## Body layout
//!
//! The secured body inherits the `Write2` (timestamped) prefix shape, then
//! appends authentication / verification fields **before** the trailing
//! `(-1 i16) + clientToken(u32) + writeIndex(i32)` slot
//! (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:40-69`).
//!
//! ```text
//!  offset      size                  field                              source
//!  0..N        N = Write2 prefix     timestamped Write2 body up to but
//!                                    NOT including the 4-byte clientToken
//!                                    and 4-byte writeIndex                .cs:41-54
//!  N           16                    currentUserToken                     .cs:56
//!  N+16        4                     clientNameLen i32 LE                 .cs:58
//!  N+20        clientNameLen         clientNameBytes (UTF-16LE + NUL)     .cs:60
//!  N+20+L      16                    verifierUserToken                    .cs:62
//!  N+36+L      2                     -1 i16 LE                            .cs:64
//!  N+38+L      4                     clientToken u32 LE                   .cs:66
//!  N+42+L      4                     writeIndex i32 LE                    .cs:68
//! ```
//!
//! `prefixLength = timestampedPrefix.Length - sizeof(uint) - sizeof(int)`
//! (`.cs:51`) — i.e. the timestamped body **minus** its trailing 8 bytes
//! (clientToken + writeIndex). The opcode byte is overwritten from `0x37`
//! to `0x38` after the timestamped encoder runs (`.cs:48`).
//!
//! ## Observed authenticated-user token
//!
//! The .NET reference exposes a sample observed token at `.cs:12-18`. It is
//! mirrored here as [`OBSERVED_AUTHENTICATED_USER_TOKEN`] for tests and
//! probes that want to replay the captured `captures/036-frida-secured*`
//! body (cited in `design/40-protocol-invariants.md:164`).

// Direct byte indexing — see reference_handle.rs for rationale.
#![allow(clippy::indexing_slicing)]

use crate::MxReferenceHandle;
use crate::error::CodecError;
use crate::write_message::{self, WriteValue};

/// Secured-write opcode (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:8`).
pub const COMMAND: u8 = 0x38;

/// Wire-format version (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:9`). The .NET `Encode`
/// path defers to `NmxWriteMessage.EncodeTimestamped` which writes
/// `version = 1` (`NmxWriteMessage.cs:10`); the constant is preserved here
/// for parity with the .NET surface.
pub const VERSION: u16 = 1;

/// Authenticator token length in bytes (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:10`).
pub const AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH: usize = 16;

/// Sample observed authenticated-user token from the live AVEVA stack
/// (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:12-18`, captured in
/// `captures/036-frida-secured*`).
pub const OBSERVED_AUTHENTICATED_USER_TOKEN: [u8; AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH] = [
    0x07, 0xb9, 0xa9, 0xf4, 0x72, 0x6e, 0xae, 0x48, 0x83, 0xb5, 0xbb, 0xde, 0x91, 0x8c, 0x89, 0x0f,
];

/// Resolve the observed token form for a given user id. Mirrors
/// `ResolveObservedUserToken` (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:94-99`): user id
/// `0` returns 16 zero bytes; any other id returns the observed authenticated
/// token. This helper is for tests / probes; production callers should pass
/// real tokens.
pub fn resolve_observed_user_token(user_id: i32) -> [u8; AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH] {
    if user_id == 0 {
        [0u8; AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH]
    } else {
        OBSERVED_AUTHENTICATED_USER_TOKEN
    }
}

/// Encode a `WriteSecured2` body (`0x38`).
///
/// Mirrors `NmxSecuredWrite2Message.Encode` (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:20-70`).
/// Internally builds a timestamped Write2 body via
/// [`crate::write_message::encode_timestamped`], strips its trailing 8 bytes
/// (clientToken + writeIndex), overwrites the leading opcode byte, and
/// appends the secured suffix.
///
/// `current_user_token == verifier_user_token` is the single-user secured
/// write path and is allowed unconditionally — see module doc.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// - Returns a [`CodecError::Decode`] if the underlying timestamped Write
///   encode fails (e.g. array element count exceeds `u16::MAX`).
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub fn encode(
    handle: &MxReferenceHandle,
    value: &WriteValue,
    current_user_token: [u8; AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH],
    verifier_user_token: [u8; AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH],
    client_name: &str,
    timestamp_filetime: i64,
    write_index: i32,
    client_token: u32,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CodecError> {
    // 1. Build the timestamped Write2 body. The .NET reference passes
    //    `clientToken: 0` (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:47`) — those 8 trailing
    //    bytes are about to be stripped, so the value is irrelevant.
    let timestamped =
        write_message::encode_timestamped(handle, value, timestamp_filetime, write_index, 0)?;

    // 2. Strip the trailing clientToken (4) + writeIndex (4) from the
    //    timestamped body — `prefixLength = ts.Length - 4 - 4`
    //    (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:51`).
    let prefix_length = timestamped.len() - 4 - 4;

    // 3. UTF-16LE + NUL terminator for the client name
    //    (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:50`,
    //    `Encoding.Unicode.GetBytes(clientName + '\0')`).
    let client_name_bytes = encode_utf16_with_nul(client_name);
    let client_name_len = client_name_bytes.len();

    // 4. Allocate body of the exact final size
    //    (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:52`).
    let body_len = prefix_length
        + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH
        + 4
        + client_name_len
        + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH
        + 2
        + 4
        + 4;
    let mut body = vec![0u8; body_len];

    // 5. Copy stripped timestamped prefix and overwrite opcode
    //    (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:48, 54`).
    body[..prefix_length].copy_from_slice(&timestamped[..prefix_length]);
    body[0] = COMMAND;

    // 6. Append secured suffix in declared order
    //    (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:55-69`).
    let mut offset = prefix_length;
    body[offset..offset + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH].copy_from_slice(&current_user_token);
    offset += AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH;
    write_i32_le(&mut body, offset, client_name_len as i32);
    offset += 4;
    body[offset..offset + client_name_len].copy_from_slice(&client_name_bytes);
    offset += client_name_len;
    body[offset..offset + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH].copy_from_slice(&verifier_user_token);
    offset += AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH;
    write_i16_le(&mut body, offset, -1);
    offset += 2;
    write_u32_le(&mut body, offset, client_token);
    offset += 4;
    write_i32_le(&mut body, offset, write_index);

    Ok(body)
}

/// Decoded secured-write body.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct DecodedSecuredWrite {
    /// Inner timestamped Write2 result (handle projection, value, write
    /// index, client token, timestamp). Note the `client_token` and
    /// `write_index` of the inner result come from the **secured** suffix —
    /// the original timestamped body was encoded with `client_token = 0`
    /// before the trailing 8 bytes were stripped (.cs:47, .cs:51), so the
    /// decoder reconstructs a synthetic timestamped body with the secured
    /// suffix's clientToken+writeIndex re-attached for round-trip parity.
    pub inner: write_message::DecodedWrite,
    pub current_user_token: [u8; AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH],
    pub verifier_user_token: [u8; AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH],
    pub client_name: String,
}

/// Decode a `WriteSecured2` body produced by [`encode`].
///
/// The .NET reference is encode-only (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:6-105`); the
/// Rust port adds a decoder for round-trip tests, mirroring the encoder
/// layout exactly.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// - [`CodecError::ShortRead`] if `body` is too small to carry the secured
///   suffix.
/// - [`CodecError::UnexpectedOpcode`] if `body[0] != 0x38`.
/// - [`CodecError::Decode`] for malformed lengths or invalid client-name UTF-16.
/// - Any error returned by [`crate::write_message::decode`] for the inner
///   reconstructed timestamped body.
pub fn decode(body: &[u8]) -> Result<DecodedSecuredWrite, CodecError> {
    if body.is_empty() {
        return Err(CodecError::ShortRead {
            expected: 1,
            actual: 0,
        });
    }
    if body[0] != COMMAND {
        return Err(CodecError::UnexpectedOpcode(body[0]));
    }

    // Trailing slot: 16 (verifier) + 2 (-1 i16) + 4 (clientToken) + 4 (writeIndex)
    // = 26 bytes after the client-name region.
    // The minimum body shape is: prefix(>=18) + currentToken(16) + nameLen(4)
    // + nameBytes(>=2 NUL) + verifierToken(16) + 10-byte tail.
    if body.len() < 1 + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH + 4 + 2 + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH + 10 {
        return Err(CodecError::ShortRead {
            expected: 1 + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH + 4 + 2 + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH + 10,
            actual: body.len(),
        });
    }

    // Strategy: walk back from the end. The last 26 bytes are the secured
    // suffix; before that lies a UTF-16LE client_name of length declared in
    // the i32 LE that precedes it; before THAT lies the 16-byte
    // currentUserToken; before THAT lies the timestamped Write2 prefix
    // (without its trailing 8 bytes). We don't know the prefix length up
    // front, but we can locate the secured suffix by scanning for the
    // currentUserToken offset using the client-name length field.
    //
    // Concretely: the last 26 bytes are
    //   verifier(16) + -1 i16 + clientToken(4) + writeIndex(4) = 26
    // Before them is the client_name of length L (variable). Before THAT
    // is the i32 LE clientNameLen (4). Before THAT is the currentUserToken (16).
    //
    // We need to find the offset where currentUserToken starts. We do that
    // by reading clientNameLen from a position relative to the end:
    //   offset_of_clientNameLen = body.len() - 26 - L - 4
    //   offset_of_clientNameLen + 4 + L + 16 + 2 + 4 + 4 = body.len()
    //
    // Equivalently: the trailing region after the timestamped prefix is
    //   16 + 4 + L + 16 + 2 + 4 + 4 = 46 + L bytes.
    //
    // So prefix_length = body.len() - (46 + L).
    //
    // We don't know L without locating clientNameLen first. The .NET
    // reference does not record where the prefix ends — it derives it on
    // encode. On decode, we need to use the inner write_message::decode to
    // figure out the timestamped body's natural length, then derive L.
    //
    // Approach: reconstruct a synthetic timestamped body by appending an
    // 8-byte clientToken+writeIndex tail with zeros to a candidate prefix,
    // decode it, and use the resulting body length to find the boundary.
    //
    // Simpler: walk forward through the timestamped wire shape using the
    // crate's own write_message::decode after we know the prefix bytes.
    // But we don't know the prefix length yet.
    //
    // The cleanest approach: read the trailing structure. We know the body
    // tail layout. Count bytes from the end:
    //   [body.len() - 4 .. body.len()]            writeIndex i32
    //   [body.len() - 8 .. body.len() - 4]        clientToken u32
    //   [body.len() - 10 .. body.len() - 8]       -1 i16
    //   [body.len() - 26 .. body.len() - 10]      verifierUserToken (16)
    //   [body.len() - 26 - L .. body.len() - 26]  clientNameBytes (L)
    //   [body.len() - 30 - L .. body.len() - 26 - L] clientNameLen i32 (4)
    //   [body.len() - 46 - L .. body.len() - 30 - L] currentUserToken (16)
    // We need L. The clientNameLen i32 lives at offset (body.len() - 30 - L).
    // We can solve by scanning candidate L values OR by realising that the
    // timestamped prefix has a deterministic length given the value kind.
    //
    // We use the deterministic-length approach: rebuild a candidate
    // timestamped prefix of length `prefix_length`, then decode by parsing
    // the wire-kind-driven shape. Since the inner write_message::decode
    // already implements this, and since the prefix shape is fully
    // determined by body[1..3] (version) and body[17] (wire_kind), we can
    // compute the timestamped body length without seeing the secured suffix.

    // body[0..18] is the common prefix: cmd + version + 14 handle bytes + wire_kind.
    let wire_kind = body[17];

    // For each wire kind, the timestamped body length is fixed (scalar) or
    // determined by an inner length prefix (variable / array). The
    // timestamped body length = prefix_length + 8 (the 8 stripped trailing
    // bytes). prefix_length = body.len() - 46 - L. We don't know L.
    //
    // But we DO know the timestamped body length from wire_kind directly:
    let ts_body_len = compute_timestamped_body_len(body, wire_kind)?;
    let prefix_length = ts_body_len - 8;

    // Now layout is known.
    let suffix_offset = prefix_length;
    if suffix_offset + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH + 4 > body.len() {
        return Err(CodecError::ShortRead {
            expected: suffix_offset + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH + 4,
            actual: body.len(),
        });
    }

    let mut current_user_token = [0u8; AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH];
    current_user_token
        .copy_from_slice(&body[suffix_offset..suffix_offset + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH]);

    let name_len_offset = suffix_offset + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH;
    let client_name_len = read_i32_le(body, name_len_offset);
    if client_name_len < 0 {
        return Err(CodecError::Decode {
            offset: name_len_offset,
            reason: "secured-write: negative clientNameLen",
            buffer_len: body.len(),
        });
    }
    let client_name_len = client_name_len as usize;

    let name_offset = name_len_offset + 4;
    if name_offset + client_name_len + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH + 10 > body.len() {
        return Err(CodecError::ShortRead {
            expected: name_offset + client_name_len + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH + 10,
            actual: body.len(),
        });
    }

    let client_name_bytes = &body[name_offset..name_offset + client_name_len];
    let client_name = decode_utf16_with_nul(client_name_bytes, name_offset, body.len())?;

    let verifier_offset = name_offset + client_name_len;
    let mut verifier_user_token = [0u8; AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH];
    verifier_user_token
        .copy_from_slice(&body[verifier_offset..verifier_offset + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH]);

    let tail_offset = verifier_offset + AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH;
    let leading = read_i16_le(body, tail_offset);
    if leading != -1 {
        return Err(CodecError::Decode {
            offset: tail_offset,
            reason: "secured-write: trailing leading i16 is not -1",
            buffer_len: body.len(),
        });
    }
    let secured_client_token = read_u32_le(body, tail_offset + 2);
    let secured_write_index = read_i32_le(body, tail_offset + 6);

    // Reconstruct the timestamped body so we can call write_message::decode.
    // The .NET encoder calls EncodeTimestamped with clientToken=0 then
    // strips, so the original prefix has 0 in the clientToken slot. We need
    // to substitute the secured suffix's clientToken+writeIndex back so the
    // inner DecodedWrite reflects what the caller passed to encode().
    let mut ts_body = body[..prefix_length].to_vec();
    ts_body.extend_from_slice(&secured_client_token.to_le_bytes());
    ts_body.extend_from_slice(&secured_write_index.to_le_bytes());
    // Restore the inner opcode (was overwritten to 0x38; restore to 0x37
    // so write_message::decode accepts it).
    ts_body[0] = write_message::COMMAND;

    let inner = write_message::decode(&ts_body)?;

    Ok(DecodedSecuredWrite {
        inner,
        current_user_token,
        verifier_user_token,
        client_name,
    })
}

/// Compute the length of the timestamped Write2 body for a given wire kind,
/// reading any inner length fields from `body` (which carries a `0x38` body —
/// but the prefix bytes are identical to the timestamped `0x37` body).
fn compute_timestamped_body_len(body: &[u8], wire_kind: u8) -> Result<usize, CodecError> {
    // Timestamped body shapes (mirroring write_message.rs):
    //   Boolean (timestamped): 17 + 1 + 1 + 14 + 4 = 37
    //     [actually: KIND_OFFSET(17) + 1 + 1-byte payload + 18-byte suffix
    //      = 37]. Per write_message.rs:357-364.
    //   Int32:     17 + 1 + 4 + 14 + 4 = 40
    //   Float32:   40
    //   Float64:   17 + 1 + 8 + 14 + 4 = 44
    //   Variable:  44 + utf16_len  (read inner_len at offset 22)
    //   Array:     46 + payload_len (count u16 at 22, walk for variable arrays)
    match wire_kind {
        0x01 => Ok(37),
        0x02 | 0x03 => Ok(40),
        0x04 => Ok(44),
        0x05 => {
            // body[22..26] = inner_length (i32 LE) — UTF-16 byte length
            // including 2-byte NUL terminator.
            if body.len() < 26 {
                return Err(CodecError::ShortRead {
                    expected: 26,
                    actual: body.len(),
                });
            }
            let inner_len = read_i32_le(body, 22);
            if inner_len < 0 {
                return Err(CodecError::Decode {
                    offset: 22,
                    reason: "secured-write: negative variable inner_length",
                    buffer_len: body.len(),
                });
            }
            Ok(44 + inner_len as usize)
        }
        0x41..=0x44 => {
            if body.len() < 28 {
                return Err(CodecError::ShortRead {
                    expected: 28,
                    actual: body.len(),
                });
            }
            let count = read_u16_le(body, 22) as usize;
            // `wire_kind` is constrained to 0x41..=0x44 by the outer match
            // arm; default to 2 for any out-of-table value (shouldn't occur).
            let element_width = match wire_kind {
                0x41 => 2,
                0x42 | 0x43 => 4,
                0x44 => 8,
                _ => 2,
            };
            Ok(28 + count * element_width + 18)
        }
        0x45 => {
            if body.len() < 28 {
                return Err(CodecError::ShortRead {
                    expected: 28,
                    actual: body.len(),
                });
            }
            let count = read_u16_le(body, 22) as usize;
            let mut cursor = 28usize;
            for _ in 0..count {
                if cursor + 13 > body.len() {
                    return Err(CodecError::ShortRead {
                        expected: cursor + 13,
                        actual: body.len(),
                    });
                }
                let inner_len = read_i32_le(body, cursor + 9);
                if inner_len < 0 {
                    return Err(CodecError::Decode {
                        offset: cursor + 9,
                        reason: "secured-write: negative variable-array inner_length",
                        buffer_len: body.len(),
                    });
                }
                cursor += 13 + inner_len as usize;
            }
            Ok(cursor + 18)
        }
        _ => Err(CodecError::Decode {
            offset: 17,
            reason: "secured-write: unknown wire kind",
            buffer_len: body.len(),
        }),
    }
}

// ---- UTF-16 helpers -------------------------------------------------------

/// UTF-16LE encoding with a trailing 2-byte NUL terminator.
/// Mirrors `Encoding.Unicode.GetBytes(clientName + '\0')`
/// (`NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:50`).
fn encode_utf16_with_nul(value: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
    let utf16: Vec<u16> = value.encode_utf16().collect();
    let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(utf16.len() * 2 + 2);
    for unit in &utf16 {
        bytes.extend_from_slice(&unit.to_le_bytes());
    }
    // Trailing NUL (the `+ '\0'` in the .NET source).
    bytes.push(0x00);
    bytes.push(0x00);
    bytes
}

fn decode_utf16_with_nul(
    raw: &[u8],
    offset: usize,
    buffer_len: usize,
) -> Result<String, CodecError> {
    if raw.len() % 2 != 0 {
        return Err(CodecError::Decode {
            offset,
            reason: "secured-write: client_name byte length is not even",
            buffer_len,
        });
    }
    let utf16: Vec<u16> = raw
        .chunks_exact(2)
        .map(|c| u16::from_le_bytes([c[0], c[1]]))
        .collect();
    // Strip the trailing NUL terminator (the .NET path always emits one).
    let trimmed: &[u16] = if utf16.last() == Some(&0) {
        &utf16[..utf16.len() - 1]
    } else {
        &utf16
    };
    String::from_utf16(trimmed).map_err(|_| CodecError::Decode {
        offset,
        reason: "secured-write: invalid UTF-16 in client_name",
        buffer_len,
    })
}

// ---- LE primitive helpers -------------------------------------------------

#[inline]
fn write_i16_le(bytes: &mut [u8], offset: usize, value: i16) {
    bytes[offset..offset + 2].copy_from_slice(&value.to_le_bytes());
}

#[inline]
fn write_i32_le(bytes: &mut [u8], offset: usize, value: i32) {
    bytes[offset..offset + 4].copy_from_slice(&value.to_le_bytes());
}

#[inline]
fn write_u32_le(bytes: &mut [u8], offset: usize, value: u32) {
    bytes[offset..offset + 4].copy_from_slice(&value.to_le_bytes());
}

#[inline]
fn read_i16_le(bytes: &[u8], offset: usize) -> i16 {
    i16::from_le_bytes([bytes[offset], bytes[offset + 1]])
}

#[inline]
fn read_i32_le(bytes: &[u8], offset: usize) -> i32 {
    i32::from_le_bytes([
        bytes[offset],
        bytes[offset + 1],
        bytes[offset + 2],
        bytes[offset + 3],
    ])
}

#[inline]
fn read_u16_le(bytes: &[u8], offset: usize) -> u16 {
    u16::from_le_bytes([bytes[offset], bytes[offset + 1]])
}

#[inline]
fn read_u32_le(bytes: &[u8], offset: usize) -> u32 {
    u32::from_le_bytes([
        bytes[offset],
        bytes[offset + 1],
        bytes[offset + 2],
        bytes[offset + 3],
    ])
}

// ===========================================================================
// Tests
// ===========================================================================

#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used, clippy::indexing_slicing)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    fn sample_handle() -> MxReferenceHandle {
        MxReferenceHandle::from_names(
            1,
            42,
            17,
            300,
            "TestChildObject",
            -1,
            7,
            0,
            "TestInt",
            false,
        )
        .unwrap()
    }

    const TOKEN_A: [u8; 16] = [
        0x07, 0xb9, 0xa9, 0xf4, 0x72, 0x6e, 0xae, 0x48, 0x83, 0xb5, 0xbb, 0xde, 0x91, 0x8c, 0x89,
        0x0f,
    ];
    const TOKEN_B: [u8; 16] = [
        0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff,
        0x00,
    ];

    #[test]
    fn opcode_and_constants_match_dotnet() {
        // `NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:8-10`.
        assert_eq!(COMMAND, 0x38);
        assert_eq!(VERSION, 1);
        assert_eq!(AUTHENTICATOR_TOKEN_LENGTH, 16);
    }

    #[test]
    fn observed_authenticated_user_token_matches_dotnet() {
        // `NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:12-18`.
        assert_eq!(
            OBSERVED_AUTHENTICATED_USER_TOKEN,
            [
                0x07, 0xb9, 0xa9, 0xf4, 0x72, 0x6e, 0xae, 0x48, 0x83, 0xb5, 0xbb, 0xde, 0x91, 0x8c,
                0x89, 0x0f
            ]
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_observed_user_token_matches_dotnet() {
        // `NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:94-99`.
        assert_eq!(resolve_observed_user_token(0), [0u8; 16]);
        assert_eq!(
            resolve_observed_user_token(123),
            OBSERVED_AUTHENTICATED_USER_TOKEN
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn opcode_byte_is_overwritten_to_0x38() {
        // `NmxSecuredWrite2Message.cs:48`.
        let h = sample_handle();
        let body = encode(
            &h,
            &WriteValue::Int32(123),
            TOKEN_A,
            TOKEN_B,
            "client",
            123_456_789_i64,
            5,
            0xCAFE_BABE,
        )
        .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(body[0], COMMAND);
    }

    #[test]
    fn round_trip_int32_two_distinct_user_tokens() {
        let h = sample_handle();
        let body = encode(
            &h,
            &WriteValue::Int32(0x1234_5678),
            TOKEN_A,
            TOKEN_B,
            "TestClient",
            0x0102_0304_0506_0708_i64,
            42,
            0xDEAD_BEEF,
        )
        .unwrap();
        let decoded = decode(&body).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decoded.current_user_token, TOKEN_A);
        assert_eq!(decoded.verifier_user_token, TOKEN_B);
        assert_ne!(decoded.current_user_token, decoded.verifier_user_token);
        assert_eq!(decoded.client_name, "TestClient");
        assert_eq!(decoded.inner.value, WriteValue::Int32(0x1234_5678));
        assert_eq!(decoded.inner.write_index, 42);
        assert_eq!(decoded.inner.client_token, 0xDEAD_BEEF);
        assert_eq!(
            decoded.inner.timestamp_filetime,
            Some(0x0102_0304_0506_0708)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn round_trip_boolean_single_user_path() {
        // Per module doc / api-notes.md: single-user secured writes use
        // currentUserToken == verifierUserToken.
        let h = sample_handle();
        let body = encode(
            &h,
            &WriteValue::Boolean(true),
            TOKEN_A,
            TOKEN_A, // same token both slots
            "Solo",
            1_700_000_000_000_000_000_i64,
            1,
            0x1234,
        )
        .unwrap();
        let decoded = decode(&body).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decoded.current_user_token, decoded.verifier_user_token);
        assert_eq!(decoded.current_user_token, TOKEN_A);
        assert_eq!(decoded.client_name, "Solo");
        assert_eq!(decoded.inner.value, WriteValue::Boolean(true));
    }

    #[test]
    fn round_trip_with_empty_client_name() {
        // Empty string still emits a 2-byte NUL terminator
        // (`Encoding.Unicode.GetBytes("" + '\0')`).
        let h = sample_handle();
        let body = encode(&h, &WriteValue::Int32(0), TOKEN_A, TOKEN_B, "", 0, 1, 0).unwrap();
        let decoded = decode(&body).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decoded.client_name, "");
        assert_eq!(decoded.inner.value, WriteValue::Int32(0));
    }

    #[test]
    fn round_trip_with_populated_client_name() {
        let h = sample_handle();
        let body = encode(
            &h,
            &WriteValue::Int32(42),
            TOKEN_A,
            TOKEN_B,
            "Operator-Console-1",
            0,
            7,
            0xABCD,
        )
        .unwrap();
        let decoded = decode(&body).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decoded.client_name, "Operator-Console-1");
    }

    #[test]
    fn round_trip_string_value() {
        let h = sample_handle();
        let body = encode(
            &h,
            &WriteValue::String("hello".to_string()),
            TOKEN_A,
            TOKEN_B,
            "client",
            0x1122_3344_5566_7788_i64,
            3,
            0xFEED,
        )
        .unwrap();
        let decoded = decode(&body).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decoded.inner.value, WriteValue::String("hello".to_string()));
        assert_eq!(
            decoded.inner.timestamp_filetime,
            Some(0x1122_3344_5566_7788)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn wrong_opcode_rejected() {
        // Take a real body and clobber the opcode.
        let h = sample_handle();
        let mut body = encode(&h, &WriteValue::Int32(1), TOKEN_A, TOKEN_B, "x", 0, 1, 0).unwrap();
        body[0] = 0x37;
        let err = decode(&body).unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, CodecError::UnexpectedOpcode(0x37)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn trailing_fields_land_at_correct_offsets() {
        // For Int32 the timestamped prefix length is 40 - 8 = 32 bytes.
        // Verify that:
        //   body[32..48]   = currentUserToken
        //   body[48..52]   = clientNameLen i32 LE
        //   body[52..52+L] = clientNameBytes
        //   body[..+16]    = verifierUserToken
        //   then -1 i16 + clientToken u32 + writeIndex i32
        let h = sample_handle();
        let client_name = "abc"; // 3 chars * 2 + 2 (NUL) = 8 bytes
        let body = encode(
            &h,
            &WriteValue::Int32(7),
            TOKEN_A,
            TOKEN_B,
            client_name,
            0x1111_2222_3333_4444_i64,
            5,
            0xBEEF_CAFE,
        )
        .unwrap();

        // prefix_length for Int32 timestamped = 32.
        let prefix_length = 32;
        assert_eq!(&body[prefix_length..prefix_length + 16], &TOKEN_A);
        let name_len_offset = prefix_length + 16;
        let name_len = i32::from_le_bytes([
            body[name_len_offset],
            body[name_len_offset + 1],
            body[name_len_offset + 2],
            body[name_len_offset + 3],
        ]);
        assert_eq!(name_len, 8);
        let name_offset = name_len_offset + 4;
        let name_bytes = &body[name_offset..name_offset + 8];
        // "abc\0" UTF-16LE LE = 'a' 0 'b' 0 'c' 0 0 0
        assert_eq!(
            name_bytes,
            &[0x61, 0x00, 0x62, 0x00, 0x63, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]
        );

        let verifier_offset = name_offset + 8;
        assert_eq!(&body[verifier_offset..verifier_offset + 16], &TOKEN_B);

        let tail = verifier_offset + 16;
        let leading_i16 = i16::from_le_bytes([body[tail], body[tail + 1]]);
        assert_eq!(leading_i16, -1);
        let client_token = u32::from_le_bytes([
            body[tail + 2],
            body[tail + 3],
            body[tail + 4],
            body[tail + 5],
        ]);
        assert_eq!(client_token, 0xBEEF_CAFE);
        let write_index = i32::from_le_bytes([
            body[tail + 6],
            body[tail + 7],
            body[tail + 8],
            body[tail + 9],
        ]);
        assert_eq!(write_index, 5);

        // Total body length: prefix(32) + 16 + 4 + 8 + 16 + 2 + 4 + 4 = 86
        assert_eq!(body.len(), 86);
    }

    #[test]
    fn short_buffer_rejected() {
        let err = decode(&[0x38u8; 4]).unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, CodecError::ShortRead { .. }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn empty_buffer_rejected() {
        let err = decode(&[]).unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, CodecError::ShortRead { .. }));
    }
}