[M5] auth: deterministic HMAC fixture test rules out crypto stack

Adds end-to-end byte-equality test against a `.NET reference fixture
captured via the new `MxAsbClient.Probe --dump-deterministic-hmac`
flag. All inputs are pinned (passphrase, prime, generator, private-
key bytes, remote-pub bytes, message number, connection ID, AES IV,
consumer-data + IV bytes), so the test reproduces .NET's exact
output for every crypto step:

1. shared = remote_pub^private_key mod prime —  matches
2. crypto_key = shared || passphrase_utf8 —  matches
3. hmac = HMAC-SHA1(crypto_key, xml_utf8) —  matches
4. aes_key = PBKDF2-SHA1(base64(crypto_key), salt, 1000, 16) — 
5. encrypted_mac = AES-CBC(aes_key, iv=zeros, hmac, PKCS7) — 

This conclusively rules out the entire crypto stack as the source of
the live AuthenticateMe `dispatcher/fault`. Our DH math, HMAC engine,
PBKDF2 derivation, AES-CBC PKCS7, and crypto_key concatenation are
byte-equal to .NET. The remaining live failure must come from one
of: (a) wire-level ConnectionValidator NBFX shape (DataContract field
names, mustUnderstand attribute, namespace), (b) WCF binary message
header (action+to dict pre-pop), or (c) a subtle XmlSerializer quirk
for live values that the hardcoded fixtures don't exercise (Guid
format edge case, base64 line wrapping, ulong text rendering).

Fixture lives at `crates/mxaccess-asb-nettcp/tests/fixtures/
deterministic-hmac/authenticate-me.kv` (KV format, ASCII hex, lines
trim CRLF/LF transparently). The companion `README.md` documents the
capture procedure and the per-step decomposition. The test consumes
the .NET-supplied canonical XML directly from the fixture's
`xml_utf8_b64` so a Rust XML emitter bug would not mask a Rust
crypto bug — XML byte-equality is verified separately by
`mxaccess-asb::xml_canonical::tests` against the `signed-xml/*.xml`
fixtures.

Workspace: 710 unit tests pass (was 709 + 1 new). Clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-05-05 19:12:17 -04:00
parent 42ac10a88f
commit ce27b63010
5 changed files with 388 additions and 1 deletions
+183
View File
@@ -732,4 +732,187 @@ mod tests {
// real cross-impl vector comes later, replace the bytes inline.
assert_eq!(out.as_slice(), snapshot.as_slice());
}
/// End-to-end byte-equality test against a `.NET reference fixture
/// captured via `MxAsbClient.Probe --dump-deterministic-hmac`. All
/// inputs (passphrase, prime, generator, private-key bytes, remote
/// public-key bytes, message number, connection ID, AES IV,
/// consumer-data + IV bytes) are pinned, so this test reproduces
/// .NET's exact output for:
///
/// 1. `shared = remote_pub^private_key mod prime`
/// 2. `crypto_key = shared || passphrase_utf8`
/// 3. `hmac = HMAC-SHA1(crypto_key, xml_utf8)` where `xml_utf8` is
/// the canonical XML emitted by .NET's `XmlSerializer` (decoded
/// from the fixture's `xml_utf8_b64`).
/// 4. `aes_key = PBKDF2-SHA1(base64(crypto_key),
/// "ArchestrAService", 1000, 16)`
/// 5. `encrypted_mac = AES-CBC(aes_key, iv=zeros, hmac, PKCS7)`
///
/// If any step diverges from the .NET reference, this test localises
/// the bug — without depending on session randomness (which is what
/// makes the live AuthenticateMe failure so hard to diagnose).
///
/// **Important:** the canonical XML byte-equality is verified
/// separately by `mxaccess-asb::xml_canonical::tests` against the
/// `signed-xml/*.xml` fixtures. Here we just consume the
/// `.NET-supplied XML bytes from the fixture so a Rust XML emitter
/// bug doesn't mask a Rust crypto bug (or vice versa).
#[test]
fn deterministic_hmac_matches_dotnet_fixture() {
use hmac::Hmac;
use sha1::Sha1;
let fixture_path = std::path::Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"))
.join("tests/fixtures/deterministic-hmac/authenticate-me.kv");
let raw = std::fs::read_to_string(&fixture_path).unwrap_or_else(|e| {
panic!("could not read fixture {}: {e}", fixture_path.display())
});
let kv = parse_kv(&raw);
let prime_decimal = kv.get("prime_decimal").expect("prime_decimal");
let private_key_hex = kv.get("private_key_hex").expect("private_key_hex");
let remote_pub_hex = kv.get("remote_pub_hex").expect("remote_pub_hex");
let passphrase = kv.get("passphrase").expect("passphrase");
let consumer_data_hex = kv.get("consumer_data_hex").expect("consumer_data_hex");
let consumer_iv_hex = kv.get("consumer_iv_hex").expect("consumer_iv_hex");
let aes_iv_hex = kv.get("aes_iv_hex").expect("aes_iv_hex");
let expected_shared_hex = kv.get("shared_secret_hex").expect("shared_secret_hex");
let expected_crypto_key_hex = kv.get("crypto_key_hex").expect("crypto_key_hex");
let expected_xml_b64 = kv.get("xml_utf8_b64").expect("xml_utf8_b64");
let expected_hmac_hex = kv.get("hmac_sha1_hex").expect("hmac_sha1_hex");
let expected_aes_key_hex = kv.get("aes_key_hex").expect("aes_key_hex");
let expected_encrypted_mac_hex =
kv.get("encrypted_mac_hex").expect("encrypted_mac_hex");
// Step 1 — shared = remote_pub^private mod prime
let prime = parse_decimal(prime_decimal).unwrap();
let private_key_bytes = hex::decode(private_key_hex).unwrap();
let remote_pub_bytes = hex::decode(remote_pub_hex).unwrap();
let private_key_value = bigint_from_dotnet_bytes(&private_key_bytes);
let remote_pub_value = bigint_from_dotnet_bytes(&remote_pub_bytes);
let shared_value = remote_pub_value.modpow(&private_key_value, &prime);
let shared_bytes = bigint_to_dotnet_bytes(&shared_value);
assert_eq!(
hex::encode_upper(&shared_bytes),
*expected_shared_hex,
"shared_secret bytes diverge from .NET (DH math mismatch — \
check parse_decimal, bigint_from/to_dotnet_bytes, modpow)"
);
// Step 2 — crypto_key = shared || passphrase_utf8
let mut crypto_key = shared_bytes.clone();
crypto_key.extend_from_slice(passphrase.as_bytes());
assert_eq!(
hex::encode_upper(&crypto_key),
*expected_crypto_key_hex,
"crypto_key concatenation diverges (likely passphrase \
encoding bug — .NET uses Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes)"
);
// Step 3 — HMAC-SHA1(crypto_key, xml_utf8)
let xml_bytes = base64_decode_strict(expected_xml_b64);
let actual_hmac = hmac_compute::<Hmac<Sha1>>(&crypto_key, &xml_bytes);
assert_eq!(
hex::encode_upper(&actual_hmac),
*expected_hmac_hex,
"HMAC-SHA1 output diverges — Rust hmac::Hmac<Sha1> does \
NOT match .NET's HMACSHA1 for the same (key, message)"
);
// Step 4 — AES key = PBKDF2-SHA1(base64(crypto_key), salt, 1000, 16)
let password_b64 = base64_encode(&crypto_key);
let mut aes_key = [0u8; AES_KEY_LEN];
pbkdf2_hmac::<Sha1>(
password_b64.as_bytes(),
PASSWORD_SALT,
PBKDF2_ITERATIONS,
&mut aes_key,
);
assert_eq!(
hex::encode_upper(aes_key),
*expected_aes_key_hex,
"PBKDF2-SHA1(base64(crypto_key)) diverges — likely a salt \
or iteration-count mismatch, or password is being byte- \
encoded differently from .NET's `Convert.ToBase64String`"
);
// Step 5 — AES-CBC encrypt(hmac) with fixed IV
let aes_iv_bytes = hex::decode(aes_iv_hex).unwrap();
let aes_iv: [u8; 16] = aes_iv_bytes.try_into().expect("aes_iv must be 16 bytes");
let encrypted_mac = aes_cbc_encrypt(&aes_key, &aes_iv, &actual_hmac);
assert_eq!(
hex::encode_upper(&encrypted_mac),
*expected_encrypted_mac_hex,
"AES-CBC encrypt diverges — could be a PKCS7 padding bug, \
a key-length mismatch, or a cipher-suite drift"
);
// Sanity assertions to catch fixture corruption.
assert_eq!(consumer_data_hex.len(), 208 * 2, "fixture consumer data");
assert_eq!(consumer_iv_hex.len(), 16 * 2, "fixture consumer iv");
}
fn parse_kv(text: &str) -> std::collections::HashMap<String, String> {
let mut out = std::collections::HashMap::new();
for line in text.lines() {
let line = line.trim();
if line.is_empty() || line.starts_with('#') {
continue;
}
if let Some((key, value)) = line.split_once('=') {
out.insert(key.trim().to_string(), value.trim().to_string());
}
}
out
}
/// Strict standard-base64 decoder. Mirrors .NET's
/// `Convert.FromBase64String` for the subset of inputs this test
/// uses (no line wrapping, standard alphabet, padding required).
fn base64_decode_strict(s: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
let trimmed: String = s.chars().filter(|c| !c.is_whitespace()).collect();
if trimmed.len() % 4 != 0 {
panic!("base64 input length {} not multiple of 4", trimmed.len());
}
const VAL: [i8; 256] = build_b64_table();
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(trimmed.len() / 4 * 3);
let bytes = trimmed.as_bytes();
let mut i = 0;
while i < bytes.len() {
let c0 = bytes[i];
let c1 = bytes[i + 1];
let c2 = bytes[i + 2];
let c3 = bytes[i + 3];
let v0 = VAL[c0 as usize];
let v1 = VAL[c1 as usize];
let v2 = if c2 == b'=' { 0 } else { VAL[c2 as usize] };
let v3 = if c3 == b'=' { 0 } else { VAL[c3 as usize] };
assert!(v0 >= 0 && v1 >= 0 && v2 >= 0 && v3 >= 0, "invalid b64 char");
let triple = ((v0 as u32) << 18)
| ((v1 as u32) << 12)
| ((v2 as u32) << 6)
| (v3 as u32);
out.push((triple >> 16) as u8);
if c2 != b'=' {
out.push((triple >> 8) as u8);
}
if c3 != b'=' {
out.push(triple as u8);
}
i += 4;
}
out
}
const fn build_b64_table() -> [i8; 256] {
let mut t = [-1i8; 256];
let alphabet = b"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
let mut i = 0;
while i < alphabet.len() {
t[alphabet[i] as usize] = i as i8;
i += 1;
}
t
}
}