Files
lmxopcua/src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Security/WriteAuthzPolicy.cs
Joseph Doherty f8d5b0fdbb Phase 6.2 Stream C follow-up — wire AuthorizationGate into DriverNodeManager Read / Write / HistoryRead dispatch
Closes the Phase 6.2 security gap the v2 release-readiness dashboard flagged:
the evaluator + trie + gate shipped as code in PRs #84-88 but no dispatch
path called them. This PR threads the gate end-to-end from
OpcUaApplicationHost → OtOpcUaServer → DriverNodeManager and calls it on
every Read / Write / 4 HistoryRead paths.

Server.Security additions:
- NodeScopeResolver — maps driver fullRef → Core.Authorization NodeScope.
  Phase 1 shape: populates ClusterId + TagId; leaves NamespaceId / UnsArea /
  UnsLine / Equipment null. The cluster-level ACL cascade covers this
  configuration (decision #129 additive grants). Finer-grained scope
  resolution (joining against the live Configuration DB for UnsArea / UnsLine
  path) lands as Stream C.12 follow-up.
- WriteAuthzPolicy.ToOpcUaOperation — maps SecurityClassification → the
  OpcUaOperation the gate evaluator consults (Operate/SecuredWrite →
  WriteOperate; Tune → WriteTune; Configure/VerifiedWrite → WriteConfigure).

DriverNodeManager wiring:
- Ctor gains optional AuthorizationGate + NodeScopeResolver; both null means
  the pre-Phase-6.2 dispatch runs unchanged (backwards-compat for every
  integration test that constructs DriverNodeManager directly).
- OnReadValue: ahead of the invoker call, builds NodeScope + calls
  gate.IsAllowed(identity, Read, scope). Denied reads return
  BadUserAccessDenied without hitting the driver.
- OnWriteValue: preserves the existing WriteAuthzPolicy check (classification
  vs session roles) + adds an additive gate check using
  WriteAuthzPolicy.ToOpcUaOperation(classification) to pick the right
  WriteOperate/Tune/Configure surface. Lax mode falls through for identities
  without LDAP groups.
- Four HistoryRead paths (Raw / Processed / AtTime / Events): gate check
  runs per-node before the invoker. Events path tolerates fullRef=null
  (event-history queries can target a notifier / driver-root; those are
  cluster-wide reads that need a different scope shape — deferred).
- New WriteAccessDenied helper surfaces BadUserAccessDenied in the
  OpcHistoryReadResult slot + errors list, matching the shape of the
  existing WriteUnsupported / WriteInternalError helpers.

OtOpcUaServer + OpcUaApplicationHost: gate + resolver thread through as
optional constructor parameters (same pattern as DriverResiliencePipelineBuilder
in Phase 6.1). Null defaults keep the existing 3 OpcUaApplicationHost
integration tests constructing without them unchanged.

Tests (5 new in NodeScopeResolverTests):
- Resolve populates ClusterId + TagId + Equipment Kind.
- Resolve leaves finer path null per Phase 1 shape (doc'd as follow-up).
- Empty fullReference throws.
- Empty clusterId throws at ctor.
- Resolver is stateless across calls.

The existing 9 AuthorizationGate tests (shipped in PR #86) continue to
cover the gate's allow/deny semantics under strict + lax mode.

Full solution dotnet test: 1164 passing (was 1159, +5). Pre-existing
Client.CLI Subscribe flake unchanged. Existing OpcUaApplicationHost +
HealthEndpointsHost + driver integration tests continue to pass because the
gate defaults to null → no enforcement, and the lax-mode fallback returns
true for identities without LDAP groups (the anonymous test path).

Production deployments flip the gate on by constructing it via
OpcUaApplicationHost's new authzGate parameter + setting
`Authorization:StrictMode = true` once ACL data is populated. Flipping the
switch post-seed turns the evaluator + trie from scaffolded code into
actual enforcement.

This closes release blocker #1 listed in docs/v2/v2-release-readiness.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 11:02:17 -04:00

89 lines
4.6 KiB
C#

using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
/// <summary>
/// Server-layer write-authorization policy. ACL enforcement lives here — drivers report
/// <see cref="SecurityClassification"/> as discovery metadata only; the server decides
/// whether a given session is allowed to write a given attribute by checking the session's
/// roles (resolved at login via <see cref="LdapUserAuthenticator"/>) against the required
/// role for the attribute's classification.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Matches the table in <c>docs/Configuration.md</c>:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item><c>FreeAccess</c>: no role required — anonymous sessions can write (matches v1 default).</item>
/// <item><c>Operate</c> / <c>SecuredWrite</c>: <c>WriteOperate</c> role required.</item>
/// <item><c>Tune</c>: <c>WriteTune</c> role required.</item>
/// <item><c>VerifiedWrite</c> / <c>Configure</c>: <c>WriteConfigure</c> role required.</item>
/// <item><c>ViewOnly</c>: no role grants write access.</item>
/// </list>
/// <c>AlarmAck</c> is checked at the alarm-acknowledge path, not here.
/// </remarks>
public static class WriteAuthzPolicy
{
public const string RoleWriteOperate = "WriteOperate";
public const string RoleWriteTune = "WriteTune";
public const string RoleWriteConfigure = "WriteConfigure";
/// <summary>
/// Decide whether a session with <paramref name="userRoles"/> is allowed to write to an
/// attribute with the given <paramref name="classification"/>. Returns true for
/// <c>FreeAccess</c> regardless of roles (including empty / anonymous sessions) and
/// false for <c>ViewOnly</c> regardless of roles. Every other classification requires
/// the session to carry the mapped role — case-insensitive match.
/// </summary>
public static bool IsAllowed(SecurityClassification classification, IReadOnlyCollection<string> userRoles)
{
if (classification == SecurityClassification.FreeAccess) return true;
if (classification == SecurityClassification.ViewOnly) return false;
var required = RequiredRole(classification);
if (required is null) return false;
foreach (var r in userRoles)
{
if (string.Equals(r, required, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
return true;
}
return false;
}
/// <summary>
/// Required role for a classification, or null when no role grants access
/// (<see cref="SecurityClassification.ViewOnly"/>) or no role is needed
/// (<see cref="SecurityClassification.FreeAccess"/> — also returns null; callers use
/// <see cref="IsAllowed"/> which handles the special-cases rather than branching on
/// null themselves).
/// </summary>
public static string? RequiredRole(SecurityClassification classification) => classification switch
{
SecurityClassification.FreeAccess => null, // IsAllowed short-circuits
SecurityClassification.Operate => RoleWriteOperate,
SecurityClassification.SecuredWrite => RoleWriteOperate,
SecurityClassification.Tune => RoleWriteTune,
SecurityClassification.VerifiedWrite => RoleWriteConfigure,
SecurityClassification.Configure => RoleWriteConfigure,
SecurityClassification.ViewOnly => null, // IsAllowed short-circuits
_ => null,
};
/// <summary>
/// Maps a driver-reported <see cref="SecurityClassification"/> to the
/// <see cref="Core.Abstractions.OpcUaOperation"/> the Phase 6.2 evaluator consults
/// for the matching <see cref="Configuration.Enums.NodePermissions"/> bit.
/// FreeAccess + ViewOnly fall back to WriteOperate — the evaluator never sees them
/// because <see cref="IsAllowed"/> short-circuits first.
/// </summary>
public static Core.Abstractions.OpcUaOperation ToOpcUaOperation(SecurityClassification classification) =>
classification switch
{
SecurityClassification.Operate => Core.Abstractions.OpcUaOperation.WriteOperate,
SecurityClassification.SecuredWrite => Core.Abstractions.OpcUaOperation.WriteOperate,
SecurityClassification.Tune => Core.Abstractions.OpcUaOperation.WriteTune,
SecurityClassification.VerifiedWrite => Core.Abstractions.OpcUaOperation.WriteConfigure,
SecurityClassification.Configure => Core.Abstractions.OpcUaOperation.WriteConfigure,
_ => Core.Abstractions.OpcUaOperation.WriteOperate,
};
}